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a joy so heavy that we could scarcely believe ourselves able to bear it. They have paid. They 
are going to pay. They pay each day. And the joy has not risen up in RXUKHDUWV´(Beauvoir 
2004, 246). 
 
³$OOWKLVLVMXVWDQRWKHUZD\RIVD\LQJWKDWLWLVPRVWGifficult when in a state of pain to stay 
responsive to the equal claim of the other for shelter, for conditions of livability and 


















This thesis probes the limits of concepts and practices in criminal law through an 
interdisciplinary analysis of vulnerability and gender, shown through the case study of women 
who act as drug mules and have been sentenced for drug importation offences in England and 
Wales. While this thesis critiques the current state of drug control and how international drug 
ODZFKDUDFWHUL]HVGUXJ WUDIILFNLQJDVFULPHFDUULHGRXWE\µHYLO¶DQGµJUHHG\¶RIIHQGHUV WKH
enquiry is much broader because it questions role of criminal law in the severe punishment of 
drug mules. Discourses on the vulnerability of drug mules expose the difficulties of judging 
them solely as threatening traffickers and highlight the particular effects and situation of 
women participating in the international drug trade. Rather than accepting the victim-offender 
dichotomy given by legal categories, this thesis suggests that the ambivalent construction of 
GUXJPXOHV¶OHJDOVXEMHFWLYLW\HYLQFHVDGHHS-seated contradiction in criminal law. The strict 
frameworks within criminal law labelling actors into either victims or offenders are ways in 
which the ambiguity intrinsic in human action and embodied social life are denied while 
shaping and perpetuating a heterosexist models of legal subjectivity. 
Drawing on phenomenology, critical theory, and feminist legal theory, the thesis offers a 
critique of legal subjectivity and the grounds of criminal law from the perspective of gender 
and vulnerability. Specifically, it maps the effects of disembodying legal personhood and 
notions of subjectivity in Western liberalism, noting in particular how they can lead to violent 
practices in law and politics which securitize physical and political bodies in pursue of an ideal 
of invulnerability. Disembodiment is not only a modality of living which alienates embodiment 
from history, gender and relationality, but it also facilitates gendered forms of violence. While 
this project contests relations of invulnerability by rethinking embodied vulnerability, there are 
also important challenges for feminist scholars in foregrounding the body of women in criminal 
law. The interdisciplinary gender analysis presented here suggests that describing drug mules 
as vulnerable offenders alone cannot provide justice to these offenders because it can reify the 
logic of invulnerability. Thus, we need to understand what the modes of relations with the 
vulnerable body are and how these relationships to vulnerability is re-inscribed in legal, 
scholarly, and political discourse. Although vulnerability discourses can be totalized into 
existing norms of subjectivity in criminal law, namely feminized victims and masculinized 
agents, this project also gestures towards imagining vulnerability otherwise. This involves 
holding a space for ethical ambiguity in the encounters between law and gender which are set 
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daughter who smuggled about 220g of a class B drug in their bodies from Dorset, England, to 
the island of Guernsey.  The news story, titled "Mother and heavily pregnant daughter acted as 
drug mules", quoted the plea to the court made by the mother, fifty-year-old Annette Cronshey: 
³:HDUHMXVWVRVWXSLG:HDUHERWKYXOQHUDEOHDQGZHUHXVHG«7KH\SLFNRQWKHYXOQHUDEOH
ones. I was just so scared´(Guernsey Press 2014).  Both Annette Cronshey and her daughter, 
Danielle Lucas were unemployed. Cronshey had suffered many years of domestic abuse and 
Lucas was heavily pregnant at the time of the arrest. The news report cited Judge Russell Finch, 
ZKR³VDLGWKHSDLUZHUHW\SLFDOGUXJFRXULHUVYXOQHUDEOHDQGVXVFHSWLEOHWRWKRVHZKRGHDOWLQ
LOOHJDO VXEVWDQFHV´ LELG ,Q DGGLWLRQ ERWK WKH GHIHQFH DQG SUREDWLRQ Rfficer stressed 
&URQVKH\¶VGRPHVWLFDEXVHZDVDPRQJWKHZRUVWWKH\KDGKHDUGRILQPDQ\\HDUV7KHMXGJH
also heard how they had committed the offence following threats against their family. Each 
one received a 4 years sentence in custody.       
 Readers (mostly male) who commented online said they did not believe their claims 
about their vulnerability, saying that the threats were fabricated, and how they had no sympathy 
for them. Instead, vulnerability appeared to readers as sign of duplicity met with scepticism. In 
other words, we can see how readers judged the culpability of the two women drawing on 
GLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQYLFWLPVDQGRIIHQGHUV$IHPDOHUHDGHUFKDOOHQJHGDUHDGHU¶VVXJJHVWLRQ
that the abuse claims were not real. She saw it as a way of further victimization (ibid.).  In fact, 
the quotes from the judge and the prosecution also identified vulnerability with domestic abuse. 
&XULRXVO\PRVW UHDGHUV¶ FRPPHQWV IRFXVHGRQ WKHRIIHQFH DQG WKHRIIHQGHU DVZHOO DV WKH
ILQDQFLDOEXUGHQRQ*XHUQVH\¶VJRvernment to imprison foreigners, yet few speculated about 
the failure of the institutions to take into account the impact on victims of domestic abuse.
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 The narratives in this news report are a microcosm of those played out in scholarly, 
legal and political discourses on drug mules-couriers.  Such discourses struggle to define the 
culpability and punishment of drug importation offenders described through references of 
µYXOQHUDELOLW\¶ 7KLV LV D ORQJ-standing problem. The first reference to vulnerability in a 
sentencing judgement in England and Wales was made by the House of Lords (HL) in the 1983 
guideline of Aramah1 . Delivering the judgement, Lane LJ observed that:  
«RQHZLOOIUHTXHQWO\ILQGVWXGHQWVDQGVLFNDQGHOGHUO\SHRSOHDUHXVHGDVFRXULHUVIRU
two reasons: first of all they are vulnerable to suggestion and vulnerable to the offer of 
quick profit, and secondly, it is felt that the courts may be moved to misplaced sympathy 
in their case.2  
<HW WKH +/ GHFLGHG YXOQHUDELOLW\ DQG µJRRG FKDUDFWHU¶ FRXOG QRW DIIRUG PLWLJDWLQJ
FLUFXPVWDQFHVIRUµFRXULHUV¶EHFDXVHWKHFRXUWUHDVRQHGGUXJWUDIILFNHUVUHFUXLWHGWKHPRQWKH
basis of those characteristics. In effect, deterrence overrode culpability considerations. 
'HVFULELQJ WKHP DV YLWDO FRJV RI WKH GUXJ WUDGH D OHQLHQW WUHDWPHQW RI µFRXULHUV¶ ZRXOG
XQGHUPLQH WKH GHWHUUHQFH RI GUXJ FULPHV 7KXV WKH FRXUWV VKRXOG QRW µPLVSODFH¶ DQ\
µV\PSDWK\¶WRZDUGVFRXULHUV1RWHKHUHKRZµYXOQHUDEOH¶UHIHUUHGWRWhe susceptibility of the 
will to a quick profit, apparently based on age (students and elderly).    
 7RGD\WKHVFRSHRIWKHWHUPµYXOQHUDEOH¶DSSHDUVWRKDYHFKDQJHGEXWLWLVQRWFOHDU
how. The new sentencing guideline for drug offences, in force since 2012, includes the 
³e[SORLWDWLRQ¶RIWKHRIIHQGHU¶VµvuOQHUDELOLW\¶ as a sentencing mitigating factor (Appendix I, 
Table 4 0RUH LPSRUWDQWO\ µLQYROYHPHQW WKURXJK QDLYHWp DQG H[SORLWDWLRQ¶ (Sentencing 
Council 2012) is also indicative of the role of a convicted drug importation offender, 
SDUWLFXODUO\WKRVHNQRZQDVµPXOHV¶. In one of the first cases appearing before the Court of 
                                                          
1
 [1983] 76 Cr. App. R. 190 
2
 Aramah (n 1) 3. 
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Appeal (CA) after the entry into force of the guidelines, Hughes LJ  GHVFULEHG µPXOHV¶ DV
³GLVDGYDQWDJHG GHIHQGDQWV SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH IURP DQ XQGHU-developed country, who have 
been exploited by serious drugs criminals and persuaded to carry drugs often for very small 
UHZDUG´3 ,Q FRQWUDVW D FRXULHU ZDV D ³¶ZRUOGO\-ZLVH¶ RIIHQGHU ZKR WUDIILFNHG GUXJV µDV D
matter of free choice for the money.´4        
 $OPRVWIRUW\\HDUVDJRWKHWHUPµYXOQHUDEOH¶ZDVXVHGWRGHVFULEHµFRXULHUV¶ Today, it 
LVPRUHRIWHQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKµPXOHV¶GHVFULEHGE\WKH&$DVDµVXEW\SHRIFRXULHU.¶5 Whether 
someone is recognised a courier or a mule is now an important source of tension because the 
role is understood in the guidelines as evidence of culpability. This thesis argues that legal, 
scholarly, and political discourses describing drug mules as vulnerable offenders exposes a set 
of problems or tensions embedded in criminal law which are represented in the dichotomy 
between couriers-mules. These two categories for offenders are iterated in the discourse along 
gendered divisions of embodied subjectivity. In that sense, this project deploys vulnerability 
and gender as critical frameworks that mark the limits that justify criminal law and practice. 
The next sections map the methods, research questions, and definitions adopted in this thesis. 
2. Method and methodologies 
Overall, the underlying method is a philosophical inquiry on the punishment of female drug 
mules and couriers, two terms that will be briefly mapped in the following section. Unlike 
traditional legal methods applied to the study of criminal law, this thesis is an interdisciplinary 
project that critically analyses legal doctrine drawing on techniques that cross over analytic and 
normative concepts. More specifically, it examines the concepts of legal personhood, 
punishment, and legal responsibility from an interdisciplinary approach which draws on 
                                                          
3
 Boakye and Ors [2012] EWCA Crim 838 [9] 
4
 ibid (n 3) [36]. 
5
 ibid [9]. 
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theoretical resources from history, philosophy, feminism, critical theory, and law. The 
conspicuous absence of vulnerability from the idea of the legal subject of crime, often 
understood as a rational actor who calculates and acts according to individual will (Norrie 
2001; Davies 2005; Naffine 2009) sparks the interest in exploring the relationship between 
criminal law and the notion of vulnerability applied to women who traffic drugs. In the context 
of criminal law, vulnerability has been used as a characteristic of a person or a group requiring 
additional care, such as gender, age or disabilities (Corston 2007; Jacobson and Talbot 2009). 
In other cases, vulnerability can appear as a synonym of experiences of domestic abused, 
human trafficking, and other acts of violence experienced by women who live and make 
choices in spaces infused with gender norms. However, it is not often clear whether 
YXOQHUDELOLW\GLVFRXUVHVDGYDQFHZRPHQ¶VFRQFHUQVEHIRUHWKHODZ(Munro and Scoular 2012), 
and especially, criminal law.         
 In that sense, this thesis critiques the concept of vulnerability, by asking what it means 
and what the implications are when deploying this term in the context of criminal courts 
concerned with implementing drug control laws. And yet, what does it mean to be a critical 
scholar researching the phenomenon of drug mules and vulnerability? Traditionally, critique 
LPSOLHV D µGLVWDQFH¶ IURP WKH REMHFW RI VWXG\ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2014). For 
example, observing how criminal law observes or frames legal personhood or how feminist 
scholarship frames drug mule work. Still, this view leaves out the position of the observer or 
critical scholar, wondering how the observer judges or explains how others see and how they 
H[SODLQ$QRWKHUYLHZLVWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKHUROHRIWKHREVHUYHUDVHPEHGGHGLQD³SDUDOOHO
FRQWH[W´DQGWKXV³LQFOXGHVDQGLPSOLHVVHOI-REVHUYDWLRQ´LELG. This is what Andreas 
Philippopoulos-0LKDORSRORXV FDOOV µFULWLFDO DXWRSRHLVLV¶ RU WKH VHOI-observation within 
observation that takes into account its location (ibid.).  For example, in the process of writing 
this thesis, my location vis-à-vis the notion of vulnerability was not of the dispassionate 
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observer but rather a continuous reflection of how this position limited or enabled an 
appreciation of the vulnerability of others. It meant acknowledging something that is universal 
in our condition of being embodied and sensible, and affective beings but also the particularities 
RIHDFKSHUVRQWKDWPD\EHQHYHUEHNQRZQRUµXQGHUVWRRG¶0RUHRYHUP\SRVLWLRQWDNHVLQWR
DFFRXQW0LFKHO)RXFDXOW¶V VXJJHVWLRQ WKDWNQRZOHGJH LV D IRUPRISRZHU (Foucault [1975] 
1995) and in that sense the task of knowing about vulnerability may appropriate what or who 
may be elusive to our thought or comprehension. Critique and ethics are not necessarily the 
same but each can enable the possibility of knowing without possessing, reifying norms or 
eclipsing the multiple forms of life that exist without us knowing.      
 This appreciation is resonant with one of the frameworks that most influenced the 
approach to criminal law in this thesis, namely critical and feminist legal studies. By criminal 
ODZ ,UHIHU WRZKDW LVNQRZQDVWKHµJHQHUDOSDUW¶EURDGO\XQGHUVWRRGDVWKHERG\RIUXOHV
principles and practices which DUHEHOLHYHG WR³reflect a philosophical understanding of the 
relationship between thHLQGLYLGXDOODZDQGWKHVWDWH´ (Norrie 1997, 1). Unlike doctrinal legal 
scholarship, which focuses on coherence-based legal reasoning, I approach criminal law 
through discourse analysis and interpret the judgements through narrative and textual analysis. 
Let me explain first what I mean by coherence-based legal reasoning. The jurisprudence of 
coherence and clarity has been essential to the definition of the identity and authority of 
criminal law articulated since the sixteenth century in Britain (Norrie 2001; Loizidou 2007; 
Lacey 1998a; Conaghan 2013a). One influential jurisprudent who incorporated this approach 
was William Blackstone, who sought to uncover the underlying wisdom in disparate Common 
/DZ VRXUFHV DQG VKRZ WKH ³the general spirit of laws and the principles of universal 
jurisprudence, combined with an accurate knowledge of our own municipal constitutions, their 
RULJLQDOUHDVRQDQGKLVWRU\´ (Blackstone 1979, vols. I, ii.). Reviewing the effect of the logic 
of legal coherence in Common Law, Conaghan  suggests this method of interpreting the law 
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SOD\HG³a vital role in authenticating and legitimating law and presenting it as an intelligible 
DQGXQLILHGILHOG´ (Conaghan 2013a, 27)%ODFNVWRQH¶VTXRWHVKRZVWKLVPHWKRGLVSUHPLVHG
on the view there is a rational, universal order that defines the legal objects of knowledge. 
 Feminist and critical legal scholars have pointed the limits of legal reasoning (Kleinman 
1987; Young 1997; Mcveigh and Rush 1997) which purports to represent the law as systematic 
and harmony-oriented institution. Thus, coherence based reasoning appears not only limited 
by its own rules and perspective but it is arguably the problem itself because it glosses 
µLUUDWLRQDOLWLHV¶ DQG¶LQFRKHUHQFLHV¶LPSLQJLQJOHJDOWKHRU\WKURXJKWHFKQLTXHVRIH[FOXVLRQ
(Davies 2005; Norrie 2005). Drawing on the traditions of critical legal studies and feminist 
legal studies, chapter III and IV interrogate how normative concepts like legal personhood, 
criminal responsibility and punishment, exclude and efface the embodied life of subjects 
coming before the law.  The relationship between politics and the law is central to critical legal 
studies (Stone et. al., 2012), and an important approach to the study of drug policy and laws. 
From a strict legal-coherence perspective or based on legal principles, judgments on drug 
offences often make no sense (Norrie 2001; Fortson 2005; Sunter 2008). Deterrence has been 
a primary objective embedded in the English legal framework, particularly for sentencing 
(Green 1998). One need look only at the United Nations Single Narcotic Convention 1961 for 
the legal basis of the almost obsessive attachment to deterrence. This treaty, depicts drug use 
DQGWUDGHDVDQµHYLO¶FULPH(Lines 2010).        
 Thus, part of this thesis examines the doctrinal interpretation of drug importation 
offences in England and Wales but cannot leave out the discourse and practices underpinning 
domestic and international drug control framework. Some academic and political discourses 
on vulnerability may naturalise ideas about risk and resilience which only strengthen the 
rhetoric of securitisation engrained in drug control (chapter II and V). Hence, the discourses 
analysed here include policy papers by national and international stakeholders in law, politics, 
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and research. By discourse, I wish to convey in broad terms WR)RXFDXOW¶VQRWLRQRIGLVFRXUVH
understood as a body of ideas and practices that claim knowledge, legitimacy, truth and power 
(Foucault 1990; Jorgensen and Phillips 2002):KLOVWWRXFKLQJRQDVSHFWVRI)RXFDXOW¶VZRUN
my approach throughout chapters IV-VII draws more explicitly on the performativity approach 
geQGHUEDVHGRQ-XGLWK%XWOHU¶VZRUN(Butler 1997a; Butler 2006; Butler 2009a; Butler 2009b) 
DQG(OHQD/RL]LGRX¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDVWRKRZSHUIRUPDWLYLW\UHODWHVWRODZHWKLFVDQGSROLWLFV
(Loizidou 2007).  Whilst acknowledging the debt to Foucault to performativity theory and 
critical legal studies, my aim is to give feminist and queer scholarship a centre stage in this 
project.           
 At the same time, a discursive analysis on drug policy and laws offers only limited 
sources for getting a fuller picture on the phenomenon of drug mules sentenced to prison. This 
thesis presents the information available about the extent of the participation of women in the 
international drug trade, incarceration statistics in the United Kingdom, and also gaps in the 
data collected.  One salient issue is the lack of a common definition to collect data and 
inconsistent gathering of data disaggregated by sex (Fleetwood and Haas 2011). Other barriers 
LQFOXGH WKH DPELJXLW\ RI WKH WHUP µGUXJ WUDIILFNLQJ¶ DQG WKH DUELWUDU\ QDWXUH RI KRZ
governments define which quantity crosses the thresholG RI µSHUVRQDO XVH¶ RI GUXJV DQG
becomes an illicit commercial activity (Gottwald 2006)$OWKRXJKNQRZOHGJHDERXWZRPHQ¶V
participation in the drug trade is limited, social research produced over the last 20 years 
provides rich ethnographies and interviews with women and men who have worked as mules.  
Part of this thesis draws from the refleFWLRQV DQG QDUUDWLYHV E\ -HQQLIHU )OHHHWZRRG¶V
ethnographic research in Ecuador (Fleetwood 2014). Of course, the claim is not that all drug 
PXOHV¶H[SHULHQFHVDUHWKHVDPHWRWKDWof drug mules importing drugs to England. Instead, the 
studies cited throughout offer an invaluable insights into the multiplicity of stories of drug mule 
work, showing the nuances in the experiences according to different geographical and political 
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settings, as well as intersection of experiences and concerns shared by women and men working 
as drug mules-couriers (Torres 2008; Giacomello 2013; Martel 2013; Fleetwood 2014).  
 The contribution of this research is not to explain what women and men go through 
when they traffic drugs across international borders or how they agree to smuggle drugs in the 
first place. It nevertheless references studies that give us a glimpse into the processes involved 
in this illicit economy (Torres 2008; Fleetwood 2011; 2014). In short, the stories that cannot 
be seen in statistics about drug seizures and arrests. And yet, unlike those publications, the 
contribution of this project is to offer a glimpse into the end of the process of unsuccessful drug 
trafficking. That is, the sentencing stage. Recalling the metaphor of the observer at the 
beginning of this section, the narratives explored in the case law present a picture of the law as 
an observer, translator, and judge of women and men who are presumed to be mules. In that 
sense, the narratives presented have been already translated and filtered by the legal norms of 
reasoning and adjudicating legal responsibility. The aim of the case study, is to present how 
the law encounters and responds to claims about vulnerability. In the process, it also shows a 
partial yet rich view on the stories of women and men who are convicted for drug trafficking 
in England and Wales. At the same time, this picture could be considered rather small because 
it only looks at sentencing appeals.        
 Conscious of the inevitable and necessary risks in speaking about others (bell hooks 
1990; Spivak 1988; Doezema 2005; 2010), my intentions is not to speak for drug mules but to 
point out the frames of exclusion and inclusion in the law which intensify the precariousness 
RISHRSOHZKR DUHE\QRPHDQV µHYLO¶GUXJ WUDIILFNHUV&RQFUHWHOy, this thesis critiques the 
IUDPHVWKDWLGHQWLI\VRPHRQHDVDµYLFWLP¶RUDQµRIIHQGHU¶ Of course, speaking in strict legal 
WHUPVGUXJPXOHVDUHQRWUHFRJQLVHGDWDQ\SRLQWDVµYLFWLPV¶ They are convicted offenders 
who were either tried by a jury or pleaded guilty to the offence. What is meant by frames of 
inclusion and exclusion is slightly different from the traditional terminology or ideas of 
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criminal law and criminal justice. As noted before, coherence-based reasoning delimits what is 
included or excluded within the field of legal knowledge. Pierre Schlag uses the very useful 
WHUPRIµORJLFRIWKHIUDPHV¶(Schlag 1998). Rather than simply being a conceptual tool, the 
IUDPHLV³the shape and the limit of apprehension anGXQGHUVWDQGLQJLWVHOI´ (ibid., 74). This 
PHDQV WKH DFWLYLW\ RI UHDVRQLQJ LV QRW VROHO\ DQ DEVWUDFWLRQ RU DQ µREMHFW¶ DSSUHKHQGHG E\
consciousness. Instead, there is a long list of scholars who have pointed out to interdependence 
between images and figures of speech and formative effect on concepts and material practices 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Murphy 2012a; Bourke 2012) ,QRWKHUZRUGV WKHµORJLFRI WKH
IUDPHV¶ FDQQRW EH GLVVRFLDWHG IURP ODnguage and more generally discourse.  Of course, 
discourse analysis is not necessarily the same as narrative or textual analysis. Narrative analysis 
³VLWXDWHVZRPHQDVVXEMHFWVUDWKHUWKDQREMHFWVRINQRZOHGJH´ (Fleetwood 2014, 64) that helps 
WR EULQJ IRUWK ³VXEMHFWLYH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RI PDWHULDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV«´LELG  ,W LV D
methodology that links wider questions of gender, structure, and agency (ibid). For example, 
Fleetwood argues that drug mules offered their own interpretations and evaluations yet these 
narratives could not be completely dissociated from the dominant accounts of victimhood and 
FULPLQDOLW\WKDWIUDPHGUXJPXOHV¶H[SHULHQFHV7Ke point is that there are legal, political and 
DFDGHPLFGLVFRXUVHVWKDWQDPLQJZRPHQGUXJPXOHVHLWKHUDVµYLFWLPV¶RUDVµRIIHQGHUV¶EXW
these categories do fit entirely to  how people interpret or evaluate their lives and experiences. 
Still, Fleetwood shows how drug mules respond and adopt those frames, even when may fail 
to convey their own stories (ibid.).        
 Narrative analysis in law also portrays stories as an embodiment of individual and 
collective experiences (Brooks 1996). The law and literature (L&L) methodologies treat also 
the law as form of rhetorical narrative in order to evaluate and examine the relation between 
legal argumentation and judgements with storytelling. This approach proposes that law-making 
LV µPDGH¶ UDWKHU WKDQ µIRXQG¶ (Gerwitz 1996) DQG LQ WKDW VHQVH UHFRJQL]HV WKH ³SRZHU RI
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VWRU\WHOOLQJ´ (Gerwitz 1996, 19). 7KHµSRZHU¶LQVWRULHVKDYHOHGWRIRUPDOL]LQJ³WKHFRQGLWLRQV
of telling- to assure those charged in judging them in certain rule-JRYHUQHGIRUPV´LELG,Q
contrast to the aforementioned traditional legal interpretation, Allison Young suggests that the 
³LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIIDFWVLVFRQVWUXFWHGWRKDYHDQHIIHFWXSRQWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIOHJDOUXOHV´
(Young 1997, 130). In other words, the law is articulated and grounded by the case narratives 
and the legal actors who reconstruct narratives into stories that shape and rehearse gender and 
OHJDOQRUPV/HJDOWH[WVVKRZWKH³VXEWOHPXWDWLRQVPDQLSXODWLRQVDQGPHWDPRUSKRVHV´LELG
129) of both events and the law. My aim is not to present the legal text as a piece of paper 
capturing the intentions of an author or the truth of an event. Instead, a text can be seen as 
¶DOOHJRULFDOUHDGLQJ¶6 which performs a promise and a failure (De Man 1979). In other words, 
the text reflects a discourse articulated by the judge, the counsel, or the probation officer, which 
is presented in the form of a legal story. However, those stories may fail and those failures open 
the spaces for resistance to dominant discourses on drug mules.     
 One of criticisms to interpretative analyses, whether it is discourse, narrative, or 
hermeneutic,  has been that it fails to account for the materiality of lives (Bevir and Rhodes 
1995), as if the literal and figural were unrelated. Chapter IV, V and VII address this dilemma 
WKURXJK-XGLWK%XWOHUDQG(ODLQH6FDUU\¶VDSSURDFKWRGLVFRXUse, narratives, texts, and language 
in general (Scarry 1985; 1994; Butler 1997b; 1997a), showing how these are not simply literal 
or rhetorical vehicles for knowledge or recording events but have very material effects. The 
contribution of poststructuralist or deconstructive approaches7 is, for example, the added layer 
of complexity where that figurative language is marked by its own rhetorical inflection. In other 
words, a text paradoxically performs the impossibility and concretisation of theory, treatise, or 
figure of speech (De Man 1978; 1986).        
                                                          
6
 We could play with the meaning of this term. Trope means JHQHUDOO\DµILJXUHRIVSHHFK¶ 
7
 Scarry could not be considered a deconstructive author, yet her unique approach bears resemblances. This is 
probably because their common ground is the influence of J.L. Austin in the American academia. 
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 The reason for adopting an interdisciplinary approach was to expand limited scope 
offered by legal doctrine to understand the effects of characterising drug mules as vulnerable 
ZRPHQIURPµXQGHUGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV¶8 Rather than simply looking at  what Foucault calls 
the juridical, this research understands  ³MXULGLFDOSRZHU´DV ³only one form of power among 
many: analysis of the subject in relation to law alone does not fully explain his or her 
VXEMHFWLRQ´(Davies 2005, 21). In other words, this project departs from the idea that it is harder 
to grasp or comprehend the characterisation of drug mules adopted by the criminal courts 
without considering how drug policy and law frame the offence of trafficking; how gender is 
absent from the concept of legal personhood; how vulnerability draws attention to the body but 
it is a ubiquitous concept that refers also to broader experiences in life, mainly to pain and 
injuring. Of course, these experiences cannot be looked in isolation either, as if they were 
simple biological facts of life. The next section maps the multifaceted presence of vulnerability 
across many disciplines.  
3. Defining vulnerability: The performative ambiguity of vulnerability 
What happens when a women drug mules are described as vulnerable persons? What discourses 
DUH HYRNHG E\ WKH WHUP µYXOQHUDELOLW\¶" :KDW GRHV LW HYRNH LQ HDFK VSHFLILF FRQWH[W RU
GLVFRXUVH")RUH[DPSOHZKDWDUHWKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQFDOOLQJVRPHRQHµYXOQHUDEOH¶LQWKHcontext 
of criminal justice or in the context of feminist activism? Who is figured, imagined or 
understood as being vulnerable in the context of drug control or crime? Is vulnerability gender-
specific? How is vulnerability described in law?  To an extent, these questions address 
specifically criminal law and gender.  It is worth pointing out how neither of the quotes from 
the leading sentencing cases presented at the beginning of this chapter mentioned specifically 
the gender of mules. The absence of genderDOVRNQRZQDVµJHQGHU-QHXWUDOLW\¶LVRQO\SUHVHQW
                                                          
8
 Boakye and Others (n 3) [9]. 
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in the formal legal terminology. Before explaining why gender matters in this research, might 
help clearing and narrowing down the view adopted to navigate the different approaches to 
vulnerability.            
 The concept of vulnerability has been addressed in a wide range of studies, from 
bioethics, human rights (Morawa 2003; rua Wall 2008; Grear 2010a; Andorno and Baffone 
2014), gender and sexuality (Snow 2008), development studies (Watts and Bohle 1993), 
sociology (Turner 2006), ethics, in both the traditional sense (moral philosophy) and in critical 
theory (Harris 1997; Hershock 2003; Murphy 2012a) . Other interdisciplinary areas of research 
also include the framework of vulnerability, such as like migration studies (Heikkilä 2005) and  
geography (Philo 2005). But one might also find vulnerability discourses in religious studies 
(Stone 2011), psychology and philosophy (Vetlesen 2009), policy-making (Furedi 2008), and 
crime control (Ramsay 2012) to name a few. What is common to most of these perspective is 
their investment  on the idea RIWKHIUDJLOLW\RUµLQMXUDELOLW\¶(Fineman 2008a).   
 Vulnerability derives from the Latin word vulnus WUDQVODWHGLQWRµLQMXU\¶ 7KH Latin 
term LQLǌULD DOUHDG\VLJQDOVWKHPHGLDWLRQRIODZLQQRWLRQVRIZRXQGLQJ'HILQHGDVDµZURQJ¶
RUDQµRIIHQFH¶LQMXU\KLQWVDWWKHQRUPDWLYHDQGSURKLELWLYHGLPHQVLRQRIWKHDFWRIZRXQGLQJ
,QLǌULD, composed by the prefix in-³QRW´DQGLǌVLǌULV wKLFKLVµULJKW¶RUµODZ¶(Harper 2014). 
Although vulnerability pointed to something more concrete, it still appeared suspiciously 
EURDG<HWWKHOLWHUDWXUHSRLQWHGRXWFOHDUO\WRWKHLPDJHRIDQLQMXU\RQµERGLHV¶DVWKHµKRPH¶9 
of several approaches to vulnerability (Shildrick 2002; Bergoffen 2003; Philo 2005; Turner 
2006; Cavarero 2009; Kruks 2012).  The injury may be literal or symbolising something else, 
such the malleability and porosity of bodies. And from that point of view, vulnerability has not 
been conceived as something all bodies have in common. Liberal legal discourse on 
                                                          
9
 I am purposefully paraphrasing Elaine Scarry in one of the sections where she talks about poena or pain, as the 
µHW\PRORJLFDOKRPH¶RISXQLVKPHQW(Scarry 1985, 16). My intention of course is to bring closer the metaphors 
giving life to punishment and vulnerability in an effort to understand how they relate, if they relate at all.  
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personhood uses vulnerability to describe people with physical or cognitive disabilities (Dunn 
et. al., 2008). Instead of including stigmatized individuals, this limited understanding of 
vulnerability pathologizes their identity (Fineman 2008a, 8). While vulnerability discourses  
seek to offer special protection to marginalised social groups (Morawa 2003),  the description 
appears to be linked to identity characteristics rather than a universal feature all human beings 
have by virtue of their interdependence (Fineman 2008b).     
 Fineman clearly anchors vulnerability to interdependence and the image of the injurable 
body, but it is not often clear in the literature if vulnerability applies only to human bodies and 
subjects. Several authors, including Fineman, note how state and institutions can be also 
characterised as vulnerable ( Turner 2006; Fineman 2008a), while others argue that  non-human 
subjects like corporations,  political body, legal order, are  portrayed as a vulnerable entity 
(Butler 2006; Grear 2010a; Ramsay 2012). Vulnerability has also been used to defy the borders 
of humanity and signal the commonality of embodied fragility with non-human animals 
(Shapiro 1989; Stanescu 2012). Some resist the  negative association of vulnerability with 
µLQMXUDELOLW\¶QRWLQJKRZWKHFRQFHSWSRLQWVDWRWKHUDIIHFWLYHVWDWHVOLNHORYHHPSDWK\FDUH
and a disposition of openness to others that engenders more virtuous legal and ethical relations 
(Harris 1997; Hershock 2003; Butler 2012a; Assiter 2013).    
 After careful reading and based on the interpretative approach in this thesis,  I was 
SHUVXDGHG E\ WKH FODLP WKDW YXOQHUDELOLW\ LV DQ µDPELJXRXV¶ FRQFHSW  WKDW FRXOG SRLQW WR
different meanings and cause different effects that were beyond the control of the actors who 
enunciate the term (Murphy 2012a; 2012b; Munro and Scoular 2012).  We could think of 
vulnerability as part of a metonymic family of concepts related to wounding. A metonymy is 
GHILQHG³DILJXUHRIVSHHFKFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\WKHDFWLRQRIVXEVWLWXWLQJIRUDZRUGRUSKUDVH
denoting an object, action, institution, etc., a word or phrase denoting a property or something 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWK LW´ (Oxford English Dictionary 2014a). Thus, the metonymy substitutes the 
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name of a thing or a concept with something that is closely linked to it. Indeed, its Greek 
HW\PRORJLFDOPHDQLQJLVµWRFKDQJHQDPHV¶LELG/LNHPHWDSKRUVPHWRQ\PLHVµFDUU\RYHU¶
but only something which is already associated with it. Metaphors could be seen as more radical 
EHFDXVHWKH\WUDQVIHU³to an object or action different from, but analogous to, that to which it 
LV OLWHUDOO\ DSSOLFDEOH´(Oxford English Dictionary 2014b).  What this means is that 
vulnerability-as-metonymy does not efface completely the object or concept. In contrast, 
vulnerability-as-metaphor substitutes the original referent.      
 The suggestion presented here is that vulnerability is a relational concept but it can take 
the shape of a concept by effacing the referent (metaphor) and presenting itself as a wholly 
different thing. Or, it can also hold those relations in sight through resemblance. For example, 
vulnerability is metonymically related to suffering, pain, risk, harm, weakness but also courage, 
love, empathy, or even care.  More importantly, the point illustrated here is how vulnerability 
is not a concept defined in isolation as if it had a unique and stable meaning. More than being 
DQLGHQWLW\DQGDGRSWLQJ0DUJULW6KLOGULFN¶VWHUPLQRORJ\YXOQHUDELOLW\PDUNVµHQFRXQWHUV¶,Q
its most simple, an encounter is unexpected and un-GHILQHGZKHUH³the self and the other are 
mutually engaged, and yet are irUHGXFLEOH WKH RQH WR WKH RWKHU´ (Shildrick 2002, 78). 
Vulnerability this conceived is irremediably impinged by ambiguity and ambivalence. Murphy 
DUJXHVKRZIHPLQLVP¶VFULWLFDORQWRORJLHVRIYXOQHUDELOLW\VKRZWKDWLWLV 
above all a figure that concerns potentialities, and the critical practice of imagining 
vulnerability otherwise requires the that the potential for violence and wounding be 
taken seriously and also held in abeyance lest the production ambiguities that animate 
vulnerability be concealed by its overwhelming association with violence (Murphy 
2012a, 98) 
In that sense, ambiguity is deployed also a critical concept which holds in sight the social 
ontology of subjectivity and the struggles between ethics and politics to define subjects through 
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the logic of sameness and identity. Ambivalence points precisely to the possibilities that of care 
and violence instantiated in the encounters with vulnerability. In that sense, the encounter also  
entDLOVZRUNLQJRUPRYLQJWKURXJK³incommensuraEOHOD\HUVRISRZHUDQGHPRWLRQ´ (Shildrick 
2002, 78) LQWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQVHOIDQGµRWKHU¶)LQDOO\WKHµOD\HUVRISRZHUDQGHPRWLRQ¶
explored in this thesis are set specifically within the context of criminal justice and the 
influence of social contract theories on how the law should negotiates the relationship between 
individuals and the state.          
 In short, the thesis situates emotion and power within the context of social contract 
theories. As will be explained later, these theories ground the rules to relate with others and the 
state. However, as feminist scholars have often pointed out, women have been assigned a place 
of their own place in the social contract (Pateman 1988), through the division of the public and 
private sphere. Contrary to the belief that there are vulnerable individuals whose vulnerability 
is a private affair- a belief implicit in the sentencing frameworks- this thesis grounds 
YXOQHUDELOLW\LQ-XGLWK%XWOHU¶V³VRFLDORQWRORJ\´RIVXEMHFWLYLW\7UDQVJUHVVLQJWKHERXQGDULHV
between private-public, Butler argues that the dispossession to vulnerability mediates and 
sustains socio-political life (Butler 2006).  In that sense, people who appear before the courts 
present stories of dispossession and socio-political abandonment. Whilst many judges 
recognise the stories of precariousness, the sentencing decisions show that criminal law is more 
invested in sustaining the ideology of personal responsibility, a dangerous discourse which 
arguably has the effect of excluding vulnerability. Concretely, the project presented here 
examines the performance of vulnerability discourses in sentencing practice and its effects on 
the distinction of EHWZHHQµFRXULHUV¶DQGµPXOHV¶ The distinction can be read as a practice that 
eliminates the ambivalence in the legal, academic, discourses about women who do drug mule 
work (chapter II). The ambivalence is not unique to legal discourses; it rather shows the 
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complexity involved in agreeing on the names, concepts and descriptions that reflect the roles 
performed by people who traffic drugs. 
4. What is in a name? The ambivalence of drug mules and couriers 
7KHWHUPVµPXOH¶DQGµFRXULHU¶KDYHEHHQRIWHQXVHGLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\LQOHJDOVFKRODUO\DQG
political discourse. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there has been a change in how 
the courts understands and differentiates mules and couriers. To understand the changes, it is 
important to point out how one of the most recurrent criticisms across jurisdictions has been 
the disproportionality of the penalties. Politicians and courts alike have believed in the power 
of deterrence, a view that has shaped sentencing decisions in the U.S. (Young 1990; Tobin 
1998; Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2002), England (Fortson 1996; Green 1998), and several Latin 
American countries (Uprimny et. al., 2013). In addition to the judicial and parliamentary 
increase of minimum sentencing terms during the 1980s, the decision in Aramah10 also meant 
judges should disregard mitigating circumstances and the role of the drug trafficker (Green 
1998; Fortson 2005).          
 Responding to the harsh sentences and disregard to individual justice issues, scholars 
and civil society have called for greater attention to the role performed by the drug trafficker, 
also understood as  individual culpability (Fortson 1996; Green 1998; Sevigny and Caulkins 
2003; Harris 2010; Uprimny et. al., 2013). One of the main criticisms to the deterrence 
approach to sentencing for drug offences in England and Wales has been the disproportionality 
of the penalties, especially in the case of drug mules (Green 1998; Harris 2010; Sentencing 
Advisory Panel 2009). Chapter II maps the institutional and sentencing frameworks reforms in 
England and Wales which pay more attention to the role of drug mules. Despite the relative 
consensus that drug mules receive harsh sentences because their role is minimal, there is no 
                                                          
10
 Aramah (n1) 
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consensus on what defines the role of a drug mule. The following discussion marks with 
hyphens the exact term used in the literature.      
 1DPLQJ RU FDWHJRULVLQJ RIIHQGHUV DV µPXOHV¶ RU µFRXULHUV¶ LV QRW RQO\ D SUDFWLFDO
problem researching databases, but also ideological (Fleetwood 2014). They cannot be easily 
characterised as neutral concepts because each term calls forth a different approach to drug 
trafficking that has been entangled to market ideologies, post-colonial ideas about victimhood, 
historical labour struggles, among others. ,QSUDFWLFDO WHUPVD µNH\-ZRUG¶VHDUFKSURGXFHD
ODUJHU VHW RI UHVXOWVXVLQJ WKH WHUPFRXULHU LQ FRPSDULVRQ WR WKH WHUP µPXOH¶7KLVSRLQW LV
carefully elaborated in Chapter II and in the research design of the case study in Chapter VI. 
The only objective now is to map the actors who use term mule or courier and how they are 
described.  For example, several United Nations reports and resolutions also use the term 
µFRXULHU¶ (Fleetwood and Haas 2011) although there are also documents which distinguish  
µKXPDQFRXULHUV¶IURP¶SRVWDOFRXULHUV¶(United Nations 2009) because parcel services have 
been used to smuggle drugs.  The Working Group of the Criminal Bar Association of England 
DQG:DOHV UHFRJQLVHG WKH WHUPµPXOH¶KDGDSHMRUDWLYHFRQQRWDWion (Fleetwood 2014). The 
term courier appears to be neutral because it describes how the drug was trafficked, whether 
inside the body or concealed in an object. Confronted by the problems of sentencing disparities 




n. 117±118).              
 In contrast, the   European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA) suggests that in general, the courier is an importer who is in physical possession 
of the drug during the process of crossing an international borders (EMCDDA 2012). Mapping 
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the way practitioners, academic researchers, and professionals use these concepts/definitions, 
LQWKH(XURSHDQFRQWH[WWKH(0&''$VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHFRXULHUUHSUHVHQWVD³JHQHUDOW\SH´ 
7KLV FRQFHSW LV IXUWKHU VXEGLYLGHG LQWR WZR RWKHU VXEW\SHV D µFRXULHUV¶ ZKR RUJDQLVH WKH
LPSRUWDWLRQWKHPVHOYHVµPXOHV¶ZKR import drugs for others. The difference between them 
LV WKH ³OHYHO RI RUJDQLVDWLRQ DQG FRPPHUFLDO LQWHUHVW LQ WKH WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ RI D GUXJ«´
(EMCDDA 2012, 3).  The results from a survey presented to European researchers, law 
HQIRUFHPHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGSURIHVVLRQVWKHPDMRULW\DJUHHGµPXOHV¶KDYHDOLPLWHGUROH
and little further involvement beyond carrying drugs across international borders (EMCDDA 
2012, 23). But the devil is in the details. Mules receive a wage, a salary, fee or reduction of 
GHEWVZKLOHFRXULHUVDUH³VHOI-HPSOR\HG´DFWRUVZKRGHULYHDEHQHILWIURPWKHVHOOLQJWKHGUXJV
LELG3D\PHQW UDWHVGHSHQG³RQ WKH W\SHDQGZHLJKWRIGUXJV WUDQVSRUWHG´LELG)RU
example, the profit derived from selling the same amount of cocaine is higher than cannabis.  
The fixation on quantity and whether it reflects how much the mule will earn is the most 
contentious issue in the cases presented in the case study.    
 Quantity and type of drug is a common method to distinguish the level  of the offence 
or punishment, but it is not the sole factor (EMCDDA 2003).Other things considered in 
sentencing by a majority of European jurisdictions include intent and all the circumstances of 
the offence (ibid). Young argues that in  U.S. context, the reasoning of the federal guidelines 
for sentencing has been drug quantities reflect the role of the offender in the trafficking scheme 
(Young 1990). The problem is that this approach conflates quantity with role. From another 
perspective, it also does not reflect the intent of the offenders. For example, a supplier and 
distributor has a very different intent than a mule or a courier (Young 1990; Tobin 1998). The 
role of quantity matters more often between drug users and traffickers because users may be 
given only a fine or a warning, depending on the jurisdiction (EMCDDA 2003). One of the 
main criticisms to quantity-based sentences is that threshold quantities are often based on 
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arbitrary parameters (Fleetwood 2011; UK Drug Policy Commission 2011). For example, the 
CA established in Aranguren11 that offenders who imported between 500 grams and 5 kilos of 
a Class A drug,12 like cocaine, the appropriate sentence was between 10 years or more. Above 
the 5 kilo threshold, the sentencing range would be between 14 years and above. 
 2WKHU (8 FRXQWULHV GR QRW VSHFLI\ D SUHFLVH DPRXQW SUHIHUULQJ WKH WHUPV µVPDOO¶
quantity as a guide and greater room for discretion (EMCDDA 2003). Also, the problem with  
VSHFLILFZHLJKWSDUDPHWHUVLV WKDW WKH\PD\QRW UHIOHFWKRZµPXOHV¶PD\RIWHQFDUU\KLJKHU
quantities than professional couriers because mules do not have the same agency over the 
process of transporting drugs (Fleetwood 2011). Another issue raised by Young  is how fixation 
on quantities does not necessarily reflect the culpability or role of the offender because 
³FRXULHUV´DUHSDLGDIODWVXPUDWKHUWKDQDSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHGHOLYHU\(Young 1990). In other 
words, this statement implies that a mule may carry 3 or 10 kilos but the salary may not 
VLJQLILFDQWO\ FKDQJH  ,Q FRQWUDVW ZKDW LV NQRZQ DERXW µVHOI-HPSOR\HG FRXULHUV¶ DV WKH
(0&''$ VXJJHVWV LV WKDW WKH\ µRZQ¶ ³ERWK WKH GLVWribution networks and the drugs the 
SRWHQWLDOIRUSURILWLVPXFKKLJKHU´(EMCDDA 2012, 20).     
 Profit and method are not the sole methods to distinguish couriers from mules. Legal, 
scholarly and politiFDO GLVFRXUVH VHHN WR H[SODLQ GUXJ PXOHV¶ PRWLYDWLRQV WKURXJK WKH
perspective of individual agency or the structure. Simply put, either a person choses freely to 
participate in the drug trade or is a passive actor because she has been coerced through threats 
of violence or forced by poverty and need. For example, descriptions of drug mules often draw 
on passivity UHIHUHQFHVLQZKLFKPXOHVDUH³YLFWLPVRIYLROHQFHDQGLQWLPLGDWLRQ«ZKRWDNH
the most visible and risky roles in the supply DQGGHOLYHU\FKDLQ´ (Global Commission on Drug 
Policy 2011). A great number of studies and reports which argue that mules are less culpable 
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 R v Aranguren (1994) 99 Cr. App. R. 347; (1995) 16 Cr. App. R. (S.) 211 
12
 The quantity is calculated according to a hundred percent purity of the substance.  
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offenders tend to draw on the position of the agency of drug mules prior to the offence. 
However, few actually consider the gradients of agency during the process. The extent of the 
use of coercion is not well known but some studies show coercion plays a role during the 
process of trafficking drugs, rather than before (EMCDDA 2012; Fleetwood 2014). Fleetwood 
suggests WKDWWKHYXOQHUDELOLW\RIµPXOHV¶FDQEHEHVWLOOXVWUDWHG³E\DODFNRIRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRU
decision-making RU FRQWURO RYHU RQH¶V DFWLRQV GXULQJ WKH SURFHVV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUDYHO´
(Fleetwood 2014, 15). The vulnerability was marked by the isolation in the process and limited 
possibilities for backing out (ibid). As I will discuss in chapter VI, importation offences 
themselves contribute to narrowing doZQWKHSRVVLELOLWLHVWRµEDFNRXW¶IURPGUXJPXOHZRUN
 While few studies available focus on the process, a majority pay attention to the 
background of the offence or the pathway to drug trafficking. The most common argument is 
WKDW GUXJ PXOHV¶ SRYHUW\ DQG opportunities in the legitimate market are very limited. 
,QWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQGHVFULEHGUXJPXOHVDV³UHFNOHVVGHVSHUDWHRULJQRUDQW´(UNODC 
and WB 2007). Following the reasoning of the economic analysis, drug trafficking becomes an  
alternative source of income (Del Olmo 1990). However, the position of disadvantage 
(poverty) increases the possibility of being used or exploited. For example, Genevieve Harris 
DUJXHVWKDW³LVZLGHO\DFFHSWHGWKDWWKHPDMRULW\RIGUXJPXOHVFRPHIURPDSRRUEDFNJURXQG
DQGDUHYXOQHUDEOHRUH[SORLWHG´(Harris 2010, 4). This statement might be powerful, but also 
unclear how poverty is already immediately a condition for exploitation and vulnerability of 
druJPXOHV7UDF\+XOLQJDOVRDUJXHVWKDWGUXJPXOHVSDUWLFXODUO\ZRPHQSHUIRUP³FKHDS
DQGH[SHQGDEOHODERXU´(Huling 1996, 57).  Exploitation and vulnerability are commonly tied  
to gender, pointing out structural issues OLNHWKHIHPLQLVDWLRQRISRYHUW\DQGZRPHQ¶VFDULQJ
responsibilities (Malinowska-Sempruch 2002; Bewley-Taylor, Hallam, and Allen 2007). A 
large part of the research outlined in this section has bHHQJHQGHUµQHXWUDO¶-or more precisely 
gender-blind- because it uses the terms of the market (quantity, supply, payment) and the law 
31 
 
(culpability). At the same time, the association between drug mules and gender is complex. 
The feminisation of poverty has provided a framework that explains drug mule in terms of 
gender-specific victimisation, while  other approaches describe female drug mules as victims 
of male exploiters (Fleetwood 2014). The next section fleshes out the relevance of gender in 
drug mule research followed by an exposition of why gender matters in criminal law 
5. Why women? Sentencing and punishment of drug importation offenders 
While gender-blindness dominates sentencing practices, the female prison population 
convicted for drug offences in general is very high in many jurisdictions. For example, female 
drug offenders represented 70 per cent of female prisoners in Ecuador and 60 per cent in 
Argentina 13(Bewley-Taylor et. al., 2007). In the US, there was an 888 per cent increase of 
women in prison between 1986-1999, driven by draconian drug sentencing schemes in the US 
(American Civil Liberties Union 2005). Although the sentencing practices in the US are 
peculiar, rising trends have been registered also in European, Asian and Latin American 
countries (Bewley-Taylor, Hallam, and Allen 2007; WOLA 2011). Also, these figures do not 
specify how many women have been convicted for drug trafficking offences. In England and 
Wales, there is also a high percentage of women convicted for drug offences in general (note, 
not trafficking). After violent offences, drug offences were the second most common offence 
for which women were convicted in 2009 (Loveless 2012a). Loveless stresses how sentences 
for drug offences show a high degree of gender similarity14 unlike violent offences, where there 
sentencing appears to be more lenient (ibid.). In short, women and men received similar 
sentences for drug offences while women get shorter sentences for violence offences. Most 
recent statistics (2013) from the Ministry of Justices show that 15.3 per cent of women 
sentenced had been convicted for drug offences in comparison to 14.8 per cent of men (Ministry 
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 The data above refers to all drug offences and not exclusively international drug trafficking.   
14
 My emphasis. 
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of Justice 2014, table 1.3b). At the same time, global statistics show male offenders make up 
PRUHWKDQSHUFHQWRIµGHWHFWHGWUDIILFNHUV¶(United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
2011). However, the problem with the figures above is that sex/gender data for drug trafficking 
offences are not consistently collected (Fleetwood and Haas 2011) DQGµWUDIILFNLQJ¶KDVDYHU\
wide meaning (EMCDDA 2003; 2012; Gottwald 2006). On that note, the absence of a common 
definition of mules and couriers also makes it difficult to ascertain how many are serving a 
prison sentence.          
 Even though gender has been invisible in the sentencing frameworks and drug 
trafficking statistics, there is a popular assumption that drug mules are women (Fleetwood 
2014). In the absence of sentencing frameworks that are sensitive to the specific impact of drug 
policies and laws on women, researchers have  highlighted the invisibility of gender (Raeder 
1995; Corston 2007; Giacomello 2009)$V5DHGHUDUJXHV³ZRPHQKDYHEHHQER[HGLQE\D
JXLGHOLQH VWUXFWXUH ZKLFK LV GRPLQDWHG E\ YLVLRQV RI PDOH FULPLQDOLW\´ ZKLFK H[FOXGH
FRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIFXOSDELOLW\RQDFFRXQWRI³JHQGHUHGUROHVLQFULPLQDOHQWHUSULVHV´(Raeder 
1995, 161).  What does appear to be consistently reported in the research is how more women 
have been convicted for drug trafficking offences since the 1980s (Fleetwood 2014; Loveless 
2012b; Harper, et.al., 2002). In the English context, Janet Loveless points out how data from 
the Ministry of Justice in 2009 shows 20 per cent of female offenders were convicted for an 
importation offence in comparison to six per cent of male offenders (ibid).  The Sentencing 
Council actually presented in the same year a higher figure (26 per cent) (Sentencing Council 
2011a, 4).           
 Foreign women are disproportionally represented in drug trafficking statistics in the 
England and Wales. The population of foreign national prisoners-  imprisoned for all offences-  
increased by 152 per cent from 1994-2004, compared to a 55 per cent increase in British 
nationals (Prison Reform Trust 2004).  At that time, the Prison Reform Trust highlighted how 
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nearly half of the foreign offenders (male and female) had been convicted for drug offences. 
Figures from 2005 show that about 80 per cent of foreign women imprisoned had been 
convicted for drug trafficking offences (Joseph 2006, 156).  The trend continues, as  foreign 
female drug offenders represented 46 per cent of the prison population in 2012, largely 
sentenced for drug importation offences (Prison Reform Trust 2012).  Foreign women 
offenders are at a disadvantage for many reasons, including language barriers, separation from 
the family, and lack of support during the legal process (Hales and Gelsthorpe 2012).15 While 
the appellate courts refer to drug mXOHVDVRIIHQGHUVIURPµXQGHU-developed countries¶ reports 
IURP&RORPELDQDQG9HQH]XHODQDXWKRULWLHVUHSRUWHGLQDQLQFUHDVHLQ6SDQLVKµPXOHV¶
in their prison population.16  Racial profiling has been commonly blamed for the higher 
percentage of foreign nationals and racial minorities in prison in US and the UK (Green 1998; 
Boyd 2004; American Civil Liberties Union 2005; Sudbury 2005; Institute of Women and 
Criminal Justice 2006).  The relation between statistical data must be unpacked and question 
its connection and perpetuation of profiling practices (Diaz-Cotto 2005; Sudbury 2005; 
Lawrence & Williams 2006) E\ UHLI\LQJ ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW¶V DVVXPSWLRQV DERXW ZKR LV the 
typical drugs mule (Schemenauer 2012). For example, law enforcement authorities in the US 
increased their surveillance of foreign and poor women based on the belief that this particular 
group is more likely to be drugs mules (ibid). While these statistics show there are issues in 
how governments collect data on women who traffic drugs, the question addressed in this thesis 
is how the law judges and punishes them in the first place. The problem is not so much how 
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 Hibiscus, a service for foreign prisoners in the UK, estimates that a thousand children are left on their own after 
the imprisonment RI WKHLUPRWKHUV LQ WKH8.&RUVWRQVXJJHVWHGEDVHGRQKHU UHYLHZDQG WKH µ,QVSHFWRUDWH¶V
WKHPDWLFUHYLHZRIIRUHLJQQDWLRQDOSULVRQHUV¶WKDWWKHUHVKRXOGEHVKRUWHUVHQWHQFHIRUGUXJPXOHVPRUH
consideration of mitigating factors particularly for IRUHLJQ ZRPHQ ZLWK FKLOGUHQ µZKRVH VDIHW\ FDQQRW EH
JXDUDQWHHG LQ WKH DEVHQFHRI WKHLU PRWKHUV DQGXVHRI FRPPXQLW\ VHQWHQFHV LQ WKH8. LQ DSSURSULDWH FDVHV¶
(Corston 2007). Family links were of particular concern for foreign offenders, among others, such as language 
barriers and immigration concerns. 
16
 Spanish news media reports Colombia, Spaniards occupied the first place in airport detentions in 2013. Peruvian 
authorities reported 17 per cent of Spaniards imprisoned for drug trafficking (Brunat 2014). 
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the law is gender-blind, instead, the next section delineates the complex relationship between 
law and gender. 
6. Law, feminism, and gender  
Feminist legal studies is broad umbrella term to designate a heterogeneous body of thought and 
perspectives that incorporate gender and sexuality into the study of the law. This includes a 
critique of concepts like sex/gender, where sex has been understood as the facticity of 
biological body and gender as a product of social and cultural roles and practices ascribed to 
femininity and masculinity (Beauvoir 2011). Without rehearsing the history of feminism, one 
of the common critiques has been the influence of the mind-body duality reflected in 
heterosexual gender differences (Grosz 1994; Lacey 1998b; Beauvoir 2011). While this 
strategy allowed feminism to take a distance from biological essentialisms, Joanne Conaghan 
DUJXHVWKHGLFKRWRP\VLPSO\UHSURGXFHGWKH&DUWHVLDQGXDOLW\ZKHUH³JHQGHUEHFDPHDOLJQHG
with the realm of the ideal and sex was reduced to raw, unmediDWHGPDWHULDOLW\´(Conaghan 
2013a, 20). Drawing on the work of Moira Gatens, Conaghan emphazises how feminist 
interventions distanced too much from bodies in order to hold together a clear distinction 
between sex-JHQGHU,QWKHV-XGLWK%XWOHU¶VTXHHUWKHRU\WURXEOHGWKHGHEDWHIXUWKHUE\
suggesting that assumptions that sexed bodies were not immune to the effects of gender. The 
essentialisation of sex in the languaJHRIELRORJ\³EHFRPHVRQWRORJLFDOO\LPPXQL]HGIURPWKH
SRZHU UHODWLRQV DQG IRU LWV KLVWRULFLW\´ (Butler 1999, 121). In other words, sex is already a 
product of a heterosexual gender matrix where the appearance of queer sexualities is limited 
and yet constantly reproduced in practice (Butler 1997b; Butler 1999).   
 Concepts like gender, sex, and sexuality are fields of constant contestation, where the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHLGHDRIWKHµERG\¶DQGVRFLDOQRUPVDUHNH\FDWHJRULHVRIGHbate. In 
that sense, this project is no different. The notion of the body and the social and legal norms 
that make some bodies more injurable than others is a key concern examined in chapter IV and 
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9'UDZLQJRQ&RQDJKDQ¶VGHILnition, I understand gender aV³DFDWHJRU\RIVRFLDORUGHULQJ´ 
WKDW FDQ EH  ³GHSOR\HG DV DQ DQDO\WLFDO WRRO WR LQWHUURJDWH SDUWLFXODU VRFLDO UHODWLRQDO
FRQILJXUDWLRQVDQGWKHLUHIIHFWV´(Conaghan 2013a, 24).  While this thesis does not engage in 
an in depth inquiry on notions of sexuality and sex, these issues addressed through the 
GLVFXVVLRQ RI ERGLHV HPERGLPHQW DQG WKH ILJXUH RI WKH µPDWHUQDO¶ ZKLFK LV VR FHQWUDO WR
vulnerability discourses. The idea of gendered embodiment is interrogated through the 
perspective of phenomenology and performative theory. In that sense, it also incorporates 
feminist philosophies of embodiment, which draw on the interdisciplinary cross-overs between 
phenomenology and post-structuralism, to interrogate the symbolic attachments to the idea of 
WKHµPDWHUQDO¶,QVRPHZD\VP\HQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHVHPHWKRGRORJLHVH[SRVHERWKDGLDORJXH
DQGDFRQWUDVWLQJH[HUFLVHEHWZHHQ%XWOHU¶VSHUIRUPDWLYHWKHRU\FKDUDFWHULVHGDVD contestation 
(Loizidou 2007) or a continuity of French feminism influenced by Simone de Beauvoir 
(Murphy 2012b) and more broadly existential phenomenology (Coole 2008).  The link between 
them, as this thesis suggests, is more explicit in their engagement and re-appropriation of 
ambiguity and ambivalence. The concepts function as  critical tropes to re-imagine 
interdependence (Beauvoir 1986; Butler 2009c; Murphy 2012b). Concretely, the suggestion 
here is to incorporate the frame of inter-dependence into the analysis of how criminal law and 
punishment responds and relates to vulnerability.     
 Feminist legal scholarship has often shown the complicated and unjust treatment of 
women implicit in criminal doctrine, pointing out the tension between the invisibility of female 
subjectivity and hyper-visibility of female bodies (Naffine 1996; 1997; Lacey 1998b; 
Conaghan 2013a). For example, feminist scholars have often argued that criminal law does not 
YLHZ ZRPHQ¶V DV VXEMHFWV EXW DV REMHFWV RI PDOH GHVLUH 7KH OHJDO QRUPV LQ SODFH GR QRW
recognise female subjectivities and by extension, fail to address them as legal subjects with 
rights  (Du Toit 2009; Cornell 1995). These critiques draw back to the principles shaping legal 
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doctrine, particularly the conspicuous exclusions implicit in the principle of equality under the 
rule of law and the white European male impinging notions of legal personhood (Naffine 2009; 
Davies 2012;Conaghan 2013a). Vulnerability approaches to law have enlivened the 
discussions on whether the equality has worked to advance feminist claims. Responding to the 
failure of equality discourses, Martha Fineman suggests that the liberal subject of rights is 
actually what needs to reconsidered. Thus, her proposal puts vulnerability at the centre of law 
rather than outside of it, as if it was  something that affects only marginalised identities 
(Fineman 2008b):KLOHWKLVWKHVLVIROORZV)LQHPDQ¶VLPSXOVHWRJURXQGYXOQHUDELOLW\LQWKH
human condition, it also suggests there are some problems in the theoretical resources and 
discourses underpinning her approach to vulnerability in law. To advance vulnerability 
GLVFRXUVHVWKURXJKWKHWURSHRIWKHµPXOH¶LQRUGHUWRHQVXUHSURSRUWLRQDOVHQWHQFLQJLVRQO\
WKHµWLSRIWKHLFHEHUJ¶LQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSRIFULPLQDOOaw and gender. As mentioned before, 
vulnerability marks the embodied relationality of subjects in a socio-political context, and thus, 
the relationship cannot leave out the effect of power relations. Normative concepts in criminal 
law instantiate relations of power by determining the terms of inclusion and exclusion as to 
whom is a legal person or who is vulnerable or not. 
7. Gendered exclusions/inclusions in criminal law and social contract theories 
One of the ideas advanced in this thesis is that the relation between criminal law and gender 
has been overtly determined by an ideal of disembodiment in punishment theories. By bringing 
into sight the relation between embodiment and disembodiment through a phenomenological 
analysis, the aim is to show criminal law¶VHWKLFDOIDLOXUHWRZDUGVSHRSOHZKRGRQRWFRQIRUP
to the norm of rational legal personhood. In other words, the stress put throughout this work is 
the relation of criminal justice towards people considered to be vulnerable. Vulnerability marks 
and ethical potential (Murphy 2012a), but it might offer a straightforward solution to social 
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justice claims (Munro and Scoular 2012). This is because contemporary discourses on the 
vulnerability of drug mules do not unpack the philosophical imaginaries of violence 
underpinning the relation between law and vulnerability.  The vulnerability of individuals or 
groups may be disavowed in contexts driven by discourses on the survival of the life of the 
political sovereign. The idea of the political sovereign is by no means straightforward. 
However, I do not refer to a political sovereign embodied in a monarch, a president, or even a 
congress. Instead, the political sovereign can include, as Emily Crick explains, the international 
drug control FRPPXQLW\ZKLFKIDVKLRQVLWVHOIWKURXJKUHLWHUDWLYHVSHHFKDFWVDVDXQLILHGµVHOI¶
whose survival is threatened by illicit drug trade (Crick 2012).   Judith Butler makes a similar 
point in the context of terrorism, explaining how the nation-state fashions itself as a vulnerable 
self who lashes out on others when its survival is jeopardized. Although scholars like Julian 
Reed argue that some vulnerability discourses closely chime liberal social contract theories and 
facilitate a conservative politics of defence where the goal of the sovereign is to secure its 
existence (Reid 2013), I will suggest that performativity theory provides a more nuanced 
account on the relationship between political sovereignty and vulnerability. The main 
difference is articulated E\%XWOHU¶VSHUIRUPDWLYHDFFRXQWRIYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGsubjectivity. In 
traditional liberal accounts, the subject is conceived as a bounded atomistic subject (Naffine 
2009; Nedelsky 1990), raising doubts about the possibility for intersubjectivity, relationality, 
and other categories of thought which aim to demonstrate how the individual is not a self-made 
unit. Whilst this thesis does not deny that vulnerability discourses tap on on the fear of an Other 
who threatens my life (and thus, the desire to cut and renounce that Other as part of me), the 
conceptual frame proposed here shows that even when the relations are disavowed, they never 
disappear fully. The operation of inclusion/exclusion of intersubjectivity can be observed in 
the relationship between law and gender. Joanne Conaghan suggests that legal concepts 
conspicuously erased the formal presence of gender through abstract categories but gender has 
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EHHQ³a crucLDOSDUWRIZKDWODZLVRUGRHV´ (Conaghan 2013a). She argues that the ubiquitous 
references femininity in common law evince how legal concepts draw on gender while denying 
the interdependence to feminine symbols. For example, influential jurists have described the 
FRPPRQODZDVDEHDXWLIXOEXWIOLUW\ZRPDQDQROGVKUHZDµSDWLHQWKRXVHZLIH¶DVHUUDWLFDQG
careless, and as justice, law genders but it is also gendered (ibid.).  Because femininity appeared 
only through figures of speech, it was not properly inside legal discourse but neither outside. 
Instead, gender has constituted law through and through but without an acknowledgement to 
of the debt to the feminine.        
 Tracing the historical development of the public-private divide, Conaghan argues that 
JHQGHUEHFDPHVHHQDVDQµLPSURSHU¶FDWHJRU\RIODZ(ibid., 132) after societal and epistemic 
transformatioQLQ(XURSH$QFLHQWDQGPHGLHYDOSKLORVRSK\KHOGDµRQH-VH[¶PRGHOZKLOHWKH
µWZR-VH[¶ PRGHO HPHUJHG LQ WKH VHYHQWHHQWK FHQWXU\ 'UDZLQJ RQ WKH ZRUN E\ 7KRPDV
Lacquer, she explains how female bodies as defective versions of the male body.  Yet, bodies 
belRQJHG WR D µQDWXUDO RUGHU¶ RI WKLQJV ZKHUH ELRORJ\ DQG VRFLDO RUGHU GLG QRW KDYH FOHDU
ERUGHUV ,Q WKDW VHQVH ZRPHQ¶V VXEMHFWLYLW\ ZDV DUWLFXODWHG E\ HDUO\ FRPPRQ ODZ
jurisprudence through their relations as mothers or wives (ibid.,151). Yet, the apparent 
V\PEROLFDQGSROLWLFDOµH[FOXVLRQ¶RIWKHIHPLQLQHVKRZVDVKLIWLQWKHorganization of social 
order along WKHOLQHVRIWKHµWZR-VH[PRGHO¶.  The two-sex model shadows two of the leading 
social contract theorists. Thomas Hobbes suggested women were vulnerable because of their 
role as child-bearers; while John Locke suggested women had a weaker constitution (ibid, 
152). The two-sex model was influenced by scientific discourse, which presents male and 
female bodies as radically different. Crucially, the two-sex model blended seamlessly with 
doctrine of separate spheres articulated through social contract theory (private/public order in 
politics) (ibid.). Locke and Hobbes differentiate women from men through characteristics 
attributed to the female body. As a UHVXOW ZRPHQ¶V ELRORJLFDO GLIIHUHQFHV EHJDQ WR EH
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understood at that time as oppositional to the legal order instituted on the rational, autonomous, 
able-bodied liberal legal subject (Naffine 1997; Norrie 2001; Naffine 2009; Grear 2010a). This 
legacy persists in legal doctrine today.      
 What happened is that formal equality, represented by the liberal and universal subject 
of law, was conceptualised E\³ignoring gender rDWKHUWKDQDFNQRZOHGJLQJJHQGHU´ (Conaghan 
2013a, 132), although the logic of liberalism depended on asserting the identicality between 
ODZ¶VDGGUHVVes and the dominantly male political establishment (ibid., 153). The principle of 
equality was only formally acknowledged in social contract theories. They would not have 
been able to logically sustain their coherence without the ideal of equality. However, the 
feminine is best characterised to be inside/outside legal and political order of the social contract 
theories. For example, Antigone stands as a liminal subject between past and future, divine 
norms and man-made laws. She represents the struggle of conflicting views on ethical living 
(Butler 2000; Norrie 2005; Loizidou 2007; Conaghan 2013a)17 and how the relation between 
ethics and law  has not yet been resolved in criminal law. As Alan Norrie explains, eighteenth 
and nineteenth century philosophy of punishment represents the struggle of modern criminal 
law is with itself, between the moral ideal of individual justice and the apparent necessity of 
µURXJK MXVWLFH¶ DV D PHWKRG WR FRQWURO FULPH 7KLV IDLOXUH LV LQLPLFDO WR WKH DUFKLWHFWXUH RI
FULPLQDO ODZ¶V DWWHPSW WR HOLPLQDWH WKH FRQWUDGLFWLRQV LQ WKH JHQesis of legal norms and 
concepts ( Norrie 2005):KLOHDJUHHLQJZLWK1RUULH¶VDQDO\VLVWKLVSURMHFWVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH
relation between ethics and criminal law is impartial because of its complex relation with the 
feminine, particularly when represented as a symbol of vulnerable embodiment. The 
exclusion/inclusion of gender arguably explains how legal norms and practices categorise 
women either as feminized victims or women who transgress femininity norms by acting like 
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 ,QDZD\KHUVWUXJJOHLVDOVRWKHVWUXJJOHRIWKHµ%HDXWLIXOVRXO¶PRUDOLW\DQGWKH8QKDSS\&RQVFLRXVQHVV
(law) between the younger more idealistic Hegel and the older Hegel who gave in to the realities of private 
property and coercive laws to maintain social order (Norrie 2005). 
40 
 
men.            
 Finally, it is important to point out that this thesis does not try to prove the truth-claims 
about the vulnerability of female drug mules. Instead, it excavates and exposes the frames 
which prevent the law from recognising vulnerable lives through an analysis of the relations of 
domination and violence impinging the appropriations and exclusions of vulnerability. Instead, 
the idea presented here is that criminal law includes/excludes vulnerability of drug mules by 
gendering vulnerability. The case study presented here shows how the law does not recognise 
the vulnerability framing drug mule work because the rationale underpinning liberal social 
contract theories leads to the abjection of vulnerability. Criminal law has long sought to manage 
and control one aspect of the main features of vulnerability- the interdependence of social life-
through disembodied legal norms and relations depending on consensual contracts. The effect 
of this troubled relation of law with vulnerability is the feminization of vulnerability (Bergoffen 
2003)7RPDLQWDLQWKHµSURSHURUGHU¶ of vulnerability, the concept of legal personhood adopted 
by criminal law includes and excludes the feminine, instead of holding a space for ethical 
DPELJXLW\,QVWHDGWKHOHJDODQGSROLWLFDOLGHDWLRQRIµLQYXOQHUDELOLW\¶EHVWUHSUHVHQWHGE\
the imaginaries of boundaries, self-bounded and individualistic subjects (Nedelsky 1990), is a  
VLJQRIWKHGHQLDORIYXOQHUDELOLW\¶VHWKLFDODPELJXLW\8OWLPDWHO\WKHDLP is to find out the 
SRVVLELOLWLHVIRUUHFODLPLQJYXOQHUDELOLW\µRWKHUZLVH¶E\DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKHUROHRIIDLOXUHDQG
renewal in socio-political relations. This attitude is presented as being an expression of 
agonistic politics rather than antagonistic. It is also an attitude that recognises that naming drug 
mules as vulnerable offenders in the courts is a practice that may call forth appropriations and 
exclusions justified through liberal social contract theories, but it also may disrupt the 
ideological underpinnings of contemporary practices of punishment of drug trafficking 
offenders. Resistance to these practices involve the exercise of clearing and unpacking the 
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disavowal of gender in criminal law as well as a collective encounters to reclaim of vulnerable 
otherwise. 
8. Structure of the thesis 
The departure point for this research project is ambivalent characterisation of drug mules as 
victims and offenders. Chapter II outlines the legal, political, and scholarly discourses 
underpinning both tropes, and queries the role of gender in the distinction between these 
categories, mapping the representation of drug trafficking actors. It suggests that to understand 
how the vulnerability of mules-couriers has been articulated, we need to unpack the productive 
ambiguity of gendered iterations of victims and offenders. The chapter unpacks two strands of 
scholarly and political discourse on drug trafficking and how victimhood articulations intersect 
and may even be appropriated by securitization and neoliberal crime management discourses. 
Discourses on the vulnerability of mules-couriers expose a tension between criminal 
responsibility and punishment theories. One of the sources of those tensions include how 
criminal legal doctrine is organized along gender lines, where legal personhood has been 
characterized by the disembodiment of rationality and decontextualized attribution of criminal 
responsibility. Vulnerability discourses hold in sight the gender and embodiment of drug 
mules, but vulnerability is sensitive to the appropriate of knowledge-producers.  
 Chapter III examines the history of criminal law and theories of criminal responsibility 
and punishment, signposting the relationship between criminal legal doctrine and ideas of 
embodiment and disembodiment. My aim is tease out a critique of criminal law  and key 
normative concepts like legal personhood, criminal responsibility, and the justification of 
punishment, through the notion of µDPELJXLW\¶  )ROORZLQJ %HDXYRLU¶V LQVLJKWV DPELJXLW\
expresses the socio-political DQG OHJDO GLOHPPDV WKDW DULVH IURP WKH µUHODWLRQ¶ ZLWK VHOI RU
others. The relation between self and others is signalled by corporeal embodiment but criminal 
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legal theory and practices of punishment have effaced ambiguity through the 
institutionalisation of the rational legal person. In that sense, this chapter explores how 
ideations of disembodied subjectivity are a µVWUDWHJ\¶ WR UHGXFH WKHULVNRIEHLQJ LQMXUHGE\
others and ensure the political future of the community. More generally, this chapter begins to 
build a critique of the disavowal of embodied vulnerability in criminal law through Simone De 
%HDXYRLU¶VFRQYHUVLRQVRIDPELJXLW\$OWKRXJKµDPELJXLW\¶KDVEHHQJHQHUDOO\FRQVLGHUHGE\
the coherence-based rationality of law as a problem in legal texts, this concept calls for more 
ethical practices in criminal law by pointing to the failure of punishment, particularly in the 
neoliberal modality.         
 Reading through a series of re-interpretations addressing the legacy of Descartes, 
chapter IV presents an analysis with intertwining levels: epistemological, ontological and 
political. Departing from the claims that vulnerability is intrinsic to the human condition, this 
chapter interrogates why vulnerability has been disavowed as a constitutive aspect of 
subjectivity. The inquiry suggests that the disavowal of vulnerable embodiment bears structural 
similarities with the Cartesian (mis) reading of the body in pain and the political 
phenomenology of torture. Specifically, it suggests pain is an experience that underpins the 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQVHOIDQGµRWKHUV¶PDUNHGE\UDGLFDOO\GLIIHUHQFHDQG
qualified by alienation, scepticism and abjection. Through a different interpretation of the 
relationship between pain, embodiment and politics, this chapter unsettles onto-
epistemologies18 of duality and advances further the idea of the potentially disruptive effects 
of holding in sight the ambiguity and ambivalence of embodied vulnerability.   
 Chapter V explores critical feminist and queer approaches to the sexual politics of 
vulnerability, building on he the symbolic/material relation between injured bodies and 
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 .DUHQ%DUDGGHILQHVDQµRQWR-HSLVWHPRORJ\¶DVWKHµLQWHUWZLQHGVWXG\RIWKHSUDFWLFHVRINQRZLQJDQGEHLQJ¶
as thoroughly material practices (Barad 2007, 379). 
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language. In particular, this chapter examines how vulnerability discourses may be 
accommodated into gendered discourses of risk and penetrability that justify securitization to 
protection institutional and state vulnerability. 7KLVFKDSWHUGHIHQGVWKHHWKLFDOµSURYRFDWLRQV¶
when one names and exposes vulnerability in the political and legal spheres. By re-
appropriating ambiguity and ambivalence, feminist and queer theory approaches to 
vulnerability map its ethical potential, particularly to rearticulate the bonds of social and 
political interdependence, but also alert critically to its limits.  Thus, the labour of ambiguity 
and ambivalence is to point at the political appropriations and disavowals of vulnerability but 
DOVRDJDLQVWµZRXQGHGDWWDFKPHQWV¶(Brown 1995) WKDWUHDIILUPGLVHPSRZHULQJµSURWHFWLYH¶
interventions.           
 Chapter VI explores the sentencing narratives on vulnerability deployed in the Court of 
Appeal. It maps the dominant articulations of vulnerability thematized through economic 
precariousness, caring responsibilities and personal characteristics of drug importation 
offenders considered through the generally as couriers.  The analysis of the judgments probes 
the limits imposed to the appearance of vulnerability in the court, and narrowing down of the 
FDWHJRU\RIµGUXJPXOHV¶WKURXJKWKHORJLFRILQFOXVLRQH[FOXVLRQ,QRWKHUZRUGVLWVXJJHVWV 
that the doctrine of mercy underpinning the legal recognition of vulnerability articulates the 
LQFOXVLRQRIGUXJPXOHVDVµDEVROXWHIHPLQLVHGYLFWLPV¶IURPWKHµWKLUGZRUOG¶WRFRQILUPWKH
norm of the rational offender motivated by financial greed. It suggests that limit the appearance 
of vulnerable lives and effects the exclusions through the disavowal of the ambiguity of agency 
signalled by the ambivalence of drug mules. Instead, it is an expression of protecting the 
borders of legal personhood and maintenance of the two-sex model (chapter I) impinging law 
and the sexual politics of vulnerability.       
 Finally, chapter VII returns to the dilemma of the appearance of vulnerability in the 
sphere of law. The conclusion reaffirms the potential of vulnerability to disrupt and retrace the 
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DQG FKDUDFWHULVWLFV¶ EXW DERXW WKH GLIIHUHQWLDO GLVWULEXWLRQ RI YXOQHUDELOLW\ DORQJ JHQGHUHG 
relations of violence (Butler and Athanasiou 2013, 1). Naming vulnerability in sentencing 
appeals enable the space for addressees to resist names given and the silencing effect of guilty 
pleas, and by doing so, exposing again and again the failure of the project of criminal law and 














II. Drug mules: Ambivalent offenders 
1. Summary 
This chapter maps the representation of drug trafficking actors, including mules-couriers in 
scholarly, legal, and political discourses. It suggests that in order to understand how the 
vulnerability of mules-couriers has been articulated, we need to unpack the productive 
ambivalence of the gendered iterations of victims and offenders. I unpack two strands of 
scholarly and political discourse on drug trafficking and the ways that victimhood discourses 
intersect and may even be appropriated by the securitization and neoliberal crime management 
rationalities underpinning drug policy. Securitization in international drug policy discourse 
geared up to contain foreign offenders and colonize victims through paternalistic practices; 
while capitalist/neoliberal discourses frame drug offences as a risk to be contained through 
managerial strategies in criminal justice. This approach posits drug offenders as failed subjects 
of capitalism who by-pass the labour market through crime. The second part of the chapter 
explores the different iterations about the vulnerability of female drug mules in feminist 
research that suggest alternative avenues to address the gender dimension of drug mule work. 
Overall, the aims of this chapter is to show how discourses on the vulnerability of mules-
couriers expose a tension impinging criminal responsibility and punishment theories. One of 
the sources of those tensions include how criminal legal doctrine is organized along gender 
lines, where legal personhood has been characterized by the disembodiment of rationality and 
decontextualized attribution of criminal responsibility. In that sense, incorporating 
vulnerability into the frames of the law, and particularly as a way to expose the case of women 





2. Ambivalent performances: Gender, victimhood and agency 
A public inquiry commissioned by the Home Office, titled the Corston Report (2007), which 
was sparked by the suicide of six women serving custodial sentences. The report recognised 
WKDWPDQ\ZRPHQRIIHQGHUVDUHµYXOQHUDEOH¶LQVRPHZD\PHQWDOLOOQHVVKLVWRULHVRIDEXse) 
and therefore required gender-sensitive treatment.  The report identified three broad sources of 
ZRPHQ¶V YXOQHUDELOLW\ GRPHVWLF VLWXDWLRQ19 personal circumstances;20 and socio-economic 
status (ibid., 2)7KHVHIDFWRUVPD\OHDGWRDFULVLVSRLQWLQDZRPDQ¶VOLIHLQFOXGLQJSULVRQ,Q
short, experiences of domestic violence, sexual abuse, coercion, mental health problems, 
SUHFDULRXVKRXVLQJDQGFRHUFLRQE\PHQWRFRPPLWFULPHVLELGIUDPHZRPHQ¶VSDWKZD\V
into crime. Corston recommended institutional suppoUWWRZRPHQVRWKDWWKH\FRXOG³develop 
resilience, life skills and emotionaOOLWHUDF\´ (ibid., 14). The point that is most interesting is 
how the report characterises women as both victims and offenders (ibid., 17) and yet, their 
vulnerability could not excuse them from having committed a criminal offence. A few years 
earlier, Baroness Brenda Hale similarly emphasised the gender differences between women 
and men offenders, characterizing women also as victims and perpetrators (Hale 2005a).  
 The central message of the Corston Report was the failure of androcentric approaches 
to prison management and other criminal justice institutions, an argument well-known in 
criminology, legal studies, politics, and other areas. For example, Ngaire Naffine explains how 
women were invisible in nineteenth cHQWXU\FULPLQRORJ\ERWKDV³FULPLQDOVXEMHFWVDQGQRQ-
FULPLQDOVXEMHFWV´(Naffine 1996, 19). From its inception, criminology focused mostly on men 
but under the guise of universality. Gender was not a relevant category of analysis. Mapping 
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 Domestic circumstances referred in the report were mainly intimate partner violence or single parenthood. As 
QRWHGE\&KULVWLQH&KLQNLQGHVFULELQJSDUWQHUYLROHQFHDVDµGRPHVWLF¶LVVXHVHSDUDWHVYLROHQFHDJDLQVWZRPHQ








WRWKHLULGHQWLW\LWZDVRQO\ZRPHQZKRFRQVWLWXWHGDSDUWLFXODUVH[´(Naffine 1996, 20).  In 
RWKHUZRUGVZRPHQ¶VJHQGHUPDWWHUHGWRH[SODLn their criminality, but the same logic did not 
apply for men. To counter the masculine-bias operating in the background under the guise of 
µREMHFWLYLW\¶(Naffine 1996, 21), feminism has sought to make gender visible. Feminists have 
challenged the androcentric approaches cloaked in gender-neutral language by documenting 
and exposing experiences of intimate partner abuse, sexual violence, and mental health 
problems, among other life-events that function as explanations to female offending. Mapping 
feminist theorizing in criminology, Meda Chesney-Lind and Katherine Faith noted how 
victimization has been central to explaining female offending (Chesney-Lind and Faith 2000). 
At the same time, this approach to gendering the subject of crime calls for a persistent balancing 
act. Rendering visible the experience of victimhood has been one of the strategies to assert 
gender-difference (Snider 2003) The balancing act is characterized by accounting for factors 
contributing to victimization of women without negating or masculinizing female agency 
(Mardorossian 2014).         
 There is a similar identification of women convicted for drug importation offences as 
both victims and offenders. For example, the UK Drug Policy Commission recommended that 
VHQWHQFLQJFRXUWVUHJDUGKRZWKH\PD\SOD\WKH³UROHDVERWKRIIHQGHUDQGYLFWLP´ (UK Drug 
Policy Commission 2011, 15).  Numerous media stories (UNODC 2012a; Bulawayo 24 2012), 
international reports, and scholarly articles highlight the gender differences between drug 
trafficking offHQGHUV KLJKOLJKWLQJ ZRPHQ¶V YLFWLPL]DWLRQ (Malinowska-Sempruch 2002; 
Kampfner 2005; Bewley-Taylor et.al.,  2007; Kramer et. al., 2009; Pieris 2014). While 
acknowledging narratives of victimization and gender violence, Julia Sudbury argues that 
victim-offender dichotomies may limit our understanding of why women risk their lives and 
freedom for a subordinate role in the drug hierarchy. Instead, she situates drug smuggling in 
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the context of interlocking phenomena, mainly the shrinking of the welfare social net; the rise 
RIWKHSULYDWL]DWLRQRISULVRQVHUYLFHVDQGDUDFLVWµWRXJKRQFULPH¶DJHQGD(Sudbury 2005). 
)RUKHUZRPHQZKRHQJDJHLQGUXJµPXOH¶ZRUNDUHQRWSDVVLYHYLFWLPVEXWDJHQWVZKRVH
choices are severely restricted by socio-economic pressures, structural gender violence and 
global inequities (ibid.).        
 Stephanie Martel unpacks the dichotomy of victims and offenders in the context of 
securitization processes in South-east Asian countries,21 stressing how law enforcement 
authorities in the Philippines have increasingly stated their concern over the recruitment of 
vulnerable women by foreign traffickers, particularly transnational crime from Nigeria, China, 
and Iran. The image of the male foreign trafficker discourse that ensnares national women is a 
common myth underpinning organised crime. What is worth pointing out is how securitization 
discourses feed on this focus on the foreign predator to justify increasing measures for law 
enforcement. Adopting a similar approach, Ellie Schemenauer argues that victim and offender 
discourses in drug policy are shaped by a racialized and masculinized logic of security and 
µSURWHFWLRQ¶RIYLFWLPL]HGRIIHQGHUV(Schemenauer 2012).     
 The victim-offender dichotomy is also implicit in other offences considered within the 
XPEUHOODWHUPRIWUDQVQDWLRQDORUJDQL]HGFULPH)RUH[DPSOHLQ-R'RH]HPD¶VSURYRFDWLYH
analysis of the history of sex trafficking/white slavery regimes, she argues that the myth of the 
µZKLWHVODYH¶LQ%ULWDLQZDVFRQVWUXFWHGDVWKH³LQQRFHQWYLFWLPLQRSSRVLWLRQWRWKHZLOOLQJ
ZKRUH´(Doezema 2010, 13). Consent has been used to demarcate the distinction between the 
µVH[ VODYH¶ DQG WKH µZKRUH¶ WR GHFLGH ZKR LV GHVHUYHV WR EH µUHVFXHG¶ (Soderlund 2005). 
Feminist critics of human trafficking rhetoric argue that the attachment to a post-colonial 
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 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde define securitization as a socially constructed process  where 
issues are framed as existential threats (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998) DJDLQVWDQ µRWKHU¶6HHQDVD WKUHDW
interventions against perceived threatening others justify actions beyond the normal rules of political engagement. 
Securitization speech acts are not successful just when an authority, for example, a political enunciates the threat. 
Instead, securitization underscores the intersubjective relation between the authority enunciating the speech act, a 
receptive audience and the right context (Martel 2013). 
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trafficking victim stereotype (Doezema 2001; Sharma 2005; Zheng 2010; Davies and Davies 
2010) has been used  to justify paternalistic interventions with regard to third world women. 
But protect them from whom? Nandita Sharma argues that human trafficking discourses 
³simultaneously obscure the vulnerability of migrant women in the nexus of state and capitalist 
practices while representing them as victims solely of traffickerV´(Sharma 2005, 89). While I 
do not want to conflate human trafficking with drug trafficking, there are parallels because they 
are framed through an international crime control strategy. Framing transnational organized 
FULPH DORQJ FDWHJRULHV RI µVXLWDEOH HQHPLHV¶ (Green 1998) SUH\LQJ RQ µVXLWDEOH¶ YLFWLPV
(Kempadoo 2005) VXVWDLQVDQGMXVWLILHVLQWUXVLYHLQWHUYHQWLRQVWRµSURWHFW¶JURXSVXQGHUstood 
as vulnerable.           
 Moreover, the victim-offender dichotomy is not normatively neutral. Maggy Lee and 
Jo Doezema, among others, show how human trafficking policy and scholarly discourses 
separate the morally deserving victims from those who are not (Lee 2011; Doezema 2010). The 
migrant sex worker is pitted against the sexually exploited trafficking victim, a distinction 
implicit in the language and aims of the UN Human Trafficking Protocol  (Doezema 2005). 
The dichotomy of the sex slave-sex worker reflects deep-seated ideological approaches to 
ZRPHQ¶VDXWRQRP\'RH]HPDFRQWHQGVWKDW:HVWHUQIHPLQLVWDFWLYLVWVKDYH an attachment to 
WKHLGHDRIµWhird-world-SURVWLWXWH¶ZKRLVDQHPEOHPIRUµVXIIHULQJERGLHV¶(Doezema 2001). 
Far from being a compassionate or protective endeavour, disciplining the colonial others 
through the metaphor of injured bodies is central to advance the identity and political 
prerogatives of Western feminists as emancipated subjects of rights within their own countries 
(Mohanty 1988). One of the criticisms of prostitution abolitionists, who categorically reject sex 
work as a choice, is that abolitionism appropriates suffering for its own political and ideological 
purposes (Doezema 2005; 2010; Soderlund 2005).The trope of the suffering female body has 
been also articulated as a characteristic of drug mules. Law-enforcement authorities expect 
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female drug mules to perform and show their victimhood (Schemenauer 2012). Naturalized 
models of motherhood play a significant role in the narratives of what Schemenauer calls the 
µNQRZLQJVXEMHFWV¶RIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOGUXJWUDGHVXFKDVFXVWRPVRIILFHUVSUREDWLRQRIILFHUV
issuing pre-sentencing reports and defence attorneys. Drug mules are assumed to be peaceful, 
vulnerable, and weak; while the state distinguishes them from the ruthless hyper-masculine 
criminals supposedly using them. The dichotomy of the violent narco-trafficker and the passive 
PXOH ³UHLQIRUFHV WKH GUXJ ZDU logic and the protector±SURWHFWHG´ UROHV RQ ZKLFK LW WKULYHV
(Schemenauer 2012, 94±95). Additionally, Schemenauer stresses how victim discourses deny 
DJHQF\ E\ UHDIILUPLQJ ³/DWLQ $PHULFDQ DQG &DULEEHDQ ZRPHQ¶V DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK SRYHUW\
LQQRFHQFHDQGPRVWLPSRUWDQWO\PRWKHUKRRG´(ibid. 93).     
 The victim discourse not only drives the attention to poor, foreign, women crossing 
international borders, but also practices that seek to differentiate the genuine and fake  drug 
PXOH6FKHPHQDXHUXQGHUVFRUHV WKH LPSOLFLW MXGJHPHQWPDGHDJDLQVWGUXJPXOHVZKR³XVH
notions of femininity DQGZRPDQKRRG WR WKZDUW WKHVXVSLFLRXVDXWKRULWLHV´ (ibid., 91). Law 
enforcement discourse interprets failed or deceptive performances of femininity through the 
V\PEROLFFRQWHQWRIµYDPSV¶RUµZKRUHV¶ 
Vamps are the trickster-sisters who strategically perform feminine roles to deceive and 
HVFDSHGHWHFWLRQ7KHµGHFHSWLRQ¶WHQGVWRIDOOXQGHUIRXUEDVLFW\SHVWKHIDNHPRWKHU
the concealment of drugs in feminine body-parts; the fake professional woman; and the 
sexual tease (ibid). The main point is to illustrate how victim narratives backlash 
EHFDXVH WKH\ EROVWHU DXWKRULWLHV¶ MXVWLILFDWLRQV WR PLOLWDUL]H ERUGHUV DQG LQFUHDVH
VXUYHLOODQFHVWUDWHJLHVDJDLQVWHQHPLHVµLPDJLQHGDVPDVFXOLQL]HGGUXJNLQJSLQVLELG
83).  
The following sections explore how gender figures in the literature on drug trafficking. These 
discourses reflect the typologies shaping organized crime literature by organizing drug 
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traffickers characteristics according to their motivations (Dorn et. al 2005). For example, the 
politico-military drug traffickers trade in drugs to finance their struggles against a political 
regime. In contrast, there are also business entrepreneurs whose sole interest profit. Finally, 
RUJDQL]HGFULPHOLWHUDWXUHUHSUHVHQWVGUXJPXOHVDVµDGYHQWXUHUV¶7KDWLVSHRSOHZKRHQJDJH
in the drug trafficking because they have been coerced; pressured by financial debts; or, 
because they seek the excitement of the risk (ibid.). However, these typologies import gendered 
assumptions by alluding to masculinity and femininity tropes. The next sections maps how 
these typologies, embedded in the international legal framework on drug offences, are not 
neutral explanations about the drug trade. Instead, drug control studies traffic particular views 
on gender, race and ethnicity into their analytic frameworks.  
3. Drug control policy: Between securitization and neoliberal management of crime 
Organized crime and security studies typically describe drug traffickers as a threat to the state 
(Dorn et al., 2005), and the illicit GUXJWUDGHDVDµQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\¶FRQFHUQ7KLVDSSURDFKLV
putatively implicit in the history of the international drug control regime, although its punitive 
IDoDGHLVPRUHFOHDUO\WKHSURGXFWRIWKH
ZDURQGUXJV¶UKHWRULFPDGHE\86SUHVLGHQWVLQWKH
1970s-1980s.  The origins of drug control bear little resemblance to the war on drug rhetoric 
because it was actually characterized by a mercantilist dispute over the monopoly of opium 
trade. After the opium wars, the imperial powers proposed a new way  to regulate and reduce 
the opium trade (Mccoy 2000). The Hague Convention of 1912 became the first international 
treaty on drug control, shaped by colonial trade interests in Asia.22  The convention was 
HYHQWXDOO\VXSHUVHGHGE\RWKHUWUHDWLHVDQGWRGD\¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOGUXJFRQWUROV\VWHPZKLFK
ZLOO EH H[SODLQHG EHORZ %HIRUH WKDW LW LV LPSRUWDQW WR FODULI\ µLOOHJDO GUXJV¶ ZHUH TXLWH
                                                          
22
 Britain imposed its economic interests onto China, forcing this country to legalise opium so that Britain could 
export opium from its East India Company, produced in the colonized region of Bengal. The revenues from the 
Chinese market were highly lucrative and sustained British colonialism in India (Green 1998, 108)   
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common in Victorian Britain for medical purposes (Bancroft 2009). The first law regulating 
the use of drugs in Britain was the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1920, which condensed a number 
of war time regulations prohibiting the possession of opium and cocaine because they were 
blamed for hampering the effectiveness of the troops (Green 1998). The 1920 Act was the first 
national statute limiting the importation, exportation, and production of opioid derivatives and 
³HQDEOHGWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPWRUDWLI\WKH+DJXH&RQYHQWLRQRI´ (Fortson 2005, 12). 
The 1920 Act was repealed by the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, to be discussed in more detail in 
chapter VI. Drug regulation significantly expanded during the twentieth century, both in the 
VFRSHRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOSURKLELWLRQVDQGUHVWULFWLRQVDJDLQVWWKHWUDGHRIµDOWHULQJ¶VXEVWDQFHV
(Bruun et. al., 1975; UNODC 2008).  Under the mandate of the League of Nations, nations 
added claims to limit the trade of certain substances across borders, increasing the scope of 
substances regulated through the creation of more multilateral agreements (UNODC 2008). 
The Second World War suspended international cooperation but was resumed soon after by 
the United Nations through the 1946 resolutions transferring the responsibilities of the 
international drug treaties of the League of Nations to the Commission of Narcotic Drugs 
(United Nations Economic and Social Council 1946). The Commission is a functional 
commission of the Economic and Social Council and the main body dealing with controlled 
substance policy. It consolidated the pre-war treaties into the UN Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs 1961, which is the main international drug control instrument in operation 
today along with the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The Single 
Convention has a number of aims which will not be discussed at length here as they are largely 
mirrored in the domestic statute, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.    
 Key figures of the anti-alcohol movement participated negotiation of the Single 
Convention and arguably shaped the moral language condemning the personal use of drugs and 
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the prohibitionist approach (Boister 1995). In contrast, Germany and the UK proposed a 
regulatory approach that would limit personal consumption through taxes amongst other 
methods (Bruun et al. 1975). The result was a balance between the member states interested in 
protecting the commercial interests of the pharmaceutical industry and the ones which 
advocated for the criminalization of drug use and illicit drug trade (Bruun et. al. 1975). Drug 
control is characterised by a two-pronged approach which allows the use, production, trade, 
etc. when it is intended for medical and scientific purposes. Anything else, for example 
recreational drug use, is considered illicit. Of course, those categories (medical or recreational), 
under-researched and constantly contested (Taylor 2008).    
What stands out in the Single Convention of 1961 is the characterisation of the drug 
WUDGH DV ³HYLO.´23  Rick Lines argues that no other UN treaty addressing issues considered 
abhorrent to the international community - such as slavery, apartheid or torture - uses similar 
terminology (Lines 2010). Drugs have also been depicted in UN documents as a potential 
ZHDSRQ IRU³the most KLGHRXVFULPHVDJDLQVWPDQNLQG´ (ibid,10)7KH µH[LVWHQWLDO UKHWRULF¶
surrounding drug control can be traced back to the pre-United Nations treaties. Paul 
Gootenberg argues that anti-drug rhetoric and laws served to reverse the roles in exploitation 
relationships through narratives which depicted immigrants and racial others as those who 
µHQVODYHG¶ ZKLWH SHRSOH ZLWK WKHLU GUXJV (Gootenberg 2005). At the turn of the twentieth 
century and the demise of colonialism and slavery, foreign drug merchants were represented 
DVSUHGDWRUV³YLSHUV´DQG³VQDNHV´, inIHVWLQJWKHFRXQWU\ZLWKWKHLU³YHQRP´ (ibid.7KHµHYLO¶
nature of the illicit drug trade was coXSOHGLQWKHVWRWKHµZDURQGUXJV¶UKHWRULF7KLV
policy, born in the U.S. has since spread throughout the world through foreign aid mechanisms 
(Norton-Hawk 2009; Barrett 2010). President Richard Nixon told the US Congress in 1971 that 
drug addiction KDG³assumed the dimHQVLRQVRIDQDWLRQDOHPHUJHQF\´ (Vullyamy 2011). In 
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 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, preamble, [6]-[7]. 
54 
 
the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan framed illicit drug trade as an issue of national security 
against external threats (Morales 1989). Curtis Marez suggests that the militaristic discourse 
SUHFHGHGWKHDFWXDOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI5HDJDQ¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOGUXJZDUVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\86
military complicity in international drug trafficking.  The bellicose discourse began as a 
pervasiYH³PDVVPHGLDHYHQW´(Marez 2004, 2±3) against crack cocaine use amongst already 
marginalised communities (Acker 2010), but eventually translated into the militarisation of 
drug control (Corva 2009) $OWKRXJK WKH µGUXJ ZDU¶ VWDUWHG DV D UKHWRULFDO SOR\ 3DWULFN
Gallahue argues it is a metaphor WKDWKDVEHFRPHµUHDO¶(Gallahue 2011a) in many countries. 
Links made between drug trafficking and terrorism are troublesome examples of how war and 
crime have become indistinct. The blurred lines between drug war and drug crimes has been 
reaffirmed in presidential statements at the UN Security Council, where international drug 
trafficking has been described as global security problem rather than a health problem (ibid.).
 While the punitive style of American drug policy is unique, it arguably has a more 
global influence because the bellicose logic was institutionalised the Convention against the 
Illicit Trafficking of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (Stewart 1989).  Again, 
the treaty negotiations were led by the US, whose domestic policies favoured increased funding 
for law enforcement and less for treatment for drug dependency, and increased international 
cooperation mechanisms (such as mutual legal assistance) to prosecute global trafficking 
(Boister 1995). Although punitive approaches to crime could be considered associated to 
SROLWLFDO FRQVHUYDWLYLVP (WKDQ 1DGHOPDQ VKRZV KRZ WKH µGUXJ ZDU¶ UKHWRULF  KDV EHHQ
replicated and embraced by communist, socialist, democratic, autocratic, and imperial 
governments alike (Nadelman 1990).  
 As suggested earlier, securitization is shaped by notions of masculinity and femininity 
(Kimmel 2003a; Schemenauer 2012; Pickering 2014)µ7RXJKPDVFXOLQLVP¶LVGHSOR\HGZKHQ
the state perceives itself to be vulnerable to symbolical injuries (Kimmel 2003b; Butler 2009a). 
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Governments embrace border securitization narratives, justified and expressed through 
existential threat speech acts, which affirm their resolve to face the multiple threats of the 
globalized world (Crick 2012). Emily Crick argues that the concept of security is not an 
objective situation; rather, it is the political result of a specific speech acts against the State 
(ibid). State-actors identify with the notion of the international community fighting drugs as if 
LWZHUHDXQLWHG µJOREDO VHOI¶FRQVWUXFWHGDURXQG WKH LGHD WKDW WKH6LQJOH&RQYHQWLRQ is the 
JXDUGLDQRIPDQNLQGUHVSRQVLEOHIRUHOLPLQDWLQJWKHµHYLO¶RIGUXJV(Lines 2010). Bolstered by 
a perception of morally superiority articulated as a battle between good and evil (Crick 2012), 
judicial and political authorities reverberate these speech acts uncritically. For example, judges 
in England and Wales commonly preface sentencing decisions with remarks like the following: 
³the dangers of these drugs, the damage they cause both to those who take them and to society 
at large is such that the courts have taken the view those harsh deterrent sentences must be 
visited on those who KHOS WRSURPRWH WKLVHYLO WUDGH´.24 In terms of political accountability, 
securitization strategies may by-SDVV OHJLWLPDWH SROLWLFDO DUHQD DQG HYHQ ³IUDPH DOWHUQDWLYH
GLVFRXUVHV DV LPPRUDO DQG LUUDWLRQDO´ (Crick 2012, 413). While political dissent may be 
FRPSURPLVHGE\WKH³H[LVWHQWLDOUKHWRULF´RIGUXJFRQWURO&ULFNVXJJHVWVWhat de-securitization 
is not impossible (ibid). The task of critical scholarship in drug policy is to show the processes 
that normalise the way drug policy is construed. In that sense, the next section elaborates on 
one of the dominant frames used to explain, understand and criminalise drug supply offences, 
including trafficking. 
4. Economic metaphors and neoliberal interpretations of crime 
Drug markets are studied as if they were legitimate business through economic models of crime 
control (Teichman and Broude 2009). The distinct language and metaphor of the market 
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 R. v Basoah [2004] EWCA Crim 104 [7]. 
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(Wacquant 2009) applies analytical tools such DVµVXSSO\¶DQGµGHPDQG¶LQRUGHUWRXQGHUVWDQG
WKH PRWLYDWLRQV RI FULPLQDO DFWRUV 'UXJ WUDIILFNLQJ FDQ EH FRQVLGHUHG D µEXVLQHVV¶ RU DQ
µHQWHUSULVH¶ZKHUHEX\HUVDQGVHOOHUV WUDGH LOOLFLWJRRGV (Wright 2006; Jenner 2014). In the 
1970s, the term transnationalism, used in political and economic theories, entered the discourse 
of criminology, describing new forms of crime which were eventually named as transnational 
organised crime (Felsen and Kalaitzidis 2005). Thus conceived, drug traffickers are rather 
international criminal entrepreneurs (Dorn et. al., 2005) ZKRVH PDLQ JRDO LV WR ³SURVSHU
FRPPHUFLDOO\ZLWKRXWEHLQJGLVWXUEHG´(Lee 1991, 9). Coupled with a political and juridical 
analysis, drug trafficking also figures as a threat to the rule of law (UNODC 2012b) which 
weakens the legitimacy of the state institutions and delays the delivery of basic needs to citizens 
(Costa 2008).          
 Through the frame of the market, the most pervasive explanation for drug crimes is 
economic gain (Seddon 2000). Of course, there are different views on economic issues, and 
the study of crime has been influenced by neoliberal scholarship. Bernard Harcourt shows how 
neoliberal scholars from the University of Chicago25 had a considerable impact on shaping 
drugs crime-control policy, mainly propitiating a shift away from criminological theories based 
on psychological motives and social context explanations (Harcourt 2011). Rational choice 
WKHRU\H[SODLQVFULPLQDO³FKRLFHV´DORQJOLQHVRIFRVWVDQGEHQHILWV (Harcourt 2011, 133±134). 
5LFKDUG3RVQHUZDVRQHRIWKHILUVWWR³HPEHGWKHIUHH-market presumption right into the very 
FRQFHSWLRQRIFULPH´(ibid., 136) SUHFLVHO\E\LQWHUSUHWLQJVRPHRIIHQFHVDVDIRUPRI³PDUNHW
by-SDVVLQJ´ LELG 3RVQHU¶V WKHVLV LV VLPSOH DQG SRZHUIul; but also imports a capitalist 
morality, which condemns free-riders who seek to accumulate wealth by cheating the rules of 
the labour market (ibid.). In the words of  Alhaji Ahmadu Giade, the former chairman of the 
                                                          
25
 A key notion developed by Milton Friedman, who was in favour of drug liberalization, was that people get 
LQYROYHGLQFULPHµDVWKHLU SRVLWLRQLQWKHOHJLWLPDWHPDUNHWGHWHULRUDWHV¶:HVWHUQHWDO2IFRXUVHWKH
profitability illicit drug trade becomes an incentive from a rational point of view (Thoumi and Windybank 2007) 
though the higher the risk, the more profit that one can make.  
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NDLEA National Drug Enforcement Agency of Nigeria, a courier caught smuggling drugs into 
WKH8.HPERGLHGD³PRUDOGHJHQHUDF\WKDWLQFOXGHVJUHHGDQGXQZLOOLQJQHVVWRSHUIRUPKRQHVW
ZRUN´ (Klein 2009, 388). Chapter VI shows the influence of these frameworks on legal 
judgements and the category of the courier described in the Court of Appeal as people who 
want quick and easy money.         
 The morality implicit in economic analyses is a barrier to drug research because it 
GULYHVDZD\WKHDWWHQWLRQIURP³HPSLULFDOUHVHDUFKRQZLWKDERXWWUDIILFNHUV´)OHHWZRRG
EXWLWDOVRLPSRUWVWKH³ODQJXDJHRIFRQWURO´LQWR the frames of analysis (Gootenberg 2005). 
,Q WKDW VHQVH UHVHDUFK GLVFRXUVH ³WDONV OLNH WKH VWDWH´ EHFDXVH LW HQGRUVHV WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ
EHWZHHQLOOLFLWOLFLWGUXJV*RRWHQEHUJDUJXHVWKLVELQDU\LVVKDSHGE\³HODERUDWHIDQWDVLHVDERXW
human loss of control - RU LQYHUVHO\ IDQWDVLHV DERXW WKH VWDWH¶V SRVVLEOH µFRQWURO¶ RI WKH
psychoactive reDOP´LELGP\HPSKDVLV7KHIDQWDV\RIFRQWUROGRHVQRWDSSO\RQO\WR
markets, but also to international security threats. Some examples in history also show how the 
ODQJXDJHRIFRQWUROKDVEHHQPDUVKDOOHGDJDLQVWJHQGHUHGDQGUDFLDOL]HGµRWKHUV¶For example, 
Marez explains how the Mexican drug criminal of the U.S. Prohibition Era in the 1930s was 
constructed as a sexual predator who used drugs to assault young, virginal women (Marez 
2004). PerversHVH[XDOLW\FRXSOHGWRGUXJV³KHOSHGWRSURPRWHSROLFHDFWLRQVE\LPEXLQJGUXJ
HQIRUFHPHQW ZLWK WDERRHG HURWLF IDQWDVLHV´ LELG +RZHYHU RWKHU VRFLDO DQG SROLWLFDO
dynamics were brewing at the time. Marez argues that the criminalization of cannabis in the 
86 VXSSRUWHG ³WKH FDSLWDOLVW GHPDQGV IRU ODERXU GLVFLSOLQH DQG FRQWURO´ LELG  DW D
moment when migrant communities demanded recognition for their labour-rights. Although 
WKHWHUPµPXOH¶LVFRQVLGHUHGGHURJDWRU\(Fleetwood 2014), it may also bring back into sight 
an aspect of social labour relations. Marez suggests that the romanticized image of Mexican-
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American labour relations,26 symbolised by the migrant and the donkey, was eventually 
juxtaposed to the unruly radical Mexican (Marez 2004, 118). Thus, the labour migrant would 
be disciplined through the criminalisation of cannabis imported from Mexico. One of the 
VWULNLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFVGHULYHGIURPUHIHUULQJWRVRPHDFWRUVLQWKHGUXJWUDGHDVµGUXJPXOHV¶
is how the name implies servitude, being like a working animal. This reference was explicitly 
addressed by the trial judge in the English case of Surina27 to differentiate roles between co-
defendants: 
Surina was the mug with the drugs around his waist, you financed this operation, made 
all the arrangements, bought all the tickets, he was the donkey, the mule who came 
through with you on this amateurish effort.28 
The suggestion throughout section is not that economic analyses are not helpful to drug 
trafficking research. To the contrary, the history of economic thought shows the diversity of 
this field of study. However, monetary vocabularies of the market render invisible the social 
dramas behind the experiences of drug mules and how they became part of the drug trade 
(Torres 2008, 185)5HVHDUFKEDVHGRQPLFURHFRQRPLFVIHWLVKL]HWKHµREMHFWLYH¶DQGDEVWUDFW
signifiers RI GUXJ FRQWURO VXFK DV µRSHUDWLRQV¶ µGUXJ VHL]XUHV¶ FKDQJHV LQ SXULW\ GHPDQG-
VXSSO\G\QDPLFVDQGµWUDGHURXWHV¶LELG7KHµTXDQWLILFDWLRQORJLF¶ LVQRWRQO\DSSOLHGWR
measure the situation of the world drug problem (through indicators about drug use, arrests, 
markets, supply and demand dynamics), but it becomes the measure for policy effectiveness 
and shaping the reality. For example, countries depending on financial aid from the US have 
to fulfil arrest quotas to prove their progress (Ponton and Torres 2007). The first to be caught 
DUHRIWHQWKHµH[SHQGDEOH¶DFWRUVLQWKHGUXJWUDIILFNLQJFKDLQVXFKDVIDUPHUVGUXJPXOHV
                                                          
26
 3DVWRUDOSDLQWLQJVLQWKH86RIWHQUHSUHVHQWHG0H[LFDQZRUNHUVWKURXJKWKHLPDJHRI µKDSS\¶0H[LFDQVRQ
donkeys, trading legal goods across the border.      
27
 R v. Surina (CA 20 November 2000) 
28
 ibid (n 27) [4]. 
59 
 
street dealers, and consumers (Edwards 2003; WOLA 2011). Arrests of drug mules help 
institutions meet drug seizure targets (Green 1998).  In short, it is an approach that totalizes the 
legal, academic and political discourse. Moreover, the market metaphor also justifies 
FRQFHSWXDOLVLQJWKHGUXJWUDGHDVD³VHULHVRIDXWRPDWLFSURFHVVHV´WKDWWHQGWR³PDUJLQDOLVH
qXHVWLRQV DERXWJHQGHU DQGH[SORLWDWLRQ´ (Fleetwood 2014, 25). Expunged of race, gender, 
QDWLRQDOLW\WKHDOOHJHGµQHXWUDO¶ODQJXDJHRIHFRQRPLFDQDO\Vis effaces the constrained socio-
political contexts of oppression in which people make choices (Sudbury 2005; Sudbury 2010; 
Fleetwood 2014).         
 Aware of the politics of exclusion through colonial labour dynamics, William 
Jankowiak DQG 'DQLHO %UDGEXUG¶ KLVWRULFDO DQG DQWKURSRORJLFDO DQDO\VLV H[SORUHV WKH OLQNV
between European colonial expansion and the drug trade from the sixteenth to nineteenth 
century (Bradburd and Jankowiak 2003). Coca was often used to enhance productivity or 
overcome drudging labour in the Andean Spanish colonies. The irony is that current drug wars 
today are now engaged against drug producing countries by former European colonies which 
originally introduced the drug trade as colonial powers seeking economic expansion. The point 
being made in this analysis is not to deny the economic processes underpin the drug trade. 
Instead, my claim is that it need broaden the epistemological and methodological scope by 
including a social and political analysis. Development studies (Youngers and Walsh 2010), 
post-colonial theory (Agozino et al. 2009), neo-colonialism (Oriola 2006) and labour dynamics 
(Zaitch 2002; Fleetwood 2014), counter the mechanistic explanations of market dynamics by 
situating actors within the context of  power-dynamics, oppression, and history.     
 Although this project does not explain empirically why women and men accept to do 
drug mule work, the question is implicit in the sentencing narratives and the research. There 
are two dominant approaches to this question: either they need money or want money. One 
stresses necessity and the other is a gain read in light of social norms of legitimate ways to 
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acquire money. The appeal of understanding crime through economy necessity is undeniable 
but also one to be used with caution because it resonates with neoliberal and mainstream 
feminisms which understand FRQVXPHULVWµIUHHGRP¶DVgender empowerment. Nina Power calls 
LW WKHSDUDGLJPRI WKHµRQHGLPHQVLRQDO¶ZRPDQ3RZHUZKRVH LQGLYLGXDO LGHQWLW\ LV
defined by the power to purchase her femininity. Echoing the critique on the morality implicit 
in crime analyses at the beginning of this section, liberal feminists have been sustained by the 
idea of white women freed by entering the work-IRUFHZKLOHWKHFULPLQDOµRWKHU¶WKHLOOHJDO
PLJUDQW WKH SURVWLWXWH RU WKH GUXJ PXOH LV VHHQ DV VRPHRQH ZKR FDQQRW µJHW LW WRJHWKHU¶
according to the social and cultural neoliberal demands of production and consumption 
(Eisenstein 2009).  Mainstream politics emphasising personal responsibility implicitly judge 
women who participate in informal economies because they fail to conform to the middle-class, 
white, working woman (Eisenstein 2009). Neoliberal feminisms lose sight of how globalization 
has been built on the backs of foreign women and men marginalized from economic power, 
sustaining the domestic work-force formerly done also by white women (ibid.). Depending on 
the context of the discourse, the use of economic frames to explain the motivations of drug 
mules DQGFRXULHUVPD\PLVILUHDQGHQFRXUDJHD MXGJHPHQWDERXW WKHµSURSHUXVH¶RIRQH¶V
freedom characteristic of neoliberal ideology.       
 Furthermore, a gender-neutral approach cannot be achieved simply by analogizing drug 
offenders to business criminals. Globalization studies note how mainstream drug trafficking 
literature reproduces the view that the feminine (woman drug mule) is local while the 
masculine LQWHUQDWLRQDOGUXJWUDIILFNHULVJOREDOUHIHUHQFHQHHGHG,IµWUDQVQDWLRQDOEXVLQHVV
PDVFXOLQLW\¶LVDKHJHPRQLFWURSH(Connell and Wood 2005), one must question and unpack 
the gendered construction of the business criminal in drug trafficking literature. Framing mules 
DQG FRXULHUV DV µHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ ZKR WDNH FDOFXODWHG ULVNV DQG UDWLRQDO EXVLQHVV GHFLVLRQV
rational decisions and calculated risks (Dorn et. al., 2005) blurs gender differences before and 
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during the process of trafficking drugs (Fleetwood 2014). In other words, what is called a 
µUDWLRQDOFKRLFH¶LVDQRWKHUYHUVLRQRIDQGUR-centrism. Women are condemned as bad mothers 
to trick law enforcement bad workers who by-pass the labour market to earn quick money; but 
DOVR DV XQGHVHUYLQJ µWKLUG ZRUOG¶ YLFWLPV ZKR SHUIRUP HURWLFL]HG UROHV UDWKHU WKDQ EHLQJ
passive preys to drug traffickers (Schemenauer 2012).     
 In that sense, discourses about women drug mules struggle to explain criminal 
responsibility without considering gender and victimization. At the same time, invoking 
situations of victimhood run the risk of reifying gendered assumptions if female identity was 
defined by victimhood. Vulnerability discourses may tap on the idea of risk and manage and 
control potential threats that need to be securitised (Munro and Scoular 2012). The next section 
explores the neoliberal risk management measures adopted to counter crime risks (Bell 2011, 
167) which gain authority by justifying the protection vulnerable individuals, communities and 
more generally the state. 
5. Vulnerability and criminal justice: Between risk mitigation and punitive 
sentencing 
Victimhood discourses seeking to condemn the effects of drug law enforcement represent 
ZRPHQDVµSULVRQHUVRIZDU¶(Huling 1995) RUµFROODWHUDOGDPDJH¶1RUWRQ-Hawk 2010) of the 
drug war inaccurately suggest that women are not targeted by crime control policies. Women 
recede to the background, as if law enforcement did not act upon them directly through 
profiling practices (Lawrence and Williams 2006; Schemenauer 2012). The assumption that 
women drug mules are passive, unintentional victims of drug traffickers paradoxically makes 
them more likely to be the subject of state control adopting paternalistic protection practices.




more actuarial forms of risk-assessment and managHPHQW´(Munro and Scoular 2012, 190), 
EROVWHULQJ WKH LPDJH RI WKH VWDWH DV D µEHQHYROHQW¶ DFWRU 'LVFXVVLQJ WKH 8.¶V DSSURDFK WR
human trafficking, Munro and Scoular note that YLFWLPGLVFRXUVHV³DWWDFK WKHFRQGLWLRQWRR
firmly to the individual herself and accept uncritically the appropriateness of criminal law as a 
PHFKDQLVP´RIHUDGLFDWLRQLELG7KHDPELJXLW\RIWKHWHUPµYXOQHUDELOLW\¶DVDGRSWHGE\
state institutions arguably increases the risk and stigmatization of marginalized populations. 
Vulnerability is duplicitous in the sense that, in this case sex workers are considered vulnerable 
individuals, but also the cause RIRWKHUSHRSOH¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\.29 Similarly, drug policies portray 
the vulnerability of the general population to drug addiction, a view which is in tension with 
the vulnerability of drug mules.        
 As I will explain and show in the case study, drug policy and sentencing discourses 
have adopted vulnerability as a very loose term translated in a dangerous, productive 
ambiguity. Whether vulnerability is considered innate or circumstantial, the recognition of 
vulnerability is shrouded by political inclusions and exclusions. Most commonly, political 
discRXUVHDWWULEXWHVYXOQHUDELOLW\WRµOHVVDEOHG¶DQGµWUDXPDWLVHG¶ERGLHVZKRKDYHVXIIHUHG
IURPVXEVWDQFHDEXVHµFKDRWLF¶HPRWLRQDOOLYHVSHUVRQVZLWKGLVDELOLWLHVDQGRUZLWKDKLVWRU\
of sexual and domestic abuse (Corston 2007). Martha Fineman argues that in the face of 
vulnerable subjects, state responsiveness is required as opposed to rolling-back the support of 
social institutions (Fineman 2010). Despite the appeal of vulnerability discourses, Munro and 
6FRXODU ZDUQ DJDLQVW WKH ³PXWXDOO\ UH-affirming relationship between constructions of the 
µYXOQHUDEOHVXEMHFW¶DQGRIWKHµYXOQHUDEOHVWDWH¶´ (Munro and Scoular 2012, 197). In other 
words, the language of vulnerability has been used by political actors to expand the reach of 
WKHVWDWHWKURXJKLQFUHDVLQJFULPLQDOLVDWLRQRIµULVN¶LQGLYLGXDOVZKHWKHUWKH\DUHat risk or 
pose a risk to others).          
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 For example, street sex workers impact on the vulnerability of children or local residents. 
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 When state actors become concerned about risks posed by criminal subjects, actuarial 
models of risk analysis are one of the tools deployed to identify and manage potential these 
µSRWHQWLDO WKUHDWV¶ 7KH DFWXDULDO PRGHO LV  D ³PRGH RI EXUHDXFUDWLF PDQDJHPHQW RI FULPH
LQYROYLQJDVW\OHRIWKRXJKWWKDWHPSKDVL]HVDJJUHJDWLRQSUREDELOLWLHVDQGULVNFDOFXODWLRQ´
(Harcourt 2003, 106).  In basic terms, the actuarial rationality seeks to predict criminality by 
knowing the criminal subject through probabilistic inference. By individualizing the offender, 
the criminal justice institutions have the knowledge which could help them identify and pre-
HPSWFULPH+RZHYHUWKLVDSSURDFKKDVKDG³VHULRXVFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKHZD\ZHWKLQNDERXW
DQGHQJDJHLQODZHQIRUFHPHQWVHQWHQFLQJDQGSXQLVKPHQW´(Harcourt 2001, 135) because it 
LVPRUHWKDQMXVWµWDPLQJ¶DQGFRQWUROOLQJWKHFKDQFHVRISRtential crimes to happen. Instead,  
it also can be seen as shaping crime statistics (Harcourt 2003). For example, profiling couriers 
became an essential tool to counter drug trafficking in the US from the late 1970s to the 1980s. 
6HDUFKHVE\ERUGHUDJHQWVZHUHWULJJHUHGE\DFRPELQDWLRQRIµFRXULHU¶ behaviours, such as 
nervousness, and demographic characteristics, including gender, race, or nationality (Harcourt 
2001).  Although the US courts attributed a high degree of sophistication and specialization to 
these practices (Rudovsky 1999; Harcourt 2001), Harcourt maintains that:  
«UDFLDOSURILOLQJDVVXPLQJLWVSUHPLVHVDQGIL[HGODZHQIRUFHPHQWUHVRXUFHVPD\EH
a self-confirming prophecy. It likely aggravates over time the assumed correlation 
EHWZHHQUDFHDQGFULPH7KLVFRXOGEHFDOOHGD³FRPSRXQG´RU³PXOWLSOLHU´RU³UDWFKHW´
effect of criminal profiling: profiling may have an accelerator effect on disparities in the 
criminal justice system (Harcourt 2001, 147). 
One objection to self-fulfilling prophecy argument could be that certain groups actually carry 
out more crimes than others or that they will adapt to profiling and change the behaviour 
accordingly. While all of this might be true, HarcourW VXJJHVWV WKDW³HYHQ LI WKHXQGHUO\LQJ
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assumptions of profiling are right, there may nevertheless EHDGYHUVHFRPSRXQGLQJHIIHFWV´
(ibid., 149).          
 Profiling may not be simply an issue of discrimination but also a response to 
institutional demands and constraints, a way to make crime control more efficient. In England, 
customs officers similarly developed courier profiles throughout the 1980s (Green 1998, 149). 
Although the precise characteristics of the offender were not clear, Green suggests nationality 
played an important role (ibid.). Green also maps the institutional shifts shaping drug 
interdiction practices. During the 1990s, the Labour government cut significantly the budget of 
Customs and Excise and substituted the loss of labour force with a change in strategy. Firstly, 
through greater emphasis on investigation and intelligence work; and secondly, rationalising 
the resources without affecting the interdiction of drugs (ibid.,148±153). By scaling back of 
resources and introducing a rationale of quantitative efficiency, the Customs and Excise 
HPEUDFHG WKH ³FXOW RI PDQDJHULDOLVP´ ZKHUH SHUIRUPDQFH ZDV PHDVXUHG WKURXJK WKH
expediency to achieve the institutional targets (ibid., 151). 
 The main point addressed in this section is how the actuarial rationality underpins 
contemporary drug control approaches in England and Wales. Although profiling does not 
explicitly target people by their race or gender, the shift is in how profiling is framed through 
tKHGLVSHUVHGFDWHJRU\RIµULVN¶which under-funded institutions need to avert. For example, 
the UK Border Agency (UKBA) stressed in a 2009 report on the cocaine trade that it did not 
WDUJHWSHRSOHEDVHGRQHWKQLFLW\,QVWHDGLWVWRSSHGLQGLYLGXDOVRQWKHEDVLVRIµULVNIDFWRUV¶ 
which included the travel origin and route; travel history; purchase of the ticket; baggage 
information; and records of prior smuggling attempts. Other indicators included behaviour and 
direct observation by UKBA officers of passengers upon disembarking. The report also stated 
that the UKBA did not only target South Americans but also North Europeans as the arrest 
statistics showed a high percentage (38 per cent in 2009) of drug mules belonged to that group 
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(Home Affairs Committee 2009, para 137). Thus, the House Affairs Committee concluded 
WKHUHZHUHQRJURXQGV³IRULQWURGXFLQJSURILOLQJRISDVVHQJHUVRQWKHEDsis of nationality or 
HWKQLFLW\´EXWLWVXSSRUWHGWKH³risk-EDVHGWDUJHWLQJRISDVVHQJHUVHQWHULQJWKH8.´XVLQJIOLJKW
information and intelligence reports (ibid., para 141-142). While UKBA does not explicitly 
targeting on nationality or ethnicity, it still does not eliminate the fact that attention to 
geographical travel origin is prioritized. If the travel origin is both a hub for drug supply and a 
developLQJFRXQWU\QDWLRQDOVDUHKLJKO\OLNHO\WREHVHDUFKHG7KH8.%$¶VDWWHPSWWRXQOLQN
nationality/ethnicity from geographical travel origin is basically a tautology.   
 Considering the above, the suggestion in this section is the following.  Even if drug 
mules are understood to be akin to victims, the intensification of vulnerability discourses could 
KDYHWKHHIIHFWRILQFUHDVLQJWKHVXUYHLOODQFHRISHRSOHFRQVLGHUHGWREHµDWULVN¶(Jones 2004; 
Munro and Scoular 2012). In the context of actuarial drug control, vulnerability discourses may 
expand the reach of the state through an increasing criminalisation of individuals who are 
figured as vulnerable but also pose a risk to others. The main point I wish to stress it that 
vulnerability discourses are not made in a vacuum. Instead, they are uttered in historical, 
institutional, and political context, which translates claims about vulnerability in different 
ways. That being said, vulnerability discourses about drug mules intersected with the 
increasing securitisation of drug trafficking in the 1980s, which was reflected in higher 
sentences for drug importation. The next section outlines the sentencing law and practices for 
drug importation offences driven by the logic of deterrence and how the 2012 Definitive 
Guidelines seek to address specifically the effects of deterrent sentences on vulnerable drug 
mules.  
6. Deterrence and the exclusion of vulnerability 
Although the measures implemented in the US differ greatly, Green suggests that Britain 
DGRSWHGRI LWV RZQYHUVLRQRI WKH µZDURQGUXJV¶ *UHHQ UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH LQFUHDVLQJ
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penalties and average lengths for drug importation offences in the 1990s (Green 1998; Fortson 
2005). Of course, there are no minimum mandatory sentences  which are at fault for driving 
the prison population in the US (Mauer and King 2007) and judges in the English courts could 
exercise more discretion in sentencing (Ashworth 1990).30 Still, the 1980s social-political 
context shifted towards the securitization of national borders against the threat of drug 
trafficking underpinned by xenophobia (Green 1998). At the same time, Fortson shows the 
increasing penalties had been already began to develop at the end of the 1960s.  For example, 
The Dangerous Drugs Act 1967 increased sentences from the statutory minimum of two years31 
to 10 years regardless of the type of drug imported (ibid.). The trend exacerbated in the 1980s, 
through the Controlled Drugs Penalties Act 1985 established seven years to life as the 
maximum penalty for drug trafficking (ibid., 157), while  the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 
required courts to impose minimum sentences of 7 years or more for offenders with two or 
more convictions of the similar offence (ibid., 154). The House of Lords (HL) justified the 
upward trend stDWLQJ WKDW LW QHHGHG WR GHWHU WKH ³SDUDVLWHV ZKR WUDGH ZLWK KXPDQ PLVHU\´
³PHUFKDQWVRIGHDWK´DQG³HYLOPHQDQGZRPHQZKRDUHPDNLQJKXJHFRPPHUFLDOSURILWVRXW
RIWKHGHVWUXFWLRQRIKXPDQOLYHV´(ibid., 157) .32  
The courts have had also considerable authority to interpret the sentencing requirements 
LQ WKH VWDWXWHV DQG UHIOHFWHG WKDW LQ µJXLGHOLQH MXGJHPHQWV¶ +LVWRULFDOO\ WKH ILUVW JXLGHOLQH
judgements from the Court of Appeal (CA) were handed down by Lawton LJ in the 1970s and 
continued by Lord Lane in the 1980s (Ashworth 2010).  The decision in Aramah33 is a good 
example of a guideline judgement, where Lord Lane set out a minimum of four-year sentence 
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 Andrew Ashworth argues that judges have had discretionary powers in sentences for drug offences (Ashworth 
1990). 
31
 7KH &XVWRPV DQG ([FLVH $FW  DOORZHG D PD[LPXP VHQWHQFH RI WZR \HDU¶V LPSULVRQPHQW IRU GUXJ
importation (Fortson 2005, 91). 
32
 The quotes collected by Green correspond to the debates in the House of Lords (Committee Stage) of the 
Controlled Drugs Penalties Act (1985) (Green 1998). 
33
  (1983) 76 Cr. App. R. 190 
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for Class A drug importers and a maximum of 14 years which was  later adjusted in Bilinsky34, 
after the 1985 Controlled Drugs (Penalties) Act increased the maximum sentence to life.  
*XLGHOLQH MXGJHPHQWV VHW RXW ³JHQHUDO SDUDPHWHUV IRU GHDOLQJ ZLWK VHYHUDO YDULDWLRQV RI D
certain type of offence, considering the main aggravating and mitigating factors, and 
suggesting an appropriate starting point or range of VHQWHQFHV´ (Ashworth 2010, 36). Their 
authoritative and binding effect derived from the fact they were issued by the Lord Justice. 
Strictly speaking, Ashworth argues they could be considered as obiter dicta, known as 
commentaries without a binding effect, but their intention and treatment was to have an 
authoritative effect in a way that other CA judgments are not (ibid., 36).   
 The significance of Aramah¶VJXLGHOLQHV is not only that it is a binding judgment. Its 
content is most revealing of the tension that, as I will argue in chapter VI, continues to this day. 
The struggle is how to accommodate the ambivalence of drug mules. As noted in the chapter 
I, Lord Lane recognised drug muOHV¶ YXOQHUDELOLW\, represented as a characteristic which 
affectHGWKHRIIHQGHU¶VSRZHUVWRUHMHFWDOOXULQJSURVSHFWRIHDV\ money, such as an illness, 
juvenile naiveté, and old age. On the other, this logic also portrays drug mules as individuals 
who are vulnerable to the drug traffickers who exploit those characteristics. In short, we see 
the contours of the trafficker who abuses the vulnerability of old, young, and ill people. Poised 
between victimhood-criminality, the HL still decided in favour of disregarding any personal 
circumstances or characteristics of the drug mule in order to uphold deterrence. Yet, the tension 
and injustice of giving drug mules harsh deterrent sentences, emerged five years later, when 
the CA accepted the obvious harshness of the Aramah guidelines but could only depart from 
them in cases meriting the mercy of the court. As noted in Faluade,35 a mature woman from 
Nigeria who was sick and had a large family to care for:  
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 [1987] Cr App. R 146 
35
 [1989]11 Cr App R (S) 156 
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There are certain cases in which this court can in suitable circumstances act with mercy. 
This we do not see as such a case. Once a person knowingly acts as a courier bringing 
heroin into this country, there is seldom, if ever, any room for mercy.36 
The case introduces the possibility of granting mercy to vulnerable drug mules. It also 
implicitly creates internal distinctions of vulnerability in order to maintain the existing 
guidelines and prevent the floodgates from opening. The case study presented in chapter VI 
develops in depth an analysis of the effect of the doctrine of mercy and its interaction with 
discourses on vulnerable drug mules. Suffice it to say for now that sentencing practices for 
drug mules have been substantially criticised  because the Aramah guidelines impose 
disproportional sentences vis-à-vis the limited role of the mule (Fortson 1996; Green 1998; 
Sentencing Advisory Panel 2009; Harris 2010). In that sense, the Definitive Guidelines for 
Drug Offences (DG)  that came into force on February 27, 201237 (Appendix I), aims for a 
more systematic and balanced approach to roles or the culpability of the offender, particularly 
drug mules (Sentencing Council 2011b). Janet Loveless notes how the DG incorporated some 
of the recommendations made by the Sentencing Advisory Panel, particularly the need for 
proportionality in sentencing for drug offences. However, the SC rejected any changes to 
sentencing ranges (Loveless 2012b). Effectively, the SC retained the policy of deterrence as it 
H[SODLQHGWKDW³WKHJXLGHOLQHDLPVWRLQFUHDVHWKHFRQVLVWHQF\RIVHQWHQFLQJZKLOHOHDYLQJWKH
DYHUDJHVHYHULW\RIVHQWHQFLQJXQFKDQJHG´(Sentencing Council 2011b). At the same time, the 
SC  FRQFHGHGWKDW³WKHLQFUHDVHGIRFXVRQUROHLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHVHQWHQFLQJUDQJHVIRU
LPSRUWDWLRQ RIIHQFHV PD\ UHVXOW LQ D GRZQZDUG VKLIW LQ VHQWHQFHV´ IRU WKH ³VR called drug 
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 R v Faluade [1989]11 Cr App R (S) 156 
37
 The Definitive Guideline (DG) for drug offences are the product of a public consultation convoked by the 
Sentencing Council (SC), a non-departmental public body of the Ministry of Justice created in 2010 which 
substituted the Sentencing Guidelines Council (SGC) and the Sentence Advisor\ 3DQHO 6$3 7KH 6$3¶V
consultation  and draft guidelines on drug offences was submitted to the SCG and then the SC, which  published 
its own draft guidelines in 2011 (Loveless 2012b). 
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PXOHV´ (Sentencing Council 2011b, 4±5). Although I will explain in more detail who is 
considered a drug mule under the current sentencing regime, the SC characterized them as 
vulnerable offenders who were ³HQJDJHG E\ SUHVVXUH LQIOXHQFH LQWLPLGDWLRQ RU UHODWLYHO\
VPDOOUHZDUG´(Sentencing Council 2011c, 1). Finally, it is worth noting how one of documents 
reviewed in the consultation for the DG was a case study of 12 women drug mules 
commissioned by the Sentencing Council in 2011 (Sentencing Council 2011c). This case study 
ZDVFDUULHGRXWLQUHVSRQVH³WRGRFXPHQWHGFRQFHUQV over the circumstances that may lead to 
the offending, the roles they tend to play in these types of offences and the impact of 
LPSULVRQPHQW RQ ZRPHQ DQG WKHLU IDPLOLHV SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH ZLWK FDULQJ UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV´
(ibid., 1). Other characteristics that were highlighted in the case study was how the majority of 
the interviewees were foreign nationals, without their own housing, with significant caring 
responsibilities, and often in financial debt. The SC acknowledges that this case study informed 
the development of the guidelines but it is not quite clear its impact. In other words, are drug 
mules understood only as foreign women with caring responsibilities?  
 While I do admit the case study provides a unique picture on the lives of women who 
have been sentenced for drug trafficking, the DG might end up facing a similar problem noted 
by Sonia Lawrence and Toni Williams after a shift in sentencing practices for drug mules in 
Canada. The Canadian courts considered that drug mules carried out a ³GLVWLQFWive offence 
deserving of mitigation because of the social context ± the racialized identities, impoverished 
FLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGSDUHQWLQJUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV´(Lawrence and Williams 2006, 287). This view 
was clearly taken by the Ontario appellate court in Hamilton,38 which was a considerable break 
from established sentencing practice because the two offenders (black women mules) were 
given a conditional sentence. Lawrence and Williams argue the decisions mirrored partially the 
contextual analysis of women offenders developed by feminist and critical anti-racist 
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 (2003), 172 C.C.C. (3d) 114, 8 C.R. (6th) 215 (Ont. Sup. Ct.J.)  
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VFKRODUVKLS ZKLFK HPSKDVL]HG WKH ³YXOQHUDELOLWLHV DULVLQJ IURP WKH FRPELQHG HIfects of 
RSSUHVVLYHVRFLDOUHODWLRQVH[FOXVLRQDU\VRFLDOSUDFWLFHVDQGYLFWLPL]DWLRQXVXDOO\E\PHQ´
(Lawrence and Williams 2006, 293) . They stress how the courts accepted feminist critique to 
an extent. What the courts fail to take into account are the more radical approaches implicit in 
the scholarship which delegitimizes FULPLQDOMXVWLFHSUDFWLFHVEHFDXVHLW³FDQQRWDGGUHVVWKH
SUREOHPVWKDWGUDZZRPHQLQWRFULPH´LEid., 293). For that reason, the authors caution against 
celebrating the judicial construction of drug mules in Hamilton39 EHFDXVHLWPDGH³TXHVWLRQDEOH
links EHWZHHQEODFNZRPHQSRYHUW\GUXJVDQGFULPH´(ibid.,289). Within the frame of the 
penal logic, sensitivity to the context of women drug mules could end up reinforcing profiling 
practices and without challenging the demonization of drug offences (ibid). The re-affirmation 




to mitigate how punishment descends upon them´LELG    
 A similar concern arises in this project in relation to the Definitive Guidelines for Drug 
Offences. Chapter VI shows how the English Court of Appeal characterisation of drug mules 
also draws dubious links between foreign women, poverty and crime. Although the sentencing 
guidelines are couched in gender neutral language which does not single out drug mules as 
women, the attention to women drug mules poses difficult questions about how to mainstream 
gender into criminal justice and its effects. As discussed in the introduction, there is an obvious 
need to consider how sentencing practices for drug trafficking affects women and how 
sentencing practices have been androcentric  (Raeder 1995; Fleetwood and Haas 2011), there 
are different ways to portray women that may reify norms of femininity and exclude women 
who fail to fit into the norms, as discussed in the first section of this chapter. One of the concern 
addressed in this project is how discourses on women drug mules represent victimhood and 
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whether vulnerability discourses import a particular notion of feminine victimhood.  The next 
section unpacks the different ways gender has been addressed in the literature on women drug 
mules.  
7. Unpacking femininity:  Women drug mules and relational notions of femininity 
Recalling the discussion at the beginning of this chapter, gendering the subject of crime calls 
for a persistent balancing act between accounting for factors contributing to victimization of 
women without negating or masculinizinJ ZRPHQ¶V agency (Mardorossian 2014). The 
following discussion shows how research unpacks gender in drug mule work. There are 
different themes that rXQWKURXJKRXWWKHOLWHUDWXUHVXFKDVUDFHQDWLRQDOLW\ZRPHQ¶VFDULQJ
responsibilities, sexualised feminine bodies, and exploitative gender relations framing 
ZRPHQ¶VDJHQF\One of the most common arguments, emphasized in articles and reports, is 
how socio-economic, political and gender dynamics partake in the context of the offences and 
WKHRIIHQGHUV¶OLYHV)DFWRUVWKDWH[SODLQZRPHQ¶VHQJDJHPHQWLQWKHGUXJWUDGHLQFOXGHWKH
feminization of poverty 2¶&RQQRU; the traditional roles women fulfil in the home based 
on caring and family responsibilities (Diaz-Cotto 2005; United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean 2007; Del Olmo 1990; WOLA 2011; Giacomello 2013); 
and racial and socio-economic discrimination underpinning drug control strategies (Joseph 
2006; Bewley-Taylor et. al., 2007).         
 Motherhood and poverty figure prominently in the description of women drug mules 
by international governmental and non-governmental organisations. For example, reports by 
UN bodies  often reference the poverty of women who smuggle drugs in order to secure 
alternative income to sustain the household (International Organization for Migration 2009; 
Fleetwood and Haas 2011; Schemenauer 2012). Studies on drug mules imprisoned across the 
world explain how the burden of caring responsibilities for children (Huling 1995; Kampfner 
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2005; Diaz-Cotto 2005; Giacomello 2013; Pieris 2014) or of relatives experiencing an illness 
(Klein 2009) precipitated the incursion into the drug trade. Caring responsibilities weigh 
heavier on women because of gendered divisions of labour (Del Olmo 1990), exacerbated 
among women who are single parents (Kampfner 2005). Julia Sudbury argues that  state 
encroachment tightening the accessibility and funding of social welfare leaves women with 
limited options but to engage in illicit economies (Sudbury 2005). In that sense, drug trafficking 
DQG RWKHU VXSSO\ RIIHQFHV DUH H[SODLQHG DV D µVXUYLYDO¶ VWUDWHJ\ ZKHUHE\ FKRLFHV DQG
accessibility to stable employment is limited (Del Olmo 1990; Sudbury 2005; A. Klein 2009). 
Similarly, Axel Klein suggests the drug trade is a form of alternative source of income for 
Nigerians who have relatively few choices in a precarious socio-economic context (Klein 
2009).            
 While the economic burden of parenting responsibilities may explain why some women 
engage in drug mule work, it opens up a gap when it comes to childless women (Fleetwood 
2014).  Many of the women interviewed by Fleetwood were heavily invested in their caring 
roles. Offending occurred at moments when the role as good mother or partner were at risk. 
Fleetwood argues that while ³¶GULYHQ¶by these identities, yet they were also engaged in creative 
FRQVWUXFWLRQVRIWKHP´ (ibid., 105). Although the interviewees were invested in their relational 
identities, these gender identities and desires were also underpinned by the material realities. 
,QRWKHUZRUGVJHQGHU³is a social structXUHZLWKJOREDOUHDFKDQGVFDOH´ (ibid, 117), that cannot 
be isolated from global neolibHUDOLVP¶V LPSDFW reshaping economic structures, subjectivity, 
identity and desire (ibid.).         
 7R EH VXUH WKLV SURMHFW DOVR VHHNV WR JLYH DQ DFFRXQW RI GUXJ PXOHV¶ relational 
subjectivities and precarious economic conditions. However, in the criminal law context, we 
face the challenge of the totalising and reductive categories of victim and offenders. How do 
we account for financial instability because of debts and/or limited work opportunities in Latin 
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America (Del Olmo 1990) ZLWKRXWUHLI\LQJDQµDWWDFKPHQW¶WRWKHWKLUG-world suffering women 
described by Doezema (Doezema 2001)"7KHµIHPLQL]DWLRQRISRYHUW\¶DOVRLPSRUWVQRUPDWLYH
assumptions (Mohanty 1988) ZKLFK GHQ\ZRPHQ¶VYRLFH DQG WKHRSSRUWXQLW\ WR UHSUHVHQW
themselves (Kapoor 2004). Chandra Talpade Mohanty rightly warns us about the humanist and 
VFLHQWLILF LPSXOVH RI :HVWHUQ UHVHDUFKHUV ZKR LQ WKHLU DWWHPSW WR µSURWHFW¶ ZRPHQ IDLO WR
acknowledge local specificities and historical processes producing a generalizable µSRRU
PRWKHU¶(Mohanty 1988). This trope risks homogenizing women drug mules whose individual 
experiences are understood through a monolithic language of oppression. For example, 
Fleetwood stresses that individual narratives of poverty intersected with gender, race, ethnicity 
DQG ORFDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV 'UXJ PXOH ZRUN RFFXUUHG LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI ³UHODWLYH GHSULYDWLRQ
UHIUDFWHGWKURXJKQDUUDWLYHO\FRQVWUXFWHGVHOYHV´(Fleetwood 2014, 96). Precarious economic 
conditions, caring responsibilities, and pressure to pay debts are an undeniable part of the 
background, but it cannot be isolated from how women understood themselves.  
 Without denying the impact of economic policies on women, explanations framing drug 
PXOHZRUNDVD ODVW UHVRUW IRU µGHVSHUDWH¶SRRUZRPHQGLVUHJDUG WKHDJHQWLDO LQYHVWPHQW LQ
caring responsibilities but also the effect of cultural gender roles in shaping identities. 
)OHHWZRRGVXJJHVWV WKDW µSURYLVLRQLQJ¶XQGHUSLQV WKHDWWDFKPHQW WR UHODWLRQDO LGHQWLWLHVDQG
desires influenced by cultural norms. While experiencing relative poverty, women express their 
desire to provide for their family, a better school, etc., which is notably a desire to fulfil gender 
roles and consumer culture norms (ibid., 105). Their own understanding of themselves is 
VKDSHGDQGFRQVWUDLQHGE\WKRVHFXOWXUDOJHQGHUQRUPVDVWKH\³UDUHO\VSRNHRIZDQWLQJWR
have more money for themselves, despite the global influence of discourses about women as 
HPSRZHUHGFRQVXPHUV´LELG).Women assuming responsibility to take care of children often 
draw this responsibility from cultural norms of motherhood yet these are restricted in a context 
of economic precariousness. In other words, economic need does not necessarily mean absolute 
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poverty. This does not mean caring responsibilities do not matter, but rather how a more nuance 
analysis shows the gender dynamics which do bear on mothers who accept to do drug mule 
work. More importantly, the issue normalisation in discourse of the victimized mother who is 
extremely poor can become a norm in the courts, as will be explained in chapter VI. Where the 
real woman appearing before the sentencing court does not show extreme passivity as a result 
of having no other option but to do the crime, the problem is how to accommodate the 
ambivalent offender.     . 
8. Relational selves: Of love, sexed bodies and other demons 
Romantic relationships also frame the participation of women in drug mule work. Andreina 
Torres interviewed women who explained how they ended up doing mule work through self-
sacrifice narratives. Although their stories were mediated through the experience of prison, 
some said they accepted to do the drug run to help a boyfriend and perceiving themselves as a 
ERG\³IRURWKHUV´(Torres 2008, 153). Self-sacrifice in the name of love also functioned as a 
mechanism of individuation and solidarity with their partner in trouble (ibid.). From the 
UHFUXLWHU¶VSRLQWRIYLHZ7RUUHVVXJJHVWVWKDWDZRPDQ¶VURPDQWLFDWWDFKPHQWDOVRIXQFWLRQHG
DV³JXDUDQWHH´ WKDW WKHFRQWUDFWZRXOGEHIXOILOOHGLELG6LPLODUO\)OHHWZRRGQRWHGFDVHV
where women became involved through a boyfriend, husband or friends of their partners 
(Fleetwood 2014). Intimate partner violence was not often cited as a direct explanation for 
ZRPHQ¶VLQFXUVLRQLQGUXJPXOHZRUN(Sudbury 2005), although intimate partner or a history 
of family violence figures prominently in statistics about women imprisoned in the UK in 
general (Corston 2007). Instead, a common narrative is the vulnerable drug mule targeted by a 
stranger/drug trafficker (Fleetwood 2014).  The trafficker myth is problematic and inaccurate 




Many cases explored in the case study for this project, also present the story of a stranger 
preying on the naïve mule-FRXULHUZLWKWRSURPLVHVIRUDµIUHH¶KROLGD\40 or asks them to carry 
a package for a relative or friend living abroad. Whether or not these stories are true, is not the 
point. What matters is how are translated or accommodated into the legal discourse.  
 Media and scholarly accounts tend to highlight stories of coercion (Huling 1995), 
grooming and entrapment by strangers (Dorado 2005), lured into a debt through loan sharks or 
powerful men in their lives (Green 1998; Jeavans 2005). This does not mean women and men 
have been subject to threats but it challenges the view that people are coerced into the offence 
rather than during the process. For example, by taking away the passport before the actual 
flight, threats against a close relative, or advance payments which effectively bound them in a 
debt with the recruiters (Fleetwood 2014, 150-153). As Fleetwood suggests, experiences of 
coercion are more nuanced if one looks at the whole process of engaging in drug mule work. 
While most of the interviewees in her case study in Ecuador sought out and agreed to engage 
in drug mule work, the possibility of backing out once the agreement had been made was 
constrained by assumptions of violence or outright threats. Gender scripts have shaped many 
times the perceptions of risk and fear (ibid.). As we will see in the analysis of the cases in 
chapter VI, legal counsellors often flag coercion but only for the purpose of sentence 
UHGXFWLRQV0HDQZKLOHDFFRXQWVRIµSDVVSRUWVGRFXPHQWVEHLQJWDNHQDZD\IURPWKHPRQFH
journeys had started, being chaperoned on the journey, being told what to do/ say (including 
ZKDWQRWWRGRVD\¶(Sentencing Council 2011c, 4) have received less attention as potential 
indices of how drug mule work might be coercive.       
 Apart from motherhood and romantic relationships, the eroticized female body has also 
been the subject of analysis in the literature. Sexualized feminine performances are regarded 
with suspicion because they are viewed as strategies to avoid detection.  Schemenauer argues 
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2012). As mentioned briefly at the beginning of this chapter, drug enforcement officers joke 
DERXWZRPHQ¶VFRQFHDOPHQWVWUDWHJLHVVXFKDVWKHµHJJSDFNDJHV¶LQVHUWHGLQWKHYDJLQD2WKHU
forms of sexualisation of bodies draw on ethnic and racial stereotypes. Racial stereotypes of 
female body parts, such as breasts, hips, and buttocks, hair-EUDLGV DQG µVKDSHO\¶ ILJXUHV
associated with nationality archetypes become the focus of the male gaze. Femininity markers 
stand out as well in the methods of concealing drugs. For example, women carry drugs while 
pregnant or a fake a pregnancy, hide the drugs in stuffed toys (Schemenauer 2012)  or cocaine 
breast implants (RT News 2014).         
 The purpose of pointing out the sexualisation of drug mules bodies is simply to tease 
out the complex gender dynamics in the drug enforcement and in legal and scholarly discourses 
on this subject)DFLOHFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQVRIµYLFWLPV¶µYDPSV¶RUµHYLO¶GLVWRUWWKHVRFLDOVSDFH
in which the actions of drug mules take place. Postcolonial critiques suggest that the victim 
trope- EODFNMXQNLHSRRUPRWKHUIURPWKHµWKLUGZRUOGZRPDQ¶UHSURGXFHGE\OLEHUDOIHPLQLVP
and development theories (Mohanty 1988)- also enables the colonization of these subjects. For 
WKLV UHDVRQ LW LV LPSRUWDQW WR UHJLVWHU KRZ FULPLQDOL]DWLRQ DQG SHQDO JRYHUQDQFH ³FRORQL]H
fields of victimization and represent them as part of the territor\RISHQDOW\´(Biko Agozino 
2008, xi)DQGWRNHHSLQFKHFNWKHGLVFLSOLQLQJHIIHFWVRIµYLFWLPYDPS¶GLVFRXUVHVtrying to 
eliminate the ambivalence which characterises discourses on women drug mules. Feminist and 
gender research on drug mule work unpicks the facile simplifications and normalisation of 
gender roles represented in the passive victim/greedy whore tropes.  It is important to keep in 
mind this dichotomy because it is arguably in the background of the legal interpretation of who 
is and who is not a drug mule, as will be further discussed in the sentencing analysis in chapter 
VI. The last section of this chapter maps the role of exploitation discourses, the last common 
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theme identified in the research and how gender and postcolonial approaches situate 
exploitation within the wider frame of globalized economy and racist drug policies.  
9. Precariousness, exploitation and gender 
Exploitation is central in the scholarly and legal discourses about drug mules. Despite its 
prevalence, exploitation has different meanings for legal and feminist scholars. For example, 
Sudbury argues that the relationship between drug mule and recruiters is characterized by 
³H[SORLWDWLRQ QRW SDUWQHUVKLS´ (Sudbury 2005, 175). Drug mule work is considered 
exploitative (Hunt 2005; Harris 2010) EHFDXVHSHRSOHDUHUHGXFHGWR³GLVSRVDEOHZRUNHUVRI
WKHJOREDOGUXJLQGXVWU\´(Sudbury 2005, 175). Although these accounts stress the role of drug 
WUDIILFNHUV LQ WKHH[SORLWDWLRQRIGUXJPXOHV6XGEXU\¶VFULWLTXH LV DGGUHVVHG WR WKHJHQHUDO
context where exploitative labour practices and gendered power relations occur. Similarly,  
Kemba Smith, who was convicted for a drug offence in the US and pardoned by President 
&OLQWRQGHVFULEHGKHURZQH[SHULHQFHDV³DNLQWRPRGHUQGD\VODYHU\´EHFDXVHLWZDV³GULYHQ
by politically motivated drug pROLFLHVWKDWGLVDGYDQWDJHPLQRULWLHVLQWKH86´(Agozino 2008, 
xvii).  Neoliberal penal regimes manage crime control through mass incarceration (Wacquant 
2009) RI SRSXODWLRQV GLVSRVVHVVHG E\ VWDWH¶V HQFURDFKPHQW DQG KLVWRULFDO SURFHVVHV RI
economic and racial exclusion (Smith 2005; Acker 2010). Similarly, Angela Davis argues that 
the prison industrial complex in the US is an extension of the chattel slavery abolished in the 
nineteenth century. The key point addressed by these critical approaches to drug policy is how 
drug offences function as a tool for political disenfranchisement (Pettus 2013), which exclude 
and profit from the criminalisation of drug offences.     
 There is another view, much less explored, which is drug mule work as economic 





WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH ZRUN GRQH E\ PXOHV PRUH JHQHUDOO\ LV WKURXJK LQGLYLGXDOV¶ QDUUDWLYHV´
(Fleetwood 2014, 14). The organization of drug mule work is less researched. The most likely 
approach is the micro-economic analysis focusing on supply-demand figures provided by 
LQWHUGLFWLRQVRIGUXJVDPRQJRWKHUGDWD)OHHWZRRG¶VUHVHDUFKIRFXVHGRQWKHVLJQLILFDQWRI
gender in drug mule work and how much control they had over their labour (ibid., 121), and  
³GLVHQWDQJOHJHQGHUHGIRUPVRIH[SORitation from exploitation of mules PRUHJHQHUDOO\´LELG
The distinction is crucial for future research and for how the courts could understand 
exploitation.  Legally, one of the clear barriers in conceptualizing drug mule work as 
exploitative is that coercion often functions as that which delimits the willing worker and the 
unwilling one. However, coercion, the absence or withdrawal of consent, is subject to much 
debate (International Labor Office 2009; Bakirci 2009; Doezema 2010). The debate about 
whether consent, deception and coercion demarcate exploitative labour has been well rehearsed 
in human trafficking debates without a conclusive decision so far (Bales 2000; Voorhout 2007). 
What is exploitative work? Can one be exploited if one earns money? These questions certainly 
remain unresolved, but the emphasis on exploitation in the sentencing judgments presented in 
Chapter VI suggests that clarification is important if drug mule work is seen from the 
perspective of labour exploitation; or if it is to  be understood in the traditional legal sense of 
the expression. That is, such as in the case of AramahZKHUHµH[SORLWDWLRQ¶LVDJHQHUDOWHUP
to describe when some is taken advantage because of a personal characteristic or circumstance. 
In sum, among the tasks set out in chapter VI is to unpack the construction of gender (both 
women and men), with reference to remuneration and exploitation; and to map the effects that 




This chapter sought to trouble the distinctions between victims and offenders. Ideas about 
QRUPDWLYH JHQGHU EHKDYLRXU UDFH DQG P\VWLILFDWLRQ RI µIRUHLJQHUV¶ SOD\ D UROH LQ WKH
distinctions between victim/offenders in drug trafficking discourses. The first sections stressed 
how knowledge producers, whether academic, political, or legal, seek to define drug mules by 
naming them and explaining their experiences and pathways into crime. Snider and Torres 
suggest that narratives of victimization by offenders may often be necessary to reconstitute 
resistance within these frames. Naming victimhood is not a simple task but it is nevertheless a 
necessary one. Instead, the trope of the vulnerable women who engage in drug mule work could 
be better characterised throuJKWKHDPELYDOHQFHLWSHUIRUPV7KHUHPLJKWQRWEHDµULJKW¶ZD\
of naming but attention to the effects of naming, especially naming and deploying vulnerability 
in ways which differ from dominant discourses in criminal justice that associate it with risk 
and securitization is also a practice of resistance. Despite the tendency to conceptualise actors 
through these binaries, the victimization and agency of drug mules are not absolute states of 
being but rather context-specific (Fleetwood 2014). However, ambivalent representations that 
recognize both victimization and agency in the offence cannot be easily accommodated into 
doctrinal rules and practice of criminal law, especially the process of adjudicating guilt. For 
example, the Sentencing Advisory Panel (SAP) noted41 how the vulnerability of drug mules 
ZDV³questionable bearing in mind that most offences are committed in the knowledge of what 
is being done (and that it is illegal´(Sentencing Advisory Panel 2009). Simply put, the law 
RQO\XQGHUVWDQGVGUXJPXOHV¶DFWLRQVDVHLWKHUguilty or innocent.   
 Although this thesis probes how the victim/criminal agent trope is embedded in 
                                                          
41
 The review on sentencing carried out by the Sentencing Advisory Panel (2009) was superseded by the one done 
by the Sentencing Council (2011a, 2011b). Arguably, the approach to this particular point is no different because 
once convicted, either through a contested trial or a guilty plea, the issue becomes the role and the harm of the 
offence, to be determined by the sentencing judge with reference to the guidelines. 
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sentencing law- signified in the distinction between mules and couriers by the CA (chapter I)- 
it explores more generally how gender figures in criminal law, including the doctrine of 
criminal responsibility (Rollinson 2000). Vulnerability has no place in the adjudication of the 
crime because the legal subject of crime is conceived as a disembodied, rational agent. While 
many would agree that references to personal characteristics or circumstances which explain 
DQRIIHQGHU¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\LVEHVWORFDWHGLQVHQWHQFLQJ1LFROD/DFH\SHUsuasively argues that 
sentencing decisions: 
affect the fundamental interests of the offender in just as coercive and intrusive way as 
decisions at the conviction stage >«@LWDOPRVWDPRXQWVWREDGIDLWKWRSODFHVRPXFK
emphasis on doctrinal values at one stage of the process whilst virtually ignoring them 
at others (Lacey 1987, 222±3).     
As much as I agree with Lacey, the question occupying this thesis is: why is vulnerability 
relegated to the sentencing stage? Alan Norrie argues that the doctrine of criminal 
responsibility leaves little room to factor personal circumstances or characteristics in the 
determination of legal guilt because criminal responsibility is based on a disembodied rational 
legal person (Norrie 2001; 2005)  5HDGLQJ WKURXJK 1RUULH¶V DSSURDFK WKH QH[W FKDSWHU
suggests the victim/agent trope mirrors a tension at the heart of the structure of juridico-moral 
responsibility in liberal criminal law (Norrie 2000).  At the centre of this tension is the idea of 
the legal subject of crime, posited as a disembodied being living yet acting in an embodied 
world. The exclusion of embodiment in the doctrine of criminal responsibility, juridical 
personhood and punishment, developed at a particular historical period known as the European 
Enlightenment.  By mapping the disembodiment of criminal law, the aim explore also why 
relationality, embodiment, and precariousness do not figure within the frames of legal doctrine 
and punishment theories. Vulnerability discourses on drug mules resurface these themes as 
shown in the last section on the research on drug mule work. They represent aspects of drug 
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mule work, but as noted in the first sections, they can be appropriated into masculinist frames 
that translate embodiment into objectified sexualised bodies; passive victims of their 
circumstances; or self-interesWHGZRPHQSHUIRUPLQJDµIDNH¶YLFWLPKRRG+RZHYHUWKHODVW
section also presented some of research on women who have engaged in drug mule work which 
show the nuances and resistance to simplifications of drug mules as passive feminized victims 















III. Crime and Punishment: Between relations of ambiguity 
1. Summary 
This chapter looks at the history of criminal law and theories of criminal responsibility and 
punishment, signposting the relationship between criminal legal doctrine and ideas of 
embodiment and disembodiment. My aim is tease out a critique of the subject of criminal law 
theories using the notion RIµDPELJXLW\¶7KURXJKWKHSX]]OHSUHVHQWHGE\DPELJXLW\ZHFDQ
trace the limitations in punishment and responsibility theories, manifested in the absence of 
embodiment in criminal law. Bringing back the body of the subject of law is important in so 
far as it brings into sight the relational constitution of subjectivity and how it might trouble 
traditional justifications for punishment. Ambiguity, as we shall see, is lodged in the notion of 
WKHVHOIRWKHUUHODWLRQDQGLVVLJQDOOHGE\FRUSRUHDOHPERGLPHQW%\µRWKHU¶,GRQRWZLVKWR
mean exclusively other people: it could also mean histories, temporalities, or geographies. For 
the same reason, ambiguity is also a space where struggles, affects, and ethical encounters can 
take place.  
2. A tale of two bodies: The legal body and the body of criminal law  
This section begins to unravel the position and role of embodiment and subjectivity in criminal 
law, and grounds the two aims pursued in this chapter. One is methodological and the other 
substantive. Methodologically, the chapter seeks a point of encounter between philosophy and 
legal theory in general, and phenomenology and criminal law in particular. The concept of 
embodiment stands at the centre of both the methodological and substantive aims. It departs 
from the critique of the legal subject of liberal individualism because it is a conceived without 
a body (Naffine 1997) or, if it has a body, it is predominantly a male body (Grear 2010a).  
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Critical legal scholarship gives an account not only of how the law has presented a disembodied 
version of the male subject, but also how the female body in criminal law has been represented 
DVDQREMHFWUDWKHUWKDQDVXEMHFW7KDWIHPDOHERG\LVGHSLFWHGDVµOLIHOHVV¶DµERG\-EDJ¶DQ
object in the shape of a vessel for the male phallus (Naffine 1997), or a commodity to capture 
or appropriate  (Lacey 1998b; Du Toit 2009). Hence, there is a tension implicit in criminal law, 
between the objectified female body and the disembodied (male) juridical subject. This section 
maps these tensions tracing the disappearance of the human body in legal personhood and the 
appearance of the µERG\¶ RI ODZV DQG LGHDV WKDW VXEVWDQWLDWH WKH GRFWULQHV RI FULPLQDO ODZ
Paradoxically, the KLVWRULFDODQDO\VLVSUHVHQWHGKHUHVKRZVKRZFULPLQDOODZµJDLQHGDERG\¶
ZKLOHKXPDQVXEMHFWVPRVWO\PDOHµORVWDERG\¶RUVRLWLVEHOLHYHGZKHQOLEHUDOWKHRULHVRI
criminal responsibility and punishment moved towards a disembodied notion of the legal 
person. 
i. The human body 
Despite the disembodied character of legal personhood, re-inserting the body into criminal law 
LVDGLIILFXOWWDVNHVSHFLDOO\IRUDIHPLQLVWSURMHFW$V1LFROD/DFH\ULJKWO\VXJJHVWVµPHUHO\
³UHSULRULWLVLQJ RU UHLQVHUWLQJ WKH ERG\´ LV KDUGO\ D SDQDFHD IURP D IHPLQLVW RU DQ\ RWKHU
SROLWLFDOO\ SURJUHVVLYH SRLQW RI YLHZ¶ (Lacey 1998b, 61). In Unspeakable Subjects (1998), 
Lacey suggests that we ought to think about embodiment in a way that moves towards the 
integration- as opposed to separation- of the mental, embodied and affective dimensions of 
women and men. The overwhelming breadth and multi-disciplinary engagements with the 
concept of embodiment attest to its complexity (Weiss and Fern Haber 1999). Notoriously, 
actual material bodies take centre stage in embodiment theorising. And yet, there are multiple 
approaches to how the body may be understood. Edmund Husserl, one of the leading 
proponents of phenomenology, drew a distinction between koerper and leib accordingly 




ground for grasping our experiences in the world, as it is proposed by existential 
phenomenology (Heinamaa 2003).  As pointed out by many feminist legal scholars, ZRPHQ¶V 
bodies have been interpreted within the legal schemes of intelligibility as objects of possession 
(Du Toit 2009; Grear 2010b)DVµERG\EDJV¶WKDWFDQEHODZIXOO\SHQHWUDWHGE\WKHPDOHVH[XDO
subject (Naffine 1997). In contrast, mHQ¶V bodies are represented as impenetrable, self-bounded 
containers for subjectivity, which finds it seat in reason (Nedelsky 1990). The function of the 
.DQWLDQFRQFHUQ³DERXWWKHVDQFWLW\DQGLQWHJULW\RIWKHPDOHERG\«´KDVEHHQWRSROLFHWKH
boundaries of sexual bodies and desires, particularly to underpin the prohibition of homosexual 
desires  while reaffirming the lack of corporeal boundaries of female bodies (Naffine 1997, 
89).            
 Other criticisms of the paradigm of the legal subject of reason stress the absence of skin 
colour, gender, class, culture, and political and geographical location. At the same time, there 
is increasing pressure on legal personhood to encompass more beneficiaries of legal rights, 
including animals, fauna, or more abstract entities like corporations (Grear 2010a). In fact, 
close interrogation reveals that various  types of legal personhood operate in legal discourse, 
some of which are depicted as more embodied than others  (Naffine 2009). Charting the 
different articulations of legal personhood, Naffine identifies and names two broad positions 
RQ OHJDOSHUVRQKRRG7KHILUVWSRVLWLRQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKZKDWVKHFDOOV µOHJDOLVWV¶ considers 
legal personhood as an artificial construct which does not necessarily have to match the human 
subject (Naffine 2009) 7KH VHFRQG SRVLWLRQ UHSUHVHQWHG E\ WKH µPHWDSK\VLFDO UHDOLVWV¶ DV
Naffine calls them, posits that in general legal personhood mirrors legal subjectivity (ibid.). 
Yet, there is no consensus about which characteristics define legal subjectivity, making 
subjectivity a ground for contestation. Naffine outlines three different positions held by 
metaphysical realists - as rationalists, religionists or naturalists. Religionists believe that 
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humans are defined by a transcendental soul while rationalists believe that reason defines 
human beings, that it is tKLVFDSDFLW\ZKLFKµGHILQHVDQGGLJQLILHVXV¶ In either context, the law 
is endowed with the responsibility of reflecting and preserving this fundamental attribute of 
humans (that is as either soul possessing or reason reflecting) (Naffine 2009, 22). In contrast, 
µQDWXUDOLVWV¶ EHOLHYH WKDW ODZ VKRXOG JLYH WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI OHJDO SHUVRQKRRG WR ³QDWXUDO
corporeal beings who can feel pleasure and paLQDQGZKROLYHQDWXUDOPRUWDOOLYHV´(Naffine 
2009, 24).           
 Vulnerability intersects with the position of both naturalists and religionists. For 
example, religionists believe in the sanctity of life even when that life has not formed the 
capacity to reason, as in the case of a foetus. Naturalists extend the mantle of legal personhood 
to animals, since they are embodied beings also capable of suffering pain. Interestingly, in the 
United States, religionists have sought to piggy-back on the position of naturalists to lend 
further support for the personhood of the foetus. Using medical studies on pain, the foetal 
personhood movement claim that foetuses experience pain at 20 weeks. The evidence has been 
criticized within the scientific community because  pain itself is a subjective experience and 
also because of the scant evidence to support the foetal pain theory (Robertson 2013). The 
intersection of pain and subjectivity will be discussed further in the next chapter. Suffice it to 
say for now that both religionist and naturalist arguments around the foetus tend to converge 
around notions of potent life. By contrast, full legal personhood, understood by rationalists as 
encompassing rights and responsibility, is limited to able-bodied persons who have the maturity 
WR UHDVRQ LQGHSHQGHQWO\ 7KXV WKHUH KDV EHHQ D JHQHUDO SULQFLSOH WKDW WKH µZHDN¶ DQG WKH
vulnerable may be sometimes exempted from responsibility, as in the case of the criminal 
defence of insanity or the criminal responsibility of children.      
 I want to dwell a bit more closely on the rationalist position as it tends to assert itself 
with particular vigour in the context of criminal law. The notion that reason defines human 
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beings is an idea which is at the core of the Western philosophical tradition which emerged 
during the Enlightenment (Naffine 2009, 22). But if reason was prioritised at this point in 
history, then where did the body go or did it go somewhere at all? How did the body become 
VHFRQGDU\LQWKHFRQFHSWRIVXEMHFWLYLW\UHIOHFWHGLQµUDWLRQDOLVW¶Oegal personhood? Different 
approaches to history appear to tell different stories about what happened to embodiment in the 
legal person and criminal law. For example, although Alan Norrie suggests that the legal person 
of criminal law was disembodied during the Enlightenment period. It is worth point out he is 
QRW UHIHUULQJSULPDULO\ WR WKHµKXPDQERG\¶EXW UDWKHU WR WKHVRFLDODQGPDWHULDOFRQWH[WRI
crime.  Thus, Norrie criticizes the rationalist position outlined by Naffine, while historicizing 
the material and political circumstances of legal personhood, in particular, the political and 
ideological project of the Enlightenment (Norrie 2001; Bhaskar and Collier 1998, 394).   
ii.  The legal body  
&RPLQJEDFNWRWKH/DFH\¶VFRQFHUQDERXWKRZWRUH-approach the body in criminal law, this 
subsection suggests that the notion of embodiment in phenomenology studies offers some 
interesting avenues, mainly because the body is not conceived as a self-bounded, atomistic unit 
(Nedelsky 1990)7KRPDV&VRUGDVDUJXHVWKDW LI³HPERGLPHQWLVDQH[LVWHQWLDOFRQGLWLRQLQ
which the body is the subjective source or intersubjective ground for experience, then studies 
XQGHUWKDWUXEULFRIHPERGLPHQWDUHQRWµDERXW¶ WKHERG\SHUVH¶´ (Csordas 1999, 143). He 
DGGV WKDW LQVRIDU DV HPERGLPHQW LV D µVWDQGSRLQW RI being-in-the-ZRUOG¶ FXOWXUH FDQQRW EH
HOLPLQDWHGIURPWKHDQDO\VLV7DNLQJLQWRDFFRXQW&VRUGDV¶YLHZHPERGLPHQWHQFRPSDVVHV
not simply external shapes but also experiences within a historical and cultural milieu. If the 
story is that criminal law legitimized the disembodiment of the legal subject and legal norms, 
through the convention of the universal rational subject, the question that emerges is not only 
how and why the body was suppressed from subjectivity, but also what happened to the body? 
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Was it simply erased without a trace or displaced? While mapping embodiment and 
GLVHPERGLPHQWLQFULPLQDOODZZHZRXOGEHQHILWIURPORRNLQJLQWRDQRWKHUµERG\¶WKHERG\
of criminal law.            
 $EDVLFGHILQLWLRQRIFULPLQDOODZGHVFULEHVLWDVWKHµERG\¶Rf laws or rules (corpus 
juris LQ/DWLQGHILQLQJRIIHQFHVDJDLQVW WKHFRPPXQLW\ZKLFK³UHJXODWHV WKHDSSUHKHQVLRQ
charging and trial of suspected persons and fixes penalties and modes of treatment applicable 
WRFRQYLFWHGRIIHQGHUV´(Jescheck and Norton 2014). Of course, one could point to the history 
of English common law to trace the body of law in the origins of offences, punishments, and 
rules, and the institutions in charge of their implementation. Yet, what does it mean for the 
FULPLQDO ODZWRµKDYH¶RUµEH¶DERG\" ,V LWDµOLYLQJERG\¶RUD µFRUSVH¶",GRQRWZLVKWR
suggest that the body of criminal law is identical to a human body, but rather to approach this 
question  as an exercise which highlights how criminal legal concepts are not atemporal 
XQLYHUVDOSURSRVLWLRQVEXWLGHDVZLWKDµOLYLQJERG\¶PDWHULDOO\VXEVWDQWLDWHGDQGVLWXDWHGLQ
space and time.          
 Historical and phenomenological approaches to law assist in the task of mapping what 
is lost in abstract rules. Concepts, theories and norms disconnected from history and materiality 
DUH WUDQVIRUPHG LQWR µFRUSVHV¶ 0DULD 'UDNRSRXORX PDNHV D VLPLODU SRLQW ZLWK UHJDUGV WR
feminist theory, cautioning agaLQVW µLPPRUWDOL]LQJ¶ H[SHULHQFHV ZLWKRXW FRQVLGHULQJ WKH
historical context in which they emerge (Drakopoulou 2013). Historical analyses temporalize 
³the distinct fLHOGVRIODZ
VGLVFXUVLYHSRZHU´LELG 'LVFRXUVHFULWLTXHLQ'UDNRSRXORX¶V
view, creates a monolithic paradigm of oppression that may not actually relate anything about 
contemporary experiences, affirming unshakeable oppressions where there might not be any or 
which operate in different forms (ibid.). Still, there are different ways of engaging with history. 
Scholars investigated in the chapter broadly apply three approaches to history: teleological; 
dialectical, and genealogical.        
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 7KHVH DSSURDFKHVSUHVHQW DSOXUDOLW\RI FULPLQDO ODZ¶VKLVWRU\ DQG VHUYH WRXQVHWWOH
grand narratives in legal doctrine. For example, teleological approaches present the history of 
criminal law as an institutional and conceptual evolution, where the practice of punishment as 
retribution evolved into moral and rationalized forms of retribution. In contrast, dialectal 
DSSURDFKHVWRWKHKLVWRU\RIFULPLQDOODZ³UHYHDOODZ¶VFRQWLQXLQJDQGVWUXFWXUDOSUREOHPV´E\
exposing the contradictions in the application of norms (Norrie 2000, 68). The dialectical 
analysis will be explained in more depth in this chapter. Finally, genealogical approaches to 
the history of criminal law caution against the naturalization of JUDQGQDUUDWLYHVRIµSURJUHVV¶
(which are often the product of teleological accounts). Ricardo Baldissone and Marc de Wilde 
HPSKDVLVHWKDW³OHJDOKLVWRU\FDQVHUYHDVDQLGHRORJLFDOPHDQVIRUJLYLQJOHJLWLPDF\WRWKH
present, but it can also function as a challenging medium that disrupts existing  beliefs and 
GLVWULEXWLRQVRISRZHU´(Baldissone and Wilde 2013, 176). In that sense, one could ask, using 
the geneaoORJLFDODSSURDFK LI WKHKLVWRULFDODFFRXQWRI WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ IURPµEDUEDULDQ¶
revenge punishment to institutionalized retribution is a founding ideology that gives legitimacy 
to modern criminal law (Lindsey Farmer and Dubber 2007a, 2). To say that criminal law is 
PRGHUQLPSOLHVWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDµSUH-PRGHUQ¶YHUVLRQ$QJOR-American jurisprudence often 
UHIHUV WR WKH µPRGHUQ¶SHULRG WR VLJQDO WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQV LQ ODZ WDNLQJSODFHEHWZHHQ WKH
seventeenth and nineteenth century (Norrie 2001; Harcourt 2003; Valverde 2005; Lacey 2008). 
:KDWPDNHVWKHFULPLQDOODZµPRGHUQ¶YDULHVDFFRUGLQJWRZKDWKDVEHHQYDOXHGRUFRQVLGHUHG
characteristiFDVµPRGHUQ¶7KHPDUNHUVRIPRGHUQLW\UDQJHIURPWKHDGRSWLRQRIWKHUDWLRQDOLW\
of the law over the irrationality of revenge (Foqué 2008), to  the organisation, 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQDQGSURIHVVLRQDOL]DWLRQRIFULPLQDOSXQLVKPHQWLQWRDµV\VWHP¶RIMXVWLFH
(Lacey 2008, 8). Norrie suggests that one of the markers of modern criminal law is  the 
individualization of legal responsibility, rights and the emergence of a particular logic of 
legality (Norrie 2001, 25)ZKLOH/DFH\LGHQWLILHVLWLQ:LOOLDP%ODFNVWRQH¶VWDVNRIGUDIWLQJ
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µJHQHUDOSULQFLSOHV¶IURPDGLVSHUVHGFRPPRQODZ(Lacey 1998a). General doctrine of criminal 
law often assumes that principles emerging at this time are foundational to law today (Simester 
and Shute 2002). 42          
 English criminal law scholarship has developed a critical approach to reading history, 
SRZHUVRFLHW\DQGSROLWLFVLQWRWKHµDQDO\WLF¶DSSURDFKLQWKHJHQHUDOGRFWULQH0DSSLQJWKH
scholarship that historicized criminal law, Lindsey Farmer and Markus Dubber stress the 
LQIOXHQFH RI (3 7KRPSVRQ¶V ZRUN ZKLFK H[SRVHG WKH FULPLQDO ODZ DV D ³GRXEOH-edged 
TXDOLW\ RI WKH UXOH RI ODZ´ (Thompson 1975; Lindsey Farmer and Dubber 2007a, 1) and 
'RXJODV +D\¶V SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW WKH LGHRORJ\ LQ FULPLQDO ODZ LV UHSHDWHG WR VXVWDLQ WKH
preservation of social order and property rights (Hay 1975). Published also in 1975, Discipline 
and Punish (Foucault 1995) went further, questioning the humanist impulse tKDWµPRGHUQL]HG¶
FULPLQDO SXQLVKPHQW )RXFDXOW¶V KLVWRULFDO LQTXLU\ FKDUWV WKH PXOWLSOLFDWLRQ RI WHFKQLTXHV
regulating human behaviour including disciplinary techniques distributed among other 
institutions, such as education, hospitals, and factories, amongst others (Smart 1989; Lindsey 
Farmer and Dubber 2007b). In sum, history opens up fields of inquiry but it can also close or 
narrow them down: one can use history to expose plurality or to sediment history into narrowed 
down narratives. The next sections, explore the three historical approaches mentioned above 
and how they implicitly and explicitly account for the tension around the presence or absence 
of embodiment in criminal law.  
iii. Rational legal personhood in the history of analytic criminal law 
As I map the history of criminal law to understand why and where embodiment disappeared (if 
it was ever important at all), I need to invoke the history of mens rea, known as the mental 
element of an offence. As noted before, the rationalist account of legal personhood prioritizes 
                                                          
42
  7KHµ*HQHUDO'RFWULQH¶RIFULPLQDOODZLVJHQHUDOO\XQGHUVWRRGDV ³WKHSULQFLSOHVDQGUXOHVZKLFKUHIOHFWD
SKLORVRSKLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHLQGLYLGXDOODZDQGWKHVWDWH´(Norrie 2005a, 53). 
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reason as a capacity of all human beings. Individuals under the purview of criminal laws are 
assumed to have particular cognitive and volitional capacities. Offences generally consist of 
WZRHOHPHQWVWKHµJXLOW\PLQG¶DQGµJXLOW\DFWZKLFKWKHSURVHFXWLRQQHHGVWRSURYHEH\RQG
reasonable doubt in a trial. In other words, a person is not necessarily guilty of an act unless he 
also has a guilty mind. As engrained as this general principle may be in our times, legal 
KLVWRULDQV DUJXH LW ZDV XQNQRZQ WR µDQFLHQW¶ DQG HDUO\ PRGHUQ SXQLVKPHQW (Lacey 2008). 
0DUWLQ*DUGQHU VXJJHVWV WKH µSULQFLSOHRI mens rea was causally related to the systematic 
HPHUJHQFHRIWKHSXQLWLYHVDQFWLRQ¶(Gardner 1993, 640). In such pre-modern times, punishing 
offenders was done on the act alone, regardless of the desire, knowledge, will, or evil intention. 
In fact, punishment was not limited to human beings but also extended to animals and objects 
(Schiff Berman 1994). Societies espoused a different cosmogony and understanding of what 
we conceive as agency (Evans 1906; Beirnes 1994). Similarly, notions like individual harm 
and personal responsibility were foreign notions as much as the distinction between 
private/public harm. Instead, punishment was more akin to a self-help practice, where a private 
party was both judge and executor of the sanction in Teutonic and to some extent Anglo-Saxon 
Law (Carson 1916). Laws allowed revenge but also tried to limit blood feuds through a 
compensation system. A blood feud was not necessarily about making the offender suffer since 
penalties varied considerably: from exile, banishment, compensation, pardons and the death 
penalty.           
 These pre-PRGHUQWDULIIV\VWHPV³provided a useful nonviolent alternative to the blood 
IHXG«´ (Gardner 1993, 649). Despite the availability of different punishment methods and 
tariffs, their application was not systematic and depended also on the social strata to which an 
individual offender belonged. In feudal England, compensation was an option for free persons, 
while slaves were subject to corporeal punishment or death regardless of the severity of the 




slay the offender into the duty to catch the offender and deliver the offender to the state for 
SXQLVKPHQWE\WKHVWDWH´(Carson 1916, 652±653). The shift of the one authorized to punish 
evidenced the transition from a tribal to state-structured political system in sixth century 
England. Offences were figured as injuries to the sovereign and the compensation system 
became a source of revenue for the Crown rather than compensation to injured parties. By the 
twelfth century, Henry II of England had abolished the system of compensatory remedy and 
punishment was increasingly used as a response to crime (Gardner 1993).    
 Tracing the sources of mens rea in common law, Gardner pinpoints its emergence in 
the thirteenth century, when punishment was increasingly justified on the grounds of moral 
guilt and the sanction had to be proportionate to the offence, a shift propitiated by canonical 
ODZLELG7KHIRFXVRIWKHODZZDVQRWVRPXFKWKHFULPLQDOGHHGVDVWKHµLQZDUG¶WKRXJKWV
of the offender, shaped by psychologically-oriented norms (ibid.). Intention became essential, 
although the meaning of intention in this context has been constantly contested (Norrie 2001; 
Nevins-Saunders 2012; Lacey 1993). This view fitted neatly with emerging ideas of individual 
blame proposed by retributivist or utilitarian theories produced during the period of the 
European Enlightenment (Frankowski 1986; Gardner 1993).    





(Frankowski 1986, 450). In this sense, a teleological narrative impOLHVWKHUHLVDQµHYROXWLRQ¶
IURPDQXQVDWLVIDFWRU\WRDVDWLVIDFWRU\VWDWHRIDIIDLUV)RUH[DPSOH-XVWLQH)OHPLQJ¶VKLVWRU\
of the common law describes the process from blood feuds to trials as a civilizing endeavour 
92 
 
(Fleming 1994). Similarly, Theodore Ziolkowski maps how the Oresteia43, symbolized the 
bedrock of justice for philosophers, historians, legal scholars and literary figures (Ziolkowski 
1997). Gardner also imports teleology into his reading of the history of criminal law, albeit a 
µ+HJHOLDQ¶44 type of analysis. Whilst there are ambiguities and vacillations around the principle 
of mens reaWKHVHDUH³WKHSURGXFWRIDQRQJRLQJhistorical process of accommodating within 
a single system of criminal law the virtues of two sometimes conflicting philosophical 
WUDGLWLRQVUHWULEXWLYLVPDQGXWLOLWDULDQLVP´(Gardner 1993, 640). Despite their contradictions, 
both traditions converged in the protection of reason in the jurisprudence of mens rea.45 
3. Enlightened stories of the subject: Disembodying criminal law 
Alan Norrie starts his analysis of the juridical subject of criminal law at this juncture, the 
KLVWRULFDO SHULRG JHQHUDOO\ NQRZQ DV µPRGHUQLW\¶ (Norrie 2000, 2001, 2005, 2012). One of 
1RUULH¶VFRUHDUJXPHQWVWKURXJKRXWKLVZRUNLVWKDWWKHMXULGLFDOVXEMHFWRIOLEHUDl theory is an 
amalgam of the homo economicus  and homo juridicus and that this amalgam became the 
foundation  of modern criminal law (Norrie 2001). The homo economicus is a free individual 
who is moved by economic self-interest, articulated more clearly by Jeremy Bentham. The 
second is the subject whose rights would be limited through punishment, an idea that emerged 
                                                          
43
 $HVFK\OXV¶Oresteia has often considered an allegory of the birth of justice. It tells the story of the transition 
from revenge and blood feuds- driven by the Erinyes, three scary female-looking daimonas- to the reconciliation 
of vindictive forces through the birth of the court of justice, the Areopagus. Theodore Ziolkowski characterizes 
WKH *UHHN WUDJHG\ DV  D µFRUQHUVWRQH LQ :HVWHUQ FLYLOL]DWLRQ¶ ZKHUH WKHUH LV WKH VKLIW IURP ³PDWULDUFK\ WR
patriarchy, the Jungians who sense there an evolution of the unconscious to conscious, the Nietzscheans who 
detect a tilt from the Dyonisian to the Apollonian, or from chaos to cosmos, the social anthropologists who register 
a shift from shame culture to guilt[culture, the legal historian who trace a process from irrational to rational law, 
from retaliation to retribution, or from strict liability to liability based on fault- all attribute to this powerful 
GUDPDWLF WULORJ\ ZKDW )UHXG FDOOHG µWKH GHFLVLYH VWHS LQ KXPDQ FXOWXUH WKH UHSODFHPHQW RI WKH might of the 
LQGLYLGXDOE\WKHPLJKWRIWKHFRPPXQLW\¶´(Ziolkowski 1997, 20). 
44
 In the Philosophy of History, the German philosopher endeavoured to study history using the dialectic method. 
He argues that events in history are not random but are part of a rational process of evolution towards freedom.  
45
 Gardner suggests that the mental state of intention is the product of retributivism and its emphasis on subjective 
states of mind while negligence can be traced to utilitarianism and its emphasis on objectively-based harms. Strict 




more clearly among philosophers like Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel (ibid., 17-18). While 
seemingly opposite to each other, both theoretical models presuppose a rational subject, who 
is equal to his peers and is able to enter into contracts with others by his own choice. 
 These two traditions in penal theory ground the authority of the law in different ways. 
The subject of liberal Enlightenment was construed in opposition to the absolutist sovereign 
who controlled social populations through the threat of corporeal pain and terror (Foucault 
1995; ibid.). Punishment no longer relied exclusively on inflicting physical pain and relied 
more on the discourse of rights and individual justice.  Retribution as retaliation could not be 
DFFHSWDEOHLQµMXVWGHVHUW¶WKHRULHV, which became more prominent in the 1980s (Gerber and 
Jackson 2012) but drew on the Kantian tradition.  In just desert theories, punishment is 
justifiable when the sentence is equal to the offence. In contrast, utilitarianism justified 
punishment when it serves the greater good. One version of utilitarian punishment was 
prominently developed by the English philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, who grounded moral 
utility in happiness. Actions that caused happiness to a greater number of people outweighed 
the pain caused to a minority (Bentham 2007). Unlike the deterrent punishment exercised by 
the sovereign monarch, utilitarian deterrence had to be slightly disproportional to the offence. 
Punishment would always be an evil, albeit a necessary one because penal reformers in 
eighteenth century England also sought to protect the property of the rising middle-class. As 
Norrie explains, utilitarian reformers transposed an economic theory of behaviour into social 
control policy, conceiving offenders as rational actors who calculated opportunities and risks 
(Norrie 2001). In retributive approaches, agents were conceived as having the ability to access 
self-evident moral truths through reason. Both traditions present two different ideas about how 
free subjects decide to act and how criminal law should judge their actions, yet coincide in how 
individuals make those choices through reason.     
 Norrie argues that the history of criminal law is punctuated by the political and 
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ideological struggles between these two approaches to crime (Norrie, 2001). Neither can really 
sustain its stated aims on its own. Instead, the shared problem of retributivism and utilitarianism 
LVWKH³LQFRPSOHWHQHVVRIWKHLULGHRORJLFDOSUHPLVHV´LELG:KDWWKHVHWKHRULHVH[FOXGHG
was the real world where the legal subject inhabits: 
Economic man or juridical man were abstractions from real people emphasising one 
side of human life-the ability to reason and calculate- at the expense of every social 
circumstance that actually brings individuals to reason and calculate in particular ways 
(ibid). 
These two theories have a dialectical and contradictory relation with each other which signals 
WKHµIDXOWOLQHV¶RULJLQDWLQJLQWKHLGHRORJ\RIWKHOLEHUDOVXEMHFW2QWKHRQHKDQGWKHUDWLRQDl 
legal subject legitimized the emancipation of the bourgeoisie from monarchical and aristocratic 
power. On the other, it distributed legitimate and illegitimate relations of property 
expropriation, where the ruling colonial and industrial classes expropriated property 
legitimately while the poor were punished for stealing to survive. In this sense, the juridical 
VXEMHFWZDVLQVWUXPHQWDOL]HGXVHGDVDSROLWLFDODQGLGHRORJLFDOFRQVWUXFWLRQ³ZKLFKVHDOVRII
the question of individual culpability from issues concerning the relationship between 
LQGLYLGXDODJHQF\DQGVRFLDOFRQWH[W´1RUULH7KHQHZUXOHUVZHUHDOVRFRQIURQWHG
E\WKHµSUDFWLFDOQHFHVVLW\¶RIOLPLWLQJIUHHGRPWKURXJKFRHUFLYHVDQFWLRQVDJDLQVWLQGLYLGXDOV
and collectives.  As such, the law simultaneously embodies and undermines the ideal of 
individual liberty and justice (Norrie 2001). The current persistence of this approach can be 
VHHQLQWKHFRPPHQWDU\E\'DYLG&DPHURQLQWKDWWKH/RQGRQULRWVZHUH³FULPLQDOLW\
pure aQGVLPSOH´(The Telegraph 2011). This perspective elides any acknowledgment of the 
relation between the behaviour condemned and the marginalization of communities and their 
constant harassment through intrusive policing practices (Hopkin 2011). Thus, law operates as 
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an instrument of politics by covertly protecting privilege (Norrie 2005, 60) while 
simultaneously adopting a formalist approach to individual responsibility based on rationality, 
autonomy and will  (Norrie 2000, 45), which partiaOO\µGLVHPERGLHG¶WKHOHJDOVXEMHFWRIFULPH
Anna Grear suggests that the archetype of the subject in liberal legality is not entirely 
³GLVHPERGLHGEHFDXVH WKHPDOHPRUSKRORJ\ LV WUDIILFNHG LQWR WKH LGHDRI OHJDOSHUVRQDOLW\´
(Grear 2010a, 44)3DUDGR[LFDOO\WKHQWKHOHJDOSHUVRQRIUDWLRQDOLW\LV³TXDVL-GLVHPERGLHG´
EHFDXVHLWLV³IRUPDOO\HPSW\´EXWDOVRLQFRPSOHWHO\HPSW\VLQFHLWVPXJJOHVWKHPDOe body. 
The juridical person performs a sleight of hand in the ideology of liberalism which 
unsuccessfully abstracts a notion of subjectivity (ibid).  
i. Ambiguity of the legal subject: Rethinking criminal justice through relational 
subjectivity 
The last section noted how contradictions in the juridical person of criminal law signify a 
tension between the abstractions of existential and political questions and the legal forms 
adopted by the law to solve them (Norrie 2000). While historical and political conditions cannot 
be left out of questions of criminal responsibility, Norrie is not prepared to jettison agency and 
PRUDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WZR SURPLQHQW .DQWLDQ WKHPHV ,QVWHDG KH VXJJHVWV ILQGLQJ ³D QRQ-
.DQWLDQDQVZHUWRWKH.DQWLDQTXHVWLRQ´RIMXVWLFH(Norrie 2000). By grounding an ethical law 
based on individual moral autonomy, Kant did so at the cost of shutting out what is passionate 
and heteronomous in the subject (ibid). A fuller account of subjectivity would internally relate 
the antinomy embedded in the juridical subject, a formal term to designate false separations 
leading to binaries and then to contradictions (Norrie 2012). The individual matters for moral 
WKLQNLQJ EXW ³RQO\ LI LW LV XQGHUVWRRG LQ D IXQGDPHQWDOO\ GLIIHUHQW QRQ-individualistic, 
UHODWLRQDOZD\´(Norrie 2000, 5), articulated through a critical realist dialectic (Norrie 2000; 
2005). Dialectical critical realism is broadly characterized as a philosophical movement 
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engaging with physical sciences and transcendental philosophy (Bowring 2010;  Scotford 
Archer et. al. 1998)  which purports to transcend the dualisms implicit in the debates on 
philosophy of social sciences (Benton 1998, 297). A classic example is the nature of 
consciousness. Western philosophy has represented consciousness and reason as something 
immaterial. In contrast, physical sciences ground explanations about consciousness in physical 
SKHQRPHQDVXFKDVWKHERG\¶VSURFHVVHV (Weiss and Fern Haber 1999, xiii±xiv). Unlike the 
µOLQJXLVW¶ DQG FRQVWUXFWLYLVW WXUQ ZKLFK 1RUULH EHOLHYHV WR EH RYHUWO\ IRFXVHG RQ
epistemological issues, he argues that dialectic critical realLVP³stresses the crucial role that 
being (ontology) plays in our understanding of how knowledge HSLVWHPRORJ\ LVSRVVLEOH´ 
(Norrie 2010, 7)/LEHUDOOHJDOHSLVWHPRORJ\IDLOVWRJLYHDQDFFRXQWRI³UHDOPDWHULDOOLYHV´
(Naffine 1997, 80). 7ZR FHQWUDO WURSHV HPHUJH LQ 1RUULH¶V FULWLTXH DPELJXLW\ DQG
ambivalence. Ambiguity exposes the dual location of the agency of WKH³PRGHUQVHOI´ZKLOH
ambivalence expresses the contradictions in retributive criminal justice (Norrie 2000, 3-4).
 $PELJXLW\ LV GHILQHG DV WKH ³VXVFHSWLELOLW\ RI PXOWLSOH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ UHJDUGLQJ
PHDQLQJ´ (Martin 2002). It has also been a concept or trope used in existentialist and 
poststructuralist ethics that implies a lack of definitive resolution, and openness that exceeds 
meanings (Reynolds 2004; Anker 2009). In contrast, ambivalence has been central to the 
philosophy of action  and articulated as a conflict of the will, according to American scholar 
Harry Frankfurt (Swindell 2010). As the etymology of the term implies, ambivalence implies 
there LVDVLPXOWDQHRXVRSSRVLWLRQRIIHHOLQJVRUGHVLUHVLPSO\LQJµLQGHFLVLRQ¶ Ambivalence 
has been said to reflects a dilemma of how to act, or even an indecision that threatens autonomy 
EHFDXVH RQH¶V ZLOO LV GLYLGHG (Poltera 2010). Although different, both concepts are closely 
LQWHUUHODWHG )RU H[DPSOHRQH FDQEH DPELYDOHQW DERXW DFWLQJDFFRUGLQJ WRRQH¶VGHVLUHRU
RQH¶V VHQVH RI GXW\ <HW 1RUULH VXJJHVWV DW WLPHV that ambiguity and ambivalence are 
dialectically related. Ambiguity refers to the dual location of individual autonomy between the 
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personal and the social. In this sense, agents mediate their decisions in a social context which 




related. They feed off each other in order to resolve what is essentially irresolute, the 
judgement of individual responsibility in the particular case (Norrie 2005, 100). 
'UDZLQJRQ5RP+DUUp¶VVRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\(Harré 1983; Norrie 2000; Norrie 2005b), Norrie 
uses the notion of the ambiguous modern self to critique the Kantian subject of law. The self 
is ambiguous because modern individualism does not locate autonomy and moral responsibility 
where it actually is, that is, in between the personal and the social (Norrie 2000, 6). Social 
UHODWLRQVPDLQWDLQDQGSURGXFHRQH¶VVHQVHRIDXWRQRP\(Norrie 2005, 88). Individual selfhood 
LV³VHFRQGDU\´DVDQHIIHFWRIWKHSULPDU\VWUXFWXUHVRIKXPDQOLIHSDUWLFXODUO\VRFLHW\:H
arrive into a world already existing and exerting pressure on us to act as individual selves. 
,QGLYLGXDODJHQWVSDUWLFLSDWHLQ³SOD\LQJ´VRFLDOUROHVUHLWHUDWHGWKURXJK³ODQJXDJH´LELG88). 
2QHEHFRPHVDµVHOI¶WKURXJKVRFLHWDOVXSSRUWWRSHUIRUPSDUWLFXODUUROHV6HOfhood is dualistic 
because it exists in relation to others but also requires a denial of that relation in order to exist 
as an individual. Through the example of selfhood, Norrie shows there is an internal dialectical 
connection between the individual and social although they are also separate.  
 Subjectivity and selfhood46 serve as springboards for a critique of modern criminal 
justice thinking, particularly the notion of orthodox subjectivism. This contemporary 
articulation of retributivism is characterized by an attempt to align morality with law (Norrie 
                                                          
46
 Selfhood and subjectivity are inter-related yet contested terms. Subjectivity tends to refer to psycho-social 
theRULHV RI VXEMHFWLRQ ³ZLWKRXW VXFFXPELQJ WR WKH UHGXFWLRQLVP RI VRFLDO GHWHUPLQLVP´ (Layton 2008, 60). 
Selfhood implies a reflection on individuality and identity, to know oneself as different from others. 
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2000). Whilst sympathetic to the project, Norrie disagrees with subjectivists like Michael 
Moore, Anthony Duff, and Andrew Ashworth, because, he maintains, their approaches 
reproduce old problems (Norrie 2000; Norrie 2001; Norrie 2005). One of them is the reliance 
of punishment on an artificial version of individual blame, culpability and responsibility47  that 
separates and denies the ambiguity of modern selfhood (Norrie 2000, 3). The separation, for 
H[DPSOHEHWZHHQLQGLYLGXDOEODPHDQGFROOHFWLYHEODPHLVDµIDOVHEXWQHFHVVDU\¶GLVWLQFWLRQ
used to justify punishment. The falsehood derives from creating an abstract legal concept; the 
necessity derives from the real existential desire for justice and giving closure to moral 
dilemmas created by wrongdoing. Yet, neither the contextualization nor particularization of 
blame resolves in a satisfactory way the outrage of a community to a crime. Individualizing 
blame performs a refusal of the relational character of agency; contextualizing blame effaces 
WKHRIIHQGHU¶VDJHQF\ 7KXV WKHDPELJXLW\ LQPRGHUQVHOIKRRGDOVR³WUDQVODWHV LQWRPRUDO
MXGJHPHQWVRQZURQJGRLQJDQGDVHQVHRIMXVWLFH´(Norrie 2005, 89). The moral judgement of 
a crime stages a wager between individualizing blame and contextualizing the actions of the 
offender through the personal history: 
Thus, our initial reaction of anger and condemnation may be followed by a sense that 
the criminal was also a victim. In so doing, we move from the sense of the individual as 
DQDXWRQRPRXVDJHQWWKHODZ¶VYLHZWRWKDWRIWKHSHUVRQDVDEHLQJ-in-relation (ibid., 
89). 
The wager is too quickly resolved, favouring individual blame. Yet, this result has already been 
structured by the legal framework, for example, by the doctrine of intention. The explanation 
that contextualizes the decisions is proper to sociology or criminology; not the law. 
Concessions for contextualization exist in sentencing but not in the adjudication of legal guilt. 
                                                          
47
 Individual blame rests on the philosophy of punishment; culpability on a theory of law; and responsibility on a 
philosophy of the mind (Norrie 2000, 94). 
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We can see here more clearly the problem posed by ambivalence in the case of drug mules 
discussed in chapter II. The agency of women acting as drug mules can be seen as ambivalently 
located between familial, cultural and political security practices. Choices made, mainly to 
traffic drugs, can hardly be characterized purely through the framework of the law, the formula 
RIHLWKHUµ\RXNQHZLWZDVGUXJVDQGZLOOHGWRFDUU\RXWWKHSURKLELWHGDFW¶RUµ\RXGLGQRW¶48 
Fleetwood and Torres interviewed ZRPHQ ZKR H[SODLQHG WKHLU ³LQYROYHPHQW LQ GUXJ
WUDIILFNLQJDVDQRSSRUWXQLW\WRµVDYH¶DUHODWLRQVKLSWURXEOHGE\DGLIILFXOWHFRQRPLFVLWXDWLRQ
DVZHOODVDQRSSRUWXQLW\WRSURYLGHDEHWWHUIXWXUHIRUWKHLUFKLOGUHQ´(Fleetwood and Torres 
2010, 131). Neither the doctrine of intention, where one desires to bring about the consequence, 
QRUWKHGRFWULQHRINQRZOHGJHZKHUHRQHµEOLQGVRQHVHOIWRWKHWUXWK¶ holds a space for the 
above narrative. Construed as motivation or as sentencing mitigation, important features which 
embody the subject, are ejected from the adjudication of the offence. Yet, the contradictory 
structure of the law of intention cannot suppress completely what was excluded. The judgement 
is ambivalent, performing a paradoxical negation/affirmation of justice. 
i. Negotiating ambiguity, ambivalence and geopolitical temporalities 
The law creates distinctionV OLNH ¶YLFWLPV¶ DQG µRIIHQGHUV DOWKRXJK 1RUULH¶V DQDO\VLV DOVR
shows these categories DUHXOWLPDWHO\XQVWDEOHDQGQHJRWLDEOHEHFDXVHWKH\DUHµIDOVH¶EXWDOVR
necessary (Norrie 2000, 47). They express struggles about values in communities subject to 
fragmentation and historical transformations (Norrie 2005, 105). Norrie illustrates this point 
through the struggle played out in the Nuremberg trials between the values held by fascism and 
post-war. On one hand, individual responsibility and guilt FRXOGQRWEHGHQLHGEXW³LQGLYLGXDOV
shift between registers of self-accounting, so that it is socio-political contexts that fix 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\´LELG 2QWKHRWKHUKDQGLQGLYLGXDOV¶RZQVHQVHRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\PRYHV
                                                          
48
 The specific elements of the legislation governing importation/exportation offences will be discussed in detail 
in chapter VI. 
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DFURVVGLIIHUHQW³PRUDOFRQWH[WVRIMXGJHPHQW´LELG., 106): One day fulfilling the law under a 
fascist regime; the next day condemned by another legal regime and under moral scrutiny of 
two different political communities.         
 For example, we might one day be confronted by two opposite ideas about drug laws. 
In England and Wales, one of the first appeals was lodged after the entry in force of the 
Definitive Guidelines for Drug Offences (2012) suggested that the sentencing scheme should 
apply retrospectively because the previous reJLPHZDV³IXQGDPHQWDOO\GLVSURSRUWLRQDWH´and 
unjust49. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) rejected the application for the joint appeal, 
UHDVRQLQJ WKDW VLQFH VHQWHQFLQJ FKDQJHG VR PXFK WKURXJKRXW WLPH VKDSHG E\ 3DUOLDPHQW¶V
responses to public perception, it would create chaos for the courts and would be unjust for the 
offender to have a higher sentence applied retrospectively.50 In contrast, Ecuador have 
reformed and given effect to a new criminal code in 2014 which radically reduces the sentences 
for anyone carrying small quantities of drugs and is applied retrospectively. It also granted a 
mass pardon to 1,500 drug mules in 2009 through a resolution approved by the constitutional 
DVVHPEO\RI7KHµSDUGRQ¶ZDVDUWLFXODWHGLQVXFKDZD\WKDWLWZRuld be compatible with 
international human rights obligations for prisoners (Metaal 2009). 51 A central motor behind 
the new Ecuadorean criminal code is the shift in the conceptualization of drug mules as 
³YLFWLPVH[SORLWHGE\GUXJFDUWHOV´DQGDVSHUVRQVEXWPRVWO\ZRPHQZKR³KDYHQRFRQWURO
over narco-trafficking but are persons who rent their bodies (. . .) as drug containers in exchange 
for (. . .) money who rent their bodies unrelated to the amount obtained by the sale of such 
VXEVWDQFHV´52 (ibid., 4).        
                                                          
49
 R v Boakye & Ors [2012] EWCA Crim 838 [10]. 
50
 ibid. [12]-[13]. 
51
 The proposal referenced Resolutions 663C (XXIV) of the 31 of July 1957 and Resolution.2076 (LXII) of 13 of 
May 1977 of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) about the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
RI3ULVRQHUVDQG³WKHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVH[SUHssed by the Inter American Court of Human Rights, in its 1997 
Annual Report, which noted that the (anti-QDUFRWLFOHJLVODWLRQKDVFDXVHGXQGXHKDUPWRSHUVRQV´(Metaal 2009, 
4).  
52
 Translated citation in the article by Pien Metaal, originally from the Majority report by the Constitutional 
Assembly of the Republic of Ecuador. No page reference. 
101 
 
 5HFDOO DOVR KRZ UHVHDUFK IRXQG WKDW WKDW GUXJ PXOHV¶ VHQVH RI VHOI ZDV GHILQHG
relationally and while relative deprivation was part of the context (Fleetwood 2014), engaging 
in drug mule work was partly driven to prevent the end of the ideation of their identity as 
mothers. Narratives provided by women sentenced for drug mule work were not only a shaped 
by their life experiences and personal biographies but also their material and geopolitical 
UHDOLWLHVZLWKLQWKH(FXDGRULDQSULVRQVXFKDVWKHµZDURQGUXJV¶LELG7KRVHOLYLQJLQWKH
overcrowded prisons of El Inca were aware of the impact from the exportation of the war on 
dUXJVWR(FXDGRU7KHDYDLODEOH³webs of meaning and the kinds of female gender and subject 
position (victim or agent´ shaped, supported or limited their possibility to speak in the prison 
environment (ibid., 45). By this, Fleetwood refers to the active role by prisoners in collective 
VWULNHVDQGSURWHVWVFHQWUHGRQWKH³FROOHFWLYHLGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWKWKHGUXJPXOH´LELG
WKHSDUWLFXODUWURSHRIWKHIHPLQL]HGYLFWLPRISRYHUW\$OWKRXJKWKLVLGHQWLILFDWLRQ³GLGQRW
refOHFW DQ REMHFWLYH NLQG RI WUXWK´ LW ZDV HPEUDFHG FROOHFWLYHO\ DV ³DQ HIIHFWXDO LGHQWLW\
QHFHVVDU\IRUSURWHVW´LELG,WH[HPSOLILHVKRZWKHQDUUDWLYHVPDNHVHQVHRIRQH-self with 
others, in the broad sense of the term discussed with reference to embodimHQW¶ LV KLJKO\
WHPSRUDO/OR\GEXWDOVRDQWLWKHWLFDOWRWKHOHJDOWHPSRUDOLW\ZKLFKµIL[HV¶VHOIKRRGLQ
the rational autonomous subject required to judge criminal responsibility.     
 Taking into consideration the above, we can observe how victim-offender categories 
are in a sense ambiguous and defined through the historical context and struggles in the 
community to define, re-GHILQH RU FRQWHVWV WKRVH ODEHOV ,Q 1RUULH¶V YLHZ WKH LGHD RI
responsibility as the duty to the law is solipsistic and excludes the relational constitution of 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ &RPSDULQJ WZR GLIIHUHQW YHUVLRQV RI MXGJHPHQW LQ .DQW¶V WKRXJKW 1RUULH






ZLWKRQH¶s own reason. Rational thought has to agree with itself (Norrie 2005; Arendt [1961]  
2006) at the cost of excluding the relational self. Arendt does not dismiss Kantianism 
FRPSOHWHO\RQO\WKHFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYH,QFRQWUDVW.DQW¶VDHVWKHWLFMXGJPHQWHQWDLOVLQ
1RUULH¶VZRUGVWKHDELOLW\WR³WKLQNLQWKHSODFHRIHYHU\ERG\HOVH´(Norrie 2005, 108). Re-
LQWHUSUHWLQJ.DQWWKURXJK$UHQGW¶VUHQGLWLRQ1RUULHVXJJHVWV 
«WKH UROH RI WKH FRPPXQLW\ DQG LWV UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH LQGLYLGXal, far from the 
solipsist bar of the categorical imperative, identifies the place where judgement occurs, 
and which generates the complexity, ambivalence and ambiguity that has been sought 
here (ibid.)  
If duty to the law is insufficient to express the relational space where the self makes decisions, 
WKHQZKDWLVWKHUHDFKRIWKLQNLQJLQWKHSODFHRIRWKHUVRUµWKLQNLQJLQWKHSODFHRIRWKHUV¶"
2IIHQGLQJFRXOGZHOOEHERWKWKLQNLQJDERXWRQHVHOIDQGWKLQNLQJDERXWRQH¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\WR
others. But who arH WKHVH µRWKHUV¶RQHPXVW WKLQNDERXW"6R IDU WKLV VHFWLRQKDV VRXJKW WR
trouble the legal subject of criminal law through the ambiguity situated in the criminal justice 
thinking that stresses individual responsibility at the expense of the relational constitution of 
subjectivity. Norrie emphasises the complicity between theories of legal thinking with an 
ontology of the legal being that is partial and ultimately, unjust (Norrie 2000, 69). Instead, he 
proposes a relational theory of responsibility. How would a relational theory of responsibility 
reconstitute concepts like blame, guilt or judgement?      
 To understand the conclusion he reaches, we must look at the third step of his critique, 
which involves re-establishing the dialectical relation in legal thinking about responsibility in 
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 'LDOHFWLFDO WKRXJKW FRXQWHUV WKH DUJXPHQWV E\ DQDO\WLF SKLORVRSK\ ZKLFK LV JURXQGHG RQ µVHOI-evident 




means of bringing to beat juGJHPHQW RQ LQGLYLGXDOV IRU ZKRP JXLOW LV D PRUDO VHQWLPHQW´ 
(Norrie 2005, 108) . If we understood legal subjectivity relationally, the law would be able to 
locate blame in between the individual and society, as recognition of the co-extension of 
responsibility to the community (ibid.,$MXGJPHQWUHWULHYHV³ZKDWLVRIPRUDOYDOXHLQ
Kantian individualism and [locates] its significance within DUHODWLRQDOFRQWH[W´ (Norrie 2000, 
193). ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKH MXGJHPHQW RXJKW WR H[SUHVV WKH ³EODPLQJ UHODWLRQ´ EHWZHHQ WKH
individual and the community (ibid.,  7KH LGHD RI ³judgement and justice through law 
RFFXSLHVDµVSDFHEHWZHHQ¶WKHOHJDODQGWKHPRUDO´ (ibid., 77). 
ii. Ambiguity and femininity: The unspoken debt to liminal motherhood 
The idea of relational responsibility leads to the difficult questions about judging the criminal 
responsibility of women drug mules because it poses difficult questions for feminism. To what 
extent is blame relational? Does it extend to victims? Victim-blaming is a characteristic feature 
of rape discourse because female subjects are more often constructed relationally: understood 
as wives, mothers, girlfriends while the masculine subjectivity is more often than not presented 
without reference to his relations. Norrie would perhaps say that blaming only the victim would 
be missing the point, since it simply shows a reversal of the dichotomy or the false separations 
LGHQWLILHG WKURXJK WKH LPPDQHQW FULWLTXH  &OHDUO\ 1RUULH¶V DQDO\VLV FKLPHV ZLWK SRVLWLRQV




and political agency (ibid., 4).        
 Relational subjectivity and relational autonomy may not be an ideal panacea for 
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feminism for several reasons. Performing heteronormative gender roles, ritualized in socio-
legal practices, may ground a sense of self. Yet, this archetype of motherhood affirms relational 
autonomy for women, while the strength of the practice of masculine autonomy affirmed as 
individualistic decision-making does not seem to diminish. As I will outline through the case 
analysis in chapter VI, the vulnerability of female mules is often presented through familial 
and romantic relationships. If ambiguity is the trope that signifies the relationality of 
subMHFWLYLW\WKHµIHPLQLQH¶KDVEHHQRIWHQFRGHGDVWKHSDUDGLJPRIDPELJXRXVVXEMHFWLYLW\
WKDWµJLYHVELUWK¶WRWKHSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\(Schott 2010a). In this sense, Robyn May Schott 
affirms ambiguity and ambivalence to push further critical approaches on gender, but need to 
be probed  through the lens of sexual difference (Schott 2010b). She explains how stories about 
political genesis in various ideologies, from Marxism to Freudianism and existentialism, have 
been often posited as the generative bond between opposites: life and destruction, war and 
peace; revolution and institutionalization. One of the central features in the narratives of tragic 
µFULVLV¶LVWKHLGHDRIVDFULILFHHQDcted through sexual violence. Analysing historical narratives 
of the rape of the women of the enemy as a practice of war in Ancient Greece, Judeo-Christian 
and Roman history, Schott questions what is at stake when a political community rests on 
sacrificial violence. Schott argues that sacrificial victims usually bear the mark of ambiguity. 
In other words, they are individuals whose political belonging is liminal, at the margins of the 
political community, such as women, slaves and animals. In all the storieVWKH³YLRODWLRQRID
ZRPDQ¶VERG\«EHFRPHVWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLYHPRPHQWRIWKHFRPPXQLW\´LEid., 31) whether 
by ensuring  life will continue in the political future of a new nation or by making impossible 
the resurgence of the vanquished community through her death.     
 Crucially, Schott argues that this form of political violence is enabled through the 
ideation and abjection of the ambiguity symbolized in the pregnant female body (ibid. 39). 
Ambiguity resides in the womb, the place where the relationship with life and death begins 
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LELGFKDUDFWHUL]LQJ IHPLQLQLW\DVGXSOLFLW\6FKRWW VWUHVVHV WKDW WKH³SDWWHUQVRI VDFULILFLDO
WKLQNLQJ´KDUERXUDORJLFZKHUHWKHSROLWLFDOVRFLDORUGHUDQGWKHKXPan body mirror each other 
(ibid.:RPHQ¶VERG\WDNHVthat role, through the symbolic mark of maternal embodied 
DPELJXLW\ZKLOH³VDFULILFHQHJRWLDWHVWKHDPELYDOHQWUHODWLRQEHWZHHQGHDWKDQGELUWKVRWKDW
GHDWKEHFRPHVWKHRULJLQRIQHZELUWK´LELG, 44). Victims of sacrifice restore the stability of 
a community in crisis or transition. In the historical narratives revised, the common 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFRIVDFULILFLDOYLFWLPVLVWKDWWKH\DUH³QHLWKHUWRRIRUHLJQQRUWRRIDPLOLDU´LELG
35). Familiar victims, such as recognized members of the community, cannot be sacrificed 
because their death would be considered a loss; killing foreign victims would activate the cycle 




the future of the nation through their death.        
 Through this perspective, my aim is not to fully discredit relational approaches to 
subjectivity and responsibility departing from ambiguity. But there is a limit to what they can 
RIIHUWRWKHSUREOHPRIOLYLQJLQFRPPXQLW\¶VSURFOLYLW\WRDOORFDWHUHODWLRnal subjectivity along 
gender and sexual lines. The rational juridical subject is coded through differential scripts 
framing feminine and masculine roles (Nedelsky 1990; Naffine 1997; Davies 2012). These 
IUDPHV DUH QRW VLPSO\ GHVFULSWLYH EXW DUH SURGXFWLYH OHJDO QRUPV DQG UHJLPHV ³KDYH
disciplinary effects on actual social relations by normatively re-inscribing certain patterns of 
VH[HGDQGJHQGHUHGVRFLDOEHKDYLRXU´(Conaghan 2013a, 104). Legal norms punish or reward 
different expressions of motherhood and femininity (ibid.). In the case of drug mules, sentence-
mitigation is available for offenders with dependents, but a woman who brought her children 
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LQ WKH FULPLQDO YHQWXUH EHFDPH D µVHULRXV DJJUDYDWLQJ IHDWXUH¶.54 This is evident even in 
sentencing appeals by drug mules, where the courts protect the boundaries of the juridical 
person by favouring a reading of agency in the calculating rational subject.   
 Ambiguity defies the stability of those boundaries, including the self-defined 
boundaries of the law. Liberal theories of law represent it as an enterprise guided by 
consistency, rationality, and coherence in its ideas and practice. These norms ground the 
legitimacy of the law itself (Norrie 2001, 2005),QVWHDGRIGHVFULELQJODZDVLILWZHUH³DUHDOP
RI KRPRJHQRXV FRQFHSWV WKDW DUH FXW RII IURP WKH RXWVLGH ZRUOG RI PRUDOLW\ DQG SROLWLFV´
through allegedly value-neutral legal concepts and argumentation techniques (Norrie 2001, 
87), DWKHRUHWLFDODSSURDFKWKDWFDQ³HQFDSVXODWHDQDPELYDOHQFHLQRXUDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHOHJDO
FRQFHSWLRQRI MXVWLFH´ZRXOG H[SRVH WKH OLPLWV DQG VWUHQJWKVRI WKH ODZ (Norrie 2005, 76). 
While I agree with Norrie, my concern is that his affirmative approach to ambiguity and 
ambivalence does not reflect on the complicated relationship of masculinity frames with these 
tropes. A critical approach to criminal law would also unpick the relationship of masculinities 
with ambiguity and in that sense, with vulnerability, as I will explain in chapter V. For now, 
we need only look at the scene of ambiguity from the perspective of feminist scholarship and 
what it means for criminal justice. 
4. 6LPRQH'H%HDXYRLU¶VFULWLTXHRIPRUDOSKLORVRSK\DQGSXQLVKPHQW 
In this section, I want to draw attention to an unlikely interlocutor in the field of criminal 
MXVWLFH /DWH HQJDJHPHQWV ZLWK 6LPRQH GH %HDXYRLU¶V ZRUN RQ DPELJXLW\ GHPRQVWUDWH WKH
breadth of her method, encompassing themes that are not limited to gender and sexuality 
studies but also extend to broader questions of politics, moral philosophy, and ethics (Morgan 
2008; Kruks 2012; Murphy 2012a) ,Q SDUWLFXODU %HDXYRLU¶V PRUDO SKLORVRSK\ DQG UHFHQW
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 R v Watson (Geraldine Alethea) [2013] EWCA Crim 182 
107 
 
interpretations of her work highlight the suppression of intersubjective relations in legal 
judgement, punishment, and moral responsibility. Through the trope of ambiguity, Beauvoir 
affirms the intersubjective constitution of the subject. Neither Beauvoir nor Norrie want to 
renounce autonomy and individual responsibility. However, both condemn individualistic 
LGHRORJLHV2IFRXUVHRQHPXVWEHFDXWLRXVDERXWGUDZLQJOLQNVEHWZHHQ1RUULHDQG%HDXYRLU¶V
engagements with ambiguity as there are important differences in their respective approaches. 
Firstly, Beauvoir adds a gender dimension to ambiguity which allows her also to point to its 
limits without renouncing to its strengths, mainly the possibility for interpersonal and political 
relations that are moved by generosity rather than by a desire for possession and control. 
6HFRQGO\1RUULH¶VGLDOHctic approach to law and history might be said to reify the foundational 
story of the Enlightenment, as if theories of reason and calculation spontaneously flowed from 
the thoughts of philosophers and politicians rather than being shaped by existing practices.55
 5HYLVLWLQJWKHPHWDSKRUVLQWKHLQWURGXFWLRQKLVWRU\IRU%HDXYRLULVPRUHDNLQWRµOLYLQJ
ERG\¶WKDQDIRXQGDWLRQDOµFRUSVH¶56 shaped by her care of temporality and embodiment. Ann 
*HQRYHVH GHVFULEHV %HDXYRLU¶V ZRUN DV D µKLVWRULRJUDSK\,57 ZKLFK LV ³¶DQWL-IRXQGDWLRQDO¶
because she is writing the self, not reclaiming or seeking essentially to explain the marginalized 
experience RIRWKHUV´(Genovese 2013, 50).The centrality of phenomenology in her thought 
FRXOGEHDFFRXQWHG IRU%HDXYRLU¶VDSSURDFK WRKLVWRU\.58 Rather than claiming a privileged 
SRVLWLRQRYHUZRPHQ¶VH[SHULHQFHV%HDXYRLUVWDWHVWKDWKHULQWHQWLRQLV³to merely translate 
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 Norrie addresses the critiques to his analysis in his 2001 monograph. Lacey considers his historical approach 
µVFKHPDWLF¶ ZKLOH /LQGVH\ )DUPHU DUJXHV LW LV WRR DQDO\WLF ZKLFK LV QRW WUXO\ D KLVWRULFDO DFFRXQW RI WKH
development of law ( Norrie 2000). 
56
 As noteGE\*HQRYHVH%HDXYRLUKHUVHOIFRQVLGHUHGWKDWWKHKLVWRULFDOSDVW³FDQQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGDVGHILQLQJ
DQHWHUQDOWUXWK´(Genovese 2013, 50). 
57
 %\KLVWRULRJUDSK\*HQRYHVHPHDQVWKHSUDFWLFHRIZULWLQJKLVWRU\WKDWRIIHUVµDSDUWLFXODUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI







 %HDXYRLU ILQGV WKDW KLVWRULFDO PDWHULDOLVP ZDV LQVXIILFLHQW WR H[SODLQ ZRPHQ¶V RSSUHVVLRQ 6KH DUJXHV WKDW
Engels took for granted many facts requiring explanation, such as proprietary interests (Beauvoir 1974, 62).  
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[...] a situation that is showing itself to be historical precisely in that it is in the process of 
FKDQJLQJ´ (Beauvoir [1949] 2011, 750).59 Ambiguity provides the gravitas to how she shapes 
her critique of history, politics and philosophy. She first used the term in Ethics of Ambiguity 
(1948), written in the context of post-war France. However, the leitmotif of ambiguity traverses 
the body of her work (Langer 2003; Deutscher 2008a; Kruks 2012; Murphy 2012a). Beauvoir 
uses ambiguity to approach the problem of individual freedom and how to conduct oneself in 
relation to others. In its core, ambiguity is described as a feature of existence enabled by the 
self-other relation, marked by our experience as objects for others and yet, with the desire to 
be subjects (Beauvoir [1948]1986). It is an ontological and epistemological problem: 
As long as there have been men and they have lived, they have all felt this tragic 
ambiguity of their condition, but as long as there have been philosophers and they have 
thought, most of them have tried to mask it. They have striven to reduce mind to matter, 
or to reabsorb matter into mind, or to merge them within a single substance (ibid., 70). 
The tragedy is the desire to flee from ambiguity because it instantiates an antinomy of action: 
to project oneself as pure consciousness (disembodied subjectivity) or to merge oneself into 
pure materiality (brute facticity of the body). In contrast, %HDXYRLU¶V H[LVWHQWLDO
phenomenology presents a version of selfhood that is relational and intersubjective (Tidd 2001) 
because one comes into a world already constituted by others. An individual consciousness 
resists this interdependence out of anxiety or fear of becoming an object for others, instantiating 
relations of inequality such as the one described by Hegel in the lord-bondsman model (Hegel 
1979). To be a subject, one must project oneself (intentionality) into the world to transcend the 
given conditions (Kruks 2012, 34). Thus, freedom emerges in action or in practical freedom. 
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 Cited by Genovese (Genovese 2013, 51). The translation by Constance Borde and Malovany-Chevalier includes 
parts originally not included in earlier English versions.  
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8QOLNH 6DUWUH¶V µRQWRORJLFDO¶ IUHHGRP60 meaning that freedom is something inalienable 
because it is constitutive to our being, Beauvoirian scholars agree that she reworks freedom 
WKURXJKWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIHPERGLPHQW6DUWUH¶VYHUVLRQRIIUHHGRPDIILUPVWKDWZHFDQDOZD\V
choose otherwise, even in the most extreme situations of existence. Thus, one must accept 
freedom respoQVLEO\RUGHQ\LWLQµEDGIDLWK¶ZKLFKPHDQVLQIXOOFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIRQH¶VFKRLFH
RUGHFOLQDWLRQRIFKRLFH,QFRQWUDVW%HDXYRLUGLVWLQJXLVKHV³RQWRORJLFDOIUHHGRP>la liberte@¶
IURPWKHµSUDFWLFDOIUHHGRPUHTXLUHGLQRUGHUWRDFWLQWKHZRUOG>puissance@´(Kruks 2012, 13). 
Her version of freedom is immersed in the contingencies of the world.   
 ,QVWHDGWRDVVXPHWKHDPELJXLW\RIIUHHGRP³LVWRDVVHUWWKDWLWVPHDQLQJLVQHYHUIL[HG
WKDWLWPXVWEHFRQVWDQWO\ZRQ´(Beauvoir [1948] 1986, 13), couched in the agonistic tension 
of political life (Kruks 2012, 7). The disclosure of being is akin to the desire for meaning to be 
FRQFUHWL]HGLQDFWLRQV%XWZHUXQDJDLQVWRWKHUSHRSOH¶VSURMHFWVZKLFKWKUHDWHQWKHGLVFORVXUH
of our own projects. This means that the ambiguity of existence is also underpinned by the 
antinomy between ethics and politics. As Bergoffen remarks, subjectivity is political in so far 
DVWKHVXEMHFW³PRYHVWRLPSRVHPHDQLQJLQWKHZRUOGHWKLFDODVLWDFNQRZOHGJHVWKHPDUNRI
WKHRWKHU´(Bergoffen 2001, 188) %HDXYRLU¶VDPELJXRXVVXEMHFWLYLW\SXUSRUWVWRVHSDUDWHEXW
not destroy the bond between ethics and politics (ibid., 187). Yet, does an ethics of ambiguity 
DFKLHYHWKLVSXUSRVH"3HQHORSH'HXWVFKHU¶VGHFRQVtructive reading offers a critical account for 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHQXDQFHVOLPLWVDQGWUDGLWLRQVIHHGLQJ%HDXYRLU¶VDSSURDFKWRDPELJXLW\DQG
KRZLQSHUIRUPLQJLWVRZQIDLOXUHLWUHDIILUPVLWVµXWRSLDQ¶SRVVLELOLWLHV 
i. Ambiguous conversions: A deconstructive reading of Simone De Beauvoir 
Penelope Deutscher characterizHV %HDXYRLU¶VPHWKRGDV WKHSHUIRUPDQFH RI FRQYHUVLRQVRI
ambiguity and resistance in her relationship with intellectual peers, or with other disciplines. 
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 Against the position of radical subjectivism, the body cannot be transcended (Kruks 2012, 34),WLV³QRWDWKLQJ
it is a situation: it is our grasp on the world DQGWKHRXWOLQHRIRXUSURMHFWV´(Beauvoir [1949] 2011, 46).  
110 
 
+HU PXOWLSOH ³intellectual debts and aIILOLDWLRQV´PDNH LW GLIILFXOW WR ³recognize the mutual 
troubliQJRIWKHWKHRUHWLFDOODQJXDJHV´ in her work61 (Deutscher 2008a, 12). For this reason, 
her work may be seen as vulnerable to theoretical clashes. Surely, these clashes are inevitable. 
<HW%HDXYRLU¶VLQWHOOHFWXDODSSURDFKLVDNLQWRWKHODERXURINQLWWLQJ62: the material itself can 
be pulled, unravelled, tightened, loosened, and brought together in different colours and threads 
into the fabric (ibid., 2008). Beauvoir enables the intersection between the thinkers she 
addresses, engaging the concepts she appropriates in an unlikely encounter. As Deutscher 
suggests: 
+HUZRUNHQJDJHVXVZLWKDFRQFHSW¶VLQFDSDFLW\RUFDSDFLW\WRGHDOZLWKDSDUWLFXODU
SUREOHPQRWRULRXVO\ LQ%HDXYRLU¶s work, sex gender, and sexual difference but also 
race and age othering), or to cohabitate witKDSDUDOOHOH[SODQDWRU\PRGHO« (ibid., 14). 
As an intellectual approach, ambiguity embodies an inWHQVLW\DIRUFHWKDWSHUIRUPV³conceptual 
FRQYHUVLRQV >«@ WKH\ PD\ EH EHWWHU XQGHUVWRRG DV SRLQWV RI WKHRU\ intersection and 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ´63 (ibid., 22). Beauvoir stages a distancing gesture away from the Hegelian 
concept of synthesis64 DQGKRZLWµIL[HV¶VXEMHFWLYLW\LQWKHDFKLHYHPHQWRIDQLGHDOSURFHVVRI
progress (Beauvoir 1949, 9). Simultaneously, she converts the movement of history through 
WKHDVVXPSWLRQRIIDLOXUH)RUH[DPSOHWKHVHOI³DVVXPHVassume) the inevitability with which 
she or he tends (tenderWRZDUGDEHLQJRQHFDQQHYHUEH´(Deutscher 2008a, 27).   
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 7KHOLVWRILQWHOOHFWXDOLQWHUORFXWRUVLQ%HDXYRLU¶VWH[WVLQFOXGH+HJHO,PPDQXHO.DQW.DUO0DU[(GPXQG
Husserl, Maurice Merleau- Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Aristotle, Paul Bergson,  Martin, Levi Strauss (Deutscher 
2008a, 12±13) and Maurice Blanchot (Deutscher 2008a, 19). 
62
 'HXWVFKHUFRQYH\VWKLVLGHDWKURXJKWKHPHWDSKRURIWKHZHDYLQJ³6KHKRRNVWKUHDGVZKLFKRQFHSXOOHGHLWKHU
bring along (or link up) the fabric in which they are embedded, or, alternatively, unravel it. The analytic work 




 2QH FDQQRW UHGXFH %HDXYRLU¶V DQDO\VLV RI µUHFLSURFLW\¶ WR DQ HYROYLQJ FRQFHSW SHUIHFWHG LQ WKH ODVW ZRUN
SXEOLVKHG LQ D VRUW RI WHOHRORJLFDO UHDGLQJ RI DQ DXWKRU¶V LGHDV ,nstead, Deutscher comments how concepts 
XQGHUSLQQLQJYDOXHVOLNHUHFLSURFLW\DUHVXEMHFWWRFRPSOH[LQWHUVHFWLRQVWKDWFRQVWDQWO\QHHGWREH³FKDOOHQJHG
UHFRQVLGHUHGDQGUHGHILQHGLQKHUZRUN´(Deutscher 2008a, 22). 
64
 Beauvoir notes how the Hegelian system provides a false comfort because it is only intellectual (Beauvoir 
[1948] 1986, 158). 
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 Now, Beauvoir does not move far away from the existentialist approach to subjectivity, 
ZKLFKLVGHILQHGE\µODFN¶(Bergoffen 2010),Q6DUWUH¶VRQWRORJ\WKHVXEMHFWKDVDQRULJLQDO
lack and a corresponding desire to be. Sartre associated the lack with the desire to appropriate 
and possess, to fill that emptiness in the subject. If the ontological tendency is to appropriate, 
6DUWUH¶V DUJXPHQW LPSOLHV SRVVHVVLYHQHVV DQG DSSURSULDWLRQ SHUVLVWV LQ DOO FLUFXPVWDQFHV
regardless of political or social orientations (ibid.). Sartre shuts down the door to ethics, 
suggesting social relations are inevitably hostile and conflictual. Beauvoir performs her own 
conversion in the concept of subjectivity and relations with others. Yet, she does not equate the 
desire of disclosing being with appropriation and possession. While the ontological lack of 
being opens the possibility to the desire of possession and to conflict, Beauvoir associates the 
lack with far greater possibilities (Deutscher 2008a, 40).65     
 ,Q'HXWVFKHU¶VYLHZ%HDXYRLU¶VYLHZRQWKHPDVWHUDQGVODYHPRGHOIRUVRFLDOUHODWLRQV
LV³QRWDPRGDOLW\RIRULJLQDOGHVLUHEXWUDWKHUDQLQGLYLGXDWLRQRIRXUHWKLFDOIDLOXUHWRUHVSHFW
the original lack and desire to diVFORVH´(ibid., 40). This position is clearest in The Second Sex, 
where the possessive WUHDWPHQWRIZRPHQUHIOHFWV³DQHWKLFDOIDLOXUHLQSHUVRQDODQGSROLWLFDO
UHODWLRQV´LELG$V\PPHWULFDOUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQZRPHQDQGPHQH[LVWEHFDXVHSDWULDUFKDO
societies socialize men into freedom while women are confined to be the opposite, an object.  
The masculine desire is to abject his own immanence by projecting it onto women, as Beauvoir 
WHOOVXV³PDQ¶VUHYROWDJDLQVWKLVFDUQDOFRQGLWLRQLVPRUHJHQHUDOKHFRQVLGHUVKLPVHOIDIDOOHQ
god: his curse is to have fallen from a luminous and orderly heaven into the chaotic obscurity 
RIWKHPRWKHU¶VZRPE´(Beauvoir [1949] 2011, 164).     
 :RPHQ LQ %HDXYRLU¶V YLHZ DOVR DYRLG WKHLU RZQ DPELJXLW\ DFFHSWLQJ UROHV RI
REMHFWLILFDWLRQ UDWKHU WKDQ DVVXPLQJ RQH¶V IUHHGRP.66 One could reframe Beauvoir into 
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 Deutscher aGGUHVVHVKHUHWKHHQJDJHPHQWRI*DLO:HLVVZLWKWKHQRWLRQRIDPELJXLW\LQ%HDXYRLU¶VZRUN 
66
 7KHUHLVDUHYLYDORIWKLVGHEDWHLPSOLFLWLQWKHµWZLWWHUZDUV¶EHWZHHQWKHFDPSDLJQVµ:K\,QHHGIHPLQLVP¶




neoliberal readings of freedom and choice, or even victim-blaming. I think such readings are 
possible but also a dismissal of her overall project. For her, the ethical attitude is to reaffirm 
ambiguity in the disclosure of being, to face the tension in human existence. It is a fine line to 
balance but as Gail Weiss suggests, the desire to disclose being is ontological but not 
necessarily dependent on intentionality. Disclosure is both a passive and active process where 
the process is marked by the ambiguous relationship between desiring to disclose the world 
and desiring to be disclosed by it (Weiss 2012, 181). Bergoffen partially disagrees with this 
interpretation because intentionality itself is ambiguous, multiple and often contradictory67 
(Bergoffen 2001)7KXVLQWHQWLRQDOLW\LVDQµDFWLYHSDVVLYLW\¶LPSLQJLQJRQHWKLFVDQGSROLWLFV
By formulating alternative relations to sexuality where reciprocity and generosity are possible, 
Beauvoir presents an alternative to hostile socLDO UHODWLRQV E\ ³drawing a line between the 
political project of mastery that calls itself just and the political proMHFWRIOLEHUDWLRQWKDWLVMXVW´ 
(Bergoffen 2001, 190). Beauvoir drafts a framework where generosity also figures in the desire 
to disclose being, characteristic of the openness and relationality in erotic encounters. In this 
scenario, individuals mutually risk their vulnerability to the other. Deutscher shows scepticism 
in relation to the idealised erotic encounter, as the male sex has been historically and politically 
fashioned to be the possessor rather than the one who risks his vulnerability (Deutscher 2008a, 
56).            
 There are other caveats to an ethics of ambiguity. Deutscher also questions its cogency 
DV%HDXYRLU¶VZRUN³VWDJHGWKHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQDQDPELYDOHQWHWKics and one that aspires to 
FODULW\´(Deutscher 2008a, 52). Beauvoir is surely committed to moral values like generosity 
                                                          
choices with feminist discourse on victimhood. As Deutscher comments, in the context RI%HDXYRLU¶VQHJDWLYH
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIROGDJHVKHµZDONVDILQHOLQH¶LQKHUGHVFULSWLRQVDQGQHJRWLDWLRQRIIUHHGRPDQGWKHODFNRILW
(Deutscher 2003). Scholars note a more Sartrean vein (possibly not only SarWUH¶VZRUNEXWDVKHUPRUDOHVVD\V
show, the post-war context she addressed) in her early work yet moving towards concerns of gender and racial 
oppression, violence, and privilege. 
67
 The desire for possession is also a negation of the disclosure of being. Beauvoir describes a typology of attitudes 
WRZDUGVWKHGHVLUHWRIOHHIURPDPELJXLW\ZKLFKH[SUHVVLQWHQWLRQDOLW\WRWUDQVFHQGRQH¶VJLYHQ¶VVLWXDWLRQEXWDW
the cost of further self-objectification or objectification of others (Beauvoir [1949]1986). 
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or reciprocity, but the uncertainty and precariousness of ambiguity, constantly undermine these 
values.68 6LPLODUO\$QQ90XUSK\DUJXHVWKDW%HDXYRLU¶VDIILUPDWLRQRIDPELJXLW\PDUNVD
tension between care and violence that cannot offer a prescriptive ethics. While affirming 
incompletion, vulnerability, ambiguity and tension, ambiguity makes it impossible to deny 
violence as a possible response (Murphy 2012a)$PELJXLW\DQGLQGHWHUPLQDF\³LQIRUPWhe 
existentialist understanding of human action as permanently haunted by failure, as intention 
FROOLGHV ZLWK ZRUOG DQG DFWLRQV FRPH WR DGRSW XQH[SHFWHG VLJQLILFDQFH´ (ibid.220). 
Beauvoirian ethics are ultimately paradoxical, staging the impossibility and possibility of their 
occurrence. Ambiguity performs both an adherence to ethics and calls this ethics into question69 
(Deutscher 2008a, 53). Reading failure and violence into an ethics of ambiguity is possible 
EHFDXVHEHLQJLVµHPSW\¶ as exemplified by the idea that one becomes DZRPDQ%HDXYRLU¶V
conversion of the Sartrean subject through Merleau-3RQW\¶V SKHQRPHQRORJ\ RI WKH µOLYLQJ
ERG\¶DOORZVKHUWRUHDUWLFXODWHDVRFLDORQWRORJ\ZKHUHSRVVHVVLRQDQGDSSURSULDWLRQDUHQRW
the only forms of relation possible (Bergoffen 2001; Heinamaa 2003). Unlike Merleau-Ponty, 
Beauvoir surpasses him by locating embodiment in a social milieu where oppression, conflict, 
generosity and love cannot be discarded.70 
ii. Legal responsibility: Phenomenological encounters with values 
Moral relativism has been a usual objection against existentialism or post-structuralism in so 
IDU DV WKH\ KDYH EHHQ XQGHUVWRRG DV UHFLSHV IRU µHYHU\WKLQJ JRHV¶ But I consider these 
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 Deutscher notes for examSOH WKDW³LI WKHGHILQLWLRQVKHRIIHUVRI µUHFLSURFLW\¶ VXJJHVWV WKDW LW FDQQHYHUEH
FDOFXODWHGRU FHUWDLQ DQG WKXV LQ D IRUPDO VHQVH QHYHUEH UHOLDEO\ µUHFLSURFDO¶ ZH VXSSRVH WKDW WKH HWKLFV
VLPLODUO\FDQQHYHUEHFDOFXODWHGRUFHUWDLQ´(Deutscher 2008a, 52). 
69
 Beauvoir performs in her own writing the stream of conversions, ambiguities and resistances, but Deutscher 
suggests that the philosophical writing of 6HFRQG6H[¶ undermines the literary, and thus, constitutes an ambiguous 
exposure of the ambiguities of ethical sexual relations. 
70
 0HUOHDX 3RQW\¶V SKHQRPHQRORJ\ JURXQGHG RQ WKH OLYLQJ ERG\ VWUHVVHV WKH DPELJXLW\ of perception in all 
H[SHULHQFHV HQDEOLQJ ³D VWURQJRQWRORJLFDO IRXQGDWLRQ IRU%HDXYRLU¶V VXEVHTXHQWGLVFXVVLRQRI WKH VWULNLQJO\
varied ways in which individuals actually contend or even fail to contend with this omnipresent ambiguity in their 
daily livHV´(Weiss 2012, 178).  
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oversimplifications of existentialism as only a caricature of what they really propose. Actually, 
6DUWUH¶VYHUVLRQRILQGLYLGXDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\KDVEHHn seen as the opposite of popular views of 
relativism. The emphasis on overcoming bad faith stresses individual responsibility as an 
obligation, a view that arguably fits uncomfortably with neoliberal concepts of responsibility 
(Vetlesen 2009). The same criticism does not in my opinion apply to Beauvoir. Her moral and 
political philosophy reminds us of the inter-subjective grounds of responsibility, and may 
H[WHQGWR%HDXYRLU¶V LQVLJKWVRQDEVWUDFWKXPDQLVm71 or the abstract rational subject.72  For 
KHUWKH³XQLYHUVDODEVROXWHPDQH[LVWVQRZKHUH´(Beauvoir [1949] 1986, 112); he is a fictive 
figure that is disconnected from others. Instead, the Kantian morality evades the ambiguity of 
freedom by attaching fixed values and meaning to rules; while societal moralities impose 
values upon individuals.73 Phenomenological and existential approaches to crime, criminal 
responsibility and punishment offer other avenues for exploring moral questions without 
resorting to abstract values in order to justify legal responsibility.     
 For example, Thomas Giddens argues that notions of legal responsibility are premised 
on an idea of universality that is too dependent on the ideology of rationality. Existential 
dilemmas are reduced simplistically into right/wrong or guilty/not-guilty. It is a mechanization 
RIODZWKDWFDQQRWSHUIRUPD³TXDOLWDWLYHDVVHVVPHQW´RIFULPLQDOEHKDYLRXUWDNLQJSODFHLQWKH
FRQWH[WRI³HPERGLHGDFWLRQDQGH[SHULHQFH´(Giddens 2013, 1). To counter mechanization, 
Giddens defends phenomenological indeterminacy as an approach that facilitates a continuous 
GLDOHFWLFHQFRXQWHUEHWZHHQODZDQGWKHXQLTXHQHVVRIHDFKGHIHQGDQW¶V OLIH-story, enabling 
also a transformation of the meaning attached to criminal responsibility (ibid.).  
                                                          
71
 That is the tradition of philosophies and ethical perspectives that emphasize human agency. 
72
 This precept in Kantian moral philosophy is one of the strongest and most compelling rules upon which the 
legal theorists and moral philosophers addressed in this chapter seem to agree.  
73
 Although Beauvoir used Kantian language of universality in the Ethics of Ambiguity, she changed her mind 
ODWHURQ:LOOLDP:LONHUVRQFRPPHQWVRQ%HDXYRLU¶VLGHDRIXQLYHUVDOLW\ZKLFKLVGLIIHUHQWIURPWKH.DQWLDn-
W\SH+HDUJXHVWKDW%HDXYRLUSRVLWVDQHWKLFVWKDWYDOXHVDXWRQRP\EXW³GHILQHVKXPDQLW\DVDODFNDQGH[SODLQV
ERWKWKHRULJLQRIYDOXHDQGRXULQHYLWDEOHIDLOXUHWRDWWDLQRXUSURSRVHGYDOXHV´(Wilkerson 2012, 70). 
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 Similarly, Mark Coeckelbergh proposes interpreting human action through 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VH[LVWHQWLDOLVWQRWLRQRIµWUDJHG\¶$FWLRQRFFXUVLQWKHSODQHRIPRYHPHQW³LQ-
EHWZHHQ´ passivity and activity74 (Coeckelbergh 2010, 237). The legal attribution of fault lacks 
µPRUDO LPDJLQDWLRQ¶ EHFDXVH LW UHOLHV RQ ULJLG IRUPXODH artificially extracting criminal acts 
from the contexts in which they took place.75 Criminal justice has lost its ability to find different 
meanings of criminal responsibility because it does not engage in a dialogue with the 
GHIHQGDQW¶V µWUDJLF¶ KLVWRU\ 7KH UHODWLRQDO FKDUDFWHU RI D SHUVRQ¶V DFWLRQV LV OLPLWHG E\
reductive and mechanistic understandings of accountability in criminal law (Coeckelbergh 
2010).            
 From this view, the legislative and judicial task should not necessarily be undermined 
by rejecting transcendental universal values. Rejecting the blind application of values to actions 
does not necessarily mean approving a relativist or nihilistic position. Moreover, Beauvoir does 
QRW VXJJHVW ZH UHQRXQFH DOO YDOXHV ,Q %HDXYRLU¶V HWKLFV YDOXHV - such as reciprocity, 
generosity, or love - have instead a heuristic function (Kruks 2012). Rather than function as 
absolute values, they are subject to political and historical negotiations. Love and generosity 
KDYHOLWWOHPHDQLQJLIXVHGWRQHJOHFWRQH¶VVXEMHFWLYLW\VXFKDVRFFXUVLQWKHFXOWXUDOVFULSW
that designates women as incomplete subjects if they do not marry. In short, values do not have 
transcendental origin; their meanings are constantly made through an agonistic process, 
through political struggles and re-negotiations of what these values mean in each situation.
 Take as an example the historical and anthropological analysis of the proto-criminal 
justice in Ancient Greece by Rene Foqué.  He shows that the transition from divinely mandated 
retribution to a law-based justice emerged through an agonistic and dialogical re-negotiation 
                                                          
74
 He suggests there is no absolute passivity or absolute activity where cause and effect are categorically separated. 
75
 'UDZLQJRQ$QWKRQ\'XII¶VDSSURDFKWRFULPLQDOODZ&RHFNHOEHUJKDIILUPVWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLYHGLPHQVLRQRI
criminal responsibility. An offender must µDQVZHU¶WRKLVFULPHVLQRUGHUWRUHVWRUHDQRUPDWLYHV\PEROLFRUGHU
However, he disagrees on one crucial point with Duff, who thinks defendants must give an account of themselves 
without reference to the relational character of their actions (Coeckelbergh 2010). 
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RIWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VYDOXH-orientations (Foqué 2008).76  Legal discourse occupies a mediating 
and counterfactual role in the process of re-negotiating the values of a political community. 
Drawing on Hannah Arendt, Foqué suggests legal concepts have also counterfactual status that 
can only come into the world through action and speech. All legal concepts are susceptible to 
change and under-determination because they are temporal and agonistic expressions of legal 
relations. For example, the legal subject is not entirely a person in flesh; it functions as a 
FRXQWHUIDFWXDO FDWHJRU\ WKDW DOORZV SHRSOH WR VKDUH ³D SURFHGXUDO SODWIRUP DQG D common 
language for dealing in a peaceful way with their mutual conflicts and with their cooperative 
GHILFLWV´(ibid., 220). However, the concept of the legal subject also has limited value as an 
empty transcendental juridical construction without being negotiated through dialogue and 
concretised in action (ibid., 227).  
iii. The failure of punishment: revenge and calculation without ambiguity 
One of the most interesting implications of ambiguity is how it unsettles the values ascribed to 
the theory and practice of punishment. Ambiguity mediates the effects of judgement and 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\RQHPERGLHGVXEMHFWVDQG WKHLU VLWXDWLRQ%HDXYRLU¶VHVVD\ µ(\H IRUDQ(\H¶
(1946), seeks to make sense of the trial and execution of Robert Brasillach - a French 
intellectual who collaborated with the Germans by publishing a fascist newspaper. Kristiana 
Arp suggests this was not simply an occasion piece, but important in so far as Beauvoir alludes 
to ambiguity for the first time (Arp 2004). Beauvoir affirms the human condition is marked by 
WKHµWUDJHG\RIDPELJXLW\¶WKHLVRODWHGVXEMHFWLYHH[SHULHQFHWKDWQHYHUWKHOHVVFRH[LVWVµDWWKH
KHDUWRIWKHZRUOGZLWKRWKHUPHQ¶(Beauvoir [1946] 2004, 258). Punishment, in its different 
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 )RTXpFHQWUDOFODLPLVWKDWYDOXHVDUH³RSHQWH[WXUHGYDOXHRULHQWDWLRQVZKich constantly require appropriate 
DQG FXOWXUDOO\ HPERGLHG DSSURSULDWLRQV´ (Foqué 2008, 222).  The ethical-legal order emerges from strong 
evaluations of our shared understanding of the world. Value orientations are formed by the process of adjusting 
the symbolic order of authority through a shared understanding achieved only by democratic dialogue. The 
symbolic order of authority does not derive its legitimacy from an extrinsic source because a democratic order 
requires it to be open.  
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expressions, delineates the borders of this intersubjective dilemma.   
 %HDXYRLU¶VLQTXLU\UHDUWLFXODWHVWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKH desire for equivalence in the law 
of retaliation DQG ³VLWXDWHV WKH SKHQRPHQRORJ\ RI UHYHQJH ZLWKLQ WKH DPELJXLWLHV RI
HPERGLPHQW DQG WKH QHFHVVDU\ IDLOXUHV RI KXPDQ DFWLRQ´ (Kruks 2012, 161). Revenge, 
Beauvoir VD\V³UHWDLQVDZKLIIRIPDJLF´EHFDXVHLW³VWULYHVWRVatisfy some unknown dark god 
RIV\PPHWU\´WKDW³DERYHDOOFRUUHVSRQGVWRDSURIRXQGKXPDQQHHG´(Beauvoir [1946] 2004, 
247). And yet, punishment is essentially asymmetrical, unlike struggle for survival. She wagers 
DJDLQDQGVXJJHVWVWKDW³YHQJHDQFHLVQRWMXVWLILHGE\UHDOLVWLFFRQVLGHUDWLRQV´HLWKHU(ibid.) 
EHFDXVH WKH RQH ZKR LV LQFDSDFLWDWHG FDQ QR ORQJHU GR KDUP ³7UXH´ UHYHQJH HPerges 
VSRQWDQHRXVO\DQGLWLVD³PHWDSK\VLFDO´GHPDQG77 (ibid.) ZKLFKKDV³QRJRDORXWVLGHRILWVHOI´
(ibid., 248) and is moved by deep emotions, such as hatred. Private revenge becomes goal 
oriented, as it devolves into an endless spiral of injustice through false hatred and will to power. 
(YHQLQWKHFDVHVRI³DERPLQDEOH´FULPHVZKHUH³PDQWUHDWVIHOORZPHQDVREMHFWV´LELG) and 
UHGXFHVRWKHUVWR³PHUHSDQWLQJIOHVK´78 revenge does not bring the satisfaction one would 
hope for79. Spontaneous revenge is pUHIHUDEOHLQWKHODWWHUFDVHVEHFDXVHLWUHDFKHVRXWWR³WKH
freedom RIWKHHYLOGRHU´LELG). It is the kind of violence that can reverse the master-bondsman 
UHODWLRQVKLSDQG WKXV WKHYLFWLP¶VVXEMHFWLYLW\ LV UHVWRUHG (Kruks 2012, 162). Yet, it could 
devolve into torture because punishment can never restore what was lost. Retributive 
SXQLVKPHQW DFKLHYHV RQO\ D WHPSRUDO UHYHUVDO E\ IRUFLQJ WKH RWKHU WR VHH KLV RZQ µWUDJLF
DPELJXLW\¶UDWKHUWKDQDSSHDOLQJWRKLVIUHHGRPEXWZLWKRXWSXQLVKPHQWWKHRIIHQGHUPLJKW
continue to act adversely upon others. Thus, revenge is contradictory, pursuing an impossible 
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 Later on, she explains what she means by a metaphysics basis for revenge. Since we are intersubjective beings 
VHHNLQJWKHUHFRJQLWLRQDVVXEMHFWVQRWREMHFWVRIRWKHUVWKHDIILUPDWLRQRIUHFLSURFLW\LVWKH³PHWDSK\VLFDOEDVLV
RIWKHLGHDRIMXVWLFH´ZKLFKLVZKDWUHYHQJHWULHVWRUH-establish in the face of sovereign tyranny (Beauvoir [1946] 
2004, 249). 
78
 De Beauvoir reflected on this through the experience of the rape of Djamila Boupacha in the Algerian War 
(Kruks 2012, 162).  
79
 6KHZURWH³«ZHVDLGRXUVHOYHVLQDQRXWEXUVWRIDQJHUµ7KH\ZLOOSD\¶$QGRXUDQJHUVHHPHGWRSURPLVHD
joy so heavy that we could scarcely believe ourselves able to bear it. They have paid. They are going to pay. They 
pay each day. And the joy has not rLVHQXSLQRXUKHDUWV´(Beauvoir 2004, 246). 
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HTXDWLRQ ZKLFK LV ZK\ %HDXYRLU VXJJHVWV LW FDQ QHYHU EH VDWLVILHG ³H[FHSW LQ SDSHUEDFN
QRYHOV´LELG80. After casting serious doubts about whether revenge can EHJUDVSHG³LQ
LWVVSRQWDQHLW\´LELG%HDXYRLUVXJJHVWVWKDWWKLVIDLOXUHPD\DFFRXQWVIRUWKH³HODERUDWH
IRUPV´FUHDWHGE\VRFLHW\WRHQYHORSHWKHVSRQWDQHLW\UHTXLUHGIRUUHYHQJHLELGLQFOXGLQJWKH
law and criminal justice institutions.         
 Founded in the failure of grasping the spontaneity of revenge, institutional punishment 
is no less prone to repeating the failure because signification for punishment is drawn from the 
concept of universal rights. On the one hand, criminal courts can be likened to vigilantes 
EHFDXVHERWKMXVWLI\DYHQJLQJDQLQMXU\RIDQDQRQ\PRXVXQLYHUVDOµRWKHU¶ZKLOHDFWLQJOLNHD
sovereign consciousness with the authority to make others pay for a crime.  To sustain the 




punish justified in the name of abstract social justice.     
 %HDXYRLU¶V LQVLJKWV DUH SURIRXQGO\ VKDSHG E\ KHU FRQFHUQ ZLWK WHPSRUDOLW\ ZKLFK
creates a distance between the offender and the offence as well as the desire for revenge. The 
offender appearing in the trial is no longer the sovereign consciousness that acted as if was not 
bounded to others; but a fragile individual who is often punished for something other than the 
crime itself. Legal punishment always aims at something beyond itself, such as the abstract 
morality of a formalistic law or the political ends that characterize utilitarianism.  Courts fail 
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 A privileged case of punishment would be one where the victims themselves take action against their 
perpetrators. She gives the example of concentration camp inmates who massacred their S.S. jailers. However, it 
is also impinged by failure because the situation of the jailers had changed. Kristiana Arp argues that Beauvoir, 
ZKR GLG QRW VLJQ WKH SHWLWLRQ DJDLQVW %UDVLOODFK¶V GHDWK SHQDOW\ VKRXOG EH MXGJHG DJDLQVW WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH
German invasion of France in the 1940s. In existential terms, she made a choice attuned with the exigencies of 
the situation (Arp 2004). There were people who chose otherwise, like the men and women who assisted the 
Germans rather than joining the Resistance. In the novel The Blood of Others (1948) Beauvoir fleshes out the 
PRUDOGLOHPPDVRIKHUWLPHVDQGSHRSOHDURXQGKHULQWKHQRYHO¶VFKDUDFWHUVWKHIDLOXUHRISDFLILVPDQGWKHQHHG




rejected by society. Moreover, the legitimacy of those who enforce punishment is questionable. 
The judge obeys commands of the law while popular revenge expresses passion and will but it 
risks becoming into tyranny and is prone to punishing innocents. Interestingly, the judge and 
WKHRIIHQGHUPLUURU HDFKRWKHU¶V DPELJXLW\ %RWK UHSUHVHQW WKH IDLOXUHRI ³HYHU\ DWWHPSW WR
FRPSHQVDWHIRUWKLVDEVROXWHHYHQWWKDWLVWKHFULPH´(Beauvoir [1946] 2004, 258). 
 /HJDOLQVWLWXWLRQVSXQLVKLQJDFULPHFDQRQO\JUDVSWKH³PLUDJHRIH[WHULRULW\´(ibid., 
255), that is, a story about a crime disconnected from the situation of offenders and victims. 
Neither retributive nor utilitarian punishment can grasp the interiority of a person because 
subjectivity is not something fixed, but constantly changing in the situation of the self with 
others. Recall how the concept of situation in existential phenomenology is defined by 
embodiment, a concept that is far more encompassing than personal biographies or 
circumstances. Beauvoir articulates this point more clearly in The Second Sex, where she 
DVVHUWVWKDWHPERGLPHQWLV³QRWDWKLQJLWLVDVLWXDWLRQLWLVRXUJUDVSRQWKHZRUOGDQGWKH
RXWOLQHRIRXUSURMHFWV´(Beauvoir [1949] 2011, 46). Embodiment includes the historical and 
political milieu but also temporality.        
 And what does that mean for punishment? Before we analyse the implications of 
introducing temporality to the analysis, I want to stress that crux of her argument is that the 
equivalence between crime and punishment is far from being equivalent. Abstract justice is 
KDXQWHGE\IDLOXUHEHFDXVHLW³JLYHVXSOLQNLQJWKHFULPHWRWKHSXQLVKPHQW´(Beauvoir 2004, 
254), but none of the expressions of punishment analysed achieve the impossible aim of 
establishing a bond between offence and penalty. In conclusion, the essay stages the 
impossibility of equivalence at every stage of the analysis, resisting the compelling passion of 
revenge but also the alluring purity of abstract legal processes. Her reading compels us to 
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abandon and constantly question facile equivalences in pHQDOGLVFRXUVHVWKDWRIIHUWKH³serene 
recovery of a reasoQDEOHDQGMXVWRUGHU´(ibid., 259).  
iv. Punishment and vulnerable subjectivity: Failed equivalence 
To bring the arguments home, let us recapitulate a few ideas. Punishment theories eliminate 
the ambiguity of the situation where individuals are sanctioned for an offence. Laws represent 
temporal values of a community and existential dilemmas about justice. However, the temporal 
dimension is lost in ideological or theoretical abstractions, reducing the substantial content of 
WKH ODZWRD µPLUDJHRIH[WHULRULW\¶:HKDYHGLVFXVVHGDW OHQJWK WKHGLVHPERGLPHQWRI WKH
history of punishment, criminal law, and the legal subject. Ambiguity troubles the rigidity of 
concepts, laws, or norms, which are no longer temporally situated and shows how seemingly 
disconnected entities are relationally constituted. The refusal of ambiguity is equivalent to the 
refusal of the embodiment of subjectivity in favour of a disembodied rational legal subject, in 
as much as a disembodied criminal law. There are limits to what the trope of ambiguity can 
offer criminal justice. Norrie finds a space for ambiguity and ambivalence, but does not 
consider how ambiguity has been gendered. Patriarchal societies resist and abject the liminal, 
the woman who is not one, a view on femininity where motherhood ensures the political 
survival of a community. Another view worth signposting is how Norrie, like Derrida, adopts 
DPELJXLW\WRRSHQXSWKHQDUURZILHOGRILGHQWLW\WKLQNLQJ\HWIDLOVWRDFNQRZOHGJHµERUURZLQJ¶
the generative metaphor of the maternal (Oliver 1995).     
 To understand both the disembodiment of the legal subject and of criminal law, we 
PLJKW QHHG WR ORRN EDFN DW WKH LQMXUDEOH RU YXOQHUDEOH ERG\ LQFOXGLQJ µWKH ERG\ RI WKH
FRQGHPQHG¶ DV)RXFDXOW¶VIDPRXVO\H[SUHVVHG (Foucault [1975] 1995).  Pain was a great part 
of medieval punishment and yet, physical pain gradually ceased to be a form of punishment 
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(Shoemaker 2001)81. The humanist discourses of European Enlightenment appear to have 
displaced the regulation of behaviour to the soul rather than the body (Foucault 1995; 
Shoemaker 2001). Yet, what is the significance of pain in contemporary accounts of 
SXQLVKPHQW"+DYHZHHIIHFWLYHO\HOLPLQDWHGSDLQDQGLIZHKDYHQ¶WZK\LVLWXQUHFRJQL]DEOH
through our current schemes of intelligibility? Scholars have been often drawn to Friedrich 
1LHW]VFKH¶VOn the Genealogy of Morals (1887) to understand the metamorphosis of the subject 
of pain and what it has meant for criminal law, ethics, and punishment. A common 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LV WKDW SDLQ JUDGXDOO\ PRYHG LQWR WKH EDFNJURXQG RI PRGHUQ VRFLHW\¶V
consciousness through a new form of thinking about causality.  If one could foresee the causes 
of suffering, one could also control and limit them. The humanitarian project which sought to 
eradicate bodily suffering took IRRWKROGRQO\RQFH³causal thinking and consequential planning 
had taken root´ (Shoemaker 2001, 23) 3K\VLFDO SDLQ LQ )RXFDXOW¶V DQDO\VLV DFFRPSDQLHG
punishment but did not define it. Yet, the body continued to be an intermediary for the new 
forms of punishment (ibid., 25).        
 Mariana Valverde agrees that the legal doctrinal principles of orthodox subjectivism82 
were not born from a humanist moral philosophy. Instead, concepts like individual 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ KDG ³WKHLU LQJORULRXV URRWV LQ SUDFWLces of indebtedness and debt recovery, 
LQFOXGLQJWKHSK\VLFDOSDLQLQIOLFWHGRQLQVROYHQWGHEWRUV´(Valverde 2005, 68). Commercial 
practices created the conditions under which people became accountable (ibid.). Thus, 
individual responsibility is actually a misleading term for a legal practice that was analogous 
WR ³ULJKW WR FRQWUDFW´ DQG URRWHG LQ WKH DFFRXQWDELOLW\ H[SHFWHG LQ FRPPHUFH (ibid.). The 
reasoning is that an operable political community rests on the expectation of predictable human 
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 Nietzsche looks aWWKH*HUPDQZRUGµVFKXOG¶ZKLFKWUDQVODWHVLQWRJXLOWDQGGHEW7KHHW\PRORJLFDOURRWVRI
µSXQLVKPHQW¶VWUHWFKLQWRDZLGHUQHWZRUNRIPHDQLQJVDQGOLQJXLVWLFVRXUFHV,Q$QFLHQW*UHHN poina meant 
punishment, particularly retribution   
82
 As Valverde poinWVRXW³1LHW]VFKHZRXOGVLGH-OLQHDOOLQTXLULHVLQWRFULPLQDOµLQWHQW¶RUmens rea, because one 
WKLQJKHDQG)UHXGZRXOGDJUHHRQLVWKDWSHRSOHQHYHUUHDOO\NQRZZKDWWKH\DUHGRLQJ´(Valverde 2005, 81). 
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behaviour. Promises would ensure the future of the community, for example, the promise to 
abide a contract. Yet, promises were not enough to guarantee safety, unless promises were 
EDFNHGXSE\PHPRU\$QGKRZGRZHUHPHPEHU"3DLQDFFRUGLQJ WR1LHW]VFKH³ZDV WKH
PRVWSRZHUIXODLGWRPQHPRQLFV´(Nietzsche [1887] 1989, 61). The infliction of pain prevents 
IRUJHWWLQJRQH¶VGHEW0HPRULHVRISDLQZHUHEXUQHGLQWRWKHZLOOVRWKDWRQHZRXOGQRWZLOO
again (Butler 2014a). Yet, there is a paradox between memory and forgetfulness (Valverde 
2005). If I remember the injury done by my neighbour and do not actively seek to forget, life 
between us might be impossible because I would seek revenge for it.  Without forgetting 
political life could be paralyzed by resentment, an incessant cycle of revenge and violence to 
have our debts repaid. To make someone feel guilty was to make them internalize the blame 
through physical punishment: 
:LWKWKHKHOSRIVXFKLPDJHVDQGSURFHGXUHVSHRSOHILQDOO\UHWDLQHGILYHRUVL[³,ZLOO
QRW¶V´LQWKHPHPRU\DQGVRIDUDVWKHVHSUHFHSWVZHUHFRQFHUQHGWKH\JDYHWKHLUZRUG
in order to live with the advantages of society²DQGLW¶VWUXH:LWKWKHDVVLVWDQFHRIWKLV
VRUWRIPHPRU\SHRSOHILQDOO\FDPHWRµUHDVRQ¶(Nietzsche [1887]1989, 64). 
The legal subject of reason allegedly masters his destructive emotions by burning the memory 
of pain in guilt (Butler 2014a). -XGLWK %XWOHU H[SDQGV RQ 1LHW]VFKH¶V WH[W WKURXJK -DFTXHV
Derrida and Sigmund Freud, suggesting that the guilt is pain turned inwards: a form violence 
against one-self but also as a form extreme cruelty on behalf of the punisher (Butler 2009c). 
Before going into a few of the details of her reading, it is important to consider how liberal 
legalism forged the subject of promises through moral guilt (Valverde 2005, 70) rather than 
fostering an ethical stance which requLUHV WKH DIILUPDWLRQ RI D ³temporal, struggle, and 
fluctuating forms- not a transcendentaOMXGJHPHQWRUUXOHRIPRUDOLW\´(ibid.,82). Instead, the 
liberal subject was institutionalized in the social contract model, which established the ³belief 
that the future and survival of the social/political establishment would be ensured through the 
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SURPLVHRILWVVXEMHFW´ (Valverde 2005, 75)3URPLVLQJWRUHSD\GHEWVµVROYHG¶WKHSUREOHPRI
IXWXUH¶VXQFHUWDLQW\EHFDXVHRQHFRXOGFDOFXODte human behaviour. In other words, to mitigate 
RQH¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\XQGHUVWRRGLQLWVPRVWOLWHUDOVHQVHDVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIEHLQJLQMXUHG. 
 Surprisingly, Shoemaker is not convinced that pain was simply pushed to the periphery 
of punishment through internalization of pain through guilt. Instead, he suggests that what has 
changed is our intelligibility of pain to the point that we are no longer able to register it. Surely, 
one feels the sensorial experience when one gets hurt or cut. That is not the kind of intelligibility 
Shoemaker is pointing out. Instead, he stresses how pain was intelligible and had a redeeming 
meaning for the medieval and ancient regime, while the modern episteme on pain sought to 
control, avoid and employ it as policy tool. In other words, what has changed is the relation 
with pain, something external to the subject and mastered by human agents (Shoemaker 2001). 
This relationship is crucial to understand also what kind of relationship has been fostered in 
contemporary law and politics towards the trope of vulnerability and what it means to stress 
vulnerability in the context of criminal law and drug trafficking offences carried out by women. 
Yet, even as the link between pain and punishment morphed, the bond remains hauntingly 
HPEHGGHGLQWKHSHQDOHTXDWLRQDQGKDVEHFRPHDQµLQGHVWUXFWLEOHLGHD¶(Butler 2014a) which, 
echoes how Beauvoir also characterised the formula of punishment as something that retained 
something of a whiff of magic.         
 7KHQH[WVHFWLRQH[DPLQHV-XGLWK%XWOHU¶Vinterpretation RI1LHW]VFKH¶Vdebtor-creditor 
relation through 'HUULGD¶V OHFWXUHVRQ WKHGHDWKSHQDOW\ DQG)UHXG¶V WKHRU\RQFUXHOW\. Her 
account is important because I think she is providing a reading of how there is an intensification 
of the debt towards society that offenders cannot ever really repay, and thus, something that 
increases the precarity of people who confront the criminal justice institutions. I interpret her 
reading as a critique of the unresolved tension between deterrence-retribution in the current 
expressions of power, which will be discussed in depth in chapter V.  For now, my focus is 
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only on retributive-deterrence,83 which in light of Butler¶VUHDGLQJRQSXQLVKPHQW, appears as 
a style of punishment which increases the precarity of people because drug laws extend a debt 
on offenders they can never repay. In other words, the failure of the equivalence between 
punishment and crime is completely masked by the logic of securing the future through the 
management, pre-emption of risks, and punitive approaches to crime. In the brief reading 
presented here, I wish to highlight again the critical function of ambiguity and pointing out the 
ambivalence of socio-political life. This will be further expanded in chapter IV and V, where I 
explain what vulnerability means for subjectivity, politics, and justice. For now, we need only 
attend to the production of precarity84 facilitated by the rationality of the debt in criminal law 
which has displaced pain and injurability from our frames of intelligibility. In short, masking 
iQMXUDELOLW\DQGGLVSODFLQJLWWRWKHRIIHQGHU¶VZKRVHdebt to society is incalculable and clearly 
exemplified in the judicial discourse on drug trafficking.   
v. Unlimited temporality of punishment 
3HUKDSV WKH µPDJLF¶ RU LQGHVWUXFWLELOLW\ RI WKH SHQDO HTXDWLRn has to do more with the 
impossibility of ever paying a debt, the impossibility of the penal equation implicit in 
%HDXYRLU¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHIDLOXUHRISXQLVKPHQW%XWOHU¶Vanalysis on punishment shows how, 
DV³field of suffering is pervasively economised, and the contract becomes the salient model 
IRUKXPDQH[FKDQJH´ (Butler 2014a, 31), there was also a shift in the relation and conception 
between punishment, subjectivation, and political relations. Guilt, internalized in the psyche, 
became a perpetual payment and a debt never fully paid (Butler 2014a). In that sense, the 
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  Indeed, Butler H[SODLQVKRZLQ1LHW]VFKH¶V*HQHDORJ\RI0RUDOVERWKGHWHUUHQFHDQGUHWULEXWLYLVPDUH
XQGHUSLQQHGE\DNLQGRI³FUXHOW\± LQGHHGµIHVWLYHFUXHOW\¶>@7KLVLVH[SOLFLWLQ%HQWKDP¶VUHIOHFWLRQVRQ
punishment, but it can also be found operating in a morHVXEWOHIDVKLRQLQ.DQW¶VFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYHZKLFK
1LHW]VFKHFODLPHGµUHHNVRI>reicht nach@FUXHOW\¶´(Butler 2014a, 31). 
84
 -XGLWK%XWOHUXVHVERWK WKH WHUPSUHFDULW\DQGSUHFDULRXVQHVV-DQHOO:DWVRQH[SODLQVKRZ%XWOHU³PDNHVD
FDUHIXO GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ ³SUHFDULRXVQHVV´²the corporeal vulnerability shared by all mortals including the 
SULYLOHJHG DQG ³SUHFDULW\´²the particular vulnerability imposed on the poor, the disenfranchised, and those 
HQGDQJHUHGE\ZDURUQDWXUDOGLVDVWHU´(Watson 2015). The main difference is that everyone is precariousness is 
an onWRORJLFDOFRQGLWLRQZKLOHSUHFDULW\LV³GLVWULEXWHGXQHTXDOO\´(Butler 2009a, xvii, xxv, 25). 
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subject punished in advance for the failure to calculate her actions. So while the debtor never 
reDOO\ IXOILOV WKH FRQWUDFW WKH ³creditor is always punishing, and always enjoying that 
apparently infinite WDVN´ (ibid., 31). 5HDGLQJ WKURXJK )UHXG¶V WKHRU\ RI FUXHOW\,85 pleasure 
accompanies this infinite task of punishment. The whole engine of this economy of debts is 
QHYHUWREHFRPHµZKROH¶DJDLQWRSD\WKHOLIHWDNHQE\WKHPXUGHU,QVWHDGWKHPRGHORIWKe 
VRFLDOGHEWPRUSKHGLQWRWKHSULVRQLQVWLWXWLRQ³VRWKDWVHQWHQFLQJEHFRPHVDZD\RIUHJXODWLQJ
and extenGLQJWKHWLPHRIGHEW´ibid.). Sentencing for drug trafficking offences exemplifies 
the extension of debtVXFKDVZKHQMXGJHV¶VWDWHKRZGUXJVXSply causes a harm to others that 
is ³incalculable´ (BBC 2010). Considered a victimless crime, but at the same time, drug 
trafficking offences have attracted sentencing averages comparable to serious violent offences 
(Sentencing Advisory Panel 2009). This logic is not exclusive to drug offences, but according 
to Derrida, it is the underlying rationality of the enlightened humanitarianism which sought to 
eradicate violence on the body, inadvertently stretched the temporality of punishment through 
the repression of aggressive tendencies (Derrida 2014; Butler 2014a).   
 Still, violence, pain, and suffering were not eradicated from social and political life; 
what changes is the relationship to it as well as the methods and strategies to regulate it. The 
best example is how utilitarian punishment extends the cruelty of punishment through long 
prison sentences, which in the US, has affected a specific demographic, namely racial and 
ethnic minorities (Butler 2014a). However, deterrence does not offer a better solution to the 
problem of securing the safety of the social future by extending the time of punishment directly 
on the life of the condemned who can never repay such debt. An example of this is how 
generations of black men and women in the US have gone to prison WKURXJKWKHµZDURQGUXJV¶ 
(American Civil Liberties Union 2003). 5HWXUQLQJWR%XWOHU¶VDQDO\VLVVKHDOVRH[SODLQVKRZ
Derrida suggested that death penalty abolitionists were not moved by good intentions but by a 
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 Butler reviews Civilization and its Discontents (1930) and Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1922). 
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repressed aggression. Yet, Butler finds a problem with this analyVLVQDPHO\WKDW³'HUULGD¶V
dialectical inversioQ >«@ relies on the >)UHXG¶V@ death drive, or its principal exponent, 
DJJUHVVLRQDVWKHRQO\PRWLYHRSHUDWLQJLQWKHVFHQH´of punishment (Butler 2014a, 32).86 In 
that way, Derrida posits the problem of violence as inevitable, a criticism which echoes 
%HDXYRLUPDGHDERXW6DUWUH¶VRQWRORJ\RIWKHVRFLDOVXEMHFWAnd in the context of criminal 
law, this translates into a law that cannot be anything but violent, even when it poses itself as 
benevolent as Enlightenment theories of punishment did. Although Butler does offer a set of 
possibilities in her reading, my aim here is only to highlight her affirmation of ambivalence, as 
a reminder that violence can be undercut although not wholly eliminated from the passionate 
relations that characterize political life: 
There is no overcoming ambivalence in love, since we are always at risk of destroying 
what we are most attached to and vulnerable to being destroyed by those on whom we 
are most dependent (ibid., 32). 
In other words, the death drive and the pleasure principle mark this ambivalence, or rather, can 
be directed into an agonistic struggle (ibid.) between two incompatible forces at work in 
punishment. Both motives, the wish for someone to live and to die, try to coexist despite their 
complete incompatibility. Read otherwise, these two forces represent in a way the failure of 
punishment which Beauvoir noted in an Eye for and Eye, the impossibility of the penal 
equation. Still, Butler goes beyond Beauvoir, by suggesting the relationship between 
aggression and protection of the social bonds must be posited beyond relations of contract 
which authorize incarceration as social management and the death penalty as a form of  
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 %XWOHUUHPLQGVWKHUHDGHUDERXW'HUULGD¶VIUDQNQHVVRQWKLVLVVXH7KHSUREOHPZLWKWKHGLDJQRVLVRQFUXHOW\
LVWKDWLWDSSHDUVWREHµRULJLQDO¶DSUH-disposition that morality and abolitionist discourse could not erase by 
repressing it through guilt or benevolence. For Derrida, the benevolence of Beccaria or Bentham is worse that 
open cruelty because it is masked by rhetorical formulations which extend the time of punishment (Butler 
2014a; Derrida 2014). 
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eliminating WKHµZUHWFKHGERQGV¶ (Butler 2014b). Specifically, she redirects the attention to 
vulnerability.  Drawing on WKHZRUNE\0HODQLH.OHLQ%XWOHUDUJXHVWKDWVLQFH³individuation 
is never complete, and dependency never really overcome, a broader ethical dilemma emerges: 
how not to destroy the other or otheUVZKRP,QHHGLQRUGHUWROLYH´(Klein 2011; Butler 2014a, 
32). Although the prospect of dependency and vulnerability to others is both comforting and 
terrifying, the uncertainty in relation to violent futures cannot be overcome simply through the 
social contract and criminal law¶VIRUPXODWLRQVZKLFKHOLPLQDWHWKHDPELYDOHQFHof social life. 
The more extreme version of the desire to overcome vulnerability (understood as relationality) 
is in the neoliberal logic that seeks to manage and control human action through a managerial 
approach to law, which in turn, reifies the vulnerability of both offenders and victims of crimes 
(Foqué 2008, 227). Guided by the logic of calculation, the criminal justice system fails to 
protect individuals against processes of reification and disrespect (ibid.)  which he translates 
into a pervasive precarity (Butler 2006; Butler and Athanasiou 2013). Foqué suggests that if 
our criminal justice today has become characterized by a neoliberal governmentality, it is 
because the conceptual language of law has been infused by the logic of the market and 
possessive individualism. The agonistic space of value-IRUPDWLRQIRUHFORVHGRU³HFOLSVHG´87 the 
inter-subjective field of action and inter-SHUVRQDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\EHFDXVHDOOFKRLFHV³DSSHDUDV
being dominated by the systems theory view of control, managemeQW DQG SUHGLFWDELOLW\´
(Foqué 2008, 222). So far, this chapter has laid the foundations to the critique of the legal 
subject, punishment in liberal theory through its relation with embodiment and particularly, the 
body in pain, which is the subject of the next chapter.  The following chapters will return to the 
relationship between relationality and vulnerability; precarity and the forms of power already 
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 Eclipse phenomena present narratives of the world as naturalized orders. They form ideologies in the sense that 








This chapter has sought to explore the multiple implications of ambiguity in criminal law in 
order to relate embodiment with penal theories. The first section explained how the emergence 
of a focus on the internal states of mind of offenders occurred while revenge- based justice was 
allegedly sublimated by a civilizing approach to punishment that respected individual 
autonomy. Criminal legal doctrine based on universal principles has been more akin to a corpse 
as opposed to a historically situated and living-body of law.  Norrie calls our attention to 
ambiguity and ambivalence in criminal law, first as an expression of the fault lines in the 
doctrine but ultimately to signal the abeyance of relationality. His approach offers a map to 
unsettle the disembodiment of modern criminal law, but Norrie does not address the male body 
implicit in the concept of legal personhood nor the symbol of the feminine in ambiguity. 
Although Beauvoir was conscious of embodiment, she did not take it as far as explaining the 
genesis of the legal subject. Instead, she moved ambiguity to its paradoxical limits, the 
possibility-impossibility of justice through punishment.     
 %HDXYRLU¶VDFFRXQWRIHPERGLHGOLIHFDOOVRXUDWWHQWLRQWRWKHGLOHPPDVRISROLWLFVDQG
ethics, but also the problems arising from the practices and ideas of punishment which deny 
ambiguity. Thus, the apparatuses of punishment (the ideas and practices that justify its 
DSSOLFDWLRQµIOHH¶ IURPDPELJXLW\UDWKHU WKDQDFFHSW LWDQGVWUXJJOHZLWK WKHTXHVWLRQV WKDW
arise from the impossibility of a perfect penal equation. The failure and pervasiveness of the 
penal equation88 and its relation to the problem of living together are important threads that 
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 %HDXYRLUQHYHUUHIHUHQFHV1LHW]VFKH¶VGenealogy of Morals, but it is probable it was part of her philosophical 
formation at the Sorbonne. 
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relate the so-called modern punishment with its predecessors. But more importantly, the pull 
away from ambiguity is also a movement away from relationality and the interdependency in 



















IV. Vulnerability and Subjectivity: Law, Pain and Embodiment 
1. Summary 
This chapter explores the connections between vulnerability and the experience of pain to show 
how and why embodiment has been excluded from notions of subjectivity in law. By drawing 
on the critiques to the mind-body relation, the inquiry suggests that dualistic epistemologies 
bear structural similarities with the Cartesian (mis) reading of the body in pain. In other words, 
the reading suggested here suggests there is a positive valorization of reason and denial of 
embodiment (discussed in the last chapter with reference to legal personhood in criminal law) 
because of the relationship between consciousness and the body in pain. While addressing 
epistemological issues, this chapter extends the analysis to the political sphere, questioning 
how knowledge is deployed to mobilize the protection of wounded or woundable bodies. 
Following the approach on ambiguity crafted before, it suggests that there is both an ambiguity 
underpinning the political phenomenology of the body in pain. By showing the ambiguous 
relation between the body in pain and discourse (instead of radical duality), one of the aims is 
to show the limits when one speaks about the victimhood of others but also ethical dilemmas 
opened up by the need to respond to others. This is because the image of the wounded body, 
often equated with vulnerability (chapter I) is underpinned by the affective intensities fleshed 
out through a phenomenological analysis of pain.  Mindful that vulnerability exposes relations 
of emotion and power, rather than atomised wounded/woundable bodies, my aim is not to 
equate vulnerability with the wounded bodies or bodies in pain. Instead, the objective is to 
point out that vulnerability is marked by the ambiguous relationship with the body in 
pain/wounded body: bodies are open to appropriation by others discourse but on 
simultaneously resist representation. 
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2. Law and the embodied enclosures against injuring 
As explained in the last chapter, one of the dominant models of legal personhood underpinning 
criminal law has been the rational subject stripped of embodiment in order to become a socially 
and politically accountable actor. Seeking an alternative account for legal personhood, Martha 
A. Fineman (2008) proposes that subjectivity is defined by its universal vulnerability which 
etymolRJLFDOO\SRLQWVWRVWDWHVRIµLQMXUDELOLW\¶9XOQHUDELOLW\GHQRWHVWKHpotential of suffering 
pain where the body is exposed, opened by an injury or open to being injured.  By reclaiming 
the fragility of the body, Fineman seeks to construct a fuller account of the legal person through 
WKHQRWLRQRIYXOQHUDELOLW\RQHWKDWGRHVQRWUHO\RQDGLVHPERGLHGµULJKWV¶PRGHO,QVWHDGVKH
adopts a broader definition which factors human vulnerability into environmental catastrophes, 
embodied propensity to injury and illness, as well as economic and institutional abandonment 
(Fineman 2008a, 9±10). I agree with FinemaQ¶VJHVWXUHWRZDUGVUHFODLPLQJ³a more complex 
subject around which WREXLOGVRFLDOSROLF\DQGODZ´ (ibid., 1). However, deploying the concept 
of vulnerability correlated to injurability, fragility, and suffering does not necessarily deliver 
the kind of state responsibility Fineman seeks to engender, as I will explain in more depth in 
WKLV DQG WKH IROORZLQJ FKDSWHU )LQHPDQ¶V DFFRXQW GRHV QRW TXHVWLRQ KRZ YXOQHUDELOLW\
responses to negative states of being require a critical inquiry. Starting from the 
phenomenology of pain and how it has shaped the ontology of the subject, this chapter traces 
the methods and techniques which serve to alienate, appropriate, or deny vulnerability. Like 
vulnerability, pain is part of the human condition, but it is differentially distributed, and open 
to political appropriation.        
 Now, let us examine the trope of the injury. From a legal perspective, a physical wound 
is simply defined as the breaking of the layers of the skin.89 Of course, this conception, which 
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 Moriarty v Brookes [1834] EWHC Exch J79 
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can be found in sections 18-20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, offers both a 
limited definition for injurability. Moreover, such an apparent and immediate common sense 
definition of wounding is not as transparent as one might assume. In general, criminal law is 
given the task of limiting embodied vulnerability (Foqué 2008). More than just an arbiter of 
human relations, the law mediates the definitions and distinctions which prompt the recognition 
of injurability in the first place. Additionally, wounding and injury are not synonymous 
although they are metonymically related. Although the law is populated by injuries or, more 
FRPPRQO\ WHUPHG µKDUPV¶ IURP WRUW ODZ WR FULPLQDO ODZ QHLWKHU LQMXU\ QRU KDUP LV
necessarily embodied or physical.90 In general, the connection between the phenomenal and 
linguistic basis is assumed to be unproblematic91 but in fact, the delineation of a legal injury is 
highly dependent on social relations mediated by law. Whether a harm is self-evident or not is 
not depends on the social location of the injured party (Conaghan 2002, 322) because the 
concept of KDUPLWVHOILVD³product of social relations DQGWKHPHDQLQJVWKH\JHQHUDWH´ (ibid.).  
Social relations significantly determine the meaning of harm or injury as well as its legal 
significance. Where an injury was previously invisible, the law can make it intelligible, 
UHFRJQL]LQJWKHµZURQJQHVV¶RIDQLQWHUYHQWLRQ)RUH[DPSOHXQWLOIDLUO\UHFHQWO\PDULWDOUDSH
was not a harm which the law recognised as such.92       
 In the production of legal meanings, the body marks a limit upon access to others, 
although not categorically. As criminal law students learn early on, consent often serves to 
draw a line between the legality and illegality of bodily interventions.  For example, socially 
sanctioned situations, such as boxing, surgery, and tattooing are legal so long as they are 
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 For example, in criminal law, harm is not limited to physical injuries, but can also encompass psychological 
trauma (for example, in the Offences against the Person Act 1861) or in rape, where the injury is the denial of 
sexual autonomy.  
91
 The study of harm is central to legal theory and has been the subject and basis of much legal scholarship. 
However, the connections with the phenomenology of pain seem to have been largely circumvented.  
92
 In England and Wales, the House of Lords determined in R v R [1992] 1 A.C. 599 that the lawfulness of marital 
rape was an unsustainable legal fiction.  
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consensual and do not reach a specific threshold of harm. In contrast, sadomasochistic 
practices, even when consensual, are not legal. The rejection of BDSM93 in Brown94 could be 
interpreted as a rejection of sexual desire expressed through physical violence. Yet, there is 
also an argument that the law defines what appropriate sexual desire should be.  Male bodies 
have been construed in the law as if they were hermetically sealed from the intrusion of others 
(Naffine 1997) while female bodies have porous boundaries,  open to male sexual desire and 
until 1991, presupposed through the contract of marriage.95 Historically, marital rape 
exemptions made invisible the implicit violence or transgression to womHQ¶VVHQVHRIVHOI(Du 
Toit 2009), part of a consistent pattern whereby the criminal justice system has aided the 
reconstruction of harmful non-FRQVHQVXDOKHWHURVH[XDODFWVDVµMXVWVH[¶(Conaghan & Russell 
2014, 39).           
 The relations, intersections and roles performed by the law in regulating, punishing, 
allowing, or even inflicting injuring, are too vast to cover here. My aim is to take a step back, 
and uncover what is beneath these legal boundaries and enclosures.96 We saw in the last chapter 
how embodiment has a somewhat troubled relation with reason, and yet, a feminist reassertions 
of the body may backlash in ways which do not enable or empower marginalised subjects. 
Before rethinking the boundaries of legal personhood through vulnerability or the possibility 
of being injured, I suggest that we first take a step back and examine the experience of pain ± 
and its related modalities such as vulnerability, suffering, discomfort, alienation, dependence, 
and isolation, amongst others. Secondly, I want to consider how those affective expressions of 
vulnerability play out along the lines of gender norms, a task examined in the next chapter (V). 
The argument presented here lays the foundation for the next chapter, which proposes that 
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 BDSM stands for bondage, discipline and sado-masochism. 
94
 R. v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212  
95
 R v R (n 92) 
96
 An enclosure is characterised by fences. English authorities enclosed common land throughout the 18th and 19th 
century, and turned it into private property. The terminology has been chosen carefully, hinting at the processes 
whereby possessive individualism (closed subject) coincides/intersects with the enclosure of lands. 
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vulnerability has been feminized and in that sense, one must question the sexual politics of 
injurability. The feminization of vulnerability operates along the lines of the body/mind 
dichotomy (Bergoffen 2003) LQWHU DOLD SHUSHWXDWLQJ WKH EHOLHI WKDW ³ZRPHQ DUH
somehow more biological, more corporeal, and more QDWXUDOWKDQPHQ´(Grosz 1994, 14). The 
insidiousness of this epistemology is particularly apparent in legal discourses around women 
drug mules, whose subjectivity is re-constructed through narratives of motherhood, sexual 
partners, and sexualized bodies (chapter II). To understand the enclosures of the body along 
gendered lines and the abjection of embodied vulnerability in law, we must go back to the 
phenomenological basis of the mind/body dichotomy and how this model of subjectivity was 
shaped around a reading of the body in pain. 
3. 'HVFDUWHV¶(UURU3DLQDQGVXEMHFWLYLW\ 
Pain has been described in many ways: a neurochemical sensation with lasting implications 
and an intricate relation with the psychic dimension, expressed in the forms emotions and 
feelings of pain97 (Damasio 1995). It has also been called an affect (Gregg and Seigworth 
2010a),98 a sensibility (Rua Wall 2008), an experience that morphs into grief, anxiety, violence  
RUHYHQDVWDWHRIEHLQJHIIHFWHGE\LWVSRZHUIXOKROGRYHURQH¶VFRQVFLRXVQHVV(Vetlesen 2009). 
Science has many approaches to pain. In neuropsychology, pain is considered a pre-cognitive 
UHVSRQVHZKLFKVSXUVDµILJKWRUIOLJKW¶DFWLRQ3DLQ¶VVWLPXODWLRQDIIHFWVWKHSV\FKHLQVXFKD
way that iW³alters cognitive processing in a manQHUWKDWILWVWKHVWDWHRIIHDU´ (Damasio 1995, 
131)7KHERG\¶VKHDUWUDWHEUHDWKLQJDQGEORRGSUHVVXUHLQFUHDVHVHOLFLWLQJDGHPDQGRQRXU
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 Antonio Damasio differentiates between emotions and feelings (Damasio 1995). Emotions are direct sensory 
experience which have no mental representation whereas feelings do have a mental representation. They involve 
a feeling for someone, or a feeling about someone or something and this implies knowledge (Hacking 2004). 
98
 0HOLVVD*UHJJDQG*UHJRU\6HLJZRUWKDUJXHWKDW³DIIHFWDWLWVPRVWDQWKURSRPRUSKLFLVWKHQDPHZHJLYHWR
those forces -visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, vital forces insisting 
beyond emotion - that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension, that can likewise 
suspend us (as if in neutral) across a barely registering accretion of force-relations, or that can even leave us 
overwhelmed by the world's apparent intractability´(Gregg and Seigworth 2010b, 1). 
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psyche (ibid.) ,Q SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO WHUPLQRORJ\ SDLQ¶V GHPDQGV DUH telic,99 forcing 
consciousness to pay attention to the body (Leder 1990).     
 Rene Descartes is best known in the humanities and social sciences for the description 
of the reasonable subject who is radically distinct from the body he/she inhabits. He is also 
known in science for giving one of the first scientific explanations about the mechanism of 
pain. The Meditations on First Philosophy, first published in 1641, delves on both the 
biological mechanism and the experience of pain including the question of the reliability of the 
senses perceiving pain which he described as one of the PRVW³LQWLPDWH´ experiences with the 
body (Descartes [1641] 1998, para. 77). Through the method of doubt, the meditation follows 
the trajectory from the subjective experience of pain, to the objective perspective of the 
anatomist. The purpose is to find truth and dispel errors. Pain appears in the conclusion of his 
Sixth Meditation. He describes pain as a disturbance that travels through a fibre network 
leading to the brain. Physics teaches him that the mind is affected and moved by the pain 
registered by the nerves. Moreover, it is a sign of the goodness in God, who bestows the body 
wLWKWKHDELOLW\WRQRWHDSUREOHPDQGHQVXUHRQH¶VVXUYLYDO$VKHREVHUYHVWKHPHFKDQLVPRI
SDLQ³SURYRNHVWKHPLQGWRGRLWVXWPRVWWRPRYHDZD\IURPWKHFDXVHRIWKHSDLQVLQFHLWLV
VHHQDVKDUPIXO´(Descartes 1998, para. 88). Yet, pain signals may be confused by the mind 
because the sensation radiates in other locations, making it difficult to locate anatomically its 
origin.             
 The basic elements of this explanatory model have not changed that much over time 
although much more is known today about the biochemistry of pain. While science today still 
explains pain sensations as registered by a complex network of nerves, Krashin et. al emphasise 
the distinction between nociception and pain. Nociception is the name given to the process of 
pain, when nociceptors are nerve cells that send signals to the brain (Krashin et al. 2014). 
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 Telic means to have a purpose or an end. 
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Nociceptors transduce a mechanical, thermal, and chemical signal, which means that they turn 
the physical data into a nerve signal (ibid.3DLQLQFOXGHVQRFLFHSWLRQEXWLWPRUHEURDGO\³D 
FRPSOH[KXPDQH[SHULHQFH«ZKLFKFDQRQO\EH H[SUHVVHG LQSHUVRQDO WHUPV DQG LQYROYHV
VHQVRU\SV\FKRORJLFDODQGFRJQLWLYHFRPSRQHQWV´(ibid., 107). After a signal of injury is sent 
WRKLJKHUV\VWHPVLQWKHEUDLQWKHSURFHVVLQFOXGHVWKHFUHDWLRQRID³SDLQPHPRU\´ processed 
thereafter in the limbic system. The pain mHPRU\EHFRPHVWKH³IRXQGDWLRQIRUDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
UHVSRQVHWRDQGDELOLW\WRFRSHZLWKSDLQLQODWHUOLIH´LELG7KHNQRZOHGJHRIWKHHYHQW
of pain occurs through the combination of sensory/discriminatory and emotional pathways in 
the brain.100 In other terms, the individual registers the event and includes additional 
information about location and intensity, how it feels, and the meaning of pain.   
 Although the molecular and neural basis of pain is a fascinating field, my point in laying 
out this explanation is to stress that although pain is a physiological process, medical studies 
agree that the boundaries between physical and psychic pain are not clear-cut (Bendelow and 
Williams 1995; Duncan 2000)7KHSK\VLRORJLFDOEDVLVLVRQO\SDUWRIWKHVWRU\RIµWKHELRORJ\
RIVXIIHULQJ¶(Krashin et al. 2014). Emotional factors in the higher part of the neural system 
processing pain remain obscure to science, while biomedical treatment has been able to 
PLWLJDWHWRDODUJHH[WHQWµYLVLEOH¶FDXVHVRISDLQVXFKDVGDPDJHGWLVVXHVLELG Moreover, 
in 'HVFDUWHV¶(UURU (1995), Antonio Damasio101 argues against Descartes idea that reason is a 
separate substance from the perspective of neurosciences. 'DPDVLR¶VUHVHDUFKRQSDWLHQWVZKR
had anosognosia, which is the inability to register pain and illness, led him to conclude that 
cognition is embodied and reason is emotional (Damasio 1995). People with anosognosia or 
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 The sensation/discrimination pathway corresponds to the thalamo-cortical, which carries information about the 
intensity and location of the stimuli, whereas the emotional transports the nociceptive signals (Krashin et al. 2014).  
101
 0\HQJDJHPHQWZLWK'DPDVLR¶VZRUNDWWHPSWVWRPDNHQRSDUWLFXODUVWDWHPHQWDERXWZKHWKHUKHLVYLHZHGDV
being right or wrong. Engagement with his work by others working in the discipline of philosophy/and political 
SKLORVRSK\LQFOXGH6DPDQWKD)URVW¶VLessons from a Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflections on Ethics and 
Politics (2008); and the edited collection of Daniel M. Gross, The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle's 
Rhetoric to Modern Brain Science LQFOXGLQJFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI'DPDVLR¶VPRUHSRVLWLYHYLHZRI6SLQR]D




damage to the different sections of the brain that register feelings and emotions, showed 
disturbances in behaviour and decision-PDNLQJWKDWFDQKDUGO\EHGHVFULEHGDVµUDWLRQDO¶)RU
example, anosognosia prevents people from registering emotions related to tragic news or even 
noticing that one is experiencing an illness. In their minds, their bodies functioned normally 
but they were also unable to plan, imagine a future or be concerned about others (Damasio 
1995). Through neuropsychology, Damasio turns around the belief that good judgements 
should be emptied out of emotions because they impair reasoning. While grossly 
RYHUVLPSOLI\LQJ'DPDVLR¶VUHVHDUFK,102 my aim at this point is to introduce the relationship of 
affects such as pain with embodied/disembodied ideations of subjectivity and the effects of 
'HVFDUWHV¶IDPRXVMeditations RQWKHUDWLRQDOVXEMHFWPLUURUHGLQODZ&UXFLDOO\'HVFDUWHV¶
conclusion that reason was disembodied was partly shaped by his inferences on pain which can 
themselves be questioned.  
        
4. Pain as phenomenon: Cartesian ontologies of experience 
 
Pain and emotional suffering are connected but not all pain causes suffering, just as not all 
emotional suffering is caused by physical pain (Leder 1990; Vetlesen 2009). Instead, the 
research points at the neurobiological connections between the physical and the emotional 
(Krashin et al. 2014, 119). The radical distinction between physical pain and emotional pain is 
an unsatisfactory duality challenged not only by the neuro-biological research described above, 
but also through philosophical analysis. Arne Johan Vetlesen argues through phenomenology, 
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 )RUH[DPSOH ,DQ+DFNLQJ WULHV WRXQGHUVWDQG'DPDVLR¶VZRUNSDUticularly how he portrays a person as a 
µ´QHVWHGWULDG´RIPLQGLQEUDLQDQGEUDLQLQERG\¶VHWLQWKHEDFNJURXQGRIQDWXUDOVHOHFWLRQV1RWDEO\WKHVWXG\
RIWKHµOLYLQJEUDLQ¶LQQHXURVFLHQFHLVDSKHQRPHQRQRIWKHWZHQWLHWK-century. Before then, the secrets of this 
RUJDQFRXOGRQO\EHH[SORUHGRQ³WKHZDONLQJZRXQGHGLPSDLUHGLQOLIHDQGGLVVHFWHGLQGHDWK´(Hacking 2004). 
Hacking suggests that Damasio is not giving DWKHRU\RIHPRWLRQVEXWUHSHDWVRQHFRXOGVD\'HVFDUWHV¶HUURU
Damasio is an anatomist, much like Descartes, who thinks in terms of body parts and evolutionary biology. So, 
+DFNLQJDUJXHV³ZKHQ'DPDVLRVHHVSK\VLRORJLFDOHYLGHQFHIRUDPRUHUHFHQWO\Hvolved layer of the brain that 




existential philosophy and object-relations theories, that pain is part of the human condition. 
Pain transcends the classical body-mind divide; it is experienced as a state of being, something 
that gives meaning to our being-in-the world (Vetlesen 2009). Thus, it would make little or no 
sense to explore pain and vulnerability from the illusory perspective of the self-bounded 
individual. Moreover, if vulnerability refers to the propensity to become injured while pain 
directs the attention to the experience of that injury, the boundaries between them are more 
tenuous than at first seems. Phenomenology opens up the possibility of understanding how pain 
and vulnerability are intricately implicated in each other, with both pointing at ways that 
meaning is ascribed to our relation with the world as embodied and relational subjects.  
How does phenomenological, as opposed to biological, analysis help us understand pain 
and its connection to vulnerability? The phenomenological approach has been widely used in 
pain studies to draw information about the experience from interviews, narratives, and texts 
(Osborn and Smith 2006; Biro 2010) although, as a method, it is not without criticism because 
WKHUH LV D GDQJHU RI RYHUJHQHUDOL]LQJ RQ WKH EDVLV RI RQH¶V VXbjective standpoint could 
JHQHUDOL]HRWKHU¶VH[SHULHQFHV(Murphy 2012a). Phenomenology, crudely defined, is the study 
of structures of consciousness experienced from the first person perspective. One of the 
REMHFWLYHV RI SKHQRPHQRORJ\ DV D SKLORVRSKLFDO PHWKRG LV WR VWXG\ µOLYHG H[SHULHQFH¶ LQ
contrast to controlled experience, such as studying the body or body parts in a laboratory. In 
short, phenomenology seeks to give an account of human beings which is different from that 
of the logical positivist sciences. Still, phenomenological approaches assert there are 
underlying structures of lived experience, that organize those experiences (Husserl 1983) but 
WKH\GRQRWFRQVLGHUSKHQRPHQDWREHµRXWWKHUH¶ as if separated from consciousness (Laverty 
2003).Thus, Maurice Merleau-Ponty,103 among the most influential twentieth century 
                                                          
103
 Feminist scholars have responded to Merleau-3RQW\¶VDWtention to the centrality of embodiment in subjectivity. 
See the essay collection Feminist Interpretations of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Olkowski and Weiss 2006), which 
maps the influence, appropriations, and critique in feminism. Luce Irigaray and Simone de Beauvoir criticized 
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phenomenologists, disagrees with the idea that a universal consciousness receives meanings 
attached to certain contents or objects (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 46) or that the body is an 
LQVWUXPHQW E\ ZKLFK WR SHUFHLYH WKH µH[WHUQDO ZRUOG¶ collecting data which the mind then 
processes. Instead, in the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty disrupts the 
assumption of the empirical and biological sciences that the scientific observer is detached 
from the world investigated (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2002; Flynn 2011). A particular problem 
with this detached mode of thinking is that it does not take into account how apprehension 
occurs even before one gains consciousness of self ³I could not apprehend anything as 
existing, unless I, first of all, experience myself as existing in WKH DFW RI DSSUHKHQGLQJ LW´ 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002, ix).          
 Of course, WKHUH DUH YDULDQWV LQ SKHQRPHQRORJ\ 5HDGLQJ 'HVFDUWHV¶ Meditations 
WKURXJK GLIIHUHQW SHUVSHFWLYHV LQ SKHQRPHQRORJ\ 'UHZ /HGHU VSHFXODWHV WKDW 'HVFDUWHV¶
µHUURU¶LVQRWRQO\WKDWUHDVRQLVHPERGLHG:KDW/HGHUFRQWHQGVLVWKDW&DUWHVLDQHSLVWHPRORJ\
is a motivated misreading (Leder 1990, 133) of the mind-body relation. The misreading departs 
from affective states such as pain, illness, disease or fatigue, where the body is apprehended as 
DVHSDUDWHµWKLQJ¶DVDQREMHFWRIUHDVRQ/HGHUVXJJHVWVZHEHFRPHFRnscious of the body in 
WKHSUHVHQFHRISHUFHSWXDO³G\V-DSSHDUDQFH´(Leder 1990, 86). Dys-appearance refers to events 
ZKHQ³WKHERG\LVUHPHPEHUHGSDUWLFXODUO\DWWLPHVRIHUURUDQGOLPLWDWLRQ´ reIOHFWHGLQ³WKH
&DUWHVLDQHSLVWHPRORJLFDOGLVWUXVWRIWKHERG\´LELG([SODLQHGRWKHUZLVHZHGRQ¶WSHUFHLYH
the body until it appears to the fore of our consciousness during experiences like pain and 
illness.             
 In contrast, the perception of disembodiment is characteristic of healthy abled-bodies. 
When we are healtK\ WKH ERG\ LV LQ D ZD\ µVLOHQW¶ LW VOLSV LQWR WKH EDFNJURXQG RI
                                                          




consciousness, while thoughts appear as if they were not embodied. The subject of experience, 
who identifies herseOIDV³,´,104 thinks she can move towards the world through the senses. 
7KXV/HGHUDUJXHVWKDWWKHNQRZOHGJHLVQRWWKH&DUWHVLDQµ,WKLQN¶WKDWWUDQVFHQGVWKHERG\
,QVWHDGWKHµ,WKLQN¶SDUDOOHOVWKHERG\XQHQFXPEHUHGE\OLPLWDWLRQVDEOHWRPRYHDQGFDVt 
himself or herself into the world. However, the impression of absence of the body while we are 
healthy encourages a dualist reading because when pain appears, the body irrupts into 
FRQVFLRXVQHVVFODLPLQJRQH¶VDWWHQWLRQ(Eccleston and Crombez 1999). Yet, the body does not 
appeDU DV SDUW RI WKH µ,¶ EXW DV DQ DOLHQDWHG HQWLW\ LELG (PERGLPHQW FRPHV EDFN WR WKH
forefront of consciousness mediated by the body in pain.105 However, it also appears to 
FRQVFLRXVQHVVDVD³PRUH2WKHUWRWKHVHOIDIRUFHRSSRVHGWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGZLOO´(ibid., 
132±133).           
 Why is this so? At first sight, it seems paradoxical that although pain forces the mind 
to turn its attention to the body, consciousness thematizes106 the body part that is hurting but 
DOVRREMHFWLILHV LW)RUH[DPSOH LQVWHDGRI VD\LQJ µ,KXUW¶ZHXVXDOO\ VD\ µP\ IRRWKXUWV¶
Notice the difference between these assertions: The first one implies that that I am in pain 
because pain throws me into a state of being107; the second hints at an experience of separation 
IURPWKDWZKLFKZHµSRVVHVV¶3KUDVHGRWKHUZLVHFRQVFLRXVQHVVFUHDWHVDGLVWDQFHIURPZKDW
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 /HGHU¶VDUJXPHQWLVEDVHGRQWKHLQDELOLW\RIWKHPLQGWRWKLQNRI LWVHOI7KDWPHDQVWKDW WKHEUDLQLVDOso 
enfolded in the body and it conceals its own processes to the perceiver. We cannot perceive our brain perceiving 
DQ H[SHULHQFH 'HVSLWH FULWLFLVP GLUHFWHG DW 'HVFDUWHV¶ LQIOXHQFH RQ &RQWLQHQWDO SKLORVRSK\ LQ SDUWLFXODU KLV
dualistic representation of the mind-ERG\ UHODWLRQ /HGHU DUJXHV WKDW 'HVFDUWHV HQJDJHG LQ D µSURWR-
SKHQRPHQRORJ\¶+LVFRQFHSWRIWKHµGLVWULEXWHGVRXO¶HYLQFHVWKHLGHDWKDWFRJQLWLRQLVHPERGLHGDQGPHPRU\LV
not only located in the brain, but potentially throughout the body (Leder 1990, 109). 
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 /HGHUGUDZVRQ'DYLG%DNDQ¶VWKHVLVLQDisease, Pain and Sacrifice (1971) that the telic demand of pain is 
both hermeneutical and pragmatic (ibid., 78). One seeks to give meaning to pain and to practically eliminate it 
from our experience.  Elaine Scarry, who will be discussed later on, draws on the same idea to outline the basic 
structure of pain where the experience creates an emptiness to be given a meaning but paradoxically, also resists 
representation (Scarry 1994; Scarry 1985). 
106
 Thematisation is a common term in the vocabulary of phenomenology. It refers to mental mapping and 
organization into themes. 
107
 ³3DLQVSOLQWHUVPH,DPFUDFNHGOLNHJODVV,WDVWHVDOWP\RZQIHDUFDQVDYHQRWKLQJDPJURXQGGHJUDGHG
on my own fragmentVDEUDGHGIHDWXUHOHVV«$QGDPIUHHRISDLQIRUDEULHIVSDFH$ILUH-talented tongue will 
FKRRVHLWVWUXWK´(Harwood 2011, 5). 
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hurts (body-part); and recognizes something possessed 108 by the self, acknowledged in the 
DIILUPDWLRQµP\IRRWKXUWV¶.109 First, I distance myself from the pain to avoid being engulfed 
by it, that is, to abject the feeling of pain: I reject being pain so I have pain instead. There is a 
contradiction: I realize I cannot live without a body but in the moment of pain, I cannot 
UHFRJQL]H WKLV SDLQIXO ERG\ VLQFH P\ µQRUPDO¶ ERG\ LV XVXDOO\ VLOHQW 7KLV ERG\ LQ SDLQ
impinges on my desires, possibilities, and even on my future. So, pain is an interruption which 
GHPDQGV³hermeneutic and SUDFWLFDOVWUDWHJLHVRIUHSDLU´ to continue living (Leder 1990, 133).   
'HVFDUWHV¶GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHDWWHQWLRQWRWKHdysfunctional ERG\LV/HGHU¶VPDLQSRLQWRI
critique. The mind-body dichotomy would be less of a problem if the Cartesian epistemology 
did not privilege the mind over the body. The Cartesian cogito established an onto-valuational 
dualism in which rationality is not only positively valued in comparison to the body, but is also 
thought of as a dis-embodied or disconnected from the body. Leder faults the Cartesian model 
for presenting these experiences of perceived embodiment and disembodiment110 as ontology 
(ibid., 115). Ontology, in the traditional sense, is the study that questions the nature of being, 
reality, and existence. This is obviously a vast subject and the literature is filled with disputes 
about the fundamental concepts animating ontology. However, Leder stresses that the negative 
bias observed in the experience of pain is not necessarily an ontological fact. Affects function 
as phenomenological vectors111 LQ WKH ³VWUXFWXUH RI H[perience that makes possible and 
                                                          
108
 One of the methods of abjection of pain includes VWHDOLQJVXIIHULQJIURPWKHYLFWLPRQHLVDWWDFNLQJWRRQH¶V
own predicament. To turn around the instinct of feeling the suffering of another, into my own suffering: See Elaine 






 Leder argues that Descartes thought bodily disturbances were unpleasant and prevented the search for truth.  
As much as his observations were rooted in experience, the Cartesian cRQFOXVLRQVKDYHEHHQ³PLVUHDG LQWRD
UHLILHGRQWRORJ\´(Leder 1990, 132).  
111
 $SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOYHFWRUUHIHUVWRWKHPHDQLQJDQGXVHWKDW³PDNHVSRVVLEOHRUHQFRXUDJHVWKHVXEMHFWLQ
certain pUDFWLFDO RU LQWHUSUHWDWLYH GLUHFWLRQV ZKLOH QHYHU PDQGDWLQJ WKHP DV LQYDULDQWV´ /HGHU  
(GPXQG+XVVHUO¶VSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOPHWKRGVRXJKWWRXQFRYHUWKH³FRQVWLWXWLRQRIH[SHULHQFH´LELGLQFOXGLQJ
what is constant or necessary in experience anGZKDWLVQRW,QWKDWVHQVH/HGHUDOVRVHHNVWKHµLQYDULDQWV¶LQ
KXPDQH[SHULHQFH+HVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHµHFVWDWLFDQGUHFHVVLYHQDWXUHRIWKHOLYHGERG\¶RUWKHµIURP-WR¶ORJLFRI
the senses remains as a constant across cultures and personal experiences (ibid.)  The difference between Merleau-
Ponty and Husserl is that the former minded empirical and psychological science (Carman 1999), but he did not 
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encourages the subject in certain practical or interpretative directions, while never mandating 
WKHPDVLQYDULDQWV´LELG7KHYHFWRUHQFRXUDJHVDQRXWZDUG-going direction as in the 
experience of passions or the healthy body; or, as in the case of pain or illness, the vector is 
inward-going. The horizon of the existence shrinks through the experience of pain because 
consciousness is forced to turn its attention inward. Intentionality and the perception of being 
able to move outside towards others breaks down in proportion to the intensity of pain or the 
limitations of an ill body. Crucially, the particular direction of the vector depends on and is 
reinforced by positive or negative feedback loops embodied in cultural practices, beliefs, etc. 
The lived body is constantly affecting and affected; the mutually engendering structures of 
H[SHULHQFH³VKDSHVRFLDOSUDFWLFHVDQGVRFLDOSUDFWLFHVVKDSHRXUVHQVHRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH
ERG\´(Leder 1990, 152).          
Paying attention to the affective orientations of pain matters because the way it is 
experienced is not solely determined by our neurobiology. Pain is not experienced the same 
way by everyone because other factors come into play in the structure of experience, such as 
cultural practices and beliefs (Leder 1990; Bendelow and Williams 1995; Damasio 1995). If 
pain were really, as AlEHUW6FKZHLW]HUVDLG³DPRUHWHUULEOHORUGRIPDQNLQGWKDQHYHQGHDWK
LWVHOI´(Schweitzer 1998, 92), the sense of powerlessness in its grip would have thwarted many 
RI WKH SUDFWLFHV GHYHORSHG WR OLPLW SDLQ DQG VXIIHULQJ LQ RXU OLYHV +RZHYHU 6FKZHLW]HU¶V
characterization of pain expresses important aspects that play a part in the politicization of pain 
and vulnerability, particularly the power of pain and the perception of inevitability in how it 
SUHVHQWVLWVHOIDVDQDXWRQRPRXVIRUFHEH\RQGFRQWUROIURPRQH¶VLQWHQWLRQVZLOOVDQGGHVLUHV
(Vetlesen 2009, 56) , ZLOO FODULI\ WKLV SRLQW LQ UHIHUHQFH WR (ODLQH 6FDUU\¶V SROLWLFDO
phenomenology of pain at the end of this chapter.  
                                                          




For now, I want to hold sight of the ambiguity RISDLQLPSOLFLWLQ/HGHU¶VDQDO\VLV7KH
ambiguity OLHVLQWKHPHDQLQJWKDWSDLQKDVRQHDFKSHUVRQ¶VOLIH7KLVGRHVQRWPHDQRQHFDQ
choose to experience pain or other affects through a false voluntarism, as Sartre suggested 
(Leder 1990; Vetlesen 2009) or that it has as an absolute deterministic force acting upon bodies. 
,QVWHDG/HGHU¶VSKHQRPHQRORJLFDODQGELRORJLFDOSDLQVWXGLHVUHIOHFWXSRQWKHFRPSOH[LW\RI
SDLQDQGSUHVHQW LWDVDQDIIHFWLYHVWDWHZLWKRXW6FKZHLW]HU¶V WRWDOL]LQJWRQHV7KLV LVQRW WR 
deny the impact of extreme pain; that it can be a totalizing, absorbing sovereign power over 
the ego.112 Pain is not simply a neurophysical event or an intrusion upon consciousness even 
though it is perceived as such. If the living body is our entry and reference point to being in the 
world (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Heinamaa 2003)SDLQ¶VIRUFHIXO LUUXSWLRQFDQQRWEHH[SUHVVHG
through a radical separation of somatic and psychic phenomena; nor individual and social.  
Instead, a phenomenological interpretation of the body in pain troubles the relationship 
between the public and private domains, elucidating how the body is not an isolated entity but 
thoroughly imbricated in a network of cultural practices, sedimented meanings, and habits 
which favour particular ways of experiencing the body. In short and recalling the discussion of 
embodiment in the last chapter, pain is embodied rather than just something that happens to the 
body.            
 Drawing upon the phenomenology of pain, one of my aims is to understand how 
consciousness relates to vulnerability. The suggestion elaborated here is that the alienated 
relation of vulnerability and selfhood is an effect of the responses aimed at eliminating pain 
and illness. Consider the telic demand elicited by pain: when we are ill or in pain, consciousness 
may be inclined towards healing. However, healing is often understood as a restoration of 
µQRUPDOLW\¶RUWKHQRUPRIWKHKHDOWK\ERG\ZKLFKH[LVWHGSULRUWRWKHHYHQWRISDLQRULOOQHVV
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 Vetlesen describes the SKHQRPHQRORJ\RISDLQDQGWKHUHODWLRQWRZLOOVXFFLQFWO\³3DLQSRVVHVVHVDQXWWHUO\
sovereign power, a sovereignty that marks the limit for my belief in my own power, my freedom and my right 
over everything in my life, over all its significance and meaniQJ3DLQKHDYHVWKHHJRGRZQIURPWKHSHGHVWDO´
(Vetlesen 2009, 52). 
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(Mol 2003, 121±122). To return to normality, I need to map, to thematize and locate the source 
of my pain. Moreover, one of the effects of the abjection of negative affects is that Western 
SKLORVRSKLHV KDYH IDYRXUHG D ³GLVHPERGLHG GLUHFWLRQ´ at the expense of shaming and 
UHSUHVVLQJ³embodiHGLQWHOOLJHQFH´ (Leder 1990, 152). 
7KLV µRQWRORJLFDO¶ YDOXDWLRQ RI WKH PLQG-body impinges upon approaches to  
subjectivity which consider vulnerability as a pathology (Fineman 2008b),  pertaining only to 
SHUVRQVZKRDUHQRWµQRUPDO¶DFFRUGLQJWRWKHVWDQGDUGRIWKHUHDVRQDEOHDEOH-bodied person. 
)RU H[DPSOH WKH FDWHJRU\ RI µYXOQHUDEOH DGXOWV¶ LQ (QJOLVK DQG :HOVK FULPinal laws113 
describes people who have cognitive or physical disabilities, are dependent on others for care, 
and at risk of exploitation.114 The legal definition applies most commonly to medical and 
community care cases, expressed in regulatory regimes such as e the provisions of the Mental 
&DSDFLW\ $FW RI   DQG HVWDEOLVKLQJ D µIL[HG¶ RU µLQWULQVLF¶ FKDUDFWHULVWLF DSSURDFK WR
vulnerability defined on the basis of the capacity to reason and consent. Yet, the High Court 
has also adopted another interpretation GHVFULEHGDV µVLWXDWLRQDOYXOQHUDELOLW\¶ (Dunn et. al. 
2008), which widens the network of protection to individuals who are not necessarily mentally 
incapacitated although it is also more intrusive because the courts apply D QRWLRQ RI µSUH-
HPSWLYH¶SURWHFWLRQ.115 Extending vulnerability to a situational category in law may make sense 
as a better account of an embodied and relational subjectivity, but it is not clear that it is 
conducive to justice. Still, it is an attempt to think differently about the vulnerable legal subject, 
who has been traditionally pitched into a model of either a body without rational capacities or 
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 Several statutes incorporate guides for the protection of vulnerable adults. For example, the Codes of Practice 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 requires that vulnerable adults who are suspects of an offence to 
EHDFFRPSDQLHGE\DQµDGHTXDWHDGXOW¶ 
114
 7KH&RQVXOWDWLRQ3DSHUE\WKH/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ³:KRGHFLGHV"´GHILQHGYXOQHUDEOHDGXOWVDVVRPHRne who 
LV³RYHUWKHDJHRIZKRLVRUPD\EHLQQHHGRIFRPPXQLW\FDUHVHUYLFHVE\UHDVRQRIPHQWDORURWKHUGLVDELOLW\
age or illness and who is or may be unable to take care of him/herself or unable to protect him/herself against 
significant harm or e[SORLWDWLRQ´/RUG&KDQFHOORU¶V'HSDUWPHQW.  
115
 According to Dunn et.al., the three cases decided by the High Court that extended the scope of vulnerability to 
SUHYHQWDVLWXDWLRQZKHUHWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VIUHHGRPWRFKRRVHZRXOGEHFRQVWUDLQHGZHUHRe G [2004] EWHC 2222 
(Fam), Re SK (Proposed plaintiff) (an adult by way of her Litigation Friend) [2005] 2 FLR 230; and Re SA 
(vulnerable adult with capacity: marriage) [2006] 1 FLR 867. 
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a rational but disembodied subject. Before we explore more about the limitations to widening 
the scope of vulnerable subjectivity in law, the next section explores the ambiguity of 
subjectivity in an effort to unpack the mind-body duality. 
5. Pain and subjectivity: Shadowing Descartes  
'HVFDUWHV¶GXDOLVPLVROGVWXII7KHLGHDWKDW,DPDFRPSRVLWHRItwo radically distinct 
substances, one which is essentially me, the soul/mind, and the other which is mine but 
not truly me, the body, can barely find a hearing amongst contemporary thinkers 
immersed in the continental traditions (Bergoffen 2010, 232).  
Why should the Cartesian dualism matter at all for a project that explores the legal construction 
RIGUXJPXOHV")LUVWZHFRXOGJHQHUDOO\DJUHHZLWK%HUJRIIHQWKDW'HVFDUWHVLVµROGVWXII¶DQG
that the rational legal person has been sufficiently questioned as the primary model of 
personhood in criminal law (Lacey 2001).  Yet, the mind-body dualism arguably lingers in 
criminal legal doctrine (Naffine 1997) and persists in the gendered lines of embodied 
femininity/disembodied masculinity played out in the criminal courts. As discussed in the 
previous section, the phenomenology of pain underpins the mind-body binary, but also the 
separation of physical and psychic pain as two distinct phenomena (Vetlesen 2009). Although 
Descartes radically transformed how people thought and treated pain - from the spiritual 
perspective to a mechanism of the body (Krashin et al. 2014) - the effects of this idea unleashed 
other complications. What I find most significant is how Descartes offered a spin-off to the 
WKHPDWL]DWLRQRISDLQE\GRXEWLQJWKHSHUFHSWLRQVRISDLQFLWLQJWKHFDVHRIµSKDQWRP-SDLQ¶RU
by confusing something that could cause pain for pleasure (Descartes 1996).  
 Doubt and alienation from embodiment have had a profound effect on theories of 
subjectivity and political subjectivity, which Kristine Krause and Katharina Shram define as 
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how people relate to governance and authority116 (Krause and Schramm 2011). I will illustrate 
the influence of the mind-ERG\GXDOLVPRQSROLWLFDOVXEMHFWLYLW\WKURXJK'HEUD%HUJRIIHQ¶V
analysis of the influence of Cartesian doubt and alienation on existential approaches to 
subjectivity. These modalities of relationality (abjection and alienation) will be important in 
chapter V, which suggest these modes of relation can be seen also in the sexual politics of 
vulnerability. But first, I will rehearse -XGLWK%XWOHU¶VUH-engagement with Descartes, which 
suggests the body was never really disembodied and instead, the Cartesian Meditations can be 
read through the lens of ambiguity. This is because embodiment subsisted as a spectre of 
disembodiment (Butler 1997b). Moreover, her engagement with Descartes exposes the 
relationship between epistemic authority and the materiality of bodies.  
6. Doubting and alienation from the body in pain 
In the Meditations, 'HVFDUWHV µUHDOL]HV¶ WKDW WKHVHQVHVDUHQRWDV WUXWKIXODVKH WKRXJKW ,Q
sleep, one might be deceived by a dream; in madness, one might be deceived into believing 
that the product of the derangement is a reality. What the artist, madman, and dreamer have in 
common is that the things seen, whether fictional or true, are formed in consciousness. More 
explicitly, there are common elements in what is complex or composite, like numbers, qualities, 
colours, shapes. Perceptions cannot be the trusted but cannot be completely jettisoned. 
%HUJRIIHQ H[SODLQV KRZ 'HVFDUWHV¶ 6HFRQG 0HGLWDWLRQ UHVWRUHV HPERGLHG SHUFHSWLRQV DV D
source of knowledge. Yet, bodily perceptions have already been invalidated at this point. Minds 
SHUFHLYH HVVHQFHV WKH ERG\¶V SHUFHSWLRQV DUH GRXEWIXO (Bergoffen 2010). The meditation 
continues through a process of discarding the truth in the experiences of the body. In the end, 
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 Political subjectivity is closely related to belonging and citizenship. However, the authors find political 
subjectivity far more encompassing. Belonging denotes emotional attachments while citizenship is a limited 
juridical form of legal state-PHPEHUVKLS ,QVWHDGSROLWLFDO VXEMHFWLYLW\ LV VXEWHQGHGE\³WKHSUDFWLFHV WKURXJK
which political subject-SRVLWLRQV FRPH LQWREHLQJ7KHVH HQWDLO SUDFWLFHVRI LQFOXVLRQRU H[FOXVLRQ«Eut also 
GLPHQVLRQVRIORQJLQJDQGGHVLUH´(Krause and Schramm 2011, 119). 
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WKH RQO\ ³,´ WKDW VXUYLYHV LV WKH WKLQNLQJ VHOI 7KH ERG\ DSSHDUV LUUHPHGLDEO\ DOLHQDWHG
(including the body of others). The certainty of the thinking self (cogito) is clearly set in 
opposition to the body (res extensa). It is not necessary to rehearse in detail all the meditations. 
For now, the focus is only the 6L[WK0HGLWDWLRQVXEWLWOHG³7KHH[LVWHQFHRIUHDOGLVWLQFWLRQ
between the mind and the boG\´+HUHDescartes observes that even the sensation of pain can 
be doubted because people have been said to have experienced pain in a limb which is no longer 
there.117At the same time, pain and hunger may give the impression of absolute certainty as: 
There is nothing that my own nature teaches me more vividly that I have a body that is 
ill-disposed when I feel pain, that needs food and drink when I suffer hunger or thirst, 
and the like. Therefore, I should not doubt that there is some truth in this (Descartes 
1998, para. 80).  
:KLOVWKHFRQVLGHUVKRZSDLQ¶VVHQVDWLRQVVKRZWKHLQWHUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQPLQGVSLULWDQGERG\
as a whole, Descartes realizes that perceptions are deceptive. Knowledge comes from reason 
alone because the ERG\¶VSHUFHSWLRQVPD\IRROXVLQWRGRLQJVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVQRWJRRGIRUXV
like eating when it might actually harm us more. So, Descartes is performing a radical doubt 
of all he knows as truth, including experiences of pain. This point is important, and I will come 
back to it in discussing the ontological divide asserted by Hannah Arendt and Elaine Scarry, 
and the political implications.         
 At the same time, Descartes also concedes that pain and other sensations might have 
some foundation in truth.118  But the thinking/soul double is certainly more credible than 
embodiment (Bergoffen 2010). Moreover, Descartes certainty relies ultimately on an infinite, 
                                                          
117
 The phantom limb phenomenon has been pondered extensively in philosophy. For Descartes, it was 
confirmation that the mind can perceive pain; whereas the body can deceive in some situations of danger, for 
example, confusing poison mixed in food with pleasure (Wee 2006).  
118
 'HVFDUWHVWKRXJKW³)RULIWKLVZHUHQRWWKHFDVH, then I, who am only a thinking thing, would not sense pain 
when the body is injured; rather, I would perceive the wound by means of the pure intellect, just as a sailor 
SHUFHLYHVE\VLJKWZKHWKHUDQ\WKLQJLQKLVVKLSLVEURNHQ´(Descartes 1998, para. 81) 
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perfect God, not on bodily perceptions. Humans are finite imperfect beings, yet reason is a 
faculty that allows them to discern truth and error. Thus, knowledge and memory are what 
prevent us from doing things that will harm us in the future.   
 ,PSRUWDQWO\%HUJRIIHQUHPLQGVXVWKDW³'HVFDUWHV¶WKHVLVLVQRWVLPSO\WKDWWKHERdy is 
not the self, but more complexly that the body claims to be the self and that we are lured by 
WKLVFODLPDZD\IURPRXUVHOYHV´(Bergoffen 2010, 235).119 The radical doubt alienates us from 
ourselves. Existential phenomenology and psychoanalytic theories reproduce the alienation 
from subjectivity implicit in the Cartesian wDUQLQJDERXWKRZ³perceptions which inscribe us 
as bodies have the power WR OXUHXVDZD\IURPRXUVHOYHV´(ibid., 236). In short, the duality 
between object-subject survives through the alienating doubt about what is registered by 
embodied knowledge. Take SDUWUH¶V UHDVRQLQJ )RU KLP VXEMHFWLYLW\ LV HPERGLHG <HW ,
perceive my own body as an object through other subjects but also perceive other subjects as 
REMHFWV7KHµJD]H¶RIWKHRWKHUXQGHUPLQHVP\RZQVXEMHFWLYLW\E\IHHOLQJOLNHDQREMHFWIRU
others. I can deny my own subjectivity too, and allow how others see me to have an effect also 
RQKRZ,VHHDQGWUHDWP\VHOI%HUJRIIHQH[SODLQVWKDW6DUWUH¶VVXJJHVWLRQLVWKDWLIRWKHUVFDQ
WKLQNRIPHDV,GRDERXWWKHPWKHQ³P\EHLQJDVDSHUFHLYDEOHERG\OHDves me vulnerable to 
WKHH[SORLWLYHREMHFWLI\LQJVWUDWHJLHVRIWKHRWKHU´ (Bergoffen 2010, 236). When I deny the 
freedom of others in bad faith, I deny not only their subjectivity but also my own. Adding 
DQRWKHUOD\HUWRWKHDQDO\VLV/HGHUVXJJHVWVWKDW6DUWUH¶V³FRUSRUDODOLHQDWLRQGRHVQRWFRPH
to be solely through the social confrontation but from within the body-for-PH´(Leder 1990, 
93),QVKRUWDOLHQDWLRQLVQRWRQO\KRZZHFRPHWRSHUFHLYHRXUVHOYHVZLWKRWKHUVZKRµORRN¶
at us, it comes also from our own confrontation with our embodied situation (ibid). Although 
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 For example, Bergoffen paraphrases the moments in the Meditations leading to a conclusion about alienation: 
³,H[SHULHQFH WKHSUHVHQFHRIP\ERG\GLIIHUHQWO\ WKDQ WKHSUHVHQFHRIRWKHUERGLHV0\ERG\ LVPLQH2WKHU
bodies are present to or with me. But this experience is not sufficient to establish my body as me. If I am to 




alienation is inscribed in embodied subjectivity, Sartre casts doubt on how the objectification 
of the body occurs.  
The shadow of subject-REMHFWGXDOLW\LVDOVRFDVWLQ6LPRQHGH%HDXYRLU¶VThe Second 
Sex (1949), where she questions how the male came to occupy the role of subject and the female 
as object. Yet, de Beauvoir begins to reverse the hierarchy of rationality as the defining 
characteristic of subjectivity. For her and Sartre, the body is also the condition for 
transcendence, a site of self-affirmation., At the same time, de Beauvoir locates more clearly 
the structures promoting alienation from embodiment in history and culture not in ontology 




been alienated from their own embodiment by social standards of femininity. Although 
Beauvoir works under the shadow of Descartes, she does so ambivalently. One can risk the 
body in violence, which involves risking the body through conquest, or through vulnerability 
in erotic love (Bergoffen 2010, 239).  Finally, Bergoffen explores the Cartesian shadows in 
Jacques /DFDQ¶V SV\FKRDQDO\WLF WKHRU\ :LWKRXW JRLQJ LQWR WRR PXFK GHWDLO /DFDQ¶V
contribution was that he reworked the subject-object dichotomy in relation to the body through 
the perspective of erotic desires rather than simply casting it as an epistemological issue (ibid.) 
as Sartre did. Objectification and alienation are not simply an error of perception but also a 
product of erotic desire. Lacan notes that the self is alienated from the self-LPDJHRIRQH¶VRZQ
ERG\H[SHULHQFHGLQWKHµPLUURUVWDJH¶.120 The desire to be desired by others is imprinted in 
the imagined µotheU¶ZKRLV cast in the mirror. The subject internalizes the gaze of the other in 
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 According to this theory, the child is captivated by the sight of himself/herself in the mirror, and identifies with 




but also aQµRWKHU¶WRRQHVHOI. Yet, %HUJRIIHQVWUHVVHVKRZ/DFDQ¶VWKHRU\RQWKHobjectification 
the body LVDQH[SUHVVLRQRIWKHHURWLF³GHVLUHLQWKHLGHDRIWKHERG\´ (ibid., 241), to be desired 
by others.121 ,Q%HUJRIIHQ¶VDQDO\VLV/DFDQLVFDVWVWZLFHLQWKHVKadow of alienation. Taken 
WRJHWKHU%HDXYRLU/DFDQDQG6DUWUH¶VFRQWULEXWLRQLVWKDWZKLOHZRUNLQJXQGHUWKHOHJDF\RI 
'HVFDUWHVWKH\DOVRVKRZKRZ³the body is the other of the self only insofar as our experience 
of its objectivity is accepted in place of, or is allowed to repress, our experience of its existential 
SUHVHQFH´ (ibid., 242-243). There are different modes of perception towards the body, and 
significantly, the body is the clue to the alienation of the subject (ibid., 243). To move away 
from Cartesian dualism, Bergoffen suggests, is to imagine different ways of relating to the 
body, and to stop denying the otherness of the body (ibid.). 
7. Performative doubt about embodiment     
So far, this chapter has suggested that the dualistic epistemology of Descartes has been driven 
by a misreading of the body in pain, reflected in the masculinist hierarchy of reason over the 
body. I previously explained how pain elicits the thematization of the body, which was 
reILJXUHG LQWR GRXEW DQG DOLHQDWLRQ IURP HPERGLHG NQRZOHGJH %HUJRIIHQ¶V UH-reading of 
Cartesianism suggests alienation, expressed in the mind-body binary, is more complex than the 
FDWHJRULHV RI µGLVHPERGLPHQW¶ DQG µHPERGLPHQW¶ LPSO\ ([LVWHQWLDO DQG SV\FKRDnalytic 
analyses above unpick the deterministic notion of the body in the Cartesian legacy and 
introduce into the analysis the roles of sociality, gender and sexuality, to reconsider the 
embodied subjectivity. Feminist epistemologies have long sought to critique rationality and 
subject-object dualism because of its deleterious consequences on women, as discussed in 
                                                          
121
 %HUJRIIHQHORTXHQWO\VXJJHVWVWKDW³LIZHFRXOGUHQRXQFHWKHDSSHDORIWKHLPDJHDQG undo the priority of 




chapter III. Women are not simply passive bodies, open to appropriative or violent practices 
enabled by laws and norms. However, does feminist epistemologies evade those appropriative 
practices?           
 This section questions if, by highlighting the body of the suffering and oppressed 
women, feminist discourses are not also participating in the reification of the mind-body 
dualism, and thus, re-inscribing a masculinist gender norm into feminist politics. The aim is to 
flesh out the problems arising from the dilemma of speaking about and for women drug mules 
as victims within a framework which marks a stark dualism between theory and empirical 
isVXHV,ZLOOLQWURGXFHWKHLVVXHVWKURXJK&36QRZ¶VµWZR-FXOWXUHGHEDWH¶EHWZHHQVFLHQFH
and the humanities, which is also arguably also reflected in the debates in feminist theory. 
Ultimately, this section contests the binary by tracing the connection between language and 
PDWHULDOLW\WKURXJK%XWOHU¶VSHUIRUPDWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH&DUWHVLDQ0HGLWDWLRQV 
 C.P. Snow, a British scientist and novelist, famously characterised the divide between 
VFLHQFHVDQGWKHKXPDQLWLHVDVPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJEHWZHHQ³WZR-cultures´LQD&DPEULGJH
lecture. In this lecture, Snow criticized the split in Western thought between the: 
«literary intellectuals at one pole - at the other scientists, and as the most 
representative, the physical scientists. Between the two a gulf of incomprehension²
sometimes (particularly among the young) hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of 
understanding  (C. P. Snow 1959, 4).  
Snow urges the English education system to close the gap between the two cultures, stressing 
the unproductive animosity and distrust between them. Whilst unpacking the virtues and limits 
of each culture, Snow strongly favours scientific and empirical research suggesting it has been 
undervalued by politicians. Still, he also condemns the specialisation drive in applied sciences 
but also the KXPDQLWLHV¶GLVFRnnection from practical issues. He argues that both have lead to 
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narrow-minded attitudes which ultimately neglect the disparities between the rich 
industrialized countries in the West and the poverty in the rest of the world. 




Nussbaum characterises the performative approach as a dangerous influence on feminism 
because it can lead to political quietism (Nussbaum 1999) 6KH DUJXHV WKDW %XWOHU¶V
performativity approach reifies language and epistemology over materiality since it is more 
FRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHV\PEROLFUDWKHUWKDQWKH³PDWHULDOVLGHRIOLIH´LELG 43). The influence of 
literary studies on the American DFDGHP\LVDQDSSURDFKWKDW³PDNHVWKHIOLPVLHVWFRQQHFWLRQV
ZLWKWKHUHDOVLWXDWLRQRIUHDOZRPHQ´(ibid., 38). Nussbaum argues that women cannot break 
IUHHIURPRSSUHVVLRQWKURXJK³SDURGLFSHUIRUPDQFHV´WKDW³UH-HQDFW«WKHFRQGLWLRQVRIKXQJHU
illiterac\GLVHQIUDQFKLVHPHQWEHDWLQJDQGUDSH´(ibid., 43). Parodic performance refers here 
WR%XWOHU¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHµGUDJ¶122 is an example of the subversion of gender norms, which 
simultaneously exposes the fragility of gender heteronormativity norms (Shugart 2001). Still, 
1XVVEDXP¶VSUHVXPSWLRQ begs the question, can feminism ever know the real lives of women, 
and ZKDWDUHWKHHIIHFWVRIFODLPLQJWRKDYHWKHWUXWKRYHUZRPHQ¶VµUHDO¶OLYHV?  While it is 
QRWKDUGWRV\PSDWKL]HZLWK1XVVEDXP¶VDUJXPHQW that feminism should enable social change, 
Elena Loizidou invites the readers to unpack NusVEDXP¶V µKRVWLOH FULWLTXH¶ DJDLQVW %XWOHU
pursued in defence of the real women who are victims of patriarchal violence.  
 Analysing the method adopted by Nussbaum to make those claims, Loizidou suggests 
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there is a performance of authority at play. NussbaumV¶PHWKRGWRGLVTXDOLI\%XWOHULQYRNHV
authoritative texts and making claims of truth linked to scientific knowledge and empirical data 
(Loizidou 2007). Loizidou suggests this method is similar to the legal techniques of legal 
interpretation that valorise consistency, rationality, citation of authorities to support a given 
interpretation; a method that is similar to the sixteenth to seventeenth century common law 
jurisprudence (chapter III) (ibid. 160).  By FLWLQJWKHYLFWLPV¶VXIIHULQJ1XVVEDXP¶VWH[WGRHV
not simply describe them in order to create a platform for justice, but she is actually using them 
to judge Butler and reconstitute the authority of law (ibid., 162). Thus, when Nussbaum appeals 
to the authority of empirical data not only to explain the real lives of women who are victims 
of rape, hunger and domestic abuse, but also claims to have better  knowledge and, thus, more 
authority over deciding what is good for them.      
 ,QRWKHUZRUGV1XVVEDXP¶VWH[WUHFRQVWLWXWHVthe notion of justice through victims but 
that does not necessarily mean their claims are the focus. Recall that a similar issue was 
addressed in the last chapter, with reference to the sacrifice of liminal subjects who remain as 
DEMHFWVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\'UDZLQJRQ3HWHU*RRGULFK¶VZRUN/RL]LGRXDUJXHVWKDWWKHYLFWLP
becomes the sacrificial body on which law is founded, justified as the source for the existence 
and authority of the law. In short, women brandished as victims reconstitute legal authority but 
it is not clear if their situation of oppression or subjection is actually addressed. Should 
IHPLQLVPDEDQGRQDOWRJHWKHUWKHFDWHJRU\RIµYLFWLP¶"$QGLIZHGRZKDWHOVHZRXOGUHSODFH
or point to relations of power and the violent practices which do subjugate women? What kind 
of vocabulary would we be able to use in order to point out the effect of economic 
GLVSRVVHVVLRQ WR WKH IRUHFORVXUHVRI OHJDO FDWHJRULHV VXFKDV µRIIHQGHU¶ µYLFWLP¶ FULPLQDO
responsibility); or to the experiences of trafficking drugs across borders?   
 The main point I am drawing attention to is to unpick the position of the politician or 




chimes with the postcolonial critique of liberal feminist discourses that enable the colonization 
of victimhood by disciplining and shaping subjects into the acceptable contours of the 
knowledge producer. Despite the good intentions of knowledge-producers, speaking on behalf 
of others may reify the cultural and social norms that victimize the lives of others, such as 
women drug mules.  The legal interpretation and translation of the situation of women and men 
acting as drug mules draws on normalized ideas about victimhood, as I will show through the 
case study in chapter VI. The problem with legal crusades aimed at saving or protecting victims 
is that they also determine one way or another who is an authentic victim (Agustín 2005;  
Davies and Davies 2010). At the same time, it is too easy to fall into the sceptical attitude by 
outright rejecting what is being signified by the victim trope. For example, in the process of 
writing this thesis I was once asked if the vulnerability arguments are a legal strategy rather 
WKDQDµUHDO¶LVVXH,QWKDWVHQVHLWLVDTXHVWLRQWKDWFKLPHV6FKHPHQDXHU¶VFULWLTXHRIKRZ
GUXJ PXOHV DUH YLHZHG E\ ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW DFWRUV DV GXSOLFLWRXV µYLFWLPV¶ RU µYDPSV¶
(Schemenauer 2012)? Further on, we will see how many of the sentencing appeals on behalf 
RIGUXJPXOHV¶VWUHVVWKHVWRULHVRIVXIIHULQJEHKLQGWKHRIIHQFH7KHFDVHVFROOHFWHGIRUWKH
case story invROYH RIIHQGHUV¶ ZKRVH GHVFULSWLRQV ZHUH RIWHQ SUHIDFHG E\ WKH DGMHFWLYH RI
vulnerability, mostly stories populated by suffering bodies: the woman who is depressive and 
suicidal during her trial,123 the veteran who sustained permanent injuries in Iraq,124 the woman 
who has had a long history of abusive relationships and self-harm,125 the young man who is 
responsible for a mother with multiple sclerosis,126 or the woman who cannot take care of her 
children because she is bipolar and suffers from bouts of manic behaviour.127  Gendered 
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victimhood also figures in the legal, political and academic discourse on women drug mules, 
as noted in chapter I, II and III. 7KHVHGHVFULSWLRQVRIWKHRIIHQGHU¶VVLWXDWLRQSULRUWRWUDIILFNLQJ
drugs reiterate the fragility of the embodied subject in a legal space, such as the court. However, 
we cannot lose sight of how legal actors, from the judges to the solicitors, interpret, and 
translate these facts, seeking to accommodate them within the boundaries of what is intelligible 
to the law. The victim trope is more common in criminal law, and thus, one would think 
something that is more easily recognizable. However, it is uncommon when it is used to refer 
to offenders. This creates a tension. The questions is how do vulnerability discourses mimetize 
victimhood or do they transgress the dichotomy of victim-offender.     
 7KLVLVZKHUH)LQHPDQ¶VFULWLTXHRIOHJDOSHUVRQKRRGLVLPSRUWDQW6KHLGHQWLILHVFOHDUO\
how the law tends to reaffirm the healthy abled-body as a norm and to exclude the vulnerable 
body by pathologizing it (Fineman 2008a). She rightly points out how the narrow approach to 
legal personhood fails to accommodate complex overlapping and interlocking sources of 
vulnerability involving disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, gender norms, the 
encroachment of welfare, etc. In other words, the connection between victimhood and 
vulnerability discourses cannot be easily pushed aside; but there is something else nested in 
those discourses which demand our attention. Rather than figuring out whether the discourse 
RQGUXJPXOHVLVSRUWUD\LQJDQµDXWKHQWLF¶RUDµVWUDWHJLF¶YXOQHUDELOLW\LWLVPRUHLPSRUWDQWWR
show and question the parameters which define one expression of vulnerability as real and the 
RWKHUDV µIDNH¶ LOOXVRU\RU VWUDWHJLF7KHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQYLFWLPKRRGDQGYXOQHUDELOLW\
cannot be neglected but also approached cautiously in each context where either of these tropes 
are mobilized to advance social and political change. The former will be explained more in 
detail in chapter V. The main goal so far has been to show how the debate about authenticity 
brings to the surface questions about how authenticity is grounded, an issue which relates again 
to the tension in feminist studies between discursive constructivism and materialism 
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(Conaghan 2013b). For example, Butler herself introduces a reinterpretation to Descartes 
Meditations as a response to the criticisms that addressing bodies through discursive practices 
KDVPDGH³ERGLHVOHVVWKDQUHOHYDQW´(Butler 1997a, 1). 
 To recapitulate the key point of the last sections, the Cartesian legacy expresses a mode 
of relation with the body defined by doubt and alienation. The departure point for her analysis 
begins with the passage of the First Meditation ZKHUHWKHQDUUDWRUDVNV³%XWRQZKDWJURXQGV
FRXOGRQHGHQ\WKDWWKHVHKDQGVDQGWKLVHQWLUHERG\DUHPLQH"´(Descartes 1998, 18)%XWOHU¶V
argument is that Descartes performs a radical doubt about the body that at the same time 
µLQYRNHV¶ERGLHVWKURXJKWKHDFWRIZULWLQJ$V%XWOHUQRWHVWKH³KDQGWKDWZULWHVWKHGRXEW
DQGWKHKDQGWKDWLVGRXEWHG«LVDWRQFHWKHKDQGWKDWLVOHIWEHKLQGDVWKHwriting emerges in, 
ZH PLJKW VD\ LWV GLVPHPEHULQJ HIIHFW´ (Butler 1997a).  So, instead of making the body 
GLVDSSHDURUHYHQµGLVPHPEHULQJ¶WKHERG\IURPNQRZOHGJHDQGODQJXDJH³WKHERG\HPHUJHV
LQWKHYHU\ODQJXDJHWKDWVHHNVWRGHQ\LW´(ibid., 5). Thus, it is in language where we can find 
clues about how the epistemology of disembodiment requires embodiment but also appreciate 
the modes of relation to embodiment, such DV DEMHFWLRQDQGDOLHQDWLRQ 7KHERG\¶VKLVWRU\
appears to be omitted from the Meditation because the meditator presents thinking as an 
unmediated process and the words of the text as an empty receptacle for thoughts about the 
body. Loizidou shows how, in %XWOHU¶VUHDGLQJRI'HVFDUWHVWKHERG\LVLQWKHEDFNJURXQG
through the act of writing. This means that the body does not disappear altogether because it is 
constantly brought back into the scene of knowledge, even when it is doubted and abjected 128 
as being part of knowledge.         
 And yet, that body cannot be fully captured in the writing or in the text (Loizidou 2007). 
This paradox implies that knowledge frames whether and how we come to know the body, yet 
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through which the body emerges helps to form and establish that body in its knowability, but 
the language that forms the body does not fully or exclXVLYHO\IRUPLW´(Butler 1997a, 4). Thus, 
rather than presenting conclusively what the body is (or for that matter, what knowledge is), 
the CartHVLDQ 0HGLWDWLRQ LV ³SODJXHG´ E\ UHIHUHQWLDO DPELJXLW\ (ibid., 13). The senses, the 
imagination, the hallucination where the narrator cannot know if he is dreaming or is awake, 
are called forth in the text in order to doubt and dismiss them. At the same time, these dubitable 
scenes function as referential signposts for what is indubitable: God and reason.    
 The theological issues is not really what I take from the last quote. Instead, my intention 
is to stress the effect of figures of speech, such as tropes, metaphors, allegories, etc., which are 
invoked to deny the imprint of the body in order to sustain an epistemological goal, fail. We 
see then, how the uncertainty calls forth markers of certainty. In that sense, Butler argues that 
³WKHKHXULVWLFRIGRXEWQRWRQO\HQWDLOVILJXUDWLRQEXWZRUNVIXQGDPHQWDOO\WKURXJKWKHILJXUHV
that compromise its own HSLVWHPRORJLFDODVSLUDWLRQV¶´LELG, 16). One way of looking at this 
argument is the method of doubt, aimed at suspending beliefs in order to find true knowledge, 
fails because the figures of speech characterised as uncertain (sleep, pain, dreaming, 
hallucinations) somehow bring back their opposites. That is, what is in the historical context 
of the author, absolutely certain. In other words, Descartes presents a universal reason that is 
not embodied in time, location, history, etc. Yet, as suggested by LoL]LGRX %XWOHU¶V
GHFRQVWUXFWLYHUHDGLQJVKRZVKRZ³ZKDWLVGRXEWHGUHWXUQVWRVXSSRUWWKHGRXEW´(Loizidou 
2007, 145). Figures of speech introduce something outside of the fictional isolated reason, 
presented as an XQJURXQGHGµ,¶Ultimately, neither the exclusion of figurality or materiality 
can be sustained. We see instead, as Loizidou suggests, how Butler offers a subversive reading 
which ³H[SRVHVWKHDPELJXLW\WKDWUHVLGHVLQWKHPHGLWDWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHERG\´(ibid.,143). 
This ambiguity signposts the material and figural body, showing how they are both implicated 
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with each other but cannot be reduced into sameness because writing is an embodied practice 
that the text faLOV WR HUDVH )DU IURP PDNLQJ ERGLHG µOHVV WKDQ UHOHYDQW¶ WKLV UHDGLQJ KDV
LPSRUWDQWSROLWLFDOLPSOLFDWLRQVEHFDXVHLWUXSWXUHVDQGXQVHWWOHVWKH³SROLWLFVRIVHFXULW\WKDW
KROGVRQWRWKHWRWDOLVDWLRQRINQRZOHGJH´ (ibid.,41) through a different kind of doubt. That is, 
a doubt that acknowledges it has not yet explained the relationship between the figural and the 




ODZV DUH YLFWLPV´ LELd.). One of the problems with the victim-category is that it precisely 
forecloses lives into a definition which prevents observers (such as academics) to actually see 
how people are resisting cultural and gender norms as well as laws in multiple ways. Practices 
of resistance expose the fallibility of universal claims through counter-normative practices 
(ibid) and are not necessarily channelled through the law. The methods used to research and 
interpret and the lives of others have everything to do with how and if they appear in the legal, 
political or academic fields of knowledge. Attending to the beaten, raped, and suffering bodies 
is not self-evident because the production of knowledge participates in the establishment of 
political and legal norms of recognition.       
 The reason why I have drawn out these discussions on the Cartesian legacy is not simply 
to rethink the idea of subjectivity beyond the mind-body duality. While this thesis seeks to 
reclaim vulnerability, it was difficult to do so without considering the relationship with the 
body. Foregrounding the body is not just about bringing back into the sight of knowledge the 
body itself, but most importantly, to understand what are the modes of relations with the body 
in our social and political milieu. Which modes of relations to the body are favoured while 
other discouraged, masked and shamed; how are these modes of relation with the body re-
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inscribed through legal discourse and what are the possibilities of rejecting relations with the 
body which are not conducive to social justice. The analysis Cartesian legacy on knowledge 
shows the influence on disembodied subjectivity, characterised by being an intentional, 
rational, self-bounded, able-body (Nedelsky 1990; Naffine 2009) but also recall from chapter 
III how this particular version of legal personhood is coded as a masculine subject. The aim of 
critically analysing vulnerability through the phenomenology of pain is to trace the modes of 
relations with the passive body, culturally coded as a feminine body (Grosz 1994).  
 The dilemma addressed in this chapter mirrors what has already been signalled in 
Chapters II and III. Namely, once we do stress the phenomenological relevance of the body, 
how are the lives of women represented (after pointing out it is the excluded other from 
subjectivity, after pointing out how women have been marginalised because of the legal 
knowledge and practice that has figure them as objects, body bags, property, etc.)? Recall how 
Chapter II pointed out the dichotomy in the interpretations about drug mules, figured either as 
victims and offenders. Each category is underpinned by particular discourses which do not 
simply describe the subject of crime but also bring a particular frame for knowing the subject 
of crime. The frames used to interpret someone as a victim or as an offender are not  politically 
neutral; and more importantly, already shape the practices of law enforcement (Schemenauer 
2012). Chapter III questioned how bodies were made less than relevant in the doctrine of 
criminal law and unpacked penal theory to bring to the foreground the history and practices 
that subjectivized the rational legal person as a disembodied subject. This chapter has continued 
the task of unsettling this form of legal personhood, questioning the culturally reinforced 
alienation to the body and the positive valorization of rationality and disembodiment, through 
a phenomenological interpretation of the body in pain.     
 Overall, the preceding sections have carefully peeled away layers of knowledge, so that 
we might assess whether naming women drug mules through vulnerability (chapter II) could 
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advance or hinder aspirations to address justly their case in criminal law. Far from being only 
an intellectual debate, unpacking the mind-body relation has very concrete effects through the 
role of knowledge producers. Chapters I and II suggested how the iteration of drug mules as 
victims and offenders derived from specific frames or a combination of frames used in the 
different disciplines researching drug control. Thus, there is no unmediated account of a reality. 
Yet, drawing attention to the plurality of frames can be subject to the criticism of relativism.  
In contrast, Loizidou criticizes feminist approaches that re-affirming materiality through the 
WURSHRIYLFWLPKRRGEHFDXVHWKHYLFWLP¶VPDWHULDOLW\EHFRPHVRQO\DIRUPRIFLWDWLRQWKDWUH-
affirms the authority of an epistemological position as well as juridical authority.  
 Coming to a full circle, the next chapter returns to the phenomenology of the body in 
pain. It does so by following the trace of injurable bodies and the shadow of pain in politics, 
suggesting that the ambiguous relation between materiality and figurality mirrors the paradox 
LQ %HDXYRLU¶V HWKLFV RI DPELJXLW\ FKDSWHU ,,, 8OWLPDWHO\ WKLV PHDQV WKDW YXOQHUDELOLW\ LV
ambiguous because it signals the potential for relations of care or violence, appropriation or 
social change. Unlike the previous sections, which addressed the relation between knowledge 
and bodies, the following section addresses the relation between bodies and discourse, further 
suggesting that literary approaches are not divorced from materiality.      
8. A world of pain and the dispossession to language  
The name of Elaine Scarry has become a multi-cited point of reference in pain studies. In The 
Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (1985), the Harvard English Professor 
researched what might appear to be very dissimilar sources on the subject of pain: reports about 
WRUWXUH WUHDWLVHV RQ MXVW ZDU WKH ELEOH .DUO 0DU[¶V Capital WRUW FDVHV DQG 3ODWR¶V Laws. 
Through these readings, she explores the intricate relation between the inability to give a voice 
to pain with WKH³SROLWLFDODQGSHUFHSWXDOFRPSOLFDWLRQV¶DULVLQJIURPWKLVGLIILFXOW\DQGWKH
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µQDWXUH RI ERWK PDWHULDO DQG YHUEDO H[SUHVVLELOLW\ RU PRUH VLPSO\ WKH QDWXUH RI KXPDQ
FUHDWLRQ´(Scarry 1985, 3). In short, she draws our attention to two activities: destruction and 
creation. Both activities have the body-in-pain as their driving force, and each activity grafts 
VWRULHVRQWKHEDVLVRISDLQ¶VUDGLFDOQHJDWivity: 
Physical pain has no voice, but when it at last finds a voice, it begins to tell a story, and 
the story that it tells is about the inseparability of these three subjects, their 
embeddedness in one another (ibid.) 
Of course, if pain has no voice, is it then condemned to the obscurity of the body? If a person 
who is in extreme pain cannot move or speak, is she bound to suffer alone? On this point, I 
think Scarry implicitly addresses a problem posited by Hannah Arendt in The Human 
Condition129 (1959). AreQGWGHVFULEHVSDLQDV³WKHPRVWLQWHQVHIHHOLQJZHNQRZRILQWHQVHWR
WKHSRLQWRIEORWWLQJRXWDOORWKHUH[SHULHQFHV«LVDWWKHVDPHWLPHWKHPRVWSULYDWHDQGOHDVW
FRPPXQLFDEOHRIDOO´(Arendt 1959, 50±51). Arendt then argues that the privacy of the body 
and its necessities, like hunger, thirst, and cold, remove persons from the sphere of politics. 
Her reasoning is simple: if we are concerned with providing these basic necessities there is 
hardly time left to engage in other activities, particularly political activities. Summarising 
$UHQGW¶VYLHZRIZKDWFRQVWitutes politics, Loizidou says: 
$UHQGW¶VSROLWLFDOLVDOVRWKHHIIHFWRIDSOXUDOLW\RISHRSOHFRPLQJWRJHWKHULQWKHZRUOG
acting and deciding. But, as we have already seen, she excludes the labouring body from 
this political. Instead, embodiment is an anathema, a restraint to the political. 
Accordingly, the polis is best served by maintaining a differentiation between the public 
and the private (Loizidou 2007, 137). 




the responsibility on the YLFWLPGUDZVIURP$UHQGW¶VEichman in Jerusalem (Arendt 1963). 
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7KHZD\,LQWHUSUHW$UHQGW¶VYLHZLV that pain cannot be transformed into speech or action, two 
central conditions for political plurality,QVWHDG$UHQGWDUJXHVSDLQ³deprives us of our feeling 
IRU UHDOLW\´(Arendt 1959, 51) ZKLFK LQ WXUQGHSHQGVRQEHLQJ µUHFRJQL]DEOH WR WKHRXWHU
ZRUOGRIOLIH¶LELG,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHUHLVDQLQWULFDWHERQGEHWZHHQWKHVXEMHFWLYHUHDOLW\RI
pain and the recognition of that reality by others.  Scarry elaborates a similar rendition of pain, 
showing how it appears to exert an ontological divide (Vetlesen 2009; Biro 2010) between my 
world which is filled by pain, and the world outside which cannot relate to my world. Pain 
drives a wedge, DSHUFHSWLRQWKDWWKHUHLVDQ³absolute split between one's sense of one's own 
reality and the reality oIRWKHUSHUVRQV´(Scarry 1985, 4). This utmost decentring and disfiguring 
experience is isolating because whatever the person suffering pain says, it is condemned to be 
a private and subjective experience.   
i. The performance of power in torture: Speech and the artefacts of pain 
      
Torture is the paradigmatic and extreme case where a person is forced to experience both social 
isolation and self-alienation because pain appears as that which is absolutely certain for the 
victim, but denied by the torturer. Torture also shows how extreme destruction and construction 
RI WKH SROLWLFDO ZRUOG DUH WZR GLIIHUHQW HIIHFWV ZKLFK 6FDUU\ DWWULEXWHV WR SDLQ¶V UDGLFDO
subjectivity. However, she also shows how torture is not simply inflicting pain. It has a specific 
structure which drives a multi-layered wedge between my-self and my body, my-self and my 
ZRUOG7KHVWUXFWXUHRI WRUWXUHDOLHQDWHV WKHVHOIQRWRQO\ IURPWKHZRUOGµRXWVLGH¶EXWDOVR
RQH¶VVHQVHRIEHORQJLQJ WRRQHVHOI ,QRWKHUZRUGV LWDIIHFWV WKHVXEMHFWDVDZKROHEXWD
subject who is in great extent more than just a self-bounded composite of mind-body. The 
structure of torture takes the following form: it relies on the infliction of pain and the verbal 
act of the confession. Yet, contrary to the presupposition that pain is inflicted as a means to an 
end (i.e., the information, confession of guilt), pain is the end itself (Vetlesen 2009). This does 
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not mean the interrogation-confession is unnecessary in the structure of torture. Their function 
is performative, in the sense that is that which gives an appearance, something that provides 
the torturer with a moral justification. In other words, the interrogation make believe µDVLI¶WKH
answers extracted through pain mattered. Yet, as Johan Vetlesen suggests, the confession 
GLYHUWVWKHDWWHQWLRQWRWKH³victim as the centre of the entire process, though not as victim but 
as player (himself responsible), as the party of those actions- to speak or to remain 
VLOHQW«´(Vetlesen 2009, 19). The confession, reads as a betrayal of the world once cherished 
by the victim, it signals simultaneously giving up that world and accepting that of the torturer. 
&UXFLDOO\WKHµWULFNRIWKHWRUWXUHU¶LVWRWXUQWKHYLFWLP¶VERG\LQWRWKHWRROIRUSDLQ³in the 
absolutization of the person as boG\TXLWHVLPSO\«WKHDELOLW\WRµKDYH¶ a world outside himself, 
RXWVLGHRIWKHERG\´ (ibid., 21). This is what Scarry means by the process of µXQPDNLQJ¶ZKLFK
is structurally mirrored by the process of making. Torture unmakes the world of the victim and 
in the process, makes the world of the torturer through the victim.    
Apart from the confessional language, artefacts also play a crucial role in both the 
making and unmaking of the world. In torture, artefacts that used to be references of 
nourishment and care are turned into weapons. Take water-boarding as an example. The most 
elementary object that sustains life becomes a weapon to make someone feel as if they would 
lose life by drowning. Artefacts of care are turned inside out into objects that intensify pain. 
The effectiveness of torture derives from the combined effect of language and artefacts, both 
supporting the process where pain appears WR HPSW\ RXW WKH FRQWHQW RI RQH¶V ZRUOG ZKLOH
clearing the space for the one of the torturing regime. As Vetlesen explains, Scarry presents a 
zero-game between pain and power as well as the physical and the mental (Vetlesen 2009). I 
would add that in an antagonistic scenario, the roles are divided along the one who possesses 
language and the one who is reduced to a mere panting flesh because: 
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«WKHERG\RIWKHSULVRQHUEHFRPHa colossal body with no voice130 [to articulate a world 
with, a mental content] and the torturer a colossal voice [a voice composed of two 
voices, his own and the extorted one of the other person, in the form of confession and 
cracking up] with no body«(Scarry 1985, 57).  
Thus, the structure of torture implies there is an appearance of an ontological divide, between 
victim and torturer, two radically opposed worlds, where one is embodied while the other is 
not. We see the emergence of a sovereign without a body, and thus invulnerable to injury. In 
contrast, the vulnerable recognizes herself only as a body. More importantly, the relationship 
with the body is severed. Better said, alienated from the body. Recall that the basic structure of 
the phenomenology of pain discussed in the first section involves a thematization, alienation, 
and abjection of the body-in-pain. My understanding, is that precisely the abjection of the body 
refers to WKHHJR¶VDWWHPSW³to externalize, or make alien, the source of iWVVXIIHULQJ´&RYLQR
2004, 23).131$OWRJHWKHUWKH\VKRZZKDW&RYLQRFDOOVµGLDJQRVWLFREMHFWLILFDWLRQ¶ 
Diagnostic objectification, the means by which the sufferer brings pain into the 
external, and potentially curative, world of cause and effect, is also the means by which 
she psychologically makes pain alien (Covino 2004, 23). 
7KHDOLHQDWLRQLVSHUIRUPHGDQGUHSURGXFHGLQVRFLDOUHODWLRQVDVWROGLQ%HUJRIIHQ¶VDQDO\VLV
of existentialism. From this perspective, we could also argue that the tortured body appears not 
RQO\ DV DQ REMHFW EXW DQ DUWHIDFW WKDW LQWHQVLILHV SDLQ <HW WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI WRUWXUH¶V
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 My emphasis. 
131
 Covino notes that Scarry adapts the work of David Bakan, an American psychologist who wrote Disease, Pain 
and Sacrifice: Toward a Psychology of Suffering (1968).  Bakan proposes the idea of telic decentralization, which 
conceives the body and psyche to be driven towards integrity and specialization. For an interesting analysis of the 
biological basis from which Bakan derives the idea from molecules and transposed it  the psychic realm, adapting 
LW WR)UHXG¶V WUDXPD WKHRU\ (Covino 2004). In the footnote commentary referring to Bakan, Scarry notes how 
³SDLQ¶VDYHUVLYHQHVVLQVRPHVLWXDWLRQVKDVDEHQHILFHQWHIIHFWVLQFHLWLVWKHRQO\WKLQJWKDWFDQPDNHWROHUDEOH
the otherwise intolerable separation of a human being from his limb DQG SRVVLEO\ DZRPDQ IURP KHUEDE\´
(Scarry 1985, 333). 
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DOLHQDWLQJ HIIHFWV VKRZV PRUH FOHDUO\ KRZ WKH ERG\ LV QRW VLPSO\ D µWKLQJ¶ $OWKough not 
SUHFLVHO\ DUJXLQJ ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHV VXEMHFWLYLW\ 6FDUU\¶V DQDO\VLV RI WRUWXUH VKRZV WKDW
FRUSRUHDOLW\LVLQWHJUDOWRDSHUVRQ¶VVHQVHRIZKRWKH\DUHDQGWRWKHVHQVHRIEHORQJLQJLQWKH
world. More importantly, she shows the mediating role of pain in political subjectivization.132 
ii. The ambiguity of the body in pain: Non-referentiality and objectless of pain 
To understand how they are inseparable we need to attend to the relationship between speech 
and the body-in-pain. Scarry argues that the speech of the torturer, his ideology and what he 
represents, engulfs the voice of the victim, whose sense of self is reduced to a moan, a cry 
(Scarry 1985). Speech, thoughts, memories are GHVWUR\HGE\H[WUHPHSDLQDV$UHQGW¶VTXRWH
suggests. Of course one can describe how pain radiates, pulsates, or stings, or locate the pain 
in an anatomical injury. A shout certainly communicates the intensity and unbearability of the 
experience. Yet, the body in pain resists representation (Scarry 1985; 1994).This resistance to 
representation in language is also what instantiates the labour of giving pain an objectified 
H[SUHVVLRQ7KHQHHGWRH[SUHVVSDLQLVDUHVSRQVHDQGDVWUDWHJ\WRFRSHDQGUHOLHYHSDLQ¶VGH-
objectifying work, understood as the effect of pain to reduce speech into a crying and moaning: 
A great deal, then, is at sWDNHLQWKHDWWHPSWWRLQYHQWOLQJXLVWLFVWUXFWXUHV«WKHKXPDQ
attempt to reverse the de-objectifying work of pain by forcing pain itself into avenues 
of objectification is a project laden with practical and ethical consequence (ibid.,6). 
Scarry builds thLVDUJXPHQWQRWLQJKRZSDLQLVµREMHFW-OHVV¶(Vetlesen 2009) because it lacks 
intentionality. Intentionality can be defined as ³the aboutness or directedness of mind (or states 
of mind) to things, objects, staWHVRIDIIDLUVHYHQWV´(Siewert 2011). And thus, Scarry suggests 
                                                          
132
 Jacques Rancière offers a useful definition of the process subjectivization for the purposes of this chapter. He 
DUJXHVWKDWVXEMHFWLYL]DWLRQ³WKHIRUPDWLRQRIDRQHWKDWLVQRWDVHOIEXWLVWKHUHODWLRQRIDVHOIWRDQ 
RWKHU´(Rancière 1992, 60). He characterizes the political subjectivization as the interval between voice and body 
rather than merger between them (identification). Scarry leads to a very different direction because she is actually 
showing political domination, characterised by the loss of a voice. 
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LWDOVRDZD\³to designate a relation between state and objecW´, but the object may or may not 
exist (Scarry 1985, 357):KDWWKLVPHDQVLVWKDWWKH³VHQWLHQFH´133 RISDLQ³is not of or for134 
DQ\WKLQJ´ and for WKDWUHDVRQ³it resiVWVREMHFWLILFDWLRQLQODQJXDJH´ (ibid., 5). It also means 
that even when someone communicates theiU SDLQ WKURXJK WKH PHWDSKRU RI µneedles¶ or 
µVWDEELQJSDLQ¶VKHLVQRWUHDOO\VD\LQJDQ\WKLQJabout pain but something about needles.135 
Let me illustrate these three points - the resistance to representation, the lack of intentionality 
and the objectifying/de-objectifying work of pain PRUHFOHDUO\WKURXJK6FDUU\¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKH
structure of war. Like the analysis of torture, she starts from a couple of simple questions. First, 
why does injuring appear necessary in wars? Secondly, what role does injuring and pain have 
LQWKHµXQPDNLQJ¶DQGµXQPDNLQJ¶RIQDWLRQV"6KHVXJJHVWVWKDWZDUVDQGWRUWXUHUHVHPEOHHDFK
other structurally, because bodies and voice are their two basic components. However, the 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHPLVWKDWZDULVSURMHFWHGDVDµFRQWHVW¶WRGHILQHZLQQHUVDQGORVHUV
ZKHUHDVWRUWXUHLVWKHXQLODWHUDOLQIOLFWLRQRISDLQ:LWKRXWUHKHDUVLQJDOOWKHSRLQWVLQ6FDUU\¶V
eloquent discussion, she suggests that what determines the victors or losers is not the 
sophistication of the killing technologies, which historically show an increasing ability to kill 
more people. Calculation is part of but does not define the end of a conflict. Instead, wars are 
equally determined by the relation between voice-SDLQDQGSDLQ¶VUHVLVWDQFHWRUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
in language. Pilled-XSERGLHVLQMXUHGDQGH[SRVHGLQWKHVFHQHRIZDUKDYHDµIULJKWHQLQJ¶
ambiguity: 
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 Scarry differentiates pain as a state and sentience rather than an emotion or a feeling. She argues pain is 
H[FHSWLRQDOEHFDXVHRWKHUµLQWHULRUVWDWHVRIFRQVFLRXVQHVVDUHUHJXODUO\DFFRPSDQLHGE\REMHFWVLQWKHH[WHUQDO
world, that we do not simply "have feelings" but have feelings for somebody or something, that love is love of 
-& IHDU LV IHDURIYDPELYDOHQFH LVDPELYDOHQFHDERXW]¶ (Scarry 1985, 5)3DLQVHQWLHQFHµKDVQRUHIHUHQWLDO
content. It is not of or for anything. It is precisely because it takes no object that it, more than any other 
phenomenon, resists objectification in language. 
134
 My emphasis.  
135
 One can use the weapon as a metaphor that allows us to show the attributes pain, though once it is carried over 




a non-referentiality that rather than eliminating all referential activity instead gives it a 
frightening freedom or referential activity, ones whose direction is no longer limited 
and controlled by the original contexts of personhood or motive (ibid., 119).  
Thus, the resistance to representation is what instantiates the facility with which the materiality 
of injured bodies are objectified. Scarry suggests that war is a contest where counterfactual 
SURMHFWVµOLIW¶WKHPDWHULDOUHDOLW\IURPGHDGERGLHVDQGDSSURSULDWHLWVRWKDWWKHµILFWLRQ¶RIWKH
QDWLRQ¶VSURMHFWFDQEHFRPHDUHDOLW\:HVHHKHUHWKHFRORVVDOGLVHPERGLHGYRLFHRIDQDWLRQ
and the colossal mass of bodies without voice. Yet, unlike torture, war works through the logic 
of the contest. This means that exposed injured bodies are the material and visible expression 
WKDWµUHDOLW\LVXSIRUJUDEV¶LQWKHFRQWHVWRIZDUWKDWUHDOLW\ZKLFK,XQGHUVWRRGDVWKHVWDEility 
DQGDVVXUHGQHVVRIOLIHKDVEHFRPHDPELJXRXV$VWKHVROGLHU¶VSDLQFDQQRORQJHUµFOLQJ¶WR
the human body the verbal constructions advanced to make sure political life continues, i.e. 
ideological or nationhood discourse, displace and efface the lives of wounded soldiers. In short, 
injuring involves a process whereby bodies in pain (voiceless) and the language of political 
power are implicated in the making of new political bodies through the effects of a 
materializing language. Consider how politicDOGLVFRXUVHFRPPRQO\XVHVWKHZRUGVµUHEXLOG¶
RUµUHFRQVWUXFW¶DQDWLRQDIWHUDZDURUDUPHGFRQIOLFW 
 The structure of pain in the context of war shows the resistance to representation of 
injured bodies, but also the de-objectifying and objectifying work of pain. I want to stress the 
SRLQWDERXWWKHµQRQ-UHIHUHQWLDOLW\¶RILQMXULQJ'UDZLQJRQ6FDUU\¶VDQDO\VLVP\VXJJHVWLRQ
is that the body in pain and most clearly, the injured body, can be understood as ambiguous. 
And thus, there is an ambivalence nested in this ambiguity. Explained otherwise, if the body in 
SDLQRULQMXUHGLVDPELJXRXVWKLVµIULJKWHQLQJ¶QRQ-referentiality becomes the opportunity for 
µPDNLQJ¶ DQG µXQPDNLQJ¶ WKH ZRUOG GHVFULEHG LQ WKH VWUXFWXUH RI WRUWXUH DQG ZDU  8QOLNH
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Arendt, who could not see how bodies appeared in the political sphere because their voice and 
action are destroyed by pain, Scarry draws our attention to the centrality of bodies and speech 
LQWKHSURFHVVRIPDNLQJSROLWLFDOUHJLPHV$OVRXQOLNH$UHQGW¶VYLHZWKDW the body is relegated 
WRWKHSULYDWH6FDUU\¶VDFFRXQWVKRZVWKURXJKSDLQWKLVLPSRUWDQWSRLQWMXVWEHFDXVHSDLQLV
object-less and lacking intentionality does not mean it is condemned to exist in hiding. Granted, 
she does account for how there are situations or fields where pain more visible and in which 
ones is it invisible. For example, references to pain are ubiquitous in discourses where 
imagination is central (drama and literature) while it catastrophically absent of in the 
description of torture and war136, a form of discourse that is extremely technical and reliant on 
HXSKHPLVPVOLNHµWDUJHWV¶µFROODWHUDOGDPDJH¶µVXUJLFDOVWULNH¶ 
iii. The language of agency: Of weapons and metaphors 
To be sure, what puzzles Scarry is not that we describe pain through linguistic metaphors; it is 
the fact that we cannot describe pain without the language of agency (Scarry 1985, 17). The 
common denominator between poetry lifting pain and giving it a public space and the political 
discourse appropriating the injured body of a soldier is that they are moments of suffering, 
where imagination and creation come forth,137 a process where the desire to bring pain out of 
the invisibility of the body through language is not simply a matter of describing what we feel 
EXWDVWUXJJOHWRUHVWRUHRQH¶VIRRWLQJLQOLIHWKURXJKLPDJLQDWLRQ.138 Thus, she suggests that 
the wish to eliminate pain and the imagination required to express pain are intricately related 
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 )RU H[DPSOH6FDUU\QRWHV KRZ WKH WRUWXUH LV GHILQHG DV µLQWHOOLJHQFH-JDWKHULQJ¶RU KRZ MXVW- war theories 
completely elude naming injuring and pain as the central activity of war, thus masking its effects. 
137
  Illan rua Wall attention on how Scarry links imagination and pain. While pain is objectless, imagination- the 




degraded on my own fragmenWV DEUDGHG IHDWXUHOHVV«$QGDP IUHHRISDLQ IRUDEULHI VSDFH$ ILUH-talented 
WRQJXH ZLOO FKRRVH LWV WUXWK´ (Harwood 2011, 5). She cleverly pictures the sensorial bifurcation of pain in 
metaphorical language.   The path goes inwards when pain forces the self into the depths of the body. The intensity 
of pain causes her to feel as if it were fragmenting her sense of completeness of the self. However, she reaches 
outwards and acknRZOHGJHVWKDWSDLQFDQUHYHDOLWVWUXWKRQO\WKURXJKWKHPHGLDWLRQRIµDILUH-talented tongue¶ 
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WKURXJKWKHµODQJXDJHRIDJHQF\¶LELG.). The language of agency implicates both injury and 
imagination. For example, imagining how the injury is caused by a weapon in order to describe 
pain. However, recall that the non-referentiality of the injury facilitates the appropriation by 
the weapon because the sign takes over the attributes of pain. Remember torture, where the 
body becomes the weapon of the regime; remember war, where the body materially 
substantiates the new regime. In torture, the human body is objectified into the attributes of 
SDLQ,QZDUWKHDWWULEXWHVRISDLQDUHPRUHFOHDUO\³DWWDFKHGWRDUHIHUHQWRWKHUWKDQWKHKXPDQ
ERG\´ (ibid.,13).These two paradigmatic cases of injuring show how the attributes of pain are 
lifted and held in sight out of the obscurity of the body yet equally resistant to representation. 
My suggestion is that the resistance is precisely embedded in the metaphoric expression of 
pain.           
 Metaphors and other tropes are not mere vehicles of representations. Although 
metaphors for pain play a crucial role in the objectification of pain, by saying how the pain 
µEXUQV OLNH DFLG¶ RU µFUXVKHV P\ VRXO¶ WURSHV GR QRW H[SUHVV WKDW pain is identical to the 
sensation imagined through a weapon, but rather, WKDWWKHVHQWLHQFHRISDLQVLV³DVLI´ (ibid., 
15) it were caused by an acid (the weapon) that makes skin burn (the injury). Weapon and 
ZRXQG DUH WZR PHWDSKRUV WKDW µFDUU\ RYHU¶ ZKDt does nRW EHORQJ WR WKHP WKH\ µOLIW¶ WKH
DWWULEXWHVRIERGLHV¶PDWHULDOLW\WRVXEVWDQWLDWHFRXQWHUIDFWXDOGHVLUHV)RUH[DPSOHDGRFWRU
GRHVQRWDVNµZKDWLV\RXUSDLQDERXW"¶EXWUDWKHUµZKDWGRHV\RXUSDLQIHHOOLNH"¶7RZKLFK
the answer is usually a reference to an object imagined as causing the pain or an object that can 
eliminate this sensation (ibid., 365). The crucial point about pain metaphors is that they may 
give pain an objectified existence through the language of agency but they are not pain itself.139 
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 Paul de Man argued that the role of metaphors in knowledge appears inevitable but also deceptive because they 
DUH³DOZD\VRQWKHPRYH- more like quicksilver than like flowers or butterflies which one can at least pin down 
and insert in a neat taxonomy- EXWWKH\FDQGLVDSSHDUDOWRJHWKHURUDWOHDVWDSSHDUWRGLVDSSHDU´(De Man 1978, 




Instead, body and languages for pain co-exist, signalling the referential fluidity of the injury 
and the stories created on their account.140 In my view, the ambiguity of pain also implies that 
naming or substantiating pain is an agonistic or antagonistic political or even legal process.141 
, UHDG WKLV LQ 6FDUU\¶V reminder that the language of agency can have benign or sadistic 
purposes; yet, she also clarifies that this should not be interpreted as if one is implicated in the 
RWKHU,QVWHDG³the two uses [sadistic or benign] are not simply distinct but mutually exclusive; 
in fact we will see that one of the central tasks of civilization is to stabilize this most elementary 
VLJQ´ (ibid.,13). Surely, if the sign is described as uncertain that means it is synonymous to 
ambiguity.  The stabilization of the sign is the site of struggle at times when the belief in the 
regime or other forms of authoriW\EHJLQWRDSSHDUDVILFWLRQV³the sheer material factualness 
of the human body will be borrowed to lend that cultural construct the aurDRIµUHDOQHVV¶DQG
µFHUWDLQW\¶´ (ibid., 14).   
 While relying on semiotic analysis, her approach can hardly be considered as a type of 
linguistic monism that reduces materiality inWR ODQJXDJH ,QVWHDG 6FDUU\¶V ³strange 
materiaOLVP´, as Dimock describes it, shows the corporeal aspect of materialism, a unique and 
original approach which is often usually overlooked (Dimock 1996, n. 44). First, she heeds the 
ambiguity of the body and the ambivalent effects of the language of agency. Remember that 
WKHSDUDGR[RISDLQ LV WKDW ³its absolute claim for acknowledgment contributes to its being 
XOWLPDWHO\XQDFNQRZOHGJHG´ (Scarry 1985, 61). In torture, the recognition is reversed through 
the performance of necessity of the confession, as if the answers extracted under duress 
PDWWHUHG,QZDUWKHUHFRJQLWLRQLVUHYHUVHGSUHFLVHO\WKURXJKWKHZRXQGVZKLFK³EHFomes 
DZD\RI DUWLFXODWLQJ DQG µYLYLI\LQJ¶ (literally, investing with life) the idea of the strategic 
vulnerability of an armed forces«´(ibid.,71).  In other words, in the discourse of power the 
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 As noted by Scarry, arguing about the constructed or fictitiousness of a story of injury is not a disavowal of the 
fact that actual bodies have been injured and used to make the stories alive. 
141
 She gives an eloquent reading of the agonistic process in court trials, while the events of war and torture are 




in both figural and material ways.142 The significance of these arguments lies in showing how 
political power masks its role in the production of pain and suffering by deflecting 
responsibility on the victims, but also masking pain completely. $V6FDUU\H[SODLQV³3RZHULV
cautious. It bases itself in another's pain and prevents all recognition that thHUHLVµDQRWKHU¶ by 
ORSSHG FLUFOHV WKDW HQVXUH LWV RZQ VROLSVLVP´ (ibid., 59). Yet, as mentioned before the 
trajectories that bodies in pain can take once objectified into language are ambivalent. The 
examples of torture and war are clearly what Scarry calOVWKHµVDGLVWLF¶WUDMHFWRU\RISDLQXVHG
and yet denied in order to substantiate power. She also reminds us we are also surrounded every 
day by the benign trajectories in material and figural representations of pain sustain life: how 
it brings the obscurity of pain and the apparent divide between self-others through poetry; the 
trial where an injury is shaped through law and evidence; the chair that gives relief to a tired 
body. There are no limits for the expressions of pain, whether it is through a poem, a human 
rights report, an ultrasound, or a painting.143    
9. Conclusion       
This chapter traced the negative bias towards corporeal vulnerability through an exploration of 
the political phenomenology of pain. It suggested that interpretations of experiences of pain 
underpin the Cartesian reading where the mind-body are radically separate. The separation can 
be attributed to the thematization, alienation and abjection of the body during experiences of 
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 7KHWHUPµVRYHUHLJQ¶LVQRWH[DFWO\6FDUU\¶VZRUGV$OWKRXJKVKHGRHVUHIHUWRµVRYHUHLJQW\¶WKHUHIHUHQFHLV
loosely made, without explicitly UHIHUULQJWRGLVFRXUVHVRQµWKHVRYHUHLJQ¶,QRWKHUZRUGVP\WHUPLQRORJ\DOUHDG\
crosses over into the linguistic terrain of post-structuralist terminology. For example, in Dispossession: The 
Perfomative of the Political (2013), Athina Athanasiou and Judith Butler use the term sovereign to identify  the 
ideology of individualism, as well as different forms of political power (i.e. imperial sovereignty, nation-state 
sovereignty)  
143
 For example, Frida Kahlo is well known for representing her emotional and physical suffering in a canvas. 
After the visibility the injuries endured in a tram accident faded, a specialist diagnosed her many years after with 
µ0XQFKDXVHQ GLVHDVH¶ ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV GRFWRUV GRXEWHG KHU SDLQ GHVSLWH NQRZOHGJH  RI WKH LQMXULHV VKH KDG
sustained, and accused of wanting the medical attention (Espino 2006) 
172 
 
pain and illness. These are strategies, althougKDLPHGDWµVROYLQJ¶WKHSUREOHPRIWKHERG\LQ
pain, have been (mis) read as ontology of embodied subjectivity. Approaches to subjectivity in 
existential phenomenology and post-structuralism unsettle the view that the alienated body-
mind relationship by casting doubt on the naturalized objectification of the body. Alienation 
IURPHPERGLPHQWLVQRWµQDWXUDO¶EXWJURXQGHGLQVRFLDOUHODWLRQVJHQGHUQRUPVDQGSUDFWLFHV
The accounts discussed share in common the impulse to question and counter the way bodies 
are objectified, by pointing out the interdependence between the individual and the social, the 
figural and material, the body and language, the body in pain and the politics of injuring. The 
phenomenology of pain correlates to versions of subjectivity, but also to practices of power. 
$OWKRXJK LQ GLIIHUHQW ZD\V 6FDUU\¶V SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO DQDO\VLV DQG -XGLWK %XWOHU¶V
performativity theory show how the relation between the language and the body, the figural 
DQGPDWHULDOLVDPELJXRXV,Q6FDUU\¶VDFFRXQWSDin is rhetorically excluded from the political 
GLVFRXUVH WKDW VXEVWDQWLDWHV LWVHOI WKURXJK ERGLHV 0HDQZKLOH %XWOHU¶V UHDGLQJ RI 'HVFDUWHV
shows how the body that stands in the background of the Cartesian Meditations is excluded 
from the account on the production knowledge. However, both Scarry and Butler show how 
NQRZOHGJHDQGSROLWLFDOSRZHUFRXOGQRWH[LVWZLWKRXWWKHERGLHVH[FOXGHG6FDUU\¶VDFFRXQW
of pain points to a critical limit which is more explicitly articulated by Butler. In that sense, 
discourses appropriate the body in pain through the reference of victims to ground and justify 
their epistemic, political and legal authority. This tendency to possess the dispossessed to 
language might seem unavoidable and totalizing in the case of torture, but the referential 
ambiguity of the body in pain and the ambivalence of injurability also indicate it can be resisted 
and brought into existence in ways that re-politicizes the subject (gaining a voice). The question 
occupying the next chapter is: how does gender and sexuality frame political and legal 
responses to pain and injurability? My suggestion is that the political philosophy of injuring 
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V. The Sexual Politics of Vulnerability 
 
1. Summary  
So far, the thesis has examined the discourses in drug policy, criminal law, and feminist 
approaches to victimhood and offending in the context of crime, particularly drug trafficking. 
This chapter explores critical feminist and queer approaches to the sexual politics of 
vulnerability suggesting that if vulnerability is to be reclaimed for feminist causes, including 
the impact on women by a gendered criminal law and drug policy, the context where 
vulnerability claims are uttered must be examined. This is because certain aspects of the 
philosophical imaginary animating the concept of vulnerability may resonate with 
securitization rationalities in criminal law and drug trafficking discourse, such as the prevention 
of injuries and risks through the managerial control of future insecurity (chapter III). By 
showing the interface between the securitization rationality which identifies vulnerability and 
the gendered responses to the risk of injury and penetrability, this chapter suggests that the 
trope of  injurability can lead to the political appropriations and disavowals of vulnerable 
ERGLHV&KDSWHU,9DVZHOOµZRXQGHGDWWDFKPHQWV¶(Brown 1995) that enable disempowering 
µSURWHFWLYH¶ LQWHUYHQWLRQV $QLPDWHG E\ WKH LPDJH RI WKH ZRXQGHGZRXQGDEOH ERG\
vulnerability discourses may resonate with the fear of being injured. The exposure to injury is 
rationalized through the neoliberal governmentality and the securitization against risky 
postcolonial subjects (identified as stereotypical drug traffickers) (chapter II) as a manageable 
problem to be controlled. In short, there are discourses, which will be shown as predominantly 
masculine, which frame vulnerability as a problem that can be eliminated by creating 
boundaries with others, such as building legal shields that shield exposed bodies against injury. 
Without abandoning the ethical and potential of the notion of vulnerability, the common thread 
in feminist/queer scholarship is that it critically exposes the abjection of relationality signified 
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by vulnerability. The abjection is  an effort to protect the survival of a legal form, namely the 
legal person as a sovereign self-bounded  (Nedelsky 1990), able-bodied person  (Naffine 2009) 
and a clear gender identity. Rather than negating vulnerability, this chapter reaffirms it ethical 
and political potential. As suggested by Judith Butler, vulnerability is the social ontology of 
being. In that sense, more than being a definitional characteristic of identity, vulnerability 
marks the relationality of subjectivity which is inextricably bound to discourse and precedes 
the formation of the sovereign subject.  
1. The dispossession to language and the tropic mediation of injurability 
The last chapter stressed the symbolic and material relation between injured bodies and 
language.  It suggested through the analysis on the phenomenology of pain and the tropological 
mediation of language that injured bodies resist representation. The resistance is both what 
enables the appropriation of the injured body in language but paradoxically, the resistance to 
representation is also what generates the language for the body in pain. In other words, the 
obscurity and privacy of the experience of pain only comes through into the public sphere 
through communicating the experience to others. The body is dispossessed to the stories 
conjuring, vivifying and giving substance to the pain and suffering of those whose voices have 
been diminished.  Language fosters a political (public) space where pain can be expressed but 
may also mask how political power is substantiated through another's pain, masking and 
effacing the bodies cited in order to verify the authority of the sovereign, whether it is a new 
political regime or a knowledge-producer who speaks for others. One of the aims of chapter IV 
was to trouble the relationship between materiality and figurality through a critical analysis of 
the metaphor underpinning vulnerability (the wound), stressing the interdependence between 
images and figures of speech and formative effect on concepts and material practices (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980; Murphy 2012a; Bourke 2012; Scarry 1985; Loizidou 2007; Butler 1997a).
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 While Scarry offers a convincing account on the genesis of materiality through the 
tropological144 verification of the body in pain, her approach does not focus on how the existing 
VWUXFWXUHV RI ODQJXDJH DOUHDG\ IUDPH PDWHULDOLW\ LQ D VSHFLILF ZD\ ,Q FRQWUDVW %XWOHU¶V
performativity method suggests there are already discourses framing and making 
injurable/injured bodies visible through existing schemes of intelligibility (Butler 1997b; 
Butler 2009a).  Considering the latter, if the injured and open body is one of the constitutive 
metaphors embedded in the concept of vulnerability, how is the image interpreted through the 
frames on vulnerability in criminal law and drug importation offences in particular? Recall that 
the logic of the frame (chapter I)  shapes what is within the boundaries of understanding (Schlag 
1998, 74) DQG KRZ UHDVRQLQJ LV QRW VROHO\ DQ DEVWUDFWLRQ RU DQ µREMHFW¶ DSSUHKHQGHG E\
FRQVFLRXVQHVV7KLVYLHZDOVRFKLPHVZLWK%XWOHU¶VSHUIRUPDWLYLW\DSSURDFK WR LQMXUDELOLty, 
where the encounter between the speaker and the one without a voice (considering how 
6FDUU\¶VVWUXFWXUHVWKHUHODWLRQLVDOUHDG\PHGLDWHGE\QRUPVDQGGLVFRXUVHVaccepted by a 
political community. And in that sense, one is inaugurated as subject who is intelligible within 
the norms, conventions, and practices of a community (Butler 1997b, 90). Stated briefly, the 
argument advanced in this section is that drug mules are already disposed to the categories of 
victims and offenders before they appear in the court. These two distinct frames 
(victim/offender) make the subjectivity of drug mules intelligible within the parameters of 
specific norms or discourses in criminal law and drug trafficking. That means that the lives of 
drug mules, prior to the offence and after the offence, somehow escape the narrator (legal, 
political, academic) because there are already frames at work (victim/offender) in the 
encounter. In that sense, drug mules are vulnerable or dispossessed to these categories and how 
the latter are shaped by the discourses underpinning criminal law and drug importation 
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 I use the term only to explain how body and materiality is mediated through tropes, understood as figures of 
speech such as metaphors, metonymies, allegories, etc.  
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offences. These discourses are, as suggested in chapter II and III, the securitization and 
neoliberal governmentality.         
 Although Butler and Scarry approach the relation between figurative language and 
materiality in very different ways145 (chapter IV), both address the effects of ambiguity 
(particularly, the ambiguity of the body dispossessed to language). Of course, there are many 
differences between these authors because they draw different traditions and methodologies. 
That being said, the focus in this chapter is more on how what they have in common, namely 
a critical position on how words embody the affective intensity of pain and injury; an approach 
which unpicks the ethical and political dilemmas arising from the discourse on 
LQMXUHGLQMXUDEOHERGLHV7KHLUDSSURDFKWRWKHLQMXUDEOHLQMXUHGERGLHVHQFRPSDVVHVD³SROLWLFV
RI GLVFRPIRUW´ (Loizidou 2008, 41) $OWKRXJK /RL]LGRX¶V TXRWH RQO\ UHIHUV WR %XWOHU¶V
philosophical work, this ethos is a common thread in the interpretations offered in this thesis 
RQ%HDXYRLU¶VFULWLTXH WKURXJKDPELJXLW\6FDUU\¶VSROLWLFDOSKHQRPHQRORJ\RI WKHERG\ LQ
SDLQDQG%XWOHU¶VDQDO\VLVRQWKHSHUIRUPDWLYLW\DSSURDFKWRLQMXU\6FDUU\LGHQWLILHVDPELJXLW\
in the injured body which is exposed to the ambivalent effects of the metaphors and discourses 
lifting the obscurity of pain. Butler addresses the question of injurability and its relationship to 
language, showing how we are already dispossessed to normative frames which make injury 
and pain intelligible and recognizable. In that way, my aim is to flesh out how the performative 
approach to vulnerability also shows the modes of resistance to subjugating modes of naming 
victimhood and criminality. 
 In Excitable Speech: The Performative of the Political, Butler problematizes the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQYLROHQFHDQGODQJXDJHE\UHYHUVLQJ6FDUU\¶VIRUPXODWLRQWKDW³WHQGVWR
VHWYLROHQFHDQG ODQJXDJH LQRSSRVLWLRQ´ (Butler 1997b, 5). Instead of asking how violence 
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 %RWKKDYHEHHQLQIOXHQFHGE\-/$XVWLQ¶VSHUIRUPDWLYHXWWHUDQFHV(Scarry 1994; Butler 1997b) -XGLWK%XWOHU¶V
philosophical work has been characterised as post-modern or post-structuralist (Du Toit 2009). More broadly, her 





language is not merely a tool to aid and abet torture, but how it can be seen to perform violence 
itself. As noted in a reference to Toni Morrison, language does not simply represent violence; 
it can be a form of violence by itself (ibid., 7). Thus, Butler reviews how and why language, or 
more specifically speech acts146 are imagined to hurt or how they actually hurt and injure. In 
that sense, Butler troubles the agency of language DV RSSRVHG WR 6FDUU\¶V IRFXV RQ WKH
language of agency)147 by questioning how language has been deemed to cause injuries in some 
VFHQDULRVDQGRWKHUWLPHVLWQRW7KHGLIIHUHQFHEHLQJWKDWLQ6FDUU\¶VYiew agency is imported 
into language to vivify the wound in order to imagine how pain (the obscure experience which 
destroys language) is experienced. In contrast, %XWOHU¶VYLHZLPSOLHVWKDWLWLVODQJXDJHwhich 
does things, such as wound a body. For example, anti-SRUQRJUDSK\ODZVVXJJHVWWKDWZRPHQ¶V
bodies appear to be always receptive to the injury of the pornographic image and are premised 
on the assumption that pornography successfully demeans women every time it is published 
(ibid., 18-19). However, Butler also shows how the law fails to register the injury done through 
racist hate speech; or how a man may be even considered to be the perpetrator of an injury (or 
potentially), by the mere fact of stating his sexual orientation, as in the case of gay men in the 
military (ibid., 21). What is common to all those instances is how they imply there is an agency 
in language (ibid.,1); that by uttering a speech act, one immediately is vulnerable to the 
violence of a racist epithet, an offensive photography representing women as sexual objects, or 
dispossessed to the sexual desires of others.  Let us pause briefly at the case of pornography. 
The message behind anti-pornography laws is that women are victims of the pornographic 
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 Generally speaking, speech act theory suggests that it speech is an act of communication (Bach 1998).There 
are many different types of speech acts identified in this area of study, some will be elaborated in this chapter. 
147
 RecDOOWKHODQJXDJHRIDJHQF\LQ6FDUU\¶VZRUNFKDSWHU,9UHIHUVWRWKHDFWRIJLYLQJSDLQDZD\RXWRIWKH
obscurity of the body through the metaphor imagined as causing the pain (usually invoked through the image of 
a weapon, or something that will lift the pain away (the x-ray showing the damaged tissue). 
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image because it reproduces the patriarchal norm which objectifies women¶VERGLHVLELG). 
Without minimising the offensiveness of speech acts like pornography, Butler questions the 
presumptions that injurious speech acts always have the intended effect.   
 Looking into these instances of linguistic violence, Butler troubles the agency of 
language drawing on gender performativity148 and the power of subjectification through an 
injurious speech act (Carline 2011))RUH[DPSOHWKHUHDUHVFKHPHVZKLFKPDNHDGUXJPXOHV¶
experience intelligible through the identity of the feminised victim. However, by saying she is 
a victim, one is not only describing but simultaneously subjectifying her existence in a 
particular way and articulated through a convention (norms of femininity). In other words, the 
LGHQWLW\LV³SURGXFHGWKURXJKWKHµSHUIRUPDQFH¶RIµJHQGHUHGVFULSWV¶´ (ibid., 62). Implicit in 
Excitable SpeechZHILQGKRZ%XWOHU¶VDSSURDFKWRVXEMHFWLYLW\LVJURXQGHGRQWKHLGHDRID
primary linguistic vulnerability  (Butler 1997b): 
There is no way to protect against that primary vulnerability and susceptibility to the 
call of recognition that solicits existence, to that primary dependency on a language we 
never made in order to acquire a tentative ontological status (ibid., 26) 
What that PHDQVIRUVXEMHFWIRUPDWLRQLVWKDW³WKHUHLVQRSUH-discursive I, but rather the subject 
LVEURXJKWLQWREHLQJWKURXJKGLVFRXUVH´(Carline 2011, 62). In other words, when the injurious 
speech and the effect (subjectification) are characterised as immediate and inevitable by the 
IDFWRIEHLQJXWWHUHG³WKHDFFRXQWRIWKHLQMXU\RIKDWHVSHHFKIRUHFORVHVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RID
critical response to that injury [because] the account confirms the totalizing effects of such an 
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 Loizidou shows how Butler radically reworks the notion of performative utterances in Austin and Jacques 
'HUULGD¶VUHVSRQVHWR$XVWLQ$XVWLQFRQVLGHUHGWKHSHUIRUPDWLYHDVVWDWHPHQWVWKDWDOZD\VGRZKat they say, also 
NQRZQDVIHOLFLWRXVVWDWHPHQWV'HUULGDIUDPHGWKHFRQFHSWRISHUIRUPDWLYLW\DVµLQIHOLFLWRXV¶RUVWDWHPHQWVWKDW
always fail to do what they say (Loizidou 2007). The problem is that both present an approach to performative 




LQMXU\´ (Butler 1997b, 18) 'UDZLQJ RQ -/ $XVWLQ¶V QRWLRQ RI SHUIRUPDWLYH VWDWHPHQWV,149 
Butler explains how WKHLQMXU\ZRXOGEHD µIHOLFLWRXV¶RUVXFFHVVIXOSHUIRUPDQFHZKHUH WKH
³VD\LQJ LV LWVHOI WKH GRLQJ DQG WKDW WKH\ DUH RQH DQRWKHU VLPXOWDQHRXVO\´ LELG  $Q
injurious speech act would be felicitous if every instance would successfully injure and produce 
victims. Similarly, the power of derogatory names would be always felicitous if they did in fact 
turn, for example, a drug mule into a victim or a criminal (chapter II). So when the judge says 
µ, VHQWHQFH \RX¶ WKLV LV D IHOLFLWRXV LOORFXWLRQ the utterance is apparently successful in 
condemning someone to a form of punishment. The utterance carries the force of the 
convention, instilled through historical practices of punishment.    
 0RVWVLJQLILFDQWO\%XWOHU¶VSHUIRUPDWLYLW\GRHVQRWVXEMHFWLfy the victim/criminal in 
isolation because the utterance cannot be set outside the boundaries of conventions and 
historical practices (Loizidou 2007, 35). For example, if one looks at the genealogy of the term 
YLFWLPRIIHQGHURQHFDQDSSUHFLDWHKRZWKH³SHUIRUPDWLYHSURYLVLRQDOO\VXFFHHGV´EHFDXVH
LWLVDQDFWLRQWKDW³HFKRHVSULRUDFWLRQVDQGaccumulates the force of authority through the 
repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices´(Butler 1997b, 51).  The 
authority of the speaker (the judge) LVµFLWDWLRQDO¶EHFDXVHthe utterance of a term is a repetition 
of a convention, a norm, or a rule, but it can be also a reformulation of those things (ibid., 87). 
Citationality shows how the authority of the speaker (who has the authority to speak and whose 
utterance is considered to be true) has no origins, for example, in a transcendental norm. 
Instead, one can conceive authority as the sediment of speech acts. In that sense, there also is 
no one who is particularly authoritative or endowed with the authority over speech, because  
³QHLWKHUWKHRQHWKDWLVEHLQJQDPHGQRr the one that names are independent of the performative 
XWWHUDQFH´(Loizidou 2007, 42). Explained otherwise, the authority to condemn and punish is 
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created at the moment of the utterance citing the conventions on how to relate linguistically 
with offenders. This means also that authority of the judge citing the authoritative text of the 
law is fragile, because the receiver of the utterance can resist the label, and thus also the 
authority who is doing the naming (ibid.). Considering the above, when a judge calls a drug 
PXOH D ³PHUFKDQW RI GHDWK´ FKDSWHU ,, RU D ZRPDQ ³KLJKO\ YXOQHUDEOH DQG RSHQ WR
manipulation and suggestion,´150 the label does not say anything about the person¶V OLIH. 
Instead, it is calling forth, through the act of naming, a set of historical practices and 
conventions on how to frame women as passive open bodies or the hyper-masculine agent of 
crime in drug trafficking discourses (chapter II).     
 Now, we must be wary against the totalization of subjectivity through these labels. 
Recall how Butler and Scarry show how, even if one is dispossessed to language, there is also 
resistance because the relation between materiality and figurality is marked by the ambiguity 
of bodies and the ambivalence of the discourse which brings bodies into political existence. In 
6FDUU\¶VZRUN WKHdispossession to language is inherent in the process of naming pain. Far 
from being simSOHRUGLUHFW³WKHHOHPHQWDU\DFWRIQDPLQJWKLVPRVWLQWHULRURIHYHQWV>SDLQ@
entails an immediate mental somersault out of the body into the external social circumstances 
WKDWFDQEHSLFWXUHGDVKDYLQJFDXVHGWKHKXUW´(Scarry 1985, 16). To give pain an objectified 
VWDWHUHTXLUHVµVRPHUVDXOWV¶ZKLFKDUHDPELYDOHQWEHFDXVHWKHREMHFWLILFDWLRQWKURXJKODQJXDJH
may take benign shapes (the poetry that brings pain into the public sphere) or destructive ways 
which further hide the bodies substantiating the political discourse which legitimizes an 
authoritative speech (chapter IV).  In the Butlerian framework, one is disposed to the norms 
uttered and cited through a term that has oppressive effects but language cannot be wholly 
totalised by a political discourse, legal categories determining a norm on personhood, or by 
pornographic images subjectifying women as sexualised bodies. Although speech acts do 
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reproduce oppressive norms that shape and subjectify women drug mules as a victim of the 
mythical traffickers or as masculinized offenders who pose a threat to the rule of law, a speech 
act may also fail to reiterate a norm. In short, despite the apparent totalization of experience 
WKURXJK D WHUP ZKLFK KDV ERWK DFFXPXODWHG DQG GLVVLPXODWHG LWV SRZHU WR LQMXUH %XWOHU¶V
performativity DQG6FDUU\¶VDQDO\VLVVKRZthe fault-lines of totalizing discourses.  
 In the contemporary approaches to vulnerability, Adriana Cavarero also suggests the 
language for vulnerability has been totalized by the language of political violence. In 
Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence (2009), Cavarero is concerned about the lack of 
words to express a particular form of contemporary violence: the violence against the 
vulnerable.  Instead of exposing the effects of violence, Cavarero argues that the language for 
political violence in Western culture is masking it. One of the reasons for the impoverished 
language of violence is because the discourse has been tainted by a model of consensual 
struggle, such as war, notably a masculine model of violence where equal parties fight each 
other (Cavarero 2009).151 In other words, the political language for violence cannot designate 
asymmetrical violence. Cavarero endeavours to name the pain of those whose voices have been 
annulled by the kind of violence that erases the singularity and dignity of a person. The impetus 
EHKLQG&DYDUHUR¶VZRUNRQYXOQHUDELOLW\LVWRHPSKDVLVHWKHXUJHQF\RIJLYLQJDQDPHWRIRUPV
RIYLROHQFHWKDWDUHµFRYHUHG¶XS        
 %XWOHU¶VODWHVWZRUNon vulnerability also notes how populations experience states of 
indefinite precarity which are obscured/masked by the rhetoric of terrorism and securitization 
(Butler 2009a). Moreover, this discourse is too prevalent. So while we might be exposed to an 
intensified rhetoric of violence, this discourse effaces and masks its own violent effects on 
others. One example is how the discourses on vulnerability intensified after the terrorist attacks 
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 Violence is framed by cultures of war understood as the symmetrical and reciprocal infliction of injuring. It is 
DµQDUURZ¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZDUPDUNHGE\µKHURLF¶VWUXJJOHVDQG the performance of invincibility even when 
struck by the other (Cavarero 2009, 11). In short, the invulnerability of the masculine body is practiced through 
battle DQGWKH³IDQWDV\RIEHLQJLPPXQHWRKDUP´(Bergoffen 2013, 117). 
183 
 
of 9-11,  but it was also co-RSWHGE\WKHVWDWH¶s securitization practices which engendered more 
violence (Butler and Athanasiou 2013).  In this context of heightened fear to the risk of being 
injured, the political community does not register the violation of rights or even death of 
suspected terrorists (or drug traffickers) as lives to EH µJULHYHG¶ (Butler 2009a). Although 
%XWOHU¶VGLDJQRVLVZRXOGDSSHDUWRVD\WKDWWKHGLVFRXUVHRQWHUURULVPDQGVHFXULWL]DWLRQKDYH
appropriated (totalized) the language of vulnerability, her analysis of Guantanamo shows 
otherwise. Despite the torture and isolation of the prisoners, photos of the torture and poetry 
composed by prisoners broke out from the confined and controlled space of the cells, setting 
in play a new chain of events in which other actors intervene and condemn the obscurity 
harnessed to eliminate the public visibility of those lives (ibid., 10). Thus, naming and giving 
a space for vulnerability matters. Even the leaked pictures of the female torturer in Abu Ghraib 
in 2004 show that the discourse of the torturer is beyond his/her control, engendering 
alternative spaces for contestation (ibid.).  
5HFDOOWKDW%XWOHU¶VHDUOLHUZRUNDOVRLOOXVWUDWHGKRZUHLWHUDWLQJVSHHFKDFWVWKDWLQMXUH
even in an effort to eliminate them through legal institutions, may serve to sediment those 
discourses even more (Butler 1997b). In the case of drug mules, the representation of 
vulnerability as victimized bodies has been part of the legal discourse on drug mules in the 
appellate courts since Aramah152 and Faluade.153 My question is, what are the effects of these 
reiterations and citations of vulnerability in the context of the discourses underpinning drug 
trafficking discussed in chapter II, namely securitisation and neoliberal governmentality? Do 
these claims push back the norm of the juridical person of criminal law (chapter II and III); do 
they introduce a new form of judging the responsibility of criminal offenders, or re-instate 
vulnerability within the normative parameters of feminized victimhood? Finally, do these 
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claims of vulnerability advance or limit individual and social justice for women and men doing 
drug mule work? By incorporating feminist and queer approaches to vulnerability, the next 
section suggests that the framework of ambiguity offers a way to navigate and unpack the 
political effects of naming women drug mules as vulnerable offenders. Again, by holding sight 
of the ambiguity as a critical approach, the overall effort in this chapter is to flesh out the sexual 
politics of vulnerability and what is at stake when vulnerability is animated by the imaginary 
of violence to the body.  
2. Animating wounds: Violence, identity, and the work of the image 
What has been argued so far, by weaving together the analysis on pain and injury, is how the 
concept of vulnerability is complicated by its reference to the wound. This image that incites a 
view into what is normally obscure to our consciousness, the interior of our body, stripped off 
from the protective continuity of the skin. This image of the flesh without the cover of the skin, 
a sense of exposure to the world, animates the concept of vulnerability (Turner 2006, 28). In 
that regard, the exposed body may appear as an invitation to watch a future possibility: our 
own possible encounter with wounding. How is that image received? What kinds of responses 
does it elicit? 154            
 In Violence and the Philosophical Imaginary (2012), Murphy analyses vulnerability in 
feminist theory, charting the transition from identity politics to the current iterations, including 
%XWOHU DQG &DYDUHUR¶V DFFRXQW 3URELQJ WKH OLPLWV RI GHSOR\LQJ WKH PRWLI RI YLROHQFH LQ
continental philosophy, she argues there is risk of naturalizing the relationship between the 
imaginary of violence in vulnerability and the discourse deployed to eliminate violence. For 
example, the critique of sexual violence has arguably been violent in itself, producing and 
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 For example, Butler shows how calling oneself a homosexual man was understood by the US military as an 
LQMXULRXVDFWDWKUHDWZKHUHE\VH[XDOLW\LVFRQIODWHGQRWRQO\ZLWKGRLQJWKHVH[XDODFWEXWDOVRDµFRQWDJLRXVDFW¶
that would dissemble the normative boundaries of male heterosexuality (Butler 1997b). The same statement would 
not operate the same in another context, for example, a social protest. 
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reproducing victimhood as an identity (Murphy 2012a). Further, she argues that identity 
politics has been complicit in domesticating and naturalizing modes of framing in which some 
markers of identity are rendered more visible than others. Cognizant of how mobilizing the 
visibility of certain identity markers like race, gender or sexuality may entail participation in a 
NLQGRISROLWLFVRIUHFRJQLWLRQVKHDJUHHVWKDW³LPDJHVRIYLROHQFHLQIRUPHYHUy elaboration of 
LGHQWLW\´ LELG  7KH FKDOOHQJH HPHUJHV LQ GLVFRXUVHV ZKLFK UHQGHU YLROHQFH ³DV DQ
XQDYRLGDEOHDQGUHTXLVLWHPRPHQWLQERWKWKHJHQHVLVDQGUHFRJQLWLRQRILGHQWLW\´LELG., 46). 
In that sense, demands for social change confront two intertwining dilemmas:  to mobilize 
solidarity showing how the past has constituted a subject through practices of discrimination, 
negation, and subjection, but also how that same discourse against violence subjectifies a 
person, a group, a nation. Stated diIIHUHQWO\ 0XUSK\¶V TXHVWLRQV LI D µZRXQGHG¶ LGHQWLW\
hamper the mobilization of solidarity without also disciplining and domesticating that identity. 
Rather than addressing past histories and practices of violence, vulnerability, if it is understood 
within the frame of sexual, racial, ethnic or national identity, risks reifying what Wendy Brown 
FDOOVµZRXQGHGDWWDFKPHQWV¶%URZQ)RU%URZQWKHSROLWLFL]HGLGHQWLW\³makes claims 
for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can 
hold out no future²for itself or others²that triumphs ovHU WKLV SDLQ´ (ibid., 74). In other 
words, wounded attachments rallied around identity may simply reinforce the same status of 
powerlessness155 (Bell 1999, 41). Drawing on the notion of ressentiment156 formulated by 
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 ,QDGLDORJXHRQ%URZQ¶VZRUNDQGKRZLWHFKRHVYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGLVVXHVRIGLVSRVVHVVion, Butler clarifies 
WKDW WKH LPSOLFDWLRQ RI %URZQ¶V DUJXPHQW LV QRW DJDLQVW LGHQWLW\ SHU VH DQG FHUWDLQO\ QRW DERXW FRQWHVWLQJ
oppression, but it focused on inscribing injury in identity in order to make a claim (Butler and Athanasiou 2013, 
87).  The issue is not that the identity is wrong or improper; the concern is with the norms that regulate identity 




 Brown argues that liberalism itself promotes resentful subjects through the ideal of self-reliance and self-made 
capacities. Yet, this model is bound to failure, promoting two responses to this failure, which Nietzsche identifies 
with suffering: one must HLWKHUILQGµDUHDVRQZLWKLQLWVHOIZKLFKUHGRXEOHVWKHIDLOXUHRUDVLWHRIH[WHUQDOEODPH
XSRQZKLFKWRDYHQJHLWVKXUWDQGUHGLVWULEXWHLWVSDLQ¶%URZQ,QRWKHUZRUGV%URZQDUJXHVWKHUHLV




Friedrich Nietzsche, Brown argues that in the context of contemporary liberal politics, 
mobilizing wounded attachments achieves three things: 
«LWSURGXFHVDQDIIHFW UDJH ULJKWHRXVQHVV WKDWRYHUZKHOPV WKHKXUW LWSURGXFHVD
culprit responsible for the hurt; and it produces a site of revenge to displace the hurt (a 
place to inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these operations both 
ameliorate (in Nietzsche's term, "anaesthetize") and externalize what is otherwise 
"unendurable (Brown 1995, 68). 
In other words, Brown cautions against enclosing pain within the boundaries of a political 
identity and then seeking to project that suffering outwards in the form of blame and revenge. 
However, Murphy also recognizes that jettisoning identity and recognition does not eliminate 
the dilemmas posed by violence157. Instead, unpacking the imaginaries associated with 
vulnerability, including the imaginary of violence, is meant to revise the work of metaphors 
and their effects.158   Critical engagements on vulnerability LQWHUURJDWH KRZ³WKHLPDJLQDU\
animates and repliFDWHV VH[LVWQRUPDWLYHH[SHFWDWLRQV´ (Murphy 2012a, 47) but also do not 
renounce to the aspiration of imagining vulnerability otherwise. First of all, what are the effects 
RIDQLPDWLQJZRPHQ¶VYLVLELOLW\WKURXJKWKHLPDJHRIYXOQHUDELOLW\":KDWPLJKWEHWKHHIIHFWV
of deploying vulnerability in order to demand recognition that women working as drug mules 
are less culpable? When the discourse of vulnerability in the courts present the vulnerable drug 
mules as suffering bodies, the effect has not been the recognition of a mutual relation between 
the legal addressor and addressee. Instead, chapter VI will show how one of the effects is the 
                                                          
(Brown, 1995, 67). The tension arising from promoting freedom and selfishness and the premise of equality 
sustain the process of ressentiment in all subjects of liberal politics, not only the ones who are left out from the 
structures of privilege.  
157
 Attention to the tropes of violence deployed extends to those who are  abjected, those who are  too visible and 
VXEMHFWWRGLVFULPLQDWLRQDVDUHVXOWDQG³WKRVHZKRVHSHUVLVWHQWPLVUHFRJQLWLRQRUQRQ-recognition render them 
LQHOLJLEOHIRUWKHDWWULEXWLRQRIPRUDOZRUWKDQGHYHQWKHPRVWEDVLFRIKXPDQULJKWV´(Murphy 2012a, 46). 
158
 The critique matters, not only to deconstruct the metaphor impinged in the concept of vulnerability. In other 
ZRUGV 0XUSK\¶V SURMHFW DGGUHVVHV D UDQJH RI GLVFRXUVHV ZKHUH YLROHQFH DQLPDWHV WKHRU\ VXFK DV SRVW-
structuralism, phenomenology, post-colonialism, feminism and queer theories.  
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singularization of vulnerability to the post-colonial victimized mother. Clearly, vulnerability 
cannot be considered as something particular to feminine identity (or other identities). The 
challenge for a feminist critique of the masculine model of legal personhood is how to 
incorporate WKHUHFRJQLWLRQDERXWWKHLQYLVLELOLW\RIZRPHQ¶VLQMXULHVKLVWRULHVRIRSSUHVVLRQ
subjugation, and discrimination) before the law, without immortalizing it as a fixed identity 
characteristic. One cannot disavow those histories. Most importantly, and I think this is the 
crux of the matter, is how even if those histories of oppression are fleshed out in the name of 
victim or vulnerable subjects, is  how vulnerability marks the irremediable relation between 
self and others (Murray 2000; Butler 2012b, 41). 
Much of the thesis has been drawing attention to the injured/injurable body, but it cannot 
be emphasized enough that the vulnerability has been considered as the relation between self 
and others. LLQJXLVWLFYXOQHUDELOLW\HPHUJHVLQWKH³VFHQHRIDGGUHVV´(Murray 2000; Butler 
2014b). As I understand it, the scene of address it the mutually vulnerable encounter between 
addressor and addressee. In that sense, the figure of authority that is fragile because both 
addressor and addressee are dispossessed to language. %XWOHU¶VDFFRXQWRIthis scene of address 
shows the ambivalence in the dispossession to language, given over to caring or violent 
practices, but also ambiguous because the self is not yet defined by either: 
The self that I am yet to EHDWWKHSRLQWZKHUHJUDPPDUGRHVQRW\HWSHUPLWDQµ,¶LVDW
the outset enthralled, even if to a scene of violence, an abandonment, a destitution, a 
mechanism of life support, since it is, for better or worse, the support without which I 
cannot be, upon which my very being depends, which my very being, fundamentally 
and with an irreducible ambiguity, is (Butler 2005, 81). 
However, when vulnerability is singled out as a characteristic of identity, there is already a 
logic of exclusion which disavows this ambiguity and turns it into a form of violence. My 
argument throughout this chapter is that naming the vulnerability is received within a discourse 
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or a field of knowledge which has its own norms, conventions and rationalizations about how 
to respond to the tropes within vulnerability (injury, injurability, and pain). The next sections 
chart the political effects of the image underpinning vulnerability to give a sense of the contexts 
in which it is named and put to work. What I want to illustrate is where and how vulnerability 
KDV EHHQ XQGHUVWRRG D µSUREOHP¶ RI WKH KXPDQ ERG\ ZKLFK FDQ EH FRQWUROOHG DQG PDQDJH
through the strategies and knowledge.  
3. Mitigating vulnerability: The resilience approach to injurability 
The common denominator of vulnerability approaches in sociology and politics is the body. In 
fact, the body is at the centre of most of these intellectual approaches spanning across a wide 
spectrum of disciplines. The sheer ubiquity of the concept shows a notable investment in the 
body as well as the institutional, political, social, geographical, ecological and existential 
situation of the body. I will give a brief overview of the ubiquity of vulnerability across the 
humanities, social sciences, and biological sciences to illustrate how knowledge is implicated 
in the management and control of vulnerability, understood as the exposure of the body to 
injury. Highlighting these discourses raises the two themes presented in the earlier discussion 
on pain: first, the mind-body dualism; and second, the strategies deployed to abject 
vulnerability through knowledge and technology. Eventually, I will narrow down the focus to 
what it is said about vulnerability in gender and sexuality studies, law, ethics and discourses of 
responsibility.           
 The fragility of embodiment has not been thought about in a vacuum. However, 
Descartes engaged in his anatomical studies in the isolated environment of the dissection table 
not the living body (Leder 1990). The lungs became an object of study, visible as objects but 
at the expense of losing depth in the analysis of the experience of breathing (ibid). Leder 
VXJJHVWV WKDW 'HVFDUWHV¶ DQDWRPLFDO VWXG\ RI WKH ERG\ DOVR KDG HWKLFDO LPSOLFDWLRQV DV WKH
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³figure of the third-SHUVRQFRUSVH´VXSSODQWHG³other ZD\VRIDSSURDFKLQJHPERGLPHQW´(ibid., 
146). Without a doubt anatomy and medicine, have been geared toward ensuring life. Yet, the 
price of keeping death at bay included de-subjectification159 and de-vitalization, analogized 
with machine (ibid.).160 -RDQQD%RXUNH¶VKLVWRU\RISDLQPDNHVDVLPLODUSRLQWEXWZLWKUHJDUGV
to anaesthesia. Before the nineteenth century the language of pain was framed by militaristic 
or religious discourses; they were the reference points for explaining the body in pain, even 
ZKHQWKHFDXVHIRUWKDWSDLQZDVQRWDQLQMXU\RIZDU)RUH[DPSOHSDLQZDVOLNHµDGLYLQHURG¶
RUDV%RXUNHQRWHVWKHVHGLVFRXUVHVZHUH³H[WROOHGWRSXWRQWKHDUPRXURIEDWWOH´LQWKHIDFH
RIWKHµUHWULEXWLRQ¶RIJerms (Bourke 2012, 2421).      
 Meanwhile, without the medical technology we have today to make visible the inner 
FRQILQHVRIWKHERG\GRFWRUVUHOLHGRQSDWLHQWV¶VXEMHFWLYHDFFRXQWVRISDLQ7KHGHYHORSPHQW
of analgesics furthered the perspectival shift in relation to the body in pain and thus changed 
how doctors related to the body. With analgesics, doctRUVFRXOGµWDNHWKHLUWLPH¶FXWWLQJDQG
exploring and finding the physiological cause, a damaged organ, tissue, etc. (ibid.). In short, 
anaesthetics reproduced the conditions of the dissecting table where corpses are studied. In 
addition, the development of microbiology, chemistry, among other forms of knowledge 
DOORZHG³physicians to bypass patient narUDWLYHVLQWKHLUVHDUFKIRUDQµREMHFWLYHGLDJQRVLV´¶
HQFRXUDJLQJDIRFXVPRUHRQ³WKHGLVHDVHWKDQWKHSDWLHQWRQµFDVHV¶ UDWKHUWKDQµVXIIHULQJ
SHRSOH¶´(ibid.2421).           
 7KH UHOLDQFH RQ WHFKQRORJ\ DQG DQDHVWKHVLD DOVR GHPRWHG WKH UROH RI SDWLHQWV¶ SDLQ
QDUUDWLYHVWKH\ZHUHGLVFRXUDJHGDVWKH\³EHFDPHµQRLVH¶VHUYLQJOLWWOHGLDJQRVWLFRUKHDOLQJ
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 /HGHUDUJXHVWKDWWKHGDQJHURXVPRUWDOERG\³KDVEHHQGHVXEMHFWLILHGGHYLWDOL]HG«WKHFRUSRUHDOWKUHDWLVDV
IDUDVSRVVLEOHVXEGXHG´(Leder 1990, 148). 
160
 In the Passions of the Soul 'HVFDUWHVVDLG³$QGOHWXVMXGJHWKDWWKHERG\RIDOLYLQJPDQGLIIHUVIURP
that of a dead man just as does a watch or other automaton (that is, a machine that moves by itself) when it is 
wound up and contains in itself the corporeal principle of those movements for which it is designed, along with 
all that is required for its action, differs from the same watch or other machine when it is broken and the principle 
RILWVPRYHPHQWFHDVHVWRDFW´(Descartes 2000, para. 330±331). 
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SXUSRVHV´ LELG $QQHPDULH 0RO¶V DXWR-ethnography of arteriosclerosis also notes how, 
during surgery, doctors treat the body as an object to be repaired but the singularity or 
subjectivity of the patient recedes into the background until the task is completed (Mol 2003). 
6WLOO 0RO¶V PDLQ SRLQW LV WKDW WKH ERG\ HPHUJHV DQG GLVDSSHDUV DV DQ object in different 
VLWXDWLRQV ³with the practices in which they are manipulated. And since the object of 
manipulation tends to differ from one practice WRDQRWKHUUHDOLW\PXOWLSOLHV´ (ibid., 5). In other 
words, Mol argues that bodies are shaped or treated as objects through different techniques and 
thus, there is no constant ontology but rather multiple ontologies of the body161.  
And what if the desire to keep pain and illness at bay, supported by a perspectival shift 
and scientific technology, is replicated and echoed in other areas of our life? What if these 
structures of experience have been replicated elsewhere? Scoping other disciplines, mainly 
philosophy and psychology, Vetlesen notices a general tendency to think that vulnerability can 
be regulated, managed, and distributed so as to minimize the potential of its occurrence 
(Vetlesen 2009). On a larger scale, anxiety about mortality and the imperative to control and 
bring about the submission of nature is a recurrent concern in vulnerability literature stemming 
from scientific disciplines like economics, environmental studies and geography. For example, 
YXOQHUDELOLW\ KDV EHHQ GHVFULEHG DV µULVN¶ µH[SRVXUH¶ DQG µVKRFNV¶ (Alwang et. al 2001). 
Ecology sciences note how humans have needed to devHORS ³H[RVRPDWLF LQVWUXPHQWV´162 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1993, 98) to control and manage the environment. Inter-disciplinary 
geography accounts provide a more nuanced account of vulnerability (Hogan and Marandola 
2005). Hans-George Bohle and Michael J. Bohle argue that vulnerability is increasingly 
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 Mol argues against the traditional understanding of ontology as the knowledge of being as a constant, essential, 
or else. Instead, she argXHV WKDW³RQWRORJ\ LVQRWJLYHQ LQ WKHRUGHURI WKLQJVEXW WKDW LQVWHDGRQWRORJLHVDUH
brought into being, sustained, or allowed to wither away in common, day-to-day, socio-PDWHULDOSUDFWLFHV´(Mol 
2003, 6). 
162
 This term is used in ecological economics, a concept developed by Alfred Lotke to describe things, or 
instruments external to the body which end up being integrated into embodied life, for example, houses, clothes, 
work instruments, etc.  In economic terminology it is synonymous with capital instruments; or in philosophical 




FRQFHSWXDOL]HGDVD µVSDFH¶ LQWHUFRQQHFWHG WRSROLWLFDO-economic causes, networks of social 
relations and vulnerable groups (Bohle and Watts 1993).    
 Rather than being conceptualized as a single space, vulnerability zones are configured 
DVµSHULSKHUDOUHJLRQV¶GHSHQGHQWRQWKHFRUH(Philo 2005). Exploitation in these zones is more 
OLNHO\EHFDXVHWKHFRUH³drains surpluses and reVRXUFHVDZD\IURPWKHSHULSKHU\´ (Watts and 
Bohle 1993, 56). Notably, Philo stresses the historical dimensions of vulnerability.  This 
resonates with other approaches that emphaVL]HKRZ³LQVWDQFHVRIYXOQHUDELOLW\´ cannot be 
understood without recalling the histories from which they emerge, for example, post-colonial 
history (Philo 2005, 445) 7KHUH LV DQ XUJH WR FRQFHSWXDOL]H µVSDWLDOLWLHV¶ RI YXOQHUDELOLW\ 
(Findlay 2005)HQWDQJOHGZLWK³KLVWRULHVDQGJHRJUDSKLHVRIHYHQWVWKat illuminate the stark 
UHDOLWLHVRIYXOQHUDELOLW\LQFHUWDLQSDUWVRIWKHZRUOGDQGQRWRWKHUV´(Philo 2005, 445).  While 
these approaches incorporate the social and historical dimensions of natural disasters, 
vulnerability is also defined in primarily negative terms. Neil Adger defines vulnerability as 
³VXVFHSWLELOLW\ WR KDUP IURP H[SRVXUH WR VWUHVVHV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK HQYLURQPHQWDO DQG VRFLDO
change DQGIURPWKHDEVHQFHRIFDSDFLW\WRDGDSW´(Adger 2006, 268). In this sense, the aim is 
to build the resilience of individuals and populations to withstand the risk to environmental 
shocks, conceived also in terms of man-made, human interaction with and exploitation of 
nature.             
 The purpose of charting these different approaches to vulnerability is not simply to 
show how different it has been incorporated and developed across disciplines, from 
international political economy to interdisciplinary ecology studies. While these approaches 
DGGUHVVWKH³FRQVHTXHQFHVRIFRPSOH[LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH´LQWKHFRQWH[WRIJOREDOL]DWLRQ.LUE\
2006), advancing the idea that vulnerability ought to be mitigated re-instates the view implicit 
in the history of medicine illustrated at the beginning of this chapter. Like pain, vulnerability, 
is conceived as a problem to be managed and controlled through strategies and techniques such 
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the separation from the suffering body through anesthetics. This perspective alters the relation 
with the body in pain, marking distance and separation, and the belief that the problem of pain 
KDVEHHQµVROYHG¶5HPHPEHUWKDWP\DLPLVQRWWRdefine vulnerability as the injured body in 
isolation, but stress what kinds of relations we have with these bodies. 
4. Resilience and vulnerability in legal theory: Naturalizing risk 
This section explores two regular references in legal studies in vulnerability which implicitly 
and explicitly borrow terminology and insights from interdisciplinary studies related above. 
Legal approaches that incorporate the notion of interdependence from the vulnerability studies 
described above also critique the lack of attention to interdependence in liberal approaches to 
legal subjectivity. However, their underlying message is that vulnerability is a problem that 
can be solved and mitigated through a stronger state or through the DFFXPXODWLRQRIµDVVHWV¶WR
make people less vulnerable (rua Wall 2008). Ultimately, these approaches to vulnerability do 
not break from the securitisation logic of the state and neoliberal governmentality. First, I will 
LOOXVWUDWHKRZ0DUWKD)LQHPDQ¶VDSSURDFKWRYXOQHUDELOLW\ZKLFKUHOLHVRQWKHLGHDRIUHVLOLHQFH
GHYHORSHGE\3HDGDU.LUE\,Q.LUE\¶VYLHZUHVLOLHQFHLVDZD\WRDGDSWand mitigate 
YXOQHUDELOLW\WKURXJKWKHDFFXPXODWLRQRIµDVVHWV¶(Fineman 2011; 2013). The second approach 
is WKHRQHSUHVHQWHGE\%U\DQ67XUQHU¶VVRFLRORJ\RIYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGKXPDQULJKWVZKRVH
formulation of vulnerability reproduces the securitisation logic.    
 $V PHQWLRQHG DOUHDG\ LQ SUHFHGLQJ FKDSWHUV )LQHPDQ¶V DSSURDFK LQFRUSRUDWHV D
feminist approach while recasting vulnerability as a universal constant which is basically 
intrinsic to the human condition (Fineman 2008a). The vulnerability thesis she develops departs 
from a critique of identity politics, which has promoted antagonism instead of solidarity, 
instigated by the requirements of the doctrine of equality. For Fineman, this doctrine has had 
limited success in addressing injustice, and is mainly circumscribed within discrimination 
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claims which are onerous to make in practice as they rely upon an assertion of group 
membership defined around an identity to demonstrate a long history of discrimination. One 
could argue that the limitations of identity politics addressed by Fineman are an explicit 
dimension of intersectionality scholarship since the 1980s. Subjectivity can hardly be 
constituted by only sex or gender or race. Thus, intersectionality approaches underscore the 
notion that subjectivity LV³FRQVWLWXWHGE\PXWXDOO\UHLQIRUFLQJYHFWRUV´(Nash 2012, 2) and the 
'multidimensionality' of the lived experiences of marginalized subjects (Crenshaw 1989, 139). 
However, Fineman insists that the focus on discrimination claims deviates attention away from 
the responsibilities of the state to promote social justice. In the US context, discrimination is 
VDIHO\QHVWOHGµZLWKLQWKHUKHWRULFRILQGLYLGXDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGDXWRQRP\¶MXVWLFH)LQHPDQ
2010, 255). Basic social safety goods, like housing, education and health care are excluded 
from the ambit of constitutional rights, while references to human rights are decried by the US 
Supreme CouUWDVµIRUHLJQIDGV¶ Fineman relates her frustration with this landscape and admits 
WKDW KHU ILUVW DUWLFXODWLRQV RI WKH ³YXOQHUDEOH VXEMHFW EHJDQ DV D VWHDOthily disguised human 
ULJKWV GLVFRXUVH IDVKLRQHG IRU DQ $PHULFDQ DXGLHQFH´ LELG  2YHU WKH \HDUV VKH KDV
refined the vulnerability thesis, describing it as a heuristic and a description of the human 
condition.  
Let us examine these points more closely. Fineman argues that as a heuristic, the 
acknowledgement of our mutual vulnerability and dependence forces a reflexive examination 
of biases embedded in socio-legal and cultural practices (Fineman 2013).  In developing the 
concept of vulnerability, she clearly rejects the limited scope of the term in public health 
studies, where the term is used as a synonym for marginality based on racial/ethnic background, 
poverty, or lack of health insurance (Fineman 2008b, 8).  In an argument which resonates with 
CaYDUHUR DQG %XWOHU¶V UHDVRQV IRU DGGUHVVLQJ YXOQHUDELOLW\ )LQHPDQ VXJJHVWV WKH QHHG WR
reclaim vulnerability without the negative association it has had to dependency, victimhood, 
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and pathology.  Instead, she reaffirms the condition of dependency and vulnerability as 
simultaneously natural and socially produced. Vulnerability, she argues, can be mitigated 
WKURXJKUHVRXUFHVVWUHDPOLQHGWKURXJKDµUHVSRQVLYHVWDWH¶DQG\HWYXOQHUDELOLW\FDQQHYHUEH
eliminated. To do so, would be akin to denying our humanity. Moreover, institutions and 
UHODWLRQVKLSV IRVWHUHG WKURXJKRXWDSHUVRQ¶V OLIHVKRXOGSURSHUO\ IRVWHU UHVLOLHQFHLELG
(QFRXQWHULQJWKHµULJKWRSSRUWXQLWLHV¶LVQRWDPDWWHURIFKDQFHRUYROXQWDULVPEXWUDWKHURI
IRVWHULQJ ³WKH PHDQV DQG PHFKDQLVPV whereby individuals accumulate the resilience or 
resources that they need to confront the social, material, and practical implications of 
YXOQHUDELOLW\´)LQHPDQ 
 $FHQWUDOIRFXVRI)LQHPDQ¶VFULWLTXHLVWKHOLEHUDOVXEMHFWRIODZ6KHDUJXHVthat the 
DVVXPSWLRQVXQGHUSLQQLQJWKHOHJDOVXEMHFWIDLOWRUHSUHVHQWWKHFRPSOH[LW\DQGµPHVVLQHVV¶RI
the human condition. Vulnerability repairs the eschewed subjectivity represented by the 
rational disembodied person of liberal social contract theories. This legal construct perpetuates 
inequality through the uneven distribution of social goods (Fineman 2010). Implicit in her 
QRWLRQRIYXOQHUDELOLW\LVDFULWLTXHRIUHOLDQFHRQDQµLPSRYHULVKHG¶LGHDORIDXWRQRP\DQG
IUHHGRPWKDWSDUDGR[LFDOO\³KDVUHVXOWed in a diminishing of options and autonomy for many 
as our society has become mRUH DQG PRUH XQHTXDO´ LELG, 258). Fineman refrains from 
exploring equality of opportunities from a perspective of autonomy because, she argues, it 
wrongly circumscribes the aQDO\VLV WR ³LQWHUDFWLRQV PRWLYDWLRQV DQG FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI
LQGLYLGXDOV´LELGLQVWHDGRIWKHQHWZRUNVRIUHODWLRQVWKDWIRVWHUDXWRQRP\&RJQL]DQW
of the implications of jettisoning autonomy for the feminist project, Fineman re-situates 
autonomy as a collective obligation instantiated by the condition of vulnerability. In other 
ZRUGVIRVWHULQJDXWRQRP\LVDUHVSRQVLELOLW\³IRUWKHQHHGVRIRWKHUV´LELGDGXW\RI
WKHVWDWHEXWDOVRDPXWXDO³UHFLSURFLW\LQKHUHQWLQEHLQJDPHPEHURIVRFLHW\>«@HYHU\RQH
KDVDUROHWRSOD\LQHQVXULQJWKHJUHDWHUJRRG´LELG    
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 As explained above, the vulnerability thesis proposed by Fineman shares the impetus 
of re-imagining vulnerability otherwise, mainly by expunging the negative associations that 
demonize individuals ± ³VWLJPDWL]HGDVGHSHQGHQWDQGIDLOXUHV´LELG- and reclaiming 
vulnerability to further social justice claims. In so doing she maintains the feminist critique of 
the public/private dichotomy, seen as a border that perpetuatHVZRPHQ¶VVXEMHFWLRQ7KHUHDUH
WKUHHVDOLHQWFULWLTXHVRQWKHXQGHUO\LQJPHVVDJHLQ)LQHPDQ¶VIRUPXODWLRQRIYXOQHUDELOLW\
First, with the way vulnerability is deployed without attending to the productivity of the 
metaphor of wounding; second, with how she tries to save autonomy by constituting it as an 
obligation of reciprocity binding all members of society and how this idea works out in the 
context of crime control (Munro and Scoular 2012) Thirdly, that in order to mitigate 
vulnerability, there must be an accumulation of assets (physical, human, social, ecological and 
existential).           
 Let us unpack the first point. While the idea of vulnerability might be built upon the 
commonality of the human body (Turner. 2006, 63), Fineman, and, as will be shown shortly 
also Turner, turn to the image of the injurable body. Perhaps the image of the wound is not the 
problem itself but how the wound calls for a particular rationalities and discourses on how to 
prevent, protect, and counter injurability. In that sense, Illan rua Wall argues that Fineman and 
Turner offer conservative approaches with regards to vulnerability.  Of course, no one wants 
to feel insecure. That is not necessarily where the argument is going. Rather, what needs to be 
constantly probed are the assumptions from which one starts but also how and what is proposed 
as a solution. The focal point is the nexus between vulnerability-insecurity and how binding 
these two concepts performs in the different contexts where they are put to work. I would not 
say that Fineman is saying that we should be afraid of nature. Yet, there is an implicit desire to 
close the body, to protect it from decay, illness, and disabilities. Thus, while trying to reclaim 
an acceptance for marginal subjects, it could be said that the fear and risk impinging upon the 
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injurable subject demands again its closure, a return to the normal healthy body by invoking 
the concept of resilience.         
 Secondly, the concept of resilience evokes the rationalities of security. For example, 
Julian Reid criticizes the proliferation of resilience in social and political studies because there 
DUHVWLOOVXEVWDQWLDOGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHDLPVRIDFDGHPLFGLVFLSOLQHV:KLOH³VXVWDLnable 
development deploys ecological reason to argue for the need to secure the life of the biosphere, 
QHROLEHUDOLVPSUHVFULEHVHFRQRP\DVWKHYHU\PHDQVRIWKDWVHFXULW\´(Reid 2013, 353). Reid 
argues that transplanting the notion of resilience into the context of neoliberal politics does not 
contest its premises but rather sustains them (ibid). For example, the liberal economics have 
appropriated concepts from nature that create a facade of inevitability in the economic sphere 
(Connolly 2013;  Harcourt 2011). Although development studies and neoliberalism are distinct, 
WKH\FRPHWRJHWKHUWKURXJKWKH³UDWLRQDOLWLHVRIVHFXULWLHV´LPSOLFLWLQWKHFRQFHSWRIUHVLOLHQFH
(Reid 2013). The effect is that when vulnerability is inserted in the context of criminal law and 
securitisation discourses, there might be a tendency to pre-empt criminal behaviour and 
criminalize individuals who do not behave responsibly towards the vulnerability of others 
(Ramsay 2008; Munro and Scoular 2012). This is because vulnerability appears as a thing that 
can be managed and controlled through knowledge (recall the discussion on actuarial risk 
management in chapter II). Thirdly, UXD:DOOVWURQJO\REMHFWVWR)LQHPDQ¶VYLHZRQULJKWVDV
DVVHWV WR EH DFFXPXODWHG WKURXJKRXW RQH¶V OLIH-time in order to develop resilience to 
vulnerability because it frames human rights through the lens of the market.163 
 7KHRWKHUDFFRXQWRIYXOQHUDELOLW\LQIOXHQWLDOLQOHJDOVWXGLHVKDVEHHQ%U\DQ7XUQHU¶V
sociological analysis in Vulnerability and Human Rights (2006), which links together the 
different perspectives on vulnerability in politics, law, and sociology. He argues that while 





the profit and loss table which stems ultimately from our exposurHWRWKHPDUNHW´(rua Wall 2008, n. 54) 
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technological and medical progress have visibly reduced biological vulnerability since the 
seventeenth century, technology has also transformed how embodied vulnerability is 
understood (Turner 2006). Against cultural relativism, Turner grounds his theory of 
vulnerability in suffering and pain, conceived as a negative yet universal experience: 
Human beings experience pain and humiliation because they are vulnerable. While 
humans may not share a common culture, they are bound together by the risks and 
perturbations that arise from their vulnerability. Because we have a common ontological 
condition as vulnerable, intelligent beings, human happiness is diverse, but misery is 
common and uniform (ibid., 9). 
For Turner, vulnerability today is more a question of social and economic rights, and of 
reducing institutional precariousness. He does not address vulnerability in terms of 
embodiment (Grear 2010a). Instead, he argues biological vulnerability has been surpassed 
through science. This account implies a teleological history of scientific progress tied to 
political and legal institutions. Turner uncritically reproduces an important belief or aspiration 
subtending social contract theories in seventeenth century Europe, that is, that political and 
legal institutions are at the service of controlling and rationalizing nature. Drawing on 
%RDYHQWXUDGH6RXVD6DQWRV¶FULWLTXe of law, Anna Grear stresses how the liberal legal order 
of emerged in the backdrop of a scientific revolution. Hobbes especially espoused a belief in 
³WKHSRWHQWLDORIVFLHQFHWRFUHDWHDUDWLRQDOVRFLDORUGHU´(Grear 2010a, 72) and ensure self-
SUHVHUYDWLRQ WKURXJK WKH ODZ UDWKHU WKDQ WKHYLROHQFH FKDUDFWHULVWLFRI WKH µVWDWHRIQDWXUH¶
:KLOH VWUHVVLQJ WKH UHOHYDQFHRI7XUQHU¶VSURMHFW E\ UHYLWDOLVLng the centrality of bodies in 
human rights theories, Grear notes that his conceptualisation of vulnerability is too close 
+REEHV¶VRFLDOFRQWUDFWLELG7KLVLVEHFDXVH7XUQHUHOHYDWHVWKHELRORJLFDOO\YXOQHUDEOH
body through the language of ontology. More importantly, he characterised the vulnerability 





«OHJDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DUH IXQGDPHQWDO LQ SURYLGLQJ VRPH GHJUHH RI VHFXULW\ LQ WKLV
SUHFDULRXVHQYLURQPHQW«+XPDQULJKWVFDQEHVHHQDVDFRPSRQHQWRIWKLVSURWHFWive 
juridical shield. Indeed, the social canopy is constructed of both rites [sacred 
institutions] and rights [legal devices of security] (Turner 2006, 29).  
Again, UXD :DOO VWURQJO\ UHMHFWV 7XUQHU¶V H[SRVLWLRQ FDOOLQJ LW ³FRQVHUYDWLYH LQ the literal 
VHQVH´EHFDXVHWKHsocial institutions referred by Turner are same ones protecting privilege and 
DOORZLQJ³aggressive imperial war around the world [and] the same institutions which institute 
UDFLVPGRPHVWLFDOO\DQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\´(rua Wall 2008, 67). Human rights signpost suffering 
claims but have been also used to mobilize a militaristic humanitarianism, characterized as 
UDWLRQDOLWLHVZKLFKVHHNWRDEMHFWDQGVROYHWKHµSUREOHP¶RISDLQLELGThe version of human 
ULJKWV LQ7XUQHU¶VDFFRXQWDOUHDGy directs a movement away from vulnerability ³DZD\IURP
SDLQ DQG VXIIHULQJ VR WKDW ZH GR QRW KDYH WR FRQVLGHU WKHP´ LELG   'UDZLQJ RQ WKH
arguments in chapter IV and V, we could see this as a version of human rights law that 
anaesthetises and helps us to forget pain and vulnerability.     
 Both Turner and Fineman suggest that state institutions are also vulnerable. Yet, rua 
Wall argues that attributing the language of vulnerability to social and political institutions 
confuses the distinction between LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG DFWXDO OLYLQJ EHLQJV ,QGHHG DV 6FDUU\¶V
analyses of torture and war show, fictitious states appropriate the vulnerable body to 
VXEVWDQWLDWHWKHLURZQFODLPVWROLIH)RUH[DPSOH7XUQHUDUJXHVKRZµIDLOHGVWDWHV¶ODFNWKH
institutional ability to deliver protection (Turner 2006, 33). Although his argument does not 
GHQ\ WKDW WKHVWURQJVWDWHFDQDOVR LQFUHDVHSHRSOH¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\ WKe discourse traffics the 




his account also transfers a modality of vulnerability V\QRQ\PRXVZLWKµZHDNQHVV¶ or passivity 
into the state or state institutions. Indeed, this is a very conservative account because it suggests 
that the solution LV HPSRZHULQJ DQG µVWUHQJWKHQLQJ¶ WKHVH LQVWLWXWLRQV WR HQVXUH political 
survival but also a disregard to the mutual relation of vulnerability between the political actors 
SHRSOHDQGVWDWH,QWKDWVHQVH7XUQHU¶VDSSURDFKWRYXOQHUDELOLW\GRHVQRWEUHDNDZD\IURP
the Hobbesian liberalism but rather reproduces it through the desire to flee from ambiguity 
which Beauvoir identifies in Western thought (chapter III). Butler situates a similar point more 
clearly in the context of subjectification and violence. She suggests that the subjectification of 
the sovereign falsely emerges in the moment of fleeing from its injurability, as if by 
reproducing violence against another, he would emerge as an agent and get rid of the passivity 
of vulnerability (Butler 2014b).164 The next sections suggest how this dynamic, the fear of 
being injured and responding through the activity of violence, has been sustained through a 
logic of gender difference. For now, the main point in this section is how vulnerability can be 
conceived only along the lines of a passive and objectified injured/injurable body. Transferred 
WRWKHLGHDRIWKHVWDWHWKHYXOQHUDEOHSDVVLYHVRYHUHLJQLVGHHPHGWRUHTXLUHPRUHµVWUHQJWK¶
against threats opening the possibility to regain agency through violence8OWLPDWHO\7XUQHU¶V
version of insecure vulnerability which works to justify the apparatus of security and the rule 
of law. In order to keep insecurity at bay, a theory of rights based on self-preservation is 
invoked that is ultimately unsatisfactory because rights are made highly dependent on a 
powerful sovereign (Grear 2010a).       
 Recall that in the context of drug control, security theories present drug trafficking as a 
threat to state security and the security of citizens (Herschinger 2010; Crick 2012). However, 
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critics  note that the adoption of some form of militarized police forces or even the military to 
counter drug trafficking increases the insecurity of citizens (Kushlick 2011) while it 
µVWUHQJWKHQV¶RQO\VRPHLQVWLWXWLRQVRIWKHVWDWHVXFKDVWKHSROLFHDQGWKHPLOLWDU\(Carlsen 
2012) 165)RUH[DPSOHUHVSHFWIRUKXPDQULJKWVDQGGXHSURFHVVLQ0H[LFR¶VµZDURQGUXJV¶
have been side-lined when processing offenders or there is even direct participation of the state 
representatives in extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances (Carlsen 2012; Human 
Rights Watch 2013; Gallahue 2011b). Danny Kushlick argues that the irony in the 
securitizDWLRQRIGUXJVLVWKDWLW³KDVLWVHOIFUHDWHGRQHRIWKHJUHDWHVWWKUHDWVWRLQWHUQDWLRQDO
VHFXULW\´ (Kushlick 2011). One example is how the rhetoric of war bolsters securitisation 
measures, including the militarization of the police function (Corva 2009). The insecurity, 
which is an effect of securitisation, is unequally distributed across regions, increasing the 
precariousness of populations already dispossessed to socio-economic rights (Del Olmo 1990; 
Corva 2009; Sudbury 2010; Fransiska et.al., 2011). Dominique Corva argues that the 
³H[WHQVLRQDQGH[SRUWDWLRQRIWKHSROLFHVWDWHWR WKHSRVWFRORQLDOZRUOG´ (Corva 2009, 165) 
occurred through a complex dynamic where countries would receive developing aid assistance 
only if they also imported the US bellicose approach to combatting drug trafficking and 
production. The unequal distribution of violence across regions has been shaped through the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQWUROV\VWHPZKLFKSDUWLWLRQVWKH³JOREDOVSDFHLQWRVSDFHVRISURGXFWLRQand 
GLVWULEXWLRQ´LELGThis is just another way of saying that the effects of the globalized 
war on drugs is very different in the countries considered as the places where the heroin and 
cocaine originate (drawn along the lines of third world countries in the South) from the 
countries where they are distributed and consumed.      
 To conclude, this section suggested that invoking or putting passive, incomplete, 
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injurable bodies at the centre of an approach to vulnerability also brings back the objectifying 
approach implicit in the seventeenth century scientific project. In other words, bodies become 
objects and vulnerability becomes a condition which must be overcome, master and control 
WKURXJKNQRZOHGJHDQGµWHFKQRORJLHV¶$VQRWHGE\5RE\Q0D\6FKRWW³RQHRIWKHIXQGDPHQWDO
features of the project of modernity is the attempt to master and control the natural world and 
RXUERGLHVDVSDUWRIQDWXUH´(Schott 2010b, 18). 166 Similarly, Vetlesen shows, in the context 
of philosophy, that the strategies and techniques produced to control, resist, transcend or 
eliminate pain from experience can also lead to unwanted effects (Vetlesen 2009). Yes, the 
LPSXOVHWRVROYHWKHSUREOHPRISDLQLVWKHSUREOHPLWVHOIEHFDXVHSDLQDSSHDUVDVDµSUREOHP¶
to be solved (rua Wall 2008); but the intentions may misfire and fail to achieve the desired 
UHVXOW 3DLQ LQVWDQWLDWHV ZKDW (PDG FDOOV WKH ³PHWDSK\VLFR-WHFKQRORJLFDO UHDFWLRQ WR SDLQ´
(Parvis 1982, 355) whereby pain becomes something that can be precisely calculated and 
contained through technologies. In that sense, laws have been figured as technologies or 
LQVWUXPHQWDOµDUWHIDFWV¶(Scarry 1985). What is meant in this analysis is not to reject outright 
the technologies used to heal the body when is injured and in pain, but simply that they are 
underpinned by a perspective (and most crucially) a modality of relation with the body as an 
object.            
 To be clear, the purpose of drawing out the links between the sciences and legal 
accounts of vulnerability has not been to keep tight boundaries between social sciences, 
humanities or interdisciplinary empirical sciences, as this project is itself interdisciplinary. 
Trans-disciplinary approaches to vulnerability represent an important effort in troubling the 
boundaries between the categories of human, other-human, animal, and inhuman (Neal 2013; 
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 6FKRWWGUDZVKHUFULWLTXHIURP%DXPDQ¶VVRFLRORJ\RIGHDWKDQGG\LQJDVZHOODVIURPWKHGLIIHUHQWµVWUDWHJLHV¶
devised by societies to cope with the prospect of mortality, including experiences associated with it, such as 
illness. Bauman also maps out the history of the philosophy of death in Western epistemologies across modernity 
and post-modernity and the differences between these two historical periods (Bauman 1992). 
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Stanescu 2012; Grear 2013; Barad 2012) 167. However, the example of the incorporation of 
science into social contract theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth century (Grear 2010a; 
Santos 1990) warrants caution and functions as a reminder that the relationship between 
criminal law and the empirical sciences is not necessarily always benign (Harcourt 2003; 
Harcourt 2011), as discussed in chapter II. Empirical sciences are used as references of 
authority, truth claims, or as frames for thinking about an issue differently. However, it is 
important to remember that, as Susantha Goonatilake and Sandra Harding remind us, we cannot 
forget there are hierarchies at work in science and also a plurality of approaches to scientific 
endeavours (Goonatilake 1998; Harding 2008). 
5. Confronting the sexual politics of injurability  
Drawing on the discussion of the last section, the following sections elaborate how feminist 
scholarship unpicks the trope of injurability animating social contract theories and its effects 
on women. It is undeniable that there is an extensive body of work on social contract theory in 
feminist scholarship which considers its differential impact on women (Naffine 1997; Lacey 
1998b; Shapiro 2009; Sample 2002; Pateman 1988), which also makes it hard to address all of 
the concerns feminists have raised about social contract theory. I will focus on the points that 
concern us particularly: First, an understanding of autonomy which is conceptually dependent 
on the idea of physical integrity (Naffine 2009); and second, a notion of physical integrity 
which tends to be premised on a gendered conception of harm.     
 Let us come back to the image of the wound. Corporeal harm is only really 
acknowledged when it involves a visible injury (Bergoffen 2003), the literal image of 
woundable body,  making it difficult if not impossible for other types of corporeal harm, for 
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example the harm of rape, to enter the legal or political  realm (Naffine 1997; Cornell 1995; 
Du Toit 2009). While gendered injurability is quite a complex and extensive subject, this 
section compares two critical readings of feminine/masculine injurability, where pain, 
injurability and sovereignty are put to work in order to express differential and antagonistic 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV RI YXOQHUDELOLW\ 7KH ILUVW UHDGLQJ LV /RXLVH 'X 7RLW¶V Philosophical 
Investigation of Rape: The Making and Unmaking of the Feminine Self (2009), where the 
author constructs an argument about the political impossibility of recognizing the harm of rape, 
GUDZLQJRQ6FDUU\¶VDUWLFXODWLRQRI WKHVWUXFWXUHRI WRUWXUH ,Q WKHVHFRQd reading I want to 
consider Parables of Revenge and Masculinity in Clint Eastwood's Mystic River (2005) where 
Berkowitz and Drucilla Cornell analyse the homophobic anxiety underpinning masculine 
vulnerability. In both contexts, my interest is in understanding how gender and sexuality frame 
the female body as penetrable and the male body as impenetrable and how that relates to 
concepts of vulnerability.168    
Returning to what was said at the beginning of this chapter, images of violence animate 
contemporary feminist, postcolonial, queer, literary and political theory (Murphy 2012a). 
While any discussion or theory of corporeal vulnerability cannot, and should not, elude the 
question of violence and the recognition of legal harms, Murphy warns against rhetoric and 
LPDJLQDULHV RI YLROHQFH WKDW ³V\PSWRPDWL]H DQG DWWHPSW WR PDVN SKLORVRSK\¶V SUREOHPDWLF
UHODWLRQVKLSWRWKHERG\DQGFUXFLDOO\WRLWVRZQERG\SURSHU´(ibid., 16). As inevitable as it 
might seem, the investment of theory in certain tropes, the effects of the proliferation of images, 
allegories and metaphors of violence should be kept in check, against their naturalisation. In 
feminist theory, this means questioning how and what are the effects of thinking that there is a 
µQDWXUDO¶DHVWKHWLFRUSKHQRPHQDODQDORJ\EHWZHHQWKHZRXQGDQGWKHYDJLQDKLJKOLJKWLQJWKLV
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1993, 4). Although this view has been largely discredited as an essentialist perspective on the 
bodies of women and men (Atmore 1999), it is also  seen as expressing something about  the 
cultural assumptions which mediate our perceptions of biological female bodies.  
0RYLQJEH\RQG%URZQPLOOHU¶VVSHFWUHRI'HVFDUWHVLPSULQWHGLQPHFKDQLVWLFERGLHV
&RUQHOO¶V VRSKLVWLFDWHG DQDO\VLV SUHVHQWV DQRWKHU YHUVLRQ RI WKH µZRXQG RI IHPLQLQLW\¶
grounded in Lacanian psychoanalysis and philosophy. She suggests that the wound of 
IHPLQLQLW\LVDQDOLHQDWLRQIURPVXEMHFWLYLW\WKH³ULSSLQJRIRQH¶VVH[DQGVH[XDOSHUVRQDZLWK
SRZHU DQG FUHDWLYLW\´(Cornell 1995, 7) 7KH ZRXQG LV D µFXW¶ EHWZHHQ WKH VXEMHFWLYH DQG
objective selves where women find it difficult to become individuated and live their full 
personhood. Through this fUDPH &RUQHOO DUJXHV WKDW ZRPHQ¶V VH[XDO VXEMHFWLYLW\ LV
systematically undermined by sexual violence. Rape is not simply an injury to the psyche, a 
YLHZWKDWZRXOGILWZLWKWKH&DUWHVLDQVSOLW,QVWHDGUDSHLVDQLQMXU\WRZRPHQ¶VVHQVHRIVHOI
(Du Toit 2007, 64±65). Importantly, Cornell points to the conditions where women can become 
subjects and express their own desires. However, those conditions are generally not present in 
WKHV\PEROLFRUGHUEHFDXVH WKHPDVFXOLQHµRWKHU¶QHYHUUHIOHFWVEDFNZRPHQ¶VVXEMHFWLYLW\ 
DQGWKURZV³ZRPHQEDFNRQWRWKHLUVH[XDOL]HGERGLHVXQGHUVWRRGDVWKHDQWLWKHVLVRIWKH
LGHDORI IXOO DQGXQLILHGSHUVRQKRRG´ (ibid., 54). Thus, Du Toit suggests in her reading of 
&RUQHOOWKDWUDSHLVDQµLPSRVVLELOLW\¶EHFDXVHWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRUZRPHQ¶VVHOIKRRGDUHQRW
SDUWRIWKHV\PEROLFRUGHUDQGEHFDXVHUDSHLVILUVWDQGIRUHPRVWDQLQMXU\WRZRPHQ¶VVHQVH
of self, the harm of rape is neither visible nor intelligible; under these conditions, it becomes 
impossible to recognise the true harm of rape.  
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 2QHRI'X7RLW¶VFHQWUDOFODLPV LV WKDWVRFLDOFRQWUDFWDQGSURSHUW\PRGHOV IUDPLQJ
sexual autonomy and inviolability misconstrue the harm of rape. The poverty of these models 
is not only that they misconstrue the damage of rape, but also prevent the possibility of even 
realizing that rape has occurred. Rape laws today, Du Toit argues, have transferred ownership 
of the body from men to women themselves.  However, this approach marks continuities 
between pre-modern and modern laws that frame female sexuality through the lens of 
SRVVHVVLYHFDSLWDOLVP$JDLQZHILQGWKH&DUWHVLDQVKDGRZDWZRUNLPSOLFLWLQ-RKQ/RFNH¶V
SURSHUW\PRGHO,QWKH/RFNHDQYLHZ³WKHVHOIGHSHQGVRQD&DUWHVLDQVSOLWEHWZHHQOLYHVSLULW
and dead matter, between mental, true self and mateULDO LQHVVHQWLDO ERG\´ LELG, 40). 
Subjectivity, located in the mind, is essentially impenetrable because it is the body that is 
penetrated. Rape is construed as the illegal use of the body, without the consent of the person. 
In this view, rape is akin to entering and using land without permission or a contracted 
agreement between the parties. Rather than being seen as an injury to subjectivity, rape is seen 
DVVWHDOLQJSURSHUW\IRUDEULHIWLPHEHFDXVHWKHVXEMHFWLV³IXQGDPHQWDOO\VHSDUDWHIURPRQH¶V
ERG\DQGLWVDWWULEXWHVLQFOXGLQJLWVVH[XDORQHV´(ibid., 41). The current model of property 
RZQHUVKLSDOVRRSHQVWKHGRRUWRMXGJLQJYLFWLPVDVLUUHVSRQVLEOHµRZQHUV¶RIWKHLUERG\IRU
example, if they are seen as sexually promiscuous. 
In sum, Du Toit suggests that the problem of rape is rather a problem of misrecognizing 
ZRPHQ¶V sexual subjectivity, consistently marginalized and made ultimately impossible 
through a patriarchal symbolic background. The notion of subjectivity she advances builds on  
SV\FKRDQDO\WLF DQG SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO  PRGHOV RI WKH VHOI WKDW HPSKDVL]H ³WKH FRQVWLWXtive 
UHODWLRQV EHWZHHQ ERG\ VHOI ZRUOG DQG RWKHU´ ibid., 65)  She favours these philosophical 
perspectives over postmodern notions of subjectivity, particularly deconstructive approaches, 
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where feminine identities are idealized as fragmented vis-à-vis the stable male subject.169 To 
advance notions of feminine subjectivity as ambiguous and unstable fits neatly into existing 
SDWULDUFKDOSDUDGLJPVRIVRFLDOLW\DQGWKXV³UHQHZVVXVWDLQVDQGPDLQWDLQVWKHSURGXFWLRQRI
WKH PDOH HWKRV RU VRFLDO RUGHU´ (ibid.,109) ,QVWHDG RI WKH /DFDQLDQ LQVSLUHG µRSHQ-HQGHG¶
subject, Du Toit argues that the harm of rape has to be thought in terms of the specificity of 
IHPLQLQH VXEMHFWLYLW\ 7KH V\PEROLF FXOWXUH KDV EHHQ XQDEOH WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH ³ZRXQG RI
IHPLQLQLW\«DVDQLQMXU\WKDWREWDLQVLWVSDUWLFXODUSHUQLFLRXVQHVVIURPDZRXQGHGIHPLQLQH
subjectivity that LVV\PEROLFDOO\FRQVWUXHGDVWKHDQWLWKHVLVWRIXOOSHUVRQKRRG´LELG,Q
other words, the feminine self is constantly alienated from her subjectivity through models of 
femininity construing her as an object for others.      
 0\LQWHUHVW LQ'X7RLW¶V ZRUN LV LQKRZVKHDQDORJL]HV6FDUU\¶VSKHQRPHQRORJ\RI
torture with the phenomenology of rape, although she might be overgeneralising the open-
endedness of embodied subjectivity in post-structuralism.170 Du Toit is able to draw these links 
by invoking HegeO¶VPDVWHU-bondsman model to emphasise the interdependence of subjectivity 
and the role of recognition. She argues that the master-bondsman model underlines the way 
³unequal relations and relations of domination have an effect on ontology, or on how we inhabit 
WKH ZRUOG´ (ibid., 68). The problem of domination emerges from the desire of self-
consciousness to preserve his life but in pure abstraction (ibid., 71), without a body that can be 
LQMXUHG ,Q +HJHO¶V ZRUGV SXUH DEVWUDFWLRQ LV WKH QHJDWLRQ RI WKH ³REMHFWLYH PRGH RI VHOI-
                                                          
169
 Kelly Oliver similarly criticizes the deconstructive turn for representing women as ambivalent. Even when the 
aim of deconstruction has been to erode hierarchies of sexual difference embedded into subjectivity dualism, 
Derrida reduced all sexual differencH WRµXQGHFLGDELOLW\¶ (Oliver 1995)'HUULGD¶VXVHRI WKHIHPDOHERG\DVD
PHWDSKRUIRUWKHFRQFHSWRIµXQGHFLGDELOLW\¶DSSURSULDWHVWKHIHPLQLQH³«E\WXUQLQJWKHIHPDOHERG\LQWRMXVW
so many metaphors, metaphors that no longer have anything to do with that body, the deconstructive philosopher 
FDQVDIHO\GLVWDQFHKLPVHOIIURPWKHIHPDOHERG\DQGPDLQWDLQLWVPDVWHU\RYHULW´(ibid., 110). The female body 
is used to introduce the possibility of difference in his deconstructive theory, but women remain excluded as 
authors.  
170
 <YHWWH5XVVHOODUJXHVWKDW'X7RLW¶VFULWLTXHRISRVW-structuralism is limited and without sufficient attention to 
WKHZRUNRISKLORVRSKHUVOLNH-XGLWK%XWOHUZKRKDV³PDGHDFDreer out of theorising the body, and interrogating 
the space occupied by bodies (including, arguably, those of rape victims) that subvert and problematise 
SHUIRUPDWLYHJHQGHUQRUPV´(Russell 2010, 103). 
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FRQVFLRXVQHVV« WKDW LW LV QRW DWWDFKHG WR DQ\ VSHFLILF H[LVWHQFH QRW WR the individuality 
FRPPRQ WR H[LVWHQFH DV VXFK WKDW LW LV QRW DWWDFKHG WR OLIH´ (Hegel 1979, 113). In short, 
UHFRJQLWLRQLVWLHGWRWKHGHQLDORIHPERGLPHQWDQGPRUWDOLW\DVDZD\WR³FLUFXPYHQWWKHULVN
of non-UHFRJQLWLRQE\DQRWKHUIUHHFRQVFLRXVQHVV´(Du Toit 2009, 71).  
 Now, recall the structure of torture in chapter IV, where the absence of recognition to 
WKHYLFWLP¶VSDLQLVHVVHQWLDOLQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHWRUWXUH7KHGHQLDORIWKHYLFWLP¶VSDLQ
DPSOLILHVWKHRQWRORJLFDOGLYLGHIDFLOLWDWHGE\SDLQ¶VWHOLFRULHQWDWLRQVLQZDUG)RU'X7RLW
there is a similar antagonism between victim and rapist. This relation has been vastly 
misconstrued through social contract models presupposing equality between the parties and 
LPSOLFLWO\H[FKDQJLQJJRRGVRUSURSHUW\,QVWHDGVKHFKDUDFWHUL]HVWKHUDSLVW¶VUHODWLRQZLWK
WKHYLFWLPDVD³GUDPDWLFDOO\XQHTXDOFRQWHVWIRURQWRORJLFDOGRPLQDWLRQ´(ibid., 87). The rapist 
builds a world for himself by forcing the victim to experience herself as a WKLQJDV³KLVVHQVH
of self and of his (place in the) world are affirmed, e[WHQGHGDQGH[SDQGHG´LELG).  Like the 
YLFWLPRI WRUWXUH LQ6FDUU\¶VDFFRXQW'X7RLWDUJXHV WKDW WKHYLFWLPLV IRUFHG WRDIILUPWKH
world of the offender. The world of the tortXUHULVQRWVLPSO\EXLOWLQRSSRVLWLRQWRWKHYLFWLP¶V
ZRUOGEXWUHTXLUHVWKHYLFWLP¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHGHQLDORIKHURZQZRUOG,QVKRUWZHVHH
WKHVWUXFWXUDOVLPLODULW\ZLWK6FDUU\¶VDUJument about the deflection of moral blame away from 
the torturer to the victim, where the woman is made responsible for the betrayal to herself. She 
has participated in her own objectification. She is to blame for accepting the world of the 
torturer (where women are sexual objects of self-extension). Clearly, for such a spectacle to be 
needed, for the regime to be affirmed, it must be that is highly contestable in the first place 
(ibid.,88)7KH SKDOOLF SRZHU LV D SRZHU SURGXFHG WKURXJK GLDOHFWLF ZKHUH WKH ZRPDQ¶V
VXEMHFWLYLW\LVDOPRVWFRPSOHWHO\DQQXOOHG,WLVQRWDQµRULJLQDO¶SRZHU7KLVSRLQWLVFXULRXV
EHFDXVHLWFRPHVYHU\FORVHWR%XWOHU¶VFULWLTXHRIVovereign power (Loizidou 2007), which 
will be explained further in this chapter. 
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What I wish to draw attention to is how the language of agency is implicit in the process 
where a victim is made complicit iQ WKHRIIHQFH'X7RLW¶VPDNHV DQ DQDORJ\EHWZHHQ WKH
phallus as the weapon that carries out the injury but also how the body of the woman becomes 
WKHZHDSRQDJDLQVWµKHUVHOI¶ As the torturer/rapist amplifies his colossal voice, understood as 
pure intention and will, he distances himself from the colossal body of the victim of sexual 
violence (Du Toit 2009, 91). Crucially, Du Toit analogizes the model of torture to the Cartesian 
duality. The effect of rape is the duality in the Cartesian subject, where the woman becomes a 
body without a voice and the man a voice without a body.  Coming full circle, we find the 
phenomenology of pain discussed in chapter III, played out along gendered relations of 
violence. Du Toit offers a harrowing account of rape that resembles the experience of torture.  
,Q VKRUW UDSH UREV ZRPHQ¶V YRLFH DQG WKLV PRGHO RI SK\VLFDO DQG V\PEROLF YLROHQFH LV
reproduced in the social order.         
 While I agree for the most part with Du Toit, my own interpretation of pain and how it 
is implicated in the onto-epistemology of subjectivity is slightly different. Recall key points in 
WKH SUHYLRXV FKDSWHUV )LUVW /HGHU¶V suggestion that the split between body/mind is a 
(mis)reading of the body in pain but it is not a phenomenological invariant. In that sense, 
HPERGLHGSDLQLVLPEULFDWHGLQVRFLDOVSDFHDOWKRXJKWKLVSRLQWGRHVLQWHUVHFWZLWK'X7RLW¶V
analysis of masculinism. However, recall also how violence causing pain destroys speech but 
paradoxically, pain is also the most pressing experience that moves us towards speech. They 
are related but do not collapse into each other because pain resists representation. This 
arJXPHQWFDQEHVXSSOHPHQWHGE\/RL]LGRX¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWILJXUDOLW\DQGWKHPDWHULDOLW\RI
bodies cannot wholly collapse into each other (Loizidou 2007). In short, and drawing on the 
spaces of ambiguity charted throughout this thesis, my reading of subjectivity does not consider 
post-structuralism as a dispersal of femininity and reiteration of the inability for a feminine 
subjectivity.  Instead, ambiguity is precisely a space to resist the totalization of discourse which 
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VHHNVWRDQQXOZRPHQ¶VYRLFHWKURXJKWKHREMHFWLI\LQJYLROHQFHRIUDSHMoreover, the ideal 
of the invulnerable man who objectifies others through violence responds to a desire to flee 
from the ambiguity of embodiment historically and culturally symbolised by µPRQVWURXV¶
vulnerable bodies. 
6. Anxious masculinities: Controlling ambiguity through borders and limits to the 
body 
Now, we have reviewed an account of how sexual subjugation involves the loss of the 
subjective world and the acceptance RI WKH RWKHU SHUVRQ¶V ZRUOG ZKHUH , DP IRUFHG WR
participate in my objectification. In the next reading, I want to explore the other side of the 
dialectic of sexual violence, mainly, the anxiety of the male subject of becoming an object. 
Berkowitz and CoUQHOO¶VH[SORUDWLRQRIWKHPDVFXOLQHGHVLUHIRULQYXOQHUDELOLW\HFKRHVVRPH
of the points about masculine self-extension through female subjection. As Du Toit argues, the 
phallic power is ultimately vulnerable, to the point that it uses the spectacle of violence on the 
female subject to substantiate a disembodied power. This is an invulnerable power that fears 
its own death; concretely, the fear of annihilation of the masculine stems from an envy of 
maternal power: 
(QYLRXV RI ZRPHQ¶V PDWHUQDO SRZHU PHQ ERWh turn away from the maternal body, 
denying their own birth, and they choose death as their own proper domain. Men claim 
death as their domain of power: they can risk and defy death through adventures and 
ZDUDQGLIWKH\VXFFXPEWRLWWKH\DUHµLPPRUWDOLVHG¶LQKHURLFWDOHVWKH\DUHYDOXHG
EHFDXVHWKH\µFRQWURO¶GHDWKE\GHOLEHUDWHO\ULVNLQJRUFKRRVLQJLW(Du Toit 2009, 205). 
In contrast, Roby May Schott argues Western culture has sexually coded through femininity 
(Schott 2010a, 5). Instead of associating the powers of reproduction in the maternal, femininity 
has been associated with taking life rather than giving life. Such an argument seems 
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counterintuitive to the representation of women through the capabilities of reproductive bodies. 
Yet, Schott notes that it is precisely in the trope of motherhood where ambivalence is 
instantiated because the pregnant female body symbolizes the disruption of order through its 
lack of respect for borders, positions and roles (Schott 2010b). In other words, the womb is the 
place where mortal life begins. However, the trace of creation in femininity does not disappear 
entirely from the philosophical imaginary; it is only repressed or given a negative value 
(Irigaray 1993; Oliver 1995).         
 Through a genealogy of the notion of monstrosity in Western epistemological 
conceptions of motherhood, Margrit Shildrick suggests that the abjection of femininity and 
motherhood are located in ambivalence not in an absolute negativity. Further, the anxiety is 
not towards death per se, but the inability to stop the time towards death. The pregnant body 
EHFRPHVWKHSURMHFWLRQRIWKLVIHDUWRZDUGVWKHµH[FHVV¶RIHPERGLPHQW6KLOGULFN¶VLQYLWDWLRQ
to think vulnerability otherwise also resorts to phenomenology to critique the mind-body 
dichotomy supplemented by a deconstructive analysis (Shildrick 2002). This genealogy starts 
with Aristotle, who viewed the birth of women as a monstrosity, in comparison to the male 
morphology. FXUWKHU 6FKLOGULFN H[SODLQV KRZ ZRPHQ¶V ERGLHV KDYH EHen deemed to be 
µLPSURSHU¶LELGEHFDXVHWKH\FDQQRWFRQWDLQWKH excesses of embodiment (ibid., 31). This 
representation of female bodies persisted in scientific discourses in seventeenth century France, 
ZKHUHZRPHQ¶VHPRWLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\WKHLUFRPpassion towards criminals who were publicly 
executed, were presented as explanations of infant deformities. Nicolas Malebranche, a 
Cartesian interlocutor, argued that pregnant women were unable to hold a subject-object 
GLVWDQFH LELG :RPHQ¶V LQDELOLW\ Wo master their emotions was contrasted with 
impenetrability of the rational mind.    
What is interesting here is how Shildrick re-appropriates the concept of monstrosity and 
deploys it as a mirror that reflects back the vulnerability of the idealised masculine sovereign 
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self.  Shildrick suggests that the fear of vulnerability - implicit in the excessive materiality of 
the pregnant body- VLJQLILHV WKH SHUPDQHQW FKDQJHV H[SHULHQFHG GXULQJ OLIH 3UHJQDQF\¶V
FKDUDFWHULVWLF µH[FHVV¶FRUSRUHDOLW\ VLJQLILHVD UHPLnder of the inability to contain the inner 
bodily boundaries, UHYHDOLQJ KRZ HPERGLHG OLIH LV ³not vulnerable to external threat, but 
actively and visibOHGHIRUPHGIURPZLWKLQ´(Shildrick 2002, 31)7KHµXQVWRSSDEOHFRUSXV¶LV
changed as much as it is transformed from without by others; a reminder of the impossibility 
of the impermeable sovereign self. The ambiguity in the constant change of embodiment 
marks the impossibility of individualism conceived as a coherent self (Schott 2010b). Schott 
DQG 6KLOGULFN¶V DFFRXQWV RI PRWKHUKRRG DUH VXEVWDQWLDOO\ LQIOXHQFHG E\ -XOLD .ULVWHYD¶V
SV\FKRDQDO\WLF FRQFHSW RI DEMHFWLRQ $EMHFWLRQ UHIHUV WR ³WKH FRQGLWLRQ SULRU WR EHLQJ and 
hence prior to differentiation and individuation, a condition that reminds the individual that its 
H[LVWHQFHLVXQGHUWKUHDW´.ULVWHYD3ULRUWRWKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKHVXEMHFWWKHODFNRI
differentiation from the mother incites horror and disgust in the infant because of its 
dependence on the mother. Kristeva stresses that the separation of the semiotic bond between 
mother and child is not natural but a cultural schema of the paternal symbolic order.  Other 
accounts also underline the ambiguity that subtends the scene of vulnerability (Bergoffen 2001; 
Bergoffen 2003; Cavarero 2009; Schott 2010b; Murphy 2012a; Murphy 2012b). The fear of 
being engulfed by the mother symbolizes the anxiety towards the lack of proper borders visible 
in the pregnant body. To what extent does this scene, where the impossibility of individuation 
is perceived with horror, resonate with the anxiety of the penetrability of the male body and 
the state of actual and potential vulnerability which elicit a need to protect oneself through 
µVKLHOGV¶"0RUHLPSRUWDQWO\WKHVHscenes of embodied vulnerability also imply exposure and 
threat, eliciting a response of control and which is projected onto the feminine, as the one who 
LVWREODPHIRUPHQ¶VPRUWDOLW\. And it is to that effect, that violence underpins the idealization 
RI ³WKH IDQWDV\ RI PDQ ZKR PDNHV KLPVHOI RXW RI QRWKLQJ DQG ZKR LV WKHUHIRUH SXUHO\
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PDVFXOLQH´ (Easthope 1992, 20). This is structurally similar to the lord-bondsman model 
discussed earlier. This fantasy is subtended by the fear of castration which symbolizes the 
PDVFXOLQH ³LQDELOLW\ WR FRQWURO WKHZRUOG´ (Berkowitz and Cornell 2005, 330). The anxiety 
towards male rape forces upon the masculine a confrontation with his femininity (identified as 
sexual penetrability). For the masculine sovereign, the realization he is also penetrable and 
UHGXFLEOHWRDQREMHFWSRVHVDWKUHDWWR³KLVPDVFXOLQHIDQWDV\RIFRQWUROPDVWHU\DQGHYHQ
NLQJVKLS´LELGExperiences of trauma destabilize the desired security, reminding the 
subject about his finite life and fragile embodiment. The sovereign seeks to forget the fragility 
of embodiment through violence. Berkowitz and Cornell suggest that underneath the desire for 
GRPLQDWLRQWKHUHLVDGHQLDORIWKHJLYHQZRUOGZKLFKVHHNVWRHVFDSH³WKHILQLWHDQGOLPLWHG
nature of his huPDQLW\´LQD³GHVSHUDWHVWUXJJOHWRXQGHUVWDQGDQGPDVWHUDXQLYHUVHJRQHPDG´ 
(ibid., 317). Remember that in the mind-body duality (chapter V), the body appears as an 
alienated object. Then, recall that this perception of the body, in combination to the strategies 
and scientific knowledge of the body, supports the idea that one can manage, control and 
overcome the injury/injurability of the body. However, the overcoming of injurability is often 
done through the mechanisms of blame and revenge, a response to the loss of the sense of self 
in an experience of trauma where violence appears as a possibility for regaining agency.
 Exploring the links between trauma and revenge, they suggest there are three 
fundamental responses to trauma. One is the loss of speech which they describe as the 
µFROODSVH¶RIWKHVHOI; second, the refusal to admit one's own vulnerability through revelry; and 
third, the acceptance of finitude. The first one is simply engulfed by the  melancholia of losing 
oneself, unable to relate any longer to the world outside; the second, seeks to deny the trauma 
through revenge, and the third, accept the limits of sovereignty and recover the self- lost by the 
denial of subjectivity in the violent act against him - in a different way. In short, the subject 
accepts his own vulnerability. The significance of this analysis is that Berkowitz and Cornell 
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give an account of social relations that pluralizes the responses to trauma underpinning the 
dialectic of sexual violence. Moreover, this also points to alternative modes of legal justice and 
SRZHUGLIIHUHQWIURPUHYHQJH&RPSDULQJWKHµODZRIMXVWLFH¶ZLWKµUHYHQJHDVMXVWLFH¶WKH\
suggest, revenge as justice is historically a right given by God which cannot be justified by 
XWLOLWDULDQLVPDQGGHRQWRORJ\(FKRLQJ%HDXYRLU¶VDQDO\VLVRIUHYHQJH%HUNRZLW]DQG&RUQHOO
assert that revenge can be read as a transcendental act because one acts as if one is God by 
taking life (ibid.). In contrast, the law of justice is the one that transforms melancholia resulting 
IURPWKHGHFHQWULQJHIIHFWRIWUDXPDWKURXJKWKH³DFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRIYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGORYH´
(ibid., 328).            
 To conclude, this section charted the sexual politics of vulnerability, exploring the 
gendering of the vulnerable (injurable) body. The gendering of vulnerability is an effect from 
organizing agency and passivity through gender differences. Notably, the model of gender 
difference, which attributes agency to the self-bounded man and unboundedness to women, is 
underpinned by the anxiety to the lack of boundaries because they signal the passing of time 
and ultimately death. Thus, coding vulnerability as a feature of femininity is a way in which 
the masculine deals with his mortality but also a strategy through which he can renew himself 
as a sovereign through acts of violence (such as rape). This strategy is not only a way to exclude 
the feminine subject by objectifying her, but also way of fleeing from his own injurability by 
channelling the affective excesses (anxiety and trauma) onto others. Chapter VI, which 
examines the case law, finds a similar rationality at play in how the court interprets 






7. Reclaiming vulnerability otherwise: Agonistic dispossession 
This chapter returns to the modes of relation towards vulnerability. If vulnerability discourses 
are going to have an effect on the lives of drug mules, the criminal law must be open to the 
question (not the problem) of pain. Let me explain what I mean by this. The views expressed 
throughout this thesis has EHHQLQVSLUHGE\%XWOHU¶VHQFRXUDJHPHQWWRWKLQNDERXWKRZWRstay 
responsive to the equal claim of the other for shelter when we are afflicted by pain (Butler 
2009a).171 While Butler is explicitly asking if non-violence is possible in political life, I think 
this question is equally relevant to criminal law and legal theory. Thus, is there a possibility 
for a criminal law that does not respond violently to vulnerability (its own and that of others), 
through strategies of denial and abjection, retribution, control, and securitization against 
injury? Will criminal law be forever haunted by the two extremes scenarios of failure 
H[SOLFDWHGLQ%HDXYRLU¶VHVVD\RQSXQLVKPHQWWKHW\UDQW172 (sovereign consciousness) and the 
formal law (calculation and formality)? Is there a possibility to articulate a law of justice- such 
as the one envisioned by Cornell and Berkowitz- that transforms revenge and melancholia into 
vulnerability and love?          
 As noted before, Cornell and Berkowitz suggest that it is possible, if one breaks from 
the responses to trauma which transform pain into revenge and self-destruction. I also think it 
is possible if we recall that vulnerability is not only about pain and injurability, but about the 
relations of power and affect which constitute social subjectivity. Vulnerability can be 
reclaimed to make demands for social justice, but we must also attend to its ambivalence. This 
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 Although Butler has been working for a while on issues related to injury, pain and vulnerability(Butler 1993; 
Butler 1997b; Butler 2006), the critical question is most succinctly expressed in Frames of War³$OOWKLVLVMXVW
another way of saying that it is most difficult when in a state of pain to stay responsive to the equal claim of the 
RWKHUIRUVKHOWHUIRUFRQGLWLRQVRIOLYDELOLW\DQGJULHYDELOLW\´(Butler 2009a, 184) 
172
 The vigilante or the masses claiming revenge can turn into the tyrant, while the way Beauvoir thinks of courts 
DQGRIILFLDOWULEXQDOVLVWKDWWKH\³FODLPWRWDNHUHIXJHEHKLQGWKHDQREMHFWLYLW\WKDWLVWKHZRUVWSDUWRIWKH.DQWLDQ
KHULWDJH´6KHQHYHUXVHVWKHZRUGEXUHDXFUDWWKRXJKLWLVFOHDUVKHLVFULWLFizing in Eye for an Eye, the emptiness 
RIOHJDOIRUPDOLVPKRZWKH³ODZ\HU¶VVXPPDWLRQVXQUROOHGZLWKDOOWKHSRPSRIDFRPLFGUDPD¶DQG³RQO\WKH
DFFXVHGEHORQJHGWRWKDWZRUOGRIIOHVKZKHUHEXOOHWVFDQNLOO´(Beauvoir [1946] 2004, 254) 
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section shows how Butler understands this challenge through political agonism rather than 
antagonistic violence. To clarify, agonism is a political perspective where there is a positive 
relation of struggle between adversaries. In contrast, antagonism characterizes a struggle of life 
and death between enemies (Worsham and Olson 1998).173      
 The DEMHFWVXEMHFWLVDWWKHFHQWUHRI%XWOHU¶V articulation of an agonistic politics.  Let 
me recapitulate a few key points made so far in relation to the rational legal subject of criminal 
ODZDQGLWVUHODWLRQWRµDEMHFW¶VXEMHFWLYLW\Remember that chapter III showed how theories of 
punishment are underpinned by histories of violence allegedly sublimated by the social contract 
and the reasonable person of criminal law. Norrie called our attention to ambiguity of selfhood 
and the ambivalence in criminal law, first as an expression of the fault lines in legal doctrine 
but ultimately signalling the abeyance of relationality. Getting rid of embodiment in one of the 
versions of legal personhood enables a false and idealised version of sovereignty, created at 
the expense of femininity, demoted to pure a passive sexualized body to be appropriated. This 
alignment of sexual difference is rather a fantasy that cannot be sustained unless the 
performance is re-enacted through the systematic reiteration of subjugation, as suggested in a 
way in my reading of Cornell and Du Toit.  However, the feminine is not wholly absent from 
the symbolic sphere. For Du Toit, the engulfment is almost complete, because she follows the 
torture model of sexual sociality where women cannot speak their desires because they live as 
broken subjects.            
 In contrast, a performative reading of injurability, would suggest that the subjugation 
of the feminine is ambiguous because there is a failure to engulf on into the other. In other 
words, if vulnerability is identified with the feminine, she cannot be willed away and remains 
constitutive of the masculine sovereign, even in the form of abjection. The sovereign subject 
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 Chantal Mouffe used the concept of agonism to radicalize democratic politics, and thus counter the 
foreclosure of discourse under neoconservative and neoliberal politics (Worsham and Olson 1998). 
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FDQQRW ZLOO DZD\ KLV LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH WR µDEMHFW EHLQJV¶ EHFDXVH KH LV IRXQGHG RQ WKH
repudiation of the other (Butler 1993)$V(OHQD/R]LGRXH[SODLQV³WKHµDEMHFW¶LVQRWRXWVLGH
WKHµVXEMHFW¶EXWLVUDWKHUSDUWRILWVIRXQGDWLRQWKDWZKLFKLVUHIXWHGRUGLVDYRZHGLQRUGHUIRU
DVXEMHFWLGHQWLILFDWLRQWREHIRUPHG´(Loizidou 2007, 36).  In other words, the dialectic of self-
other identity is undercut by the impossibility of ever being a fully unified, self-bounded, 
sovereign whose existence is not dependent on others. That being said, the abject being is both 
inside-RXWVLGHLVQRWDSULYLOHJHGSRVLWLRQDWDOO7KXV%XWOHU¶VSRVLWLRQRQDEMHFWEHLQJVVKRZV
WKH ³OLPLWV RI JHQGHU SHUIRUPDWLYLW\´ EXW DOVR WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK ³HPERGLPHQW FDQ EH
reconfiJXUHG WKURXJK WKHVH OLPLWV´LELG7KH ODWWHUSRLQW LVPRVW LPSRUWDQWEHFDXVH LW
PHDQVµDEMHFWEHLQJV¶FDQDOVR³UHVLJQLI\WKHDEMHFWLRQ´LQWR³GHILDQFHDQGOHJLWLPDF\´(Butler 
1993, xxviii).           
 The fact that abjects can resignify the abjection and defy the legitimacy of their 
VXEMHFWLRQLVSRVVLEOHEHFDXVHZHDUHDOORQWRORJLFDOO\µGLVSRVVHVVHG¶,QPrecarious Life: The 
Power of Mourning and Violence, Butler refers to disSRVVHVVLRQDVDVWDWHRIEHLQJ³EHVLGH
RQHVHOI´ RU ³QRW DW RQH ZLWK RQHVHOI´ (Butler 2006, 28). In short, being exists prior to the 
formation of identity and intentionality. For example, affective states reveal our affectability 
to others, but she also affirms affects are equally relationally constituted. This means affects 
shape the structure of interpretation while structuring interpretation (Butler 2009a, 11). Affects 
ERWK³SUHFHGHDQGH[FHHGRXUGHOLEHUDWHDQGERXQGHGVHOIKRRG´(Butler and Athanasiou 2013, 
4) EHFDXVHHPERGLPHQWLVµHF-VWDWLF¶174 ZKLFKVKHGHVFULEHVDV³OLWHUDOO\WREHRXWVLGHRneself 
>«@WREHWUDQVSRUWHGEH\RQGRQHVHOIE\DSDVVLRQEXWDOVRWREHEHVLGHRQHVHOIZLWKUDJHRU
JULHI´(Butler 2006, 24).          
 What this means is that %XWOHU¶VUHDGLQJRIGLVSRVVHVVLRQand vulnerability is not given 
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 7KHWHUPµHFVWDWLF¶KDVEHHQPRUHFRQFUHWHO\XVHGE\0DUWLQ+HLGHJger who argued that the essence of being 
resides in language. However, language does not fully capturH WKHHVVHQFHRIEHLQJEHFDXVH³coming into the 
world coincideVZLWKLWVFRPLQJLQWRODQJXDJH´ (Loizidou 2007, 69).  
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only to the meaning of pain, grief but also passion and love. Dispossession could be read as 
ambiguous and ambivalent: ambiguous because the meaning is open, unassured in the moment 
of dispossession; ambivalent in the sense that it implies a struggle, where the ecstatic self is set 
in motion by rage or love. She explains how she chooses this term in contrast to relationality 
to signify the ambivalence of the latter: 
Despite my affinity for the term relationality, we may need other language to approach 
the issue that concerns us, a way of thinking about how we are not only constituted by 
our relations but also dispossessed by them as well (ibid.24). 
For example, remember how chapter IV stressed how pain is an affect shaped by norms of 
interpretation that are linguistic, social and historical. The pain from cancer is not equally 
experienced by a person who is sheltered and taken care of by a health care system and 
surrounded by loved ones, than by the one who is stressed about whether he can or cannot pay 
for chemotherapy (Satija et al. 2014). Other affects can dispossess us or support our well-being 
in different ways.  Consider also KRZZRPHQ¶V UDJHKDVQRWEHHQVKDPHG as an unsuitable 
feminine affect in Western cultures, but political articulations against sexism also converge in 
states of  common rage (Butler and Athanasiou 2013). However, the affective intensities of 
pain and rage also must be renounced at some point, to let them collapse before they morph 
into the exponential reproduction of violence (Butler 2014b).  The main point I am drawing 
attention to is how the notion of a sovereign subject rejects his affectability, and instead, affects 
are managed controlled, in order to ground oneself into a bounded space, such as identity or 
any other fixed subjectivity. To ground the self, when it is beyond oneself and thus, lose 
himself. The political and legal norms µGHYDOXDWH¶SDVVLRQDWHDIIHFWV IUDPLQJWKHPWKURXJK
gendered readings of emotions, such as the hysteric woman (Lacey 1998b; Summers-Bremner 
1998; Butler and Athanasiou 2013) which limits and regulates the appearance of  women in 
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legal and political spaces.        
 0RUH WKDQ DQ\WKLQJ %XWOHU¶V QRWLRQ RI GLVSRVVHVVLRQ DV D ZD\ WR VKRZ Kow 
YXOQHUDELOLW\LVDUHODWLRQDVD³ZD\RIEHLQJIRUDQRWKHURUE\YLUWXHRIDQRWKHU´(Butler 2006). 
The abjection of interdependence happens because we are interdependent and dispossessed to 
others. We are irremediably exposed to the effect of normative frames which seek to manage 
and control interdependence producing an alienation of political life.175We are dispossessed to 
the different modalities of power (Loizidou 2007; Butler and Athanasiou 2013), including the 
frames that particularize the value of some lives while obscure and mask the precariousness of 
other lives (Butler 2009a). Liberal legalism allegedly µVROYHG¶the problem of injury through 
the calculable and moral subject (the legal subject of crime). However this version of legal 
personhood has been followed by other forms of violence because he is idealized as a possessor 
of a body and also possess other bodies. The politics of possessive individualism is intimately 
related to securitisation and neoliberal capitalism affecting disproportionally countries where 
the war on drugs is being waged against (Corva 2008). Reviewing the politics of terrorism 
(Butler 2006), neo-colonialism  and neoliberal capitalism (Butler and Athanasiou 2013), Butler 
and Athina Athanasiou argue that the epistemological frame of possession distributes 
precariousness by delimiting possession and property. In that sense, possessive individualism 
could only be possible through the disavowal of our common interdependence (ibid).176 In this 
context, violence also takes the shape of exploitation, land appropriation, racism, and borders 
against migration, among other contemporary events. Gender and sexuality converge with 
practices of dispossession. They are historically bound to practices of subjugation in Western 
FDSLWDOLVPSDUWLFXODUO\ WKH LGHDRI µRZQLQJDERG\¶DQG WKHPRGHVRI UHODWLRQV HQDEOHGE\
                                                          
175$WKDQDVLRXVXJJHVWVWKDWGLVSRVVHVVLRQLVDNLQWRWKH0DU[LVWFRQFHSWRIDOLHQDWLRQµZKLFKZRUNVRQWZROHYHOV
laboring subjects are deprived of the ability to have control over their life, but they are also denied the 
FRQVFLRXVQHVV RI WKHLU VXEMXJDWLRQ DV WKH\ DUH LQWHUSHOODWHG DV VXEMHFWV RI LQDOLHQDEOH IUHHGRP¶ (Butler and 
Athanasiou 2013, 6). 
176
 7KLVIRUPRIGLVSRVVHVVLRQµGHSHQGVXSRQDGLVDYRZDORIPRUHSULPDU\VRFLDOGHSHQGHQWDQGUHODWLRQDOPRGHV
of H[LVWHQFH¶(Butler and Athanasiou 2013, 9). 
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contract to dispose of the body. As already discussed before, women have been historically 
dispossessed as the bodies for others, as tKH PHDQLQJ RI µZRPDQ¶ KDV EHHQ FRQVWUXFWHG
relationally. In contrast, the masculine subject is self-bounded but one who accumulates 
possessions, including other persons, while the feminine subject is constituted by her relations.
 In sum,  dispossession marNV³WKHOLPLWVRIVHOI-sufficiency and that establishes us as 
UHODWLRQDODQGLQWHUGHSHQGHQWEHLQJV´(Butler and Athanasiou 2013, 3) but it also signals how 
subjectivity has been demarcated, regulating and distributing vulnerability differentially along 
gendered relations of violence (ibid., 1).  Crucially, the masculine fantasy of bodily wholeness 
XQGHUSLQVWKHµVRYHUHLJQ¶V¶UHVSRQVHWRYXOQHUDELOLW\ZKLFKDWWKHVDPHWLPHLQVWDQWLDWHVWKH
regulation of others. Vulnerability (understood as relationality) is abjected through the 
securitisation of the sovereign. It shores itself up, seeks to reconstitute its imagined wholeness, 
but only at the price of denying its own vulnerability, its dependency, its exposure, where it 
exploits those very features in others, thereby making those features "other to" itself (Butler 
2006, 41). Thus, in dealing with collective vulnerability to violence, populations may tacitly 
DFFHSWWKHDXWKRULW\RIDQµH[WUD-OHJDOVRYHUHLJQ¶ZKRHQVXUes security at the expense of abject 
beings. For example, how the invasion of Afghanistan was deployed through a blatant 
appropriation of feminist concerns for the condition of women under the Taliban regime whilst 
prisoners were sent to Guantanamo (ibid.)       
 These are forms of dealing with vulnerability through antagonistic violence, where the 
sovereign fends off his vulnerability to maintain clear limits of gender identity, signified in 
both the boundaries to the body and borders in his land. It is an expression of power which 
threatens to totalise the expressions of life and also dramatically fail to support life (Loizidou 
2007, 47).  For example, when securitization or neoliberalism engulf the meaning of the life of 
people who traffic drugs, those lives are already abjected because the room for contesting the 
discourses is severely diminished by discourses that frame drug trafficking as an evil to 
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humanity (chapter II). Although Butler acknowledges this totalising effect of power on 
dispossessed ERGLHVVKHRIIHUVDQµDJRQLVWLF¶YHUVLRQRIYXOQHUDELOLW\ (Loizidou 2007; Murphy 
2012b).177 Remember that language cannot be wholly totalised by the political discourse, legal 
categories, or by images which foreclose the possibilities of speaking about drug mules in ways 
other than the victimized, passive, sexualised bodies or threatening masculinised offenders. 
Recall also that Butler suggests vulnerability can give way to ³QRQ-violent respoQVHVWRLQMXU\´
(ibid., 44). This is because the ambivalence of vulnerability is grounded in agonistic rather than 
antagonistic politics. The next section outlines what an agonistic perspective on vulnerability 
means for the law DQG WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIGUXJPXOHV¶ OLYHVZKLFKKDYHEHHQ DSSDUHQWO\
totalized by the securitization and neoliberal discourses on drug control (chapter II). 
8. Translating struggles: The role of the law 
How should we understand what the law does in the first place and how does it respond or 
ZKHQYXOQHUDELOLW\DSSHDUVRQWRWKHSROLWLFDORUOHJDOVFHQH"$WILUVWVLJKW%XWOHU¶Vouvre shows 
contradictory conceptualisations of law (Loizidou 2007). On one hand, Butler has suggested 
that when law penalizes injurious speech, like hate speech, we lose the possibility to speak 
against normative frames like sexism or racism (Butler 1997b). This happens because the law 
WUDQVODWHV LQMXULHV LQWRLWVRZQQRUPVZKLFKGHOLPLWZKDWFRXQWVRUGRHVQ¶WFRXQWDVD OHJDO
harm, or even who counts as a legal person (Butler and Athanasiou 2013). A similar point can 
be made in relation to vulnerability discourse in criminal law.  For example, the vulnerability 
of drug mules has been described by the CA in multiple ways yet with convergent meanings: 
DVDQµLQDGHTXDF\¶178 which has its roots in financial desperation; as persons with disabilities, 
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 The sources are mainly found in Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (2004); Frames of 
War: When is Life Grievable (2009); Dispossession: The Performative in the Political (2013); and a number of 
RWKHUHVVD\VDQGDUWLFOHVSXEOLVKHGRQWKHVXEMHFW,DOVRUHO\RQ(OHQD/RL]LGRX¶VGLDORJXHDQGDQDO\VLVRI%XWOHU¶V
work on ethics and politics. 
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 R v Attuh-Benson (Irene Cynthia) [2004] EWCA Crim 3032 [22]. 
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weak will and morals; a group of disadvantaged ofIHQGHUVHVSHFLDOO\IURPµXQGHUGHYHORSHG
FRXQWULHV¶ZKRDUHH[SORLWHGE\GUXJFULPLQDOV179 In short, the juridical orients and delimits an 
interpretation of vulnerability along the lines of immorality and post-colonial victimhood. 
 On the other hand, Butler also criticizes the law for becoming impotent to sovereign 
power, for example when the law subjugates to the executive power and disavows its own 
norms, such as upholding the right to fair trials for terrorism suspects (Loizidou 2007; Butler 
2006)5HLGDUJXHVWKDW%XWOHU¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHVRYHUHLJQFKLPHVZLWK+REEHVOLEHUDOVWDWH
but such a critique is misplaced (Schippers 2014). Thus, an important clarification must be 
PDGHDWWKLVSRLQWZKLFKLVZK\%XWOHU¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHYXOQHUDEOH sovereign is different from 
7XUQHU¶VWUDQVIHUUDORIWKHµRQWRORJLFDOLQVHFXULW\¶RQWRWKHYXOQHUDEOHVWDWH%XWOHUDUJXHVWKDW
SROLWLFDO HQWLWLHV DUH ³QRW WKH VDPH DV LQGLYLGXDO SV\FKHV EXW ERWK FDQ EH GHVFULEHG DV
µVXEMHFWV¶ DOEHLW RI GLIIHUHQW RUGHUV´ (Butler 2006, 41). As Loizidou stresses, Butler is not 
explicitly concerned with upholding the rule of law to protect people from vulnerability, 
particularly because she is aware how this concept has been instrumentalized to legitimise state 
DXWKRULW\:KHQWKHODZLVPRUHSUHRFFXSLHGZLWKHQVXULQJLWVRZQSUHVHUYDWLRQLW³HQGVXS
FRQWULEXWLQJWRWKHGHVWUXFWLRQRIOLIH´(Loizidou 2007, 110).     
 Although Butler does not deny the sovereign still exists and seeks to become radically 
invulnerable, she offers a performative account of sovereign power. As Loizidou suggests, 
Butler re-works two central versions of biopolitics through performativity.180 The term 
biopolitics181 was coined by Michel Foucault in the first volume of The History of Sexuality 
where he addressed the complex tradition of disciplinary practices of the body (Foucault [1976] 
1990)7KHWHUPZDVIXUWKHUH[SDQGHGLQWZROHFWXUHVH[SORULQJWKH³JHQHDORJ\RIWKHPRGHUQ
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 2QHLV*LRUJLR$JDPEHQ¶VDUWLFXODWLRQRIWKHVRYHUHLJQSRZHUZKLFKJRYHUQVOLIHDQGGHDWKWKURXJKH[FOXVLRQV
(Agamben 1998) DQG)RXFDXOW¶VDSSURDFKWRELRSRZHUDQGJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\(Foucault 1978). 
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 In his lectures from 1978, Foucault described the biopolitical rationality as the knowledges and techniques that  
³WUHDWWKHµSRSXODWLRQ¶DVDVHWRIFRH[LVWLQJOLYLQJEHLQJVZLWKSDUWLFXODUELRORJLFDODQGSDWKRORJLFDOIHDWXUHV´




power in European history: sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopower, with these 
WKUHHKLVWRULFDOW\SHVRISRZHURYHUODSSLQJUDWKHUWKDQUHSODFLQJHDFKRWKHU´ (Esteves 2014, 
76). These overlapping forms of power182co-exist in time; although the governmentality 
scholarship has  interpreted the rise of disciplinary power as an overcoming sovereign power 
(Corva 2009). Without going into the details of the prolific governmentality studies, the only 
thing that needs to be stressed for the analysis on the case of drug mules is the idea of the 
³JRYHUQPHQWDOL]DWLRQ RI WKH VWDWH¶¶ XQGHUVWRRG DV WKH SURFHVV WKDW  ³KDV WXUQHG WKH MXVWLFH
State²the sovereign state ruled by law² LQWRWKHPDQDJHULDOVWDWH´(Esteves 2014, 76). Recall 
that chapter II outlined these different forms of power in drug control (managerialism strategies 
in criminal justice, securitisation in the juridical sources of international drug control and the 
war on drugs, and neoliberal disciplinary power shaping subjects as economical actors). 
 Now, Butler offers instead a version of political power in the context of terrorism 
characterized ³SHWW\ VRYHUHLJQV´ %XWOHU   ([SODLQHG RWKHUZLVH WKH PDQDJHULDO
DGPLQLVWUDWLYH UHJXODWLRQV LQ WKH JRYHUQPHQWDOL]HG VWDWH ³DERXQG UHLJQLQJ LQ WKH PLGst of 
bureaucratic army institutions mobilized by aims and tactics of power they do not inaugurate 
RUIXOO\FRQWURO´LELG(YHQWKRXJKWKH\KDYHQRSRZHULQWKHVHQVHRIDVRYHUHLJQSRZHU
WKH\FDQSHUIRUPDVVRYHUHLJQVE\PDNLQJ³XQLODWHUDOGHFLVLRQVaccountable to no law and 
ZLWKRXWDQ\OHJLWLPDWHDXWKRULW\´LELGSovereign power justifies authority to govern life and 
death, deciding which life counts as a life worth mourning and which cannot be grieved, and 
thus, so can also be killed, excluded, and marginalized from political life (Butler and 
Athanasiou 2013),WLVLPSRUWDQWWRVWUHVVDOVRWKDWWKHFRQFHSWLRQRIµOLIH¶RUµGHDWK¶LVQRW
always literal although closely related. Citing Orlando Patterson (1982), Butler understands 
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in-FRPPRQ´ ZKHUH RQH¶V ELRORJLFDO SHUVLVWHQFH FRQWLQXHV RXWVLGH RI WKH VFKHPDV RI
intelligibility that make it possible to recognize vulnerability or the precariousness of every life 
(Schippers 2014, 40).183          
 Bringing the arguments home, sovereign governmentality appears to be totalize the 
discourse of vulnerability, by appropriating it and figuring itself as that whose survival is in 
peril, the totalization is impossible. In short, the sovereign cannot appropriate vulnerability and 
deploy it as a justification for violence against others without encountering resistance.184 This 
is becaXVHWKHUHDUH³PXOWLSOHVLWHVIRUVRYHUHLJQJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\´ZKLFKPDNHSHRSOH¶VOLYHV
H[WUHPHO\SUHFDULRXV/RL]LGRXDUJXHVWKDWWKHUH³PXOWLSOHVLWHVIRUUHVLVWDQFH´(Loizidou 2007, 
114). Stated otherwise, sovereign governmentality cannot fully totalize life, because sovereign 
power is performative. It has no original authority; it arises in practices and speech acts, and 
WKXVIUDJLOHEHFDXVHWKHVRYHUHLJQ¶VVXEMHFWLYLW\ is dependent on a respondent who accept this 
authority. For example, drug mules reject the label of criminal through modes of resistance 
which we are not intelligible within the framework of victims-offenders. I will explain more 
about this in the following chapters. For now, my aim is only to focus on the role of the law 
vis-à-vis the sovereign governmentality in drug regulation.      
 Read through the lens of performativity, Loizidou suggests that we understand law not 
³DVDFDWHJRU\WKDWH[LVWVLQLWVHOf but, rather, our understanding of it comes through its relation 
WRYDULRXVPRGDOLWLHVRISRZHUDQGWKHSUDFWLFHVRIVXFKPRGDOLWLHV´(ibid., 14). In other words, 
the role of the law is not necessarily an instrument to politics.  Instead, she argues that role of 
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 Butler is working an idea of sociality that is not based on identity or recognition but with anonymity and 
DIIHFWDELOLW\7KHLQIOXHQFHRI/HYLQDV¶FULWLTXHRIHWKLFVWKDWLVERXQGWRHpistemology before ontology is clear. 
:HDUHDOUHDG\WKURZQLQWRDZRUOGQRWRIFKRRVLQJERXQGWRRWKHUVZKRPZHGRQ¶WNQRZRUPLJKWQHYHUNQRZ
and yet they sustain our life. It is not only our immediate contacts, for example, our family. Our daily nourishment 
is sustained by the labour of workers across geographical boundaries who we will never know but with whom we 
have a relation nonetheless (Butler 2006). 
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 Again, what I have in mind here is the ambivalence of pain arising from the referential ambiguity of the injured 
body. See chapter IV.  
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the law is constituted through its relation between politics and ethics, which I construe crudely 
as the struggles about what is a good life and how to achieve a good life when there are 
contested versions of what that means.        
 So what is the role of the law, conceived through its position between ethics and 
politics? Its role, as LoiziGRX VXJJHVWV LV WR WUDQVODWH ³competing meanings of life and 
humanness´(Loizidou 2007, 126). Recalling the discussion in chapter III, the rational legal 
person of criminal law is an example of how the law has failed to mediates and translate 
competing and counter-factual claims,185 LQFOXGLQJµFRPSHWLQJ¶YHUVLRQVRIXQLYHUVDOLW\(ibid.). 
Its responsibility is to vitalize life; not to totalize life, for example, in the form of empty 
formulations like the rational legal person or the discourse of international drug control which 
charDFWHULVHVSHRSOHLQWKHGUXJWUDGHDVµHYLO¶ Whilst one could say that the failure is in drug 
control law and the drug war rhetoric, we must not forget the how legal theory and legal 
institutions of the modern European states influenced by the Enlightenment philosophy became 
complicit with an ontology of the legal subjectivity that is partial and unjust because it has 
catered to the preservation of the legal institution and the authority of the privileged members 
of society(Norrie 2000). :KHQGUXJPXOHV¶OLYHVDUHframed through the existential rhetoric on 
drugs acts judged through the parameters of criminal responsibility of individualized subjects, 
the law is notoriously failing to act as translator of ethical and political claims about how drug 
controls are really affecting people in other regions of the globe which bear the brunt of global 
economic policies and stalling the distribution of drugs.    
 Moreover, if  the law is to fulfil this role  as a translator, it cannot be consumed with 
concerns about its own survival (Loizidou 2007, 90). In that sense, remember how the structure 
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of criminal law, including its rules and norms, has been founded on an incomplete notion of 
the subject (Norrie 2001). When the rational legal subject is challenged by the presence of 
subjects who show its artificiality, the whole edifice is also challenged because the law 
misconstrues its existence and identity through the notion of an invulnerable sovereign 
subjectivity. That includes translating who is to be recognised as a legal person or a vulnerable 
offender. The next chapter shows how this role is not being fulfilled. Whilst the law is 
relational, it has lost that relational character because drug regulation has devolved into an 
instrument for neoliberal governmentality and sovereign securitisation. Recall that chapter II 
showed how drug control, particularly drug trafficking, is underpinned by these intertwining 
modalities of power. The first one aims to regulate and normalize the sphere of the economic 
EHKDYLRXU E\ PDNLQJ GUXJV LOOHJDO ZKLOH WKH VHFRQG H[FOXGHV DQG OHW¶V GUXJ WUDIILFNLQJ
VXVSHFWVH[SHULHQFHDµVRFLDOGHDWK¶WKURXJKHSLWKHW¶VQDPLQJWKHPDVHYLORIIHQGHUVZKRVH
debt to society is incalculable. Sentencing is equally shaped by these rationalities. The 
sentencing guidelines are underpinned by the neoliberal doxa of quantification (Fleetwood 
2011) and harsh sentencing terms (Green 1998). These two rationalities are condensed and best 
exemplified in the epithets used to describe serious drug importation offenders, aVµPHUFKDQWV
RIGHDWK¶ZKRDUHµJUHHG\¶DQGEULQJµLQFDOFXODEOH¶GHDWKDQGGHVWUXFWLRQWRFRPPXQLWLHV7KLV
last presumption, about the potential suffering of communities, is drawn from the quantities 
VHL]HGFDOFXODWHGRQWKHVFDOHRIWKHRSHUDWLRQ7KHUHDUHRSHUDWLRQVZKLFKKDYHDQµLQGXVWULDO
VFDOH¶(Kent Online 2015) because the culprits traffic tons of drugs over long periods of time. 
However, this story about drug trafficking is rehearsed in the judgements, a citation that does 
not have a fundament in the actual drugs seized by a drug mule but repeated to characterize the 
level of seriousness in the crime. The next chapter examines how criminal law could be seen 
as having failed to translate the different levels of responsibility of drug importation offenders. 




the trope of the economic actor who transgresses the rules of drug regulation and the legitimate 
labour market as well as the malicious immoral actor.  While neoliberal and sovereign 
governmentality framing drug regulation already describe and name the general category of 
drug couriers (both mules and professional couriers) convicted in England, vulnerability 
narratives have been put forward as a counter-narrative, as a contestation, to these simplified 
yet dominant approaches to drug policy and law.  
9. Conclusion 
This chapter examined vulnerability approaches which fail to address the ambiguity impinging 
vulnerability and the ambivalent responses that it can elicit. In so doing, this chapter brought 
together disparate disciplines together into the analysis, with the aim of showing how there is 
a continuity between the objectification of the body in pain and the rationalities that seek to 
manage, mitigate, and control embodied vulnerability. Viewed as something to be abjected and 
kept at bay, vulnerability appears as something that is not really part of our lives. The concept 
of vulnerability can indeed further our understanding about how the law operates and as a way 
to contest the limits of the legal subject of rights.  However, vulnerability claims are not made 
or received in a discursive vacuum. They are enunciated through and received by a particular 
discourse (scientific, political, and legal) which translate the trope of injurability into their own 
rationalities and frames of intelligibility, as I illustrated through this interdisciplinary analysis. 
Whilst giving an interdisciplinary account, the running thread in the chapter was the topic of 
security. When vulnerability is postulated as a kind of ontological insecurity, the image of the 
woundable body might elicit responses aimed at µVKLHOGLQJ¶DJDLQVWDFWXDORUSRWHQWLDOULVNVIn 
order to reclaim vulnerability otherwise, as Murphy suggests, there must be a critical 
engagement with  the imaginaries of injurability and YLROHQFH WKDW FRXOG UHSOLFDWH ³VH[LVW
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normative  H[SHFWDWLRQV´(Murphy 2012a, 47). Ambiguity, deployed again as a critical concept, 
shows how the image of the wound animating the concept of vulnerability leads to caring or 
violence (ibid.). This does not mean that naming vulnerability is pointless, and it should not be 
understood that articulating these concerns encourages defeatism or nihilism. Quite the 
contrary, feminist approaches to vulnerability provide a critique of violence by mapping the 
masculinist anxiety to the ambiguity of vulnerability. This is best represented symbolically by 
the maternal body, which the masculinist logic abjects because it lacks bodily borders.  Thus, 
is order to express social justice aspirations through the idea of vulnerability, there must be 
revitalisation of the frames through which we recognize it. Stated differently, to show how 
vulnerability is not a characteristic of specific identities or an ontological insecurity. Both of 
these views fix the meaning vulnerability in unproductive ways. In the case of identity, a history 
of oppression becomes something that defines a subject. In the case of vulnerability as 
ontological insecurity, the prospect of injurying is a constant, a permanent possibility of 
violence. Eventually, the aim is to probe the frames for recognising vulnerability and show 
how these frames might open the door to practices that subject people to unwanted forms of 
violence, possession and abjection. However, recognising vulnerability is not only an 
epistemological issue, but also political.  Any discourse which totalizes the meaning of whose 
lives are worth or not protecting is already a discourse which abjects vulnerability.  Thus, an 
agonistic approach to vulnerability involves negotiating the plurality of views on what it means, 
for example, for women drug mules. When the law deploys frames that monopolise the 
meaning and appearance of life, such as the legal subject of criminal law or the sovereign 
governmentality in drug regulation, the political survival of the people who live and act against 
WKHVHQRUPVLVDWULVN+HHGLQJWR/RL]LGRX¶VDUJXPHQWV,DJUHHWKDWUROHRIWKHODZVKRXOGEH
to translate different projects aspiring for justice. This includes challenging the totalization of 
the disembodied rational (male) legal subject (chapter III and V) as the paradigm for 
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subjectivity and norms on criminal responsibility, but also the victimized drug mule. The next 
chapter shows how the ambivalence of drug importation offenders (chapter II) is engulfed into 
the either-or frameworks of criminal law, where couriers represent lives intelligible only 
through the predominant frameworks (immoral trafficker-illicit profiteer) while drug mules 



















VI. 7KHµH[FHSWLRQDO¶GUXJRffender in English Courts:                                   
(Mis) readings of vulnerability and criminal responsibility 
1. Summary 
This chapter traces the narratives around the vulnerability and criminal responsibility of drug 
mules in the English courts focusing primarily on the period from 2000 to 2014. Through 
discourse analysis, the case study traces the evolution of the feminization of vulnerability and 
its eventual equation with postcolonial victimhood. It suggests that, rather than being invisible, 
vulnerability as victimhood has been central to the construction of the female drug mule in the 
courts. Mapping the representation of feminine subjectivity through references to vulnerability, 
I argue that the courts have narrowed and limited the interpretation of vulnerability to the 
subaltern female that endures exceptional suffering. The cases can be interpreted as examples 
of how ambiguity is either appropriated or disavowed by the law to conform to the norm of the 
rational calculating legal person. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the effect of the 
judgements is to shape women (and men)  within the parameters of agential masculinity or 
IHPLQLQH YLFWLPKRRG FRQILUPLQJ WKH RSHUDWLRQ RI µHLWKHU-or-IUDPHZRUNV¶ LQ FULPLQDO ODZ
(Norrie 2000). By protecting the borders of legal personhood, the criminal courts also patrol 
the maintenance of the two-sex model implicit in legal personhood (chapter I and III).    
2. The general legal framework: Customs and Excise Management Act of 1971 
This section draws on the relevant legal framework governing drug importation offences and 
the relevant provisions of the Misuse of Drugs Act of 1971 (MDA) and the Customs and Excise 
Management Act of 1979 (CEMA). The offence of fraudulent evasion of a prohibition under 
CEMA s.170 (2) was the most common charged offence in the case study. I focus on the 
peculiarity of this offence, which is meant to accommodate different scenarios of drug 
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importation where there are multiple actors involved and in different jurisdictions. Then, I 
consider the applicability of general and particular defences to this offence, noting how the 
standards of the offence make it difficult to contest criminal responsibility. First, however, we 
need to look at the aim of CEMA, its interaction with the MDA, and the legal authority in 
charge of enforcing these statutes. CEMA creates a number of offences against the exportation 
or importation of prohibited goods into British territory but not specifically drugs. Instead an 
offence under the CEMA can be read in light of other statutes, including the MDA.  
 The MDA 1971 generally defines the lawful and unlawful activities relating to the 
controlled substances regulated in its schedules.186 It is unlawful to import/export (s.3), 
produce/supply (s.4), possess (s.5) controlled substances; cultivate cannabis (s.6); among other 
offences. Other sections relevant to drug trafficking situations in the MDA include s.20 which 
defines as unlawful assistance in or inducement of the commission of a corresponding offence 
abroad.                             
  Drugs are classified in the MDA according to their level of harm, which is assessed on 
a number of factors, including physical, moral, and socio-economic harm (Fortson 2005). 
Parliament holds the legislative power to classify controlled substances but consults the 
Advisory Council, a scientific agency created under the MDA, on how best to schedule them.  
In this context, there are a number of factors that determine the level of harm of a drug such as 
balancing its medical utility against its potential harm187. The MDA is the primary statute 
                                                          
186
 Schedule 1 through 4 regulates licit and illicit activities regarding substances listed in each schedule. The first 
schedule comprises substances deemed to have no medical or scientific purpose, like LSD, cannabis, or psilocin. 
Such assessments have been contested by scientific research, including by the former head of the Advisory 
Council, Professor David Nutt.  Similarly, the Parliament Scientific and Technology Committee issued in 1998 a 
number of recommendations to explore the medical utility of cannabis and cannabiods in the treatment of pain, 
multiple sclerosis, among other conditions.  
187
 Class A drugs, such as heroin and cocaine are considered to be most harmful and carry higher sentences. 
Opiate-derivatives fall within this category too, but they are also regulated for medical purposes, mainly pain 
treatment. Under the MDA, the government determines who can legally produce, possess, handle, import, etc. 
substances under regulation (ibid).Cannabis falls within Class B, although it has been moved to Class C in the 
past.  Accordingly, Class A carries higher sentences, explained further down in this section. Assessment of the 
harm is perhaps the most debated element of drug offences and crucial in making certain activities related to 
controlled substances unlawful. Even where the government authorizes the medical benefits of certain drugs, its 
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regulating activities related to controlled substances in the United Kingdom, and restricts the 
importation/exportation of drugs in s. 3. However, the elements of the offence are described in 
CEMA s. 170 (2) (b).            
 To understand importation/exportation offences we must look at the situation of the UK 
with respect to the global drug market. The UK is not a substantial drug producing or exporting 
country. Rudi Fortson, one of the leading legal scholars on drug offences and a primary 
reference from which the description and analysis in this section is drawn, notes that 
geographical and transportation networks make the UK an international commercial hub where 
a number of aerial and nautical routes converge (Fortson 2005). Its commercial routes overlap 
with drug trafficking routes, even if not all the drugs that enter the British territory are 
distributed here. As a signatory of international drug treaties (discussed in chapter II), Britain 
is responsible for stopping the flow of substances into its own territory and preventing them 
IURPEHLQJH[SRUWHGWRRWKHUFRXQWULHVLELG$VQRWHGLQFKDSWHU,,WKH8.%RUGHU)RUFH¶V
stated aim is both to secure the border and promote ³QDWLRQDOSURVSHULW\ E\ IDFLOLWDWLQJ WKH
legitimate movement of individuals and goods, whilst preventing those that would cause harm 
IURPHQWHULQJWKH8.´(Border Force 2014). The logic behind giving the BF the power to arrest 
drug importation suspects is that organized crime uses or pays migrants to smuggle drugs 
(Home Office 2013). Part XII of the CEMA, endows Border Force (BF) personnel designated 
as customs officers with the responsibility to search for illicit goods entering the territory 
concealed in packages, cargo, or carried by a person, where there are reasonable grounds, while 
the power to detain suspects of an offence under CEMA is laid out in s.138. There are a number 
of offences under CEMA which are punishable with imprisonment although the cases selected 
                                                          
main aim is to regulate their use by determining the authorities who can dispense them. For example, under 
Schedule 4, it is illicLWWRSRVVHVVµPLQRUWUDQTXLOL]HUV¶ZLWKRXWDSUHVFULSWLRQ6LPLODUO\DSSHDOFDVHVORGJHGE\
people justifying the use of cannabis on the basis of suffering conditions like multiple sclerosis or chronic pain 
have failed because they are not legitimated by the MDA to self-medicate.    
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for the case study mainly involve charges under s.170 (2) and to a lesser extent s.170 (1)188. 
Section 170 (2) establishes that: 
without prejudice to any other provision of the Customs and Excise Acts 1979, if any 
person is, in relation to any goods, in any way knowingly concerned in any fraudulent 
evasion or attempt at evasion; 
 (a) of any duty chargeable on the goods; 
(b) of any prohibition or restriction for the time being in force with respect to the goods 
under or by virtue of any enactment; or 
(c) of any provision of the Customs and Excise Acts 1979 applicable to the goods, 
He shall be guilty of an offence under this section and may be [arrested]. 
Regarding s.170 offences, Fortson comments that because of their complexity they have 
³EHFRPHVRPHWKLQJRIDMXGLFLDOQLJKWPDUHSDUWLFXODUO\LQWKHODVWIHZ\HDUV´(Fortson 2005, 
70).  In general terms, the offence under s. 170(2) has two essential elements: the actus reus 
which is the fraudulent evasion or attempt of evasion of a prohibited good; and the mens rea, 
which is being knowingly concerned with the evasion or attempt of evasion. The offence is 
ZLGHLQVFRSHIRUPDQ\UHDVRQV,WZDVPHDQWWR³FDWFKLQGLYLGXDOVZKRZHUHQRWSDUW\WRWKH
RULJLQDOVPXJJOLQJRSHUDWLRQ´LELG$VVXPLQJWKDW WUDIILFking or smuggling operations 
UHTXLUHDµWHDPRISDUWLFLSDQWVWRVHFXUHWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIVPXJJOHGJRRGVDQGSUHYHQWWKHLU
FRQILVFDWLRQE\ODZHQIRUFHPHQWRIILFHUV¶WKHVWDWXWHFDVWVD³SDUWLFXODUO\ZLGHQHW´(ibid., 68) 
to catch individuals who were involved at every stage of the trafficking route. Fortson argues 
                                                          
188
 The main difference between s. 170(1) and s.170 (2) is the mental state required. Subsection 1 is concerned 
with intention to evade a prohibition; subsection 2 requires merely knowledge that one was part of the evasion to 
an importation of a controlled substance.  
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the wide net is caVWWKURXJKDFRQFHSWLRQRIµHYDVLRQ¶DVDcontinuing act,189 which facilitates 
µFDWFKLQJ¶WKHDFWLRQVRIHYHU\SDUWLFLSDQWSRWHQWLDOO\LQYROYHGLQWKHLPSRUWDWLRQH[SRUWDWLRQ
from the one who packs the drugs, to those that carry, receive and harbour them.190 Thus, an 
evasion has been interpreted by the courts as including any acts done before or after the 
importation/exportation. It is for this reason that acts performed outside a jurisdiction leading 
to an importation within fall inside the scope of s.170 (2).  For example, in Wall191 the CA 
accepted that handling packages concealing cannabis in Afghanistan which later arrived in the 
8.FRQVWLWXWHGµVWHSVWDNHQWREULQJDERXWWKHIUDXGXOHQWHYDVLRQ¶   
 Importation offences give rise to difficult questions concerning the limits of 
causation192 where multiple people are involved in the operation. Prosecutors would confront 
a prosecutorial challenge if every person taking part of the trafficking operation were deemed 
to break the chain of causation. But then the option has been to cast the net of causation widely, 
as Fortson observes. For example, the organiser of a drug run abroad does not carry the 
importation, but by casting the net of evasion widely, he/she could still be prosecuted. Without 
considering causation as a continuing act, organizers could not be charged, and the offence 
would only affect the last person in the chain, such as mules and couriers. The continuing 
evasion doctrine also poses difficult questions about the liability of persons who engage in drug 
mule work and then change their mind; or at what point she/he has begun the evasion.  The 
case of Jakeman (1983)193 LOOXVWUDWHVKRZWKHODZIUDPHVLQYROYHPHQWPDNLQJµEDFNLQJRXW¶
                                                          
189
 In R v Neal [1984] 3 All ER 156, CA, the court reiterated the interpretation guidance from the case R v Watts, 
R v Stack &U$SS5DQGDIILUPHGWKDWWKHPHDQLQJRIHYDVLRQZDVZLGHUWKDQWKHWHUPµLPSRUWDWLRQ¶
The reasoning was based on the fictive scenario where different people were involved in moving and harbouring 
drugs with the aim of carrying them into the country. However, strictly speaking only one person, for example the 
sailor, physically imports them. Evasion then means everyone involved in setting the importation in motion.  
190
 In R v Caippara [1988] Crim. L. R. 172, D received an unsolicited package intercepted by customs, which they 
knew about and yet he hid it from the authorities in a warehouse, fulfilling the requirements of the offence. Also, 
in Neal (n 189), the applicant concealed the drugs after they had been imported. For evasions that begin before 
WKHGHIHQGDQW¶VLQYROYHPHQWVHHR v Wall [1974] 2 All ER 245 2. In Wall, the appellant handled cannabis packages 
in Afghanistan which were subsequently sent to the UK.  
191
 Wall (n 190). 
192
 Understood in general terms as the causal link between the unlawful conduct and the result. 
193
 R v Jakeman (1983) 76 Cr. App. R. 223  
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(chapter II) futile. Recruited in Ghana and persuaded to carry about 21 kg of cannabis in return 
for £500, Jakeman changed her mind in Paris, and abandoned the suitcase containing cannabis. 
French baggage officials thought she had lost the baggage and sent it to London, her final 
destination, where it was intercepted by customs. The question arising in this scenario was 
whether the acts of the airport personnel broke the chain of causation but also if it could still 
be said she had the mens rea at the time the airplane carrying the suitcase touched British 
ground. In short, the question also involved the contemporaneity principle, which means the 
mental state and the conduct have to coincide at the same time. The CA decided that Ms. 
-DNHPDQ¶VLQWHQWLRQWRIUDXGXOHQWO\HYDGHDSURKLELWLRQEHJDQZKHQVKHDJUHHGWRVPXJJOHWKH
drugs and took the steps to complete the offence (for example, handling the luggage, taking it 
to the plane). As Wood J said: 
 «,IDJXLOW\PLQGDWWKHWLPHRILPSRUWDWLRQLVDQHVVHQWLDOWKHPDQUHFUXLWHGWRFROOHFW
the package which has already arrived and which he knows contains prohibited drugs 
commits no offence. What matters is the state of mind at the time the relevant acts are 
done, i.e. at the time the defendant is concerned in bringing about the importation.194 
While the prosecution had to prove there was an actual importation, it is not necessary to show 
that the defendant physically imported the item or took steps to bring about the importation. In 
the conjoined appeals to the HL of Latif and Shahzad (1996),195 Lord Steyn further clarified a 
general point on causation applicable to this area of law. He stated that the chain of causation 




 In R v. Latif and Shazad  [1996] 1 All ER 353, 366 it was held that proving an evasion requires actual 
importation of the prohibited goods; which is not necessary in an attempted evasion, clarifying the differences 
between the full offence of evasion and an attempt. The case involved two undercover customs officers (B) and 
one law enforcement agent in Pakistan (H) who persuaded Shazad (S) who had expressed his desire to import 20 
kilograms of heroin to England to H. The Pakistani law enforcement agent (H) organized the contact with B, who 
SRVHGDVD%ULWLVKµSLORW¶ZKRZRXOGWUDQVSRUWWKHGUXJVDQGSHUVXDGHG6WRFRPHWRWKH8.WRWDNHFKDUJHRIWKH
delivery. Upon his arrival in England, he was arrested but the drugs were never really imported. The consignment 
ZDVVHL]HGDQGVXEVWLWXWHG IRUD IRRGSURGXFWDSURFHGXUHFRPPRQO\NQRZQDVD µFOHDQGHOLYHU\¶7HFKQLFDO
complications would arise if clean delivery took place prior to the importation in the jurisdiction where the 




who intends to exploit the situation created by the first, but is not acting in concert with him, 
is held to relieve the first actor of criminal responsibility.´196  In short, the airport personnel in 
-DNHPDQ¶VFDVHZHUHLQQRFHQWDJHQWVEHFDXVHWKH\GLGQRWNQRZWKH\ZHUHSDUWRIDQHYDVLRQ
and their act could not therefore have been free or deliberate. The only way to refute liability 
for her actions would have been if someone had stolen the bag, knowing that it had drugs and 
stole them for their own advantage (Fortson 2005, 83).   
3. The guilty mind of s.170 (2) (b): Knowledge and intent 
The guilty state of mind (or mens rea) for this offence includes knowledge and intention to 
fraudulently evade a prohibited importation/exportation. As Fortson notes, the leading case for 
interpreting the state of mind of for purposes of s.170 (2) (b) is actually the pre-CEMA case of 
Hussain.197 The case involved Hussain and two other crew members travelling in a motor 
vessel from Spain to Liverpool, where the customs officer discovered packages full of cannabis 
resin under the bulkhead panel. Hussain said he had been threatened with death if he declared 
the illicit goods. Nonetheless, he was found guilty and his case appealed on the basis of an 
alleged misdirection to the jury on the meaQLQJRIµNQRZOHGJH¶ The CA rejected the appeal 
DQG HODERUDWHG WKH PHDQLQJ RI µNQRZOHGJH¶ ZKLFK FRQWDLQV WKUHH HVVHQWLDO HOHPHQWV DOO RI
which have to be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt: knowledge that the 
goods were subject to a prohibition; b) knowledge that the acts were meant to evade a 
prohibition; knowledge that prohibition will be evaded fraudulently. Widgery LJ explained 
that: 
«WKH ZRUG NQRZLQJO\«LV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK NQRZLQJ WKDW D IUDXGXOHQW HYDVLRQ RI D
prohibition in respect of goods in taking place. If, therefore, the accused knows that 
                                                          
196
 ibid., 364a. 
197
 [1969] 2 All ER 1117 
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what is afoot is the evasion of a prohibition against importation and he knowingly takes 
part in that operation, it is sufficient to justify conviction, even if he does not know what 
kind of goods are being imported.198        
Although it might seem to be a convoluted clarification of how knowledge is applied, 
subsequent cases have ratified that knowledge does not have to be specific. In other words, 
there must be evidence that the defendant knew about the prohibition199 and that it was to be 
evaded fraudulently. Knowledge is defined in Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner200 
DV³wilfully sKXWWLQJRQH¶VH\HVWRWKHWUXWK´201 ZKLOHIUDXGXOHQWO\QRZPHDQV³a dishonest 
intHQWLRQ´ to evade the prohibition.202  The tripartite direction in Hussain has been ratified in 
subsequent cases,203 but also questioned in Hennessy. 204 In this case, the CA did not consider 
that specific knowledge of the type of prohibition was not necessary. Hennessy believed he 
carried pornography, which he knew was an item subject to a prohibition. But he did not know 
that, in fact, what was concealed in the car was actually cannabis. The appeal was denied, and 
accordingly, a harsh approach that sweepingly homogenizes all kinds of prohibited items was 
applied. This position was upheld more recently in Forbes,205 where Lord Hope defended the 
direction, noting that it would be very damaging if prosecutors had to prove the defendant knew 
the precise prohibition (whether it was drugs or pornography) or even worse, if it was a class 
                                                          
198
 ibid. [1119 ] 
199
 R v Suurmeijer [1991] Cr. L.R. 773 considered that the mere fact of accompanying someone who is carrying 
out an evasion is not enough to prove knowledge.  In this case, a passenger (S) was in the car driven by (H). 
Customs found that there was cannabis concealed in the petrol tank, but there was not enough evidence to show 
that S knew about the drugs.  
200
 [1969] 2 A.C. 256  
201
 Although this case involved a case of possession, which is not a requirement in s.170 (2)(b), it is the general 
direction of knowledge. Fortson argues that it is mostly a question of evidence rather than substantive law ( Fortson 
2005, 102). 
202
 $WWRUQH\*HQHUDO¶V5HIHUHQFH (No. 1 of 1981) [1982] Q. B 848.  
203
 See R v. Taaffe [1984] A.C. 539; R v. Shivpuri [1987] A.C. 1; and more recently R v. Forbes [2000] 1 W.L.R. 
428, H.L.  
204
 [1978] 68 Cr. App. R. 419 
205
 Forbes (n 203). 
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B or class C substance (Fortson 2005, 95). 206      
 Fortson explains thaWµGHIHQFHV¶IRUVE basically refer to the absence of the 
mental elements. There is a possibility that the defendant had a mistaken belief as to law or a 
mistaken belief as to whether the goods were not prohibited (ibid., 1971).  In the first case, the 
suspect has mistakenly believing that the goods were not prohibited by law (for example, where 
one genuinely believes that importing cannabis is not prohibited). In the second case, a person 
mistakenly believes that the goods imported were prohibited when in fact, they are not (for 
example, believing that importing chocolate is prohibited). The availability of these defences 
shows that an importation offences is not an absolute liability offence because proving the 
guilty mind, formed by intention and knowledge, is an essential ingredient of the offence207. 
Yet, knowledge is arguably subjective, 208 meaning that it is based on the facts as the defendant 
believed them to be. Drug mules often claim to the court they did not know what they carried, 
specifically, if they carried a class A or class C drug. Others claim they did not know at all the 
W\SH RI SURGXFW WKH\¶G VPXJJOH Of course, there are problems with this assessment of 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\$V)OHHWZRRG¶VUHVHDUFKVKRZVGUXJPXOHVRIWHQGRQRWKDYHFRQWURORYHUWKH
packaging (Fleetwood 2014) and do not know for certain if what they would carry are drugs or 
another prohibited commodity(Green 1998).       
 Finally, the other element required is the dishonest intention to take part in the operation 
which the defendant knows is aimed at evading a prohibition. Being reckless or negligent will 
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 Recall that importing a Class A drug is punished more severely than a Class C or B drug. This created a problem 
when the HL decided in the case of R v. Courtie [1984] A.C. 463 that if an offence creates different penalties, 
then it creates separate offences. The impact of Courtie for s.170 offences was reviewed in Taaffe (n 203); R v. 
Shivpuri [1987] A.C.1 and R v. Ellis (1987) 84 Cr. App. R. 235. The impact and resolution by the courts, as 
Fortson suggests, is that where goods are subject to different prohibitions they should also be attracting penalties. 
In other words, class A, B and C are essentially different offences because the penalties are very different. If the 
prosecution were required to prove the corresponding mens rea, then Hennessy and Hussain would be 
wrong(Fortson 2005, 97). As it stands, they are both still good law.  
207
  Forbes (n 203). 
208
  The court ratified Taaffe QZKHUHLWZDVµDOVRDFFHSWHGWKDWIRUWKHSXUSRVHRIVHFWLRQRIWKH





not suffice for a conviction, according to the direction in Panyani (No. 2).209 In this case, two 
men were arrested in British territorial waters with cannabis resin on board their yacht. They 
argued that they did not have the intention to evade the laws of Britain, but of Holland. The 
CA held that they could not be guilty because intention to dishonestly evade a prohibition 
requires specific intent. While this case stresses intention essential to an evasion, Fortson 
argues it is not clear whether the prosecution has to prove that each person in the operation was 
acting with the intention to dishonestly evade the law.210 This dilemma points again to the issue 
of how the law deals with offences where there are multiple people involved, some of whom 
PLJKWEHHYHQFDUU\LQJRXWVRPHERG\HOVH¶VGLVKRQHVWLQWHQWLRQ    
 In short, the way that CEMA has been worded, and interpreted with the intention of 
casting a broad net, disregards individual culpability. It is still unclear whether the offence 
requires only that a person knows of the operation, even if they did not agree, intend or desire 
it to happen because the House of Lords ± now Supreme Court - has not settled a definitive 
interpretation of who has to have dishonest intention, suggesting that all the prosecution needs 
to prove is that the accused knew an evasion was going to happen even if the intention to 
fraudulently evade the prohibition belonged to someone else (Fortson 2005, 80). It is not hard 
to see how this approach widens the scope of liability greatly.  
4. Excusatory defences: Duress and coercion 
Coercion is often referenced in s. 170 offences but only as a mitigation factor. A defence of 
duress211 can be undermined if the accused knew she was getting involved with people who 
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 Panyani (No.2) [1989] 1 W.L.R. 187 
210
 For example, the question in Latif (n 195) was whether an undercover law enforcement agent would have the 
LQWHQWLRQWRHYDGHWKHODZZKHQLQIDFWWKHLQWHQWLRQZDVVRPHERG\HOVH¶V,WFRXOGEHDUJXHGWKRXJKWKDWWKLVLVD
problem of separating motivation from intention.  
211
 In the leading case of duress, R. v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22, the HL defined duress as a defence which does 
QRWQHJDWHWKHDEVHQFHRIDQHVVHQWLDOLQJUHGLHQWRIWKHRIIHQFHEXWH[FXVHVWKHRIIHQGHU¶VOLDELOLW\EHFDXVHRI
pressure exeUWHG WR GR DQ RIIHQFH DJDLQVW RQH¶V ZLOO ,W LV D FRQFHVVLRQ WR KXPDQ IUDLOW\ DQG D VXEMHFWLYLVW
UHFRJQLWLRQWKDWRQHVKRXOGQRWEHOLDEOHIRUDFWLQJDOEHLWEUHDNLQJWKHODZWR³SUHYHQWFDWDVWURSKLFFRQVHTXHQFHV
to those whom they are attached or feel reVSRQVLEOH´(Simester and Sullivan 2003, 665). 
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were likely to subject her to threats of violence, such as presumed offenders.212 The defence of 
duress can only succeed where there was an imminent or almost imminent213 threat of death or 
physical harm214 against oneself or a third party. Blackmail, financial pressure,215 or a threat of 
false imprisonment216 will not suffice. It seems that due to a perceived increase in the use of 
this defence in drug offence situations,217 WKHFRXUWV¶UHsponse has been to further narrow its 
applicability. Baroness Hale did not agree to this narrow approach to duress as affirmed in 
Hussain.218 She argued that the courts are more interested in denying the defence than 
considering the dilemmas vulnerable people confront through their relations with violent 
people and lack of access to protection by state agencies (Simester and Sullivan 2003, 668). 
Immediacy of the threat is often linked to unavoidability (ibid.). If the defendant had 
opportunities to make the threat known to the police, then the defence fails.219 The law judges 
the threat from a subjective perspective, that is, on the facts as the defendant knew them. Yet 
the propensity to cave in to the threat is assessHGIURPWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRID³sober person of 
reasonable firmness;´220 a guidance which is sometimes criticised because it requires people 
to act heroically especially when coerced to commit serious offences.221 The only 
characteULVWLFV DOORZHG LQWR WKH FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI µUHDVRQDEOH ILUPQHVV¶ DUH VH[ DQG DJH
although pregnancy has been included also. Personality traits such as shyness, vulnerability 
(understood as being suggestible due to cognitive disabilities) are not attributes of the 




 Hasan (n 211). 
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 R. v. Baker [1997] Crim LR 497 (CA). 
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 R .v. Steane [1947] KB 997, 1005. Obiter accepted false imprisonment of duress, but unlikely now due to 
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 R v. Hudson [1971] 2 QB. See also (Simester and Sullivan 2003). 
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 R v. Graham [1982] 1 All ER, 801, 806. 
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  In R v. Abbott >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not sure what point you are making here ± badly expressed]. 
240 
 
³reasonable/ordinary person´222 Another requirement for duress is that the person exerting the 
threat actually nominates the crime to be done by the victim of duress.223     
 Finally, the defence of duress will fail if the victim voluntarily exposed herself to the 
risk of compulsion through the association with a criminal organization or gang.224 Where the 
SHUVRQFODLPLQJGXUHVVZDVµDVVRFLDWHG¶225 and thought the person was violent, legal duress 
cannot be claimed because the necessity to use the defence was self-induced. Prior to the 
introduction of the sentencing guidelines for drug offences in 2012, Lady Hale had suggested 
that although the pressure placed upon drug mules comes very close to the defence of duress, 
WKH+RXVHRI/RUGV³KDVGUDZQWKLVYHU\tightly, excluding anyone who voluntarily associates 
ZLWKFULPLQDOVDQGRXJKWWRKDYHIRUHVHHQWKHULVNRIEHLQJVXEMHFWWRFRPSXOVLRQE\WKUHDWV´
(Hale 2005b). She did not intend to say women should not be punished, but that sentencing 
should play a substantial role to prevent injustice. 
5. Case study: Sentencing practices for drug mules in England and Wales 
This section analyses the discourses on the vulnerability of drug mules in the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division), building on the theoretical discussions throughout this thesis. The analysis 
has two main point of references. First, the guideline judgment on the vulnerability of drug 
mules in Aramah226 and Faluade227 in the 1980s and the new Definitive Guidelines of 2012 
(DG). I will explain briefly how the history of the DG and justify the significance of researching 
sentencing appeals, the criteria adopted to select the cases for the case study, and the 
methodology employed to analyse the cases. 
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i. Examining case law and the Definitive Guidelines for Drug Offences 
As mentioned in chapter II, deterrence restricted the possibility consider the vulnerability of 




became the Sentencing Council in 2010. The latter produced another draft guideline, which 
LQFRUSRUDWHGWKH6$3¶VSURSRVDOWRJLYHPRUHZHLJKWWRWKHSULQFLSOHRISURSRUWLRQDOLty, but 
did not change the severity in the sentences for drug offences (ibid.). In other words, the aim 
of the SC was to maintain the severity of the punishment; except for lesser offenders, such as 
GUXJ ³PXOHV´ (Sentencing Council 2011b; Loveless 2012b). The Definitive Guidelines for 
Drug Offences (hHUHDIWHU'*DSSURYHGWKH6&¶VRINHHSLQJWKHJHQHUDOVHYHULW\LQWDFWEXW
balance it out against the individual culpability of the offender.    
 7KH IROORZLQJ VHFWLRQV DQDO\VH WKH &$¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI KRZ WR DSSO\ WKH QHZ
guidelines. In the case of importation offences, the courts must determine first the offence 
category (step 1). The DG sets out a list of characteristics that could indicate the role of the 
offender, subdivided into three categories: lesser, significant and leading. The second 
component which judges must weigh in step 1 is the category of the harm, which is subdivided 
into four categories according to the quantity and type of drug imported (see Appendix I, Table 
2). After determining the category, the court decides the corresponding starting point and 
category range (step 2 in the DG-see Appendix I, Table 3 and 4). As explained in the DG, the 
VWDUWLQJ SRLQW ³DSSOLHV WR DOO RIIHQGHUV LUUHVSHFWLYH RI SOHD DQG SUHYLRXV FRQYLFWLRQV´
(Sentencing Council 2012, 5).  At this point, the sentencer must also weigh in the non-
exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating factors within the category range  applicable to 
the type of drug involved (class A, B or C) (Appendix I, Table 4). However, the DG also states 
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that departures from the sentencing range are possible if the offender has a leading role. After 
determining the sentence range, the courts should adjust the starting point if the offender 
cooperates with the authorities (step 3); pleads guilty at the earliest opportunity (step 4); if there 
other sentences being served (step 5); confiscation and ancillary orders (step 6); and the court 
must provide the reasons for the sentence imposed (step 7); and time in remand (step 8) 
(Appendix I, Table I).          
 The analysis presented in the case study focuses particularly on step 1 and 2, namely 
how the courts determine the role of the offender with reference to the characteristics listed for 
the lesser and significant role. In the Professional Consultation, the SC identified drug mules 
DV RIIHQGHUV ZKR ZRXOG ILW WR WKH ³VXERUGLQDWH´ FDWHJRU\ QRZ NQRZQ DV ³OHVVHU´ while 
professional couriers would fit to the ³significant´ category. It also expected that once they DG 
were in place, GUXJPXOHVFRXOGHQGXS UHFHLYLQJ ORZHUVHQWHQFHV WKDQ³WKRVHJLYHQXQGHU
FXUUHQW VHQWHQFLQJ SUDFWLFH´ (Sentencing Council 2011b, 32). Considering these two 
categories, now represented by mules and couriers, the case study explores how vulnerability 
is deployed in sentencing appeals in order to identify an offender as a drug mule or as a drug 
courier.  The DG do not give a specific definition of vulnerability, so in that sense, another task 
involves mapping how vulnerability has been articulated in the CA. One of the reasons of 
looking at case law on the vulnerability of drug mules decided before the 2012 is because the 
DG is informed by previous sentencing practices. The guidelines sought to codify existing case 
law and judges interpret the new guidelines in light of existing sentencing practice (ibid.).
 Additionally, recall the discussion in chapter V, where vulnerability is suggested as a 
metonymic albeit ambiguous concept. Particularly, I am interested in tracking the assignation 
to offenders of characteristics normally associated with vulnerability-as-victimhood. My 
second aim is to find out which facts of the case are used to support the disambiguation of the 
roles of ambivalent drug importation offenders; in particular, the extent to which vulnerability 
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discourses, in their different expressions, support this disambiguation. Finally, I want to 
analyse how gender and subjectivity are articulated with reference to vulnerability and to assess 
the extent to which this articulation exhibit similarities with the gendered models of legal 
personhood explored in chapter III, IV and IV.      
 Concretely, the analysis draws on CA discourses on vulnerability and how they relate 
to the judicial interpretation of drug mules. This context presents some obvious challenges. 
First WKHUH LV D FOHDU SUDFWLFDO DQG LGHRORJLFDO FKDOOHQJH EHFDXVH WKH WHUP ³PXOH´ FDUULHV
assumptions about gender, nationality and agency (Fleetwood 2014, 7)7KHWHUP³FRXULHU´KDV
been the most consistently used term in the courts, and indeed, prior to 2012, it tended to be 
XVHG DV D V\QRQ\P IRU ³PXOHV´ The DG represent, apparently, a radical break with this 
practice. However, the pressure to distinguish the roles of importation offenders precedes the 
DG, through the appeals against the sentencing practices in place since the 1980s and WKH6$3¶V
FRQVXOWDWLRQLQ7KH6&LQFRUSRUDWHGVRPHRIWKH6$3¶VDGYLFHLQFOXGLQJSD\LQJPRUH
attention to the proportionality principle (Sentencing Council 2011b), which is reflected in the 
DG inclusion of the culpability of the offender in step 1 (Appendix I). Thus, while my search 
focused mainly on 2000-2014, there will inevitably be reference to leading cases prior to 2000. 
 It is ZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWDVHDUFKEDVHGRQO\RQWKHWHUPµYXOQHUDEOH¶RUµYXOQHUDELOLW\¶
returned only a handful of results. This led me to do multiple-searches cross-referencing the 
WHUPVµFRXULHU¶DQGµPXOH¶ZLWKPRWKHU¶µFKLOGUHQ¶DQGµIDWKHU¶µYXOQHUDELOLW\¶DQGµPHUF\¶LQ
order to identify cases which would enable me to query how gender shaped the legal discourse. 
7KH WHUP µPHUF\¶ ZDV DQ XQOLNHO\ WHUP WR XVH LQ WKH VHDUFK EXW LW EHFDPH QHFHVVDU\ DIWHU
reading the cases which made reference to vulnerability, which will be explained in the case 
study. A more detailed exposition of the research design and selection of cases appears in 
Appendix II of this thesis. 
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ii. Sentencing appeals and the criminal process.    
The following case study focuses on appellate sentencing judgements. There are number of 
reasons why I explore this stage in the criminal justice process. Firstly, the aim is to analyse 
the interpretation of the 2012 Sentencing Guidelines drug trafficking offences. The case study 
examines whether there was a significant change in the sentencing appeals discourses after the 
SG came into force by mapping the distinction between drug mules and drug couriers. 
Vulnerability discourses shape the distinction between drug mules and couriers. There are two 
stages were we can find vulnerability discourses: 1) the sentencing and 2) the sentencing 
appeal.  These discourses are mediated by different legal actors (the Crown prosecution, 
counsel for the appellant, and the probation officer, through the pre-sentencing report). So 
technically, in the absence of a trial, the judges may often rely on the information given by a 
SUREDWLRQRIILFHU¶VSUH-sentencing report to determine the punishment of the drug importer. 
Some cases show that the judge relies heavily on the pre-sentencing report. However, pre-
sentencing reports (hereafter PSR) are not available in every case before passing a sentence 
and in those cases, judges rely on the information from the trial (where there was one). Pre-
sentencing reports have been increasingly used since the 1960s228 and s.156 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 now requires the production of a PSR before imposing a custodial or 
community sentence.  Ashworth reports there is often a judicial reluctance to use pre-sentence 
reports because they are written in social work jargon; judges may even criticize probation 
officers for taking information provided by the defendant at face value. Other criticisms include 
also the selectivity of the information collected by the probation officers (Ashworth 2010, 379). 
However, Cyrus Tata praises PSRs for their vital role in restoring a sense of individuality and 
dignity to offenders which is lost in abstract legal jargon. Moreover, he suggests that the 
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 The meaning of a pre-sentence report is governed by s.158 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  
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process of producing the reports facilitates the production of guilty plea (Tata 2010).229 The 
compilation of PSRs in cases of female offenders has been endorsed by the Corston Report and 
incorporated by the Sentencing Advisory PanHO¶VOverarching Principles of Sentencing (2008), 
where it recommended that PSRs should always be available in cases involving female 
offenders (Ashworth 2010, 248); however, they are not mandatory under the DG (Loveless 
2012b). I also want to stress how PSRs are not unmediated accounts because they translate and 
IUDPHDQRIIHQGHUV¶VWRULHVDFFRUGLQJWRDSDUWLFXODUIRUPDWDQGSURIHVVLRQDOODQJXDJH230 
 Another reason to focus on appellate judgments is because a substantial number of the 
cases examined by the CA (Criminal Division) are sentencing appeals, lodged because the 
Crown Court or Magistrate Court might not have inadequately calculated the punishment. The 
CA also reviews points of law or procedural issues.  As mentioned before, a large bulk of the 
work of the CA addresses appeals to sentences.  For example, the CA received 4,706 
applications to appeal sentences (for all offences) and 1,410 applications to appeal conviction 
between 2013- 2014. Significantly, 74 per cent and 85 per cent were refused by a single judge 
(Courts and Tribunal Judiciary 2014). In limited cases, a case may raise questions about the 
constitutionality of a decision or points of law of general interest made by one of the lower 
courts231 may be further examined UK Supreme Court.232.      
 The last reason why the case study focuses on sentencing appeals is because it is the 
court where individual stories are more easily allowed without the restrictions of the paradigm 
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of the rational legal subject. Recall the critique in chapter II, on how sentencing has been used 
DVWKHVWDJHLQWKHSURFHVVZKLFKµFRUUHFWV¶DQGDFFRPPRGDWHVLQGLYLGXDOLQMXVWLFHFODLPVOHIW
out of the adjudication of legal guilt drawn tightly through the conventions of  individual 
responsibility (Norrie 2001). Rather than being irrelevant for the questions posed by the law 
(the legal responsibility of the offender), the personal circumstances of the appellant become 
again relevant, particularly in determining the mitigating and aggravating circumstances of the 
offence. Both the sentencing and appeal stage are even more important considering the 
particularities of drug importation offences. Recall importation offences cast a wide net, 
disregarding the role of each person as long as it can be shown they were part of the enterprise 
to evade a prohibition with dishonest intention and knowledge that it would be carried about. 
This means, as far as I understand it, that there are very few options to contest legal guilt (recall 
Jakeman233). Thus, it is not surprising at all that a majority of the cases selected were 
adjudicated through a guilty plea (See Appendix II, Table 1).  As mentioned before, the 
aSSHOODQWV¶UROHV are determined for sentencing purposes. What this means, particularly for this 
case study, is that there are many actors involved in the construction of vulnerability. In each 
stage of the process (sentencing and appeal), the actors involved offer different opinions on the 
role (culpability) of the drug importer, thus they shape what vulnerability should mean. This 
leads to the next point which is a clarification of the methodology used to analyse the cases.  
iii. Methodology: (Mis) reading facts and frames of interpretation 
,W ZRXOG QRW EH VXUSULVLQJ WR VD\ WKDW WKH IDFWV DERXW GUXJ PXOHV¶ personal and familial 
circumstances are shaped by the judicial discourse. However, are these facts also instrumental 
in shaping gendered models of legal personhood and responsibility? And considering the 
discussions in the last chapters, is vulnerability intelligible to the sentencing courts and how 
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does it become intelligible (after it was masked by the juridical subject of reason)?  I approach 
these questions, through different methods of reading a judgment. First, I draw on Allison 
<RXQJ¶VLGHDRQKRZfacts presented in the aSSHDODUHFRQVWUXFWHGLQRUGHU³to have an effect 
upon thH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI OHJDO UXOHV´ <RXQJ  . Secondly, I draw on Elena 
/RL]LGRX¶VFULWLTXHRIUHDGLQJD judgement DVDWH[WZKLFKKDVDKLGGHQµWUXWK¶WREHXQFRYHUHG
by the jurisprudent.          
 )LUVWOHWPHH[SODLQ<RXQJ¶VPHWKRGRIUHDGLQJDMXGJPHQWBy focusing on the effects 
of the facts, Allison Young reverses the order of the traditional judicial interpretation which 
assumes that the principles of criminal law shape the outcome of the case. Instead, Young 
explores how certain facts are uses to support normative characterisations of femininity, while 
these characterisations also shapes the legal principle. She shows this through a re-reading of 
the appeals of Sarah Thornton234 and Kiranyit Ahluwalia,235 two leading cases on conjugal 
homicide. Without rehearsing all the details of the cases, both Thornton and Ahluwalia were 
tried for homicide after killing their abusive husbands. Instead of focusing on the legal 
principles of the partial defences to murder contested in the appeals, Young signposts the 
locations in the text where the facts supported not only a normative and counter-normative 
expressions of femininity. In the case of Thornton, the facts of the case were interpreted as 
transgressions to an ideal of femininity. That ideal was embodied by Ahluwalia: whose 
subjectivity in the judgment appears as a passive, sacrificing mother and daughter who was 
µIRUFHG¶E\KHUFXOWXUHWRPDUU\DQDEXVLYHPDQ,QFRQWUDVWFXHVWRWKHVHTXHQFHRIHYHQWVLQ
7KRUQWRQ¶VFDVHVKRZDZLOIXOZRPDQZKRLVWREODPHIRUKHUYLFWLPL]DWLRQVKHNQHZWKHPDQ
had problems drinking, she taunted him, she threatened him in a message drawn with lipstick 
in a mirror (Young 1997). While Ahluwalia also challenged the patriarchal rule by killing her 
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husband, the event which put her at the margins of the community, her victimization allowed 
a return, but only as a victim. Young suggests the facts of the cases, like the image of the docile 
wife who endured DQ DEXVLYH PDUULDJH DUH XVHG WR VXSSRUW WKH SDUDGLJP RI ³authentic 
feminLQLW\´ UHSUHVHQWHG E\ $KOXZDOLD¶V YLFWLPKRRG DV D ZD\ WR EULQJ KHU EDFN the social 
community. Thornton, on the other hand, is an ambivalent offender, shown through the facts 
as a woPDQ ZKR µPDVTXHUDGHV¶ YLFWLPKRRG <RXQJ FRQFOXGHV WKDW IHPDOH RIIHQGHUV ZKR 
SHUIRUPDIDNHYLFWLPKRRGDUH³compelled to remain in the margins, a border figure whose 
experiences are discouQWHG DQG GLVPLVVHG E\ WKH FRXUW´(ibid., 150). The subjectivity of 
ambivalent offenders iV D ³PLPHVLV ZLWKRXW UHDOLW\´ and thus, they are shunned for their 
betrayal of femininity (ibid., 149).        
 Drawing on this dynamic of inclusion/exclusion of femininity in the judgements, the 
case study analyses how court narratives disambiguate the ambivalent female offender, that is 
WKHRQHZKRµPDVTXHUDGHV¶KHUYLFWLPKRRGIn that sense, the case analysis examines in detail 
which facts of the case are linked to notions of vulnerability based on an idealized feminine 
victim (chapter II and IV), and which facts are used to compare and exclude women deemed 
to be masquerading vulnerability (Schemenauer 2012). Recall that in the discussion in chapter 
III, I suggested there is a limited space for ambiguity in criminal law because it is structured 
LQWR µHLWKHU-RU¶ IUDPHZRUNV VXFK DV JXLOW-or-innocence. Taking these points together, my 
FRQWHQWLRQ LV DV IROORZVZKHQSUHVHQWHGZLWKDQDPELYDOHQWRIIHQGHU VXFKDV WKH µYLFWLP-
DJHQW¶GUXJPXOHWKHUDWLRQDOLW\RIWKHODZSXVKes towards disambiguation. So what supports 
the efforts of disambiguation?       
 Here we need to consider different ways to approach a legal text and analyse the 
discourses on the vulnerability of drug mules. On the one hand, there is a tradition which seeks 
WR ILQG WKH µWUXH¶ PHDQLQJ RI D WH[W (Loizidou 2007). This is common in legislative 
interpretation where judges look for the true intentions of a statute or of words uttered in a 
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judgement. Rather than ORRNLQJIRUWKHµWUXH¶PHDQLQJRIXWWHUDQFHV(ibid., 9) by charting the 
citational practices in the text, my aim is to explore the effects of the language performed. 
PerIRUPDWLYH WKHRU\ DFFRXQWV IRU WKH ³DFWLYH UROH SOD\HG E\ ERWK ODQJXDJH DQG ERGLHV LQ
UHFRQVWUXFWLQJWKHSDVWDQGUHILJXULQJWKHIXWXUH´LELG, 20 ). Translated into court practices, 
E\UHWHOOLQJDVWRU\RI WKHFULPLQDOHYHQWRQHLVQRWVLPSO\QDUUDWLQJWKHµWUXWK¶RIDQHYHQW
ORFDWHG LQ WKH SDVW ,QVWHDG WKH FRXUWV¶ GLVFRXUVHV DUH DFWLYHly shaping, gendering, and 
rendering criminal subjects legible or illegible in relation to the rules of the law and legal 
categories. However, I have also argued throughout the thesis that ambiguity cannot be wholly 
eliminated (from the legal subject, from the body in pain, from punishment). In particular, 
UHFDOOKRZ1RUULHVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHMXGJHPHQWLVWU\LQJWRVROYH³what is essentially irresolute´
QDPHO\³the judgement of individual responsibility in the particular case (Norrie 2005, 100). 
Drawing together the performativity of the citational practices and the impossibility of closing 
off the question of individual responsibility, I read the MXGJHPHQW¶V WKURXJK LWV productive 
ambiguity. Stated otherwise, sentencing proceedings introduce the stories of the offenders 
(through mitigating/aggravating factors and the culpability of the offender), and thus, could be 
read as contestations to the legal person who is not endowed with characteristics other than 
reason. Moreover, sentencing appeals restage contestations over punishment decisions in a 
public space, in contrast to the obscurity of behind-the-doors justice of guilty pleas. Guilty 
pleas formally silences the defendant, but the appeal opens up a space for contestation, to speak 
out against the norms of the rational legal person and its accompanying version of individual 
responsibility.           
 To sum up, the analysis highlights the facts, which are citational practices that have an 
effect on disambiguating subjectivity. These citational practices draw on conventions about 
femininity as well as masculinity, which intersect with other interrelated themes, specifically: 
a) economic circumstances and financial motivations; and b) personal characteristics framed 
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through gender norms. These themes reflect the discussion in chapter II, where I suggested that 
the vulnerability of drug mules has been constructed with reference to tropes of the financially 
motivated drug trafficker and the feminized drug mule. The analysis of the case law is 
organized in the following way. First, it presents the two leading cases which elaborate upon 
how the guidelines should be interpreted and applied. Then, it develops the thematization of 
vulnerability through economic circumstances and personal characteristics. Finally, it presents 
a conclusion on the effects of these narratives in differentiating couriers from mules. 
6.  Dispelling myths about WKHQHZJXLGHOLQHV'HILQLQJ³WUXH´UROHVDQG
uncovering role-playing  
Soon after the guidelines were published (in February 2012), the CA dealt with two important 
appeals dealing with their interpretation and applicability: First, the conjoined application of 
Boakye and Others 236 and then the $WWRUQH\*HQHUDO¶V5HIHUHQFH1R	RI237. 
In Boakye and Others, the CA set itself the task of showing how roles should be considered in 
the future although there were two specific grounds for the application. First, the Court were 
required to consider if the guidelines were retrospectively applicable; and second, if the 
guidelines did apply, it was necessary to determine whether or not the sentences were too high 
because the roles of the applicants were inaccurately assessed. Without going into too many 
details, the CA decided that the new guidelines could not be applied retrospectively. On the 
VHFRQGLVVXHLWQRWHGWKDWQRQHRIWKHDSSHOODQWVFRXOGEHDIIRUGHGWKHµGUXJPXOH¶ODEHODQG
ZHUH LQVWHDG µGUXJ FRXULHUV¶ In contrast to the pre-sentencing guidelines, where mule and 
couriers were synonymous, the significance of this decision is that the CA clearly distinguished 
the characteristics applicable to mules and to couriers. As I will suggest throughout the analysis 
of the cases the characteristics of the mule and the courier, both in the DG of 2012 and the case 
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law interpretation by the CA, are drawn along the lines of gender. The courier represents the 
legal person of criminal law (chapter III) while the mule is identified through feminized version 
of vulnerability.          
 Let us examine first the facts reviewed by the CA and the points highlighted in the 
judgment of why none of the applicants could be considered a drug mule. The application 
involved six applicants sentenced between 2008 and 2011 for importing varying quantities of 
Class A drugs. First, Shireen Jagne, aged 44, imported 7.35kg of cocaine. She was tried and 
sentenced to 12 years in custody. To decide whether the sentencing judge had reached the 
appropriate sentence and if the appellants could fit into the lesser role category, the CA 
reYLHZHG WKH GHFLVLRQ RI WKH &URZQ FRXUW +XJKHV¶ /- WKH &$ MXGJH H[SODLQHG KRZ WKH
VHQWHQFLQJMXGJHQRWHGWKDW-DJQH³ZDVE\QRPHDQVDYXOQHUDEOHWKLUG-world citizen´238 On 
DSSHDO +XJKHV /- DGGHG WKDW KHU VWRU\ KDG EHHQ ³OHVV WKDQ SHUVXDVLYH´ DQG ³ZKROO\
XQUHOLDEOH´239  and described her as a London resident who presented a fake story about going 
to Gambia for birth-conception traditional remedies. Next, the judgment refers to Ifeoma 
Nwude, 37, who imported the equivalent of 1.84 kg of cocaine and pleaded not guilty, but lost 
the case and was sentenced to 12 years in prison.  According to the CA she did not fit the lesser 
role category. Nwude, a Belgian-Nigerian citizen, had told the authorities she got stranded in 
Cameroon and offered to carry drugs to France, where she continued the journey to England 
on the Eurostar train. The CA noted that her role was most likely significant because the 
evidence presented at her trial was that she knew the people involved in the operation, made 
the travel arrangements herself, and was closely involved at every step of the process. In the 
case of Rebekah Alleyne, 23, she was also found guilty by jury trial and given a 10 year 
sentence after importing 3.81kg of cocaine. She was a UK citizen who went to the Caribbean 
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concealed in rum bottles. Retelling the finding of the Crown judge, Hughes LJ said: 
He reached the conclusion that the applicant was to be distinguished from the kind of 
courier in whose case it could sometimes be understood what drove them to act as they 
had, especially if they came from a very poor background.  The applicant did not.  She 
had plenty of money.  She had no need to commit the offence.  She had chosen to do 
so. The only imaginable reason was greed.240  
Then we have the case of Christiana Boakye, 49, who imported almost 4 kg of cocaine and 
pleaded guilty promptly. She was sentencHGWRHLJKW\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQW although in her case, 
Hughes LJ implied that he could not ascertain if she had a significant role because there was 
³QRHYLGHQFHRIH[SORLWDWLRQRUFRHUFLRQ´241  Reviewing the case of Sbida Nasri, the Lord 
Justice accepted that pressure had an effect on her and more likely so because her friend 
³UHPDLQHGLQ%UD]LODQGWKXVQRGRXEWXQGHUWKHLQIOXHQFHRIWKHSHRSOHIRUZKRPVKHKDGEHHQ
working´242 Nasri, 23, imported about 2 kg of cocaine and also pleaded guilty. Her sentence 
was set at seven years and three months imprisonment. Nasri is described in the narrative as a 
French citizen with a good job who thought she would be taking computers to Brazil as a favour 
to a friend. Once in Brazil, the narrative stresses how she was inIOXHQFHGE\³VWURQJ-minded 
SHRSOH´243 who pressured her to keep to the deal they had in mind. Finally, Donna Latchman, 
34 and from Guyana, imported 1 kg of a Class A drug. She pleaded guilty to the importation 
charges and was sentenced to five years in custody. Hughes L.J stated the sentencing judge had 
been willing to accept that she acted out of financial desperation even though the expected 
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used to open a shop. Despite this, or precisely because of this information, Hughes L.J. noted 
that if a fuller investigation had been carried out, Nasri could have been considered for the 
lesser role category.244         
 To understand the reasoning applied, we must stop and examine what and how the CA 
understands the terms courier and mule. From the outset, Hughes LJ said that all the applicants 
DWWUDFWHGWKHGHVFULSWLRQRI³µFRXULHU¶LQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH\ZHUHDOOGHDOWZLWKRQWKHEDVLVWKDW
the drugs they carried belonged to others´245 However, he added, not all couriers are the same 
because their culpability is likely to vary. Crucially, the distinction is drawn between exploited 
or willing couriers, as he QRWHG³WKHUHDUHWKRVHZKRDUHH[SORLWHGRURSSUHVVHGE\RWKHUVDQG
there are those who engage voluntarily in the couriering of drugs, are in it for the money and 
have tKH IUHHGRP WR PDNH WKH GHFLVLRQ´246  To make this distinction, Hughes LJ cites the 
Professional Consultation Paper of 2011 which set out that one of the goals of the new 
JXLGHOLQHVZDVWRGLVWLQJXLVKµSURIHVVLRQDOFRXULHUV¶IURPµGUXJPXOHV¶ (Sentencing Council 
2011b, 32). 247 Now, he also insisted that determining whether someone was a courier or a mule 
was not D OHJDO WHVW 7KH\ ZHUH ERWK ³classes of offenders who attracted the category of 
µFRXULHUV¶´248 on the basis of carrying drugs for someone else, but their culpability varied, 
meaning that couriers could even be found to have a leading role.     
 ,QWKHFDVHVVWXGLHGIRUWKLVSURMHFWGLVFXVVLRQVDVWRZKHWKHUVRPHRQHZDVDµPXOH¶RU
DµFRXULHU¶ZHUH absent in a majority of cases before the publication of the guidelines. However, 
the guidance judgement in Boakye and Others explicitly differentiates µGUXJ PXOHV¶ IURP
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µZRUGO\-ZLVHFRXULHUV¶WKURXJKWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVOLVWHGLQ6WHSRIWKH'*$PXOHis to be 
understood by the courts as: 
A third-world offender exploited by others [who] will be likely to be assessed by the 
judge as having a leVVHUUROHVHHWKHH[SUHVVLRQVµperforms a limited function under 
GLUHFWLRQ¶ µengaged by pressure, coercion, inWLPLGDWLRQ¶ DQG µinvolvement through 
QDLYHW\H[SORLWDWLRQ¶249 
In contrast, the other type of courier is someone: 
who knows what he (or she) is doing, and does it as a matter of free choice for the 
money, is likely to be assessed as having a significant role: see the expressions 
µmotivated by financial or other advantage, whether or not operatiQJ DORQH¶ DQG
VRPHWLPHVµsome awareness and understanding of the scale of operation¶250 
)URPWKLVOHQVQRQHRIWKHDSSHOODQWVZHUHGHHPHGILWWREHFRQVLGHUHGDVDµPXOH¶ZKLFKZDV
linked squarely to characteristics listed in the lesser role category (See Appendix I, Table II). 
Thus, we see the differentiation exercise in the guidanFHMXGJHPHQWZKHUH$OOH\QHKDG³to be 
distinguished from the kind of courier in whose case it could sometimes be understood what 
drove them to act as they did, especially if they came from DYHU\SRRUEDFNJURXQG´251 Instead, 
VKHKDGµSOHQW\RIPRQH\¶DQGWKHGUXJVZHUHSURIHVVLRQDOO\FRQFHDOHGGXULQJKHUKROLGD\WULS
to St. Lucia. Without clear references to financial desperation, coercion of exploitation, the 
roles of Boakye, Nasri and Latchman were unclear and the judge refuses to categorise them as 
PXOHV)RUH[DPSOH1DVUL¶VVWRU\FOHDUO\PHQWLRQHGKRZKHUMRXUQH\EHJDQZLOIXOO\WRSD\IRr 
liposuction but ended with her being threatened by the organizers during a drug run; Latchman 
GLGDSSHDUWREHLQDVLWXDWLRQRIµILQDQFLDOGHVSHUDWLRQ¶EXWWKHFRXUWUHDVRQHGVKHZRXOGQRW
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have been financially desperate if she had successfully imported the drugs. At the same time, 
it emphatically distinguishes Nwude, Alleyne, and Jagne as offenders who had a significant 
role. In the assessment of whether Jagne fits the lesser category, Hughes LJ affirms she was 
³E\QRPHDQVDYXOQHUDEOHWKLUG-world citi]HQ´252     
 Now, we need to read the judgement above with the other key appeal lodged in the 
aftermath of the entry into force of the DG: $WWRUQH\*HQHUDO¶V5HIHUHQFH1R	RI
2012).253 In this case, the Solicitor General asked the CA to revise unduly low sentences given 
to three men involved in the importation of 100 kg of heroin and 6 kg of cocaine. Specifically, 
WKH6ROLFLWRU*HQHUDODVNHGWKH&$WRFODULI\WKHJXLGHOLQHVDQG³¶GLVSHODIHZP\WKV¶
about its impact on the level of sentences for drugs offences´254 7KHPRVWLPSRUWDQWµP\WK¶
was that the guidelines were not intended to sweepingly reduce sentencing for drug importation 
offences.255 Following the DG and Boakye and Others, the CA emphasised that sentencing 
practice was meant to remain consistent with current levels, except in the case of drug 
mules.256The crux of the dispute in this case was whether the trial judge had departed from the 
low sentencing range.  I will only review the role of Lewis because the dispute was whether 
his role was rightly assessed.         
 David Lewis was the driver of a lorry in which drugs were concealed. He had significant 
debts.  He was sentenced to 9 years for heroin importation and 6 for cocaine importation 
EHFDXVHWKHMXGJHFRQVLGHUHGKLPWREHD³FRXULHU´ The CA considered that the trial judge had 
erred in giving Lewis a sentencing range accorded to someone fitting the lesser role category. 
Recounting the facts of the trial, Hallett LJ explained that the sentencing judge had been 
persuaded to believe Lewis had a lesser role,257 possibly because he did not show all of the 
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characteristics attributed to a significant role. In the same paragraph, she recalls how the 
SURVHFXWLRQ DUJXHG WKDW /HZLV ZDV D ³FRXULHU DQG PXVW KDYH KDG VRPH DZDUHQHVV DQG
understanding of the scale of the operation´258 )RU WKLV UHDVRQ +DOOHWW /- VDLG ³KH ZDV
PRWLYDWHGE\ILQDQFLDODGYDQWDJHDQGPRVWGHILQLWHO\QRWLQWKHFDWHJRU\RIDµGUXJVPXOH¶´259. 
&RQWHVWLQJWKHDSSHDO/HZLV¶VFRXQVHODUJXHGWKDWWKHJXLGHOLQHVcould not allow a departure 
from the sentencing ranges given, when the appellant has a lesser role. Meanwhile, the counsel 
for one of the co-DSSHOODQWVHPSKDVLVHGWKDWWKHJXLGHOLQHV³VKLIWHGIURPGHWHUUHQFHDQGKHDY\
reliance on the quantity of the drug to a focus on the role of the offender and the seizure of 
assets´260 The primary conundrum presented by the cases concerned how to sentence people 
who had lesser or significant roles, like mules and couriers, who participated in massive 
importations. However, this raised the related issue of how if deterrence was still the rationale 
for sentencing, it should be balanced with proportionality.    
 Delivering the judgment, which increased the sentences for all three appellants, Hallett 
LJ clarifies how to apply the guidelines and the steps to determine the sentence. She states that 
WKHJXLGHOLQHVVKRXOGQRWEHJLYHQDVWULFWFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGWKDWMXGJHV³VKRXOGEHDVWXWHQRWWR
place offenders in a lower category than appropriate´261 First, she recalls how the 
determination of the offence category (Step 1), includes factoring the twin pillars of sentencing: 
harm and culpability. Harm is based on the quantity and type of drug that could have reached 
the public had the offender not been detained. Culpability is assessed on the basis of the role 
undertaken. Taken together they reflect the seriousness of the offence and should be reflected 
in the sentence. Continuing her commentary, Hallett LJ characterizes calculation of the harm 
DV³DWWKHKHDUW´262 of sentencing for drug offences. Indeed, after reviewing the facts of the case, 
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VKHFRQFOXGHVWKDWTXDQWLW\SXULW\DQGYDOXHRIWKHGUXJVWROG³WKHLURZQVWRU\´263 about scale 
of the operation.264 Where the importation involves quantities significantly higher than 
Category 1, it should be considered DVDµPDVVLYH¶LPSRUWDWLRQDQGFDUU\VHQWHQFHVRI\HDUV
or above depending on the role of the offender. On this point, the court clarified another 
misunderstanding of the guidelines: The hLHUDUFK\RIUROHVLQWKH'*LV³HVVHQWLDOO\WKHVDPH´
as the milLWDU\UDQNVXVHGEHIRUHVXFKDVµIRRW-VROGLHUV¶µOLHXWHQDQWVRUµJHQHUDOV.¶265 Hallett 
LJ further cautioned judges to be careful about determining roles, to consider how they may 
RYHUODSVKHDOVRUHPLQGVKHUMXGLFLDOEUHWKUHQWKDWWKHµQRQ-H[KDXVWLYH¶OLVWRIFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
should not be given a strict meaning: 
The categories do not provide some kind of straightjacket into which every case must 
be squeezed. Few offences and few offenders will match exactly the categories 
SURYLGHG 2QFH RIIHQFH RU RQH RIIHQGHU PD\ VWUDGGOH D QXPEHU RI FDWHJRULHV«7KH
judge must do his or her best to reach a fair assessment of the overall offending, namely 
culpability and harm, before proceeding to the next stage (step 2).266 
After determining the starting point, the judge must reach a sentence within the category range 
but can depart from the category range if the mitigating or aggravating factors justify it. In this 
sense, someone with a leading role could have a higher sentence but someone at the lower end 
could also have a high sentence if the quantity merits the departure.  Qualifying the purpose of 
the guideline Hallett LJ VWDWHV WKDW ³VHQWHQFLQJ RI µGUXJ PXOHV¶ DSDUW,´267 the guidelines 
provided no dramatic shift from sentencing practices. Instead, the CA agreed in this case with 
Hughes LJ who said in Boakye and Others WKDW WKH'*SURYLGHG³a modified and clarified 
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method of reasoning«LQOLQHZLWKH[LVWLQJSUDFWLFH´268 In other words, the guidelines were 
meant to codify, rather than change sentencing practice.     
 The following section explores the pre-existing practices in the sentencing of mules-
couriers (indistinct prior to 2012), thematised through economic references. Before turning to 
the case law, it is important to clarify as well that the mule/courier distinction did not exist 
officially in legal discourse until after the 2012 DG. Since tracing the evolution of these terms 
is part of the project, I will identify how was originally used in the legal text by means of 
quotation marks. 0RVW RI WKH FDVHV DQDO\VHG WDNLQJ SODFH EHIRUH  UHIHU WR ³FRXULHU RU
PXOH´269 as synonymous terms. For example, in B (2005), Justice Owen described the term 
PXOH DV ³D FRQYHQLHQW DQG ZHOO XQGHUVWRRG VKRUWKDQG IRU WKH UROH RI FRXULHU RI GUXJV.´ 270  
5HFDOODOVRWKDW,DPQRWORRNLQJIRUWKHµWUXH¶PHDQLQJLQWHQGHGE\WKHMXGJHZKHQPDNLQJD
UHIHUHQFH WR µPXOHV¶ RU µFRXULHU¶ 7KHVH terms are not uttered in isolation but rather with 
reference to the financial situation of the offender and translated by the legal narrative. Finally, 
the following discussion does not describe all 60 cases selected for the case study, but selects 
vignettes to highlight examples of predominant themes. Also, I should caution that the 
following reading of the cases between 2000 and pre-2012 guidelines is not organized in a 
chronological order because my point was to organize them thematically.      
i. Give me the money! Financial desperation and greedy holiday makers 
Recall how the new guideline categories draw a difference in roles where there is evidence of 
exploitation and financial reward, a difference reaffirmed in the reading of Boakye and Others 
and inscribed in the distinction between courier and mule. Does exploitation refer to agency 
over the process of labour or is it the absence of minimal financial reward? For example, 
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Fleetwood argues that drug mule work is organized in such a way that mules have limited 
control over their work and cannot back out after agreeing to carry drugs (Fleetwood 2014, 
180). Although research on drug mule work focuses on the labour dynamics (Harris 2010; 
EMCDDA 2012; Fleetwood 2014), I will show how legal interpretation differs significantly.  
For example, evidence of financial stability is translated in the judgements as evidence for 
financial motivation. Yet, evidence of poverty also has been used as evidence of being 
motivated by profit. One of the caveats of the DG is that there is no guidance on how to assess 
DQGGLVWLQJXLVKµILQDQFLDOUHZDUG¶DQGµH[SORLWDWLRQ¶,QVWHDGZHDUHOHIt to assume it must be 
read in light of the existing sentencing practices.      
 Prior to the DG, legal discourses also framed the offence through the financial situation 
of the offender. These iterations reproduce the discursive frame of drug trafficking as a market 
in which actors seek to make a profit. From that point of view, the court infers a higher role 
when the offender has control over the means to carry the drugs or of transportation methods: 
For example where there is evidence of booking flight tickets by themselves,271 using 
sophisticated method to conceal the drugs,272 and finding their own customers.273  Also, a good 
financial situation prior to the offence has also been translated into being motivated by greed.274
 2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG WKH DSSHOODQW¶V ILnancial situation has also been used to try to 
challenge that someone was courier-mule or to ascertain she/he was a courier-mule in order to 
mitigate the sentence. For example, Amanda Richardson was arrested upon arriving from 
Jamaica with a carry-on bag containing 13 kg of cannabis and was sentenced to 18 months in 
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prison. She appealed against both the conviction and the sentence. Her defence argued in the 
WULDOWKDWVKHZRXOGQRWKDYHULVNHGKHUIUHHGRPDQGMHRSDUGLVHGKHUVWXGLHVIRUDµFRXULHU¶V
IHHV¶ 6XPPLQJ XS WKH MXGJH ³GLUHFWHG WKH MXU\ WKDW WKH DSSOLFDQW KDG SOHQW\ RI IXQGV
legitimately saved in her own account to cover the cost of this holiday, that she liked holidays 
DQGKDELWXDOO\WRRNWKHPDQGZDVHQWLWOHGWRGRVR«´275 <HWGHVSLWHKHUµH[FHOOHQW¶FKDUDFWHU
WKH&$UHMHFWHGWKHDSSOLFDWLRQIRUOHDYHWRDSSHDOEHFDXVHWKHµJRRGFKDUDFWHU¶RIWKHFRXULHU
was irrelevant in the mitigation according to the Aramah guidelines (as discussed in chapter 
II). Recall that these guidelines were the first for drug offences and established, against the 
general practice in sentencing, that good character and vulnerability, could not count for much 
mitigation in drug offences.        
 However, dire economic circumstances were hardly the only reference in mule and 
courier discourses. In some cases, it was hard to de-couple economic need with other 
extenuating personal circumstances or characteristics, such as illness or cognitive disability, 
responsibility for relatives with ill health, and geographical origin. For example, in 
Kyermateng,276the judgment states how the appellant had incurred a debt of £5000 and been 
threatened if he did not pay it back.277 In delivering the judgment, Brian Medley J draws 
DWWHQWLRQWR6DP$VDUH.\HUPDWHQJ¶VPDWXUHDJHSRRUKHDOWKLQFOXding diabetes, hypertension 
and arthritis, as well as a letter he wrote to the court, pleading that the sentence take into account 
the impact his imprisonment would have on his wife and children in Ghana. Kyermateng had 
been sentenced to seven years and a half in custody after being convicted of importing 697gr 
of cocaine concealed in his stomach. The appeal was dismissed because the appellate court 
considered the mitigation had been already factored in his sentence.    
 The case of Hull 278 tells of a Jamaican man doing occasional construction work but 
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who did not have a stable income. Reading the judgment, Mackay J said that the appellant 
was ³OLYLQJIURPKDQGWRPRXWKVWUXJJOLQJWRVXSSRUWKLVHOGHUO\DQGLQILUPIDWKHURIZKR
is dependent on him, and to pay the school fees of a teenage son who lives with his mother in 
.LQJVWRQ´279 ,Q VXP KLV HFRQRPLF VLWXDWLRQ ³UHYHDO>V@ D YHU\ W\SLFDO H[DPSOH RI GUXJ
LPSRUWDWLRQE\WKHXVHRIDFRXULHUIURPDQHFRQRPLFDOO\GHSULYHGEDFNJURXQG´280. He is also 
described as KDYLQJD µYXOQHUDEOHSHUVRQDOLW\¶281 based on the details provided in the PSR 
GHVFULELQJKLPDVDQµXQHGXFDWHGXQVRSKLVWLFDWHGUXUDOPDQ¶ZKRZDVDOPRVWLOOLWHUDWHDQG
RI³ORZLQWHOOHFW´282 In Beckford,283 a financial debt also sets the background of the offender. 
+HUFRXQVHOLQWKHDSSHDOVXEPLWWHGWKDWVKHZDV³DPHUHPXOH«FDUU\LQJWKHGUXJVEXWZLWKRXW
any further involvement´284 ,QGHHGWKH&$DGGVKRZWKHµJRRGFKDUDFWHU¶DQGDKLVWRU\RI
GHEWVZHUH³VDGO\«IHDWXUHVZKLFKDUHFRPPRQO\IRXQGLQFDVHVRIWhis kind´285 In contrast, 
in Akyeah,286 we find a differentiation between types of couriers. The case involved a business 
woman who imported food and exported shoes from Ghana, convicted to 23 years in prison 
and deportation for carrying around 39 kg of a Class A drug. At her trial, the defence argued 
that she was asked by her sister to carry a present for someone. The appellate court re-stated 
WKHVHQWHQFLQJMXGJH¶VFRPPHQWV 
You are an intelligent woman who had a business which was an ideal cover for such 
importation, and you decided to take the risk, having made ten visits to this country in 
PRQWKVDQGKDYLQJQRWEHHQVHDUFKHG,FDQQRWUHJDUGV\RX«DVDSRRULPSRYHULVKHG
courier with suffering children and no money, because you are not that sort of person-
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you had funds, you had a home, you had money in the bank- for the reasons which not 
before me but one can only assume are greed.287  
Although I am presenting isolated references to the financial situation of the offenders, the 
majority of cases show a more ambivalent depiction in the legal narrative, poised between 
ILQDQFLDO GHVSHUDWLRQ DQG ILQDQFLDO µJUHHG¶ DV WKH PRWLYDWLRQ )RU H[DPSOH $N\HDK LV DOVR
described in the text as an unemployed housekeeper who had plenty of money in her account. 
She was, the SURVHFXWLRQ DUJXHG D ³WUXVWHG FRXULHU´288 The issue explored is how the 
ambivalence tips in favour of reading a higher level of culpability rather than lower. While the 
facts may support the claim about her role as a professional courier, the effort in this chapter is 
to see how those facts are iterated through gender norms.  
ii. Detached femininity: The selfish drug courier-mule and the self-less carer 
At this point, we might ask if gender norms disambiguate the ambivalence of the appellant, for 
example, as in the case of the poor house-keeper/trusted courier in Akyeah.289 In some cases, 
femininity acts as a signifier that re-directs the financial situation into a reading of selfish or 
selfless financial motivations. Consider how in Akyeah, the judge recalls how she has no 
suffering children. This remark is significant considering how the drug mule seems to be 
identified only as a mother with caring responsibility. As discussed in chapter II, women drug 
mules who are single or without children fall outside the scope of the term. Similarly, Katie 
Hall290 LVGHSLFWHGDVDµGHWDFKHG¶-year-old woman who went for easy money and a holiday. 
She was sentenced to 12 months for importing cannabis from Jamaica with her co-accused, 
Carole Lewis. The basis of the appeal was also on the disparity of the sentence between them. 
Recounting the facts, mostly with reference to the PSR, the CA stated that they had justified 
the trip to Jamaica as a prize won in a magazine contest. Yet, Clark L.J cites the remarks by 
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WKDW LVDSSDUHQW IURPJHWWLQJ LQYROYHG LQ WKLV«´ZKLOH/HZLV¶VXEPLVVLRQZDVDQ³REYLRXV
cock-and-bull story which they [the jury] quickly rejected´291    
 Holland J added that judges have to ³KDUGHQWKHLUKHDUWV´DQG³PDNHLWTXLWHFOHDUWKDW
this is a very serious offence´292 Read otherwise, judges must keep their affective boundaries 
intact and make sure that what survives is legal authority. Without going through all the facts 
re-stated by the CA,293 Clark LJ highlights also passages from the PSR to determine if the 
sentencing judge had assessed rightly the sentence. For example, he stops at the 
characterization of Hall by the probation officer, who said she discussed the facts of the offence 
³LQDGHWDFKHGPDWWHU-of-fact way´294 also, the remarks that she was not a drug user and had 
no pressing financial need. Taken together, these descriptions, which would otherwise be 
FRQVLGHUHGDVHYLGHQFHRIµJRRGFKDUDFWHU¶ were actually read as intention to make easy money 
and get a free hROLGD\6LPLODUO\+DOOVKRZHGD³UHDGLQHVVWRSDUWLFLSDWHODFNRIIRUHWKRXJKW
and [her] limited understanding of the wider consequence of drug importation for others was 
worrying´295 As the legal narrative continues, it stresses how Hall got in with wrong crowd 
even though she had been in a stable relationship up until the offence. The probation officer 
HYHQ ³VHQVHG DQ DUURJDQW EHOLHI WKDW VKH ZRXOG QRW JHW FDXJKW DQG KHOG WR DFFRXQW´296  
Rejecting the appeal, Clark LJ said ³LW LV FOHDU IURP WKH SUH-sentence report that she was 
motivated as the prime mover by greed.´297 All is left in the text is a detached woman who 
became derailed, augmented by her lack of care for others, in pursuit of easy money. However, 
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WKHFRXUWDOVRQRWHVKRZ+DOOZDVXVHGE\ µUXWKOHVV people¶298 &RQWUDGLFWLQJ WKH µDUURJDQW
EHOLHI¶LQJHWWLQJDZD\VFRW-free, the appeal judge recalls that the PSR also recorded how she 
felt anxious before the trip into the UK: 
The appellant realised the chances of avoiding detection at Manchester were really small 
but at that stage felt that she had no option but to continue. Her travel documents and 
passport had been taken from her on arrival. When she expressed her concerned about 
the suitcases, she felt intimidated and threatened.299 
We also learn how Hall found out she was pregnant upon her arrest. Thus, the judge delivering 
the judgement said the court had sympathy with her situation as a mother in prison but it could 
not allow the appeal. Her appeal was rejected on the basis that the sentencing judge had already 
been lenient by giving her a 15 month sentence for the offence: the importation of 6.5 kg of 
cannabis.           
 The case of Cynthia Attuh-Benson is significant in many ways because the court 
iterated more clearly who could be a vulnerable offender and referred to it throughout the whole 
analysis. Attuh-Benson, who was pregnant at the time of her arrest and gave birth in prison, 
was convicted to 10 years in custody and recommended deportation for importing less than one 
kg of cocaine. She refused to plead guilty and said in the trial that her nephew had given her 
the suitcase to be delivered to a friend in London. However, the text of the appeals highlights 
that she did not organize the travel arrangements and possibly not her visa application either.  
Reviewing the facts of the case, Hallett LJ said: 
When she agreed to take part in this enterprise both she and her husband were in 
employment. Her husband told Mr Darlington that he was in receipt of a good income. 
She had the benefit, therefore, of a stable family unit. She was not in the category of a 
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vulnerable or inadequate person300 who was driven to commit this offence by 
hardship.301  
The significance and outcome of the case will be discussed later on. For now, what matters is 
to trace how financial stability is read as greed and financial desperation as need. Also, the fact 
that she was married and had a stable family lurks in the judicial rejection of claims that she 
was vulnerable. If we read Hall and Attuh-Benson together, there seems to be an underlying 
assumption that vulnerable drug mule are exclusively single mothers who are financially 
desperate for their children, as noted in AN\HDK¶VFDVH7KLVDVVXPSWLRQ LV LQ OLQHZLWK WKH
literature outlined in chapter II and the problems of generalizing the motivations of mules and 
couriers. Although Hall had a partner when she was arrested, she is read as a detached single 
woman whose intentions were selfish. On the other hand, Attuh-%HQVRQKDVDµVWDEOH¶IDPLO\
OLIHDEDFNJURXQGIDFWWKDWPDNHVLWXQWKLQNDEOHWRFRQVLGHUKHUDVYXOQHUDEOHRUµLQDGHTXDWH¶
We also see in this case how, in the logic of the law, vulnerability is akin to a pathology. And 
not only that, since the law also takes the role of defining whether the claim is authentic or not. 
 
iii. Masculinity, truth-telling and caring responsibilities   
     
As mentioned before, personal characteristics and the existence of dependants accompany the 
recognition of the role of the mule, where gender roles appear to be significant to explain the 
financial motivations of the offender. How do masculinities frame the narratives of financial 
motivations? In contrast to the above, the CA rejected the assertion that the appellants in 
Senesie (2005)302 and Ormirston (2005)303 ZHUH µPXOHVRUFRXULHUV¶$OWKRXJK6HQHVLHZDV
XQHPSOR\HGDQGOLYHGRQVWDWHEHQHILWV WKHSURVHFXWLRQSUHVHQWHGZKDW LVFDOOHGµOLIH-VW\OH¶
                                                          
300
 My emphasis.  
301
 R v Attuh-Benson (Irene Cynthia) [2004] EWCA Crim 3032 [22]. 
302
 R v. Senesie (Jack Ezemie) [2005] EWCA Crim 2047  
303
 R v. Ormirston (Mark) [2005] EWCA Crim 2602 
266 
 
evidence. That is, there was evidence that he had taken many flights before the one in which 
he was arrested. In contrast to the unemployed male, narratives of the good hard worker were 
common in some cases of male offenders. In the second case, Mark Ormirston had gone on 
holiday to Grenada and originally said he did carried the 1.6 kg of cocaine under duress but 
then pleaded guilty. ThH&$WRRNQRWHRIKRZKHZDVD³hard working young man of previous 
good character and form a respectable family.´304 Similarly, the passages of the PSR cited in 
the appeal of Stewart Taylor305 describe him as a hard worker who had fallen in debt; that he 
was an occasional cocaine user and that he is described as a man with a caring nature and high 
standards at work in letters sent to the court by his friends. In Taylor¶VFDVHWKHDSSHDOZDV
DOORZHGDQGKLVVHQWHQFHIRULPSRUWLQJJRIFRFDLQHUHGXFHGIURPWR\HDUV2UPLUVWRQ¶V
sentence was reduced from 7 to 6 years but the CA stated that good character cannot be 
VLJQLILFDQW IRU PLWLJDWLRQ VLQFH ³GUXJ WUDIILFNHUV often tempt vulnerable people to act as 
couriers, often impoverished people of previous good character, with heavy financial 
obligations, from third world countries´306       
 However, male offenders with caring responsibilities are often acknowledged as mules 
prior to the 2012 DG. The case of Abada El Aziz307 shows a similar recognition of the role of 
drug mules through reference to the financial responsibilities of a young man. Abada El Aziz 
was convicted for importing 1.24 kg of cocaine, and sentenced to 3 years in custody in a young 
RIIHQGHUV¶LQVWLWXWLRQ,QKLVFDVHKLVSHUVRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVWRRNFHQWUH-stage in the text of 
the appeal. Recounting the facts, the text explains that this 18 year old British citizen, had been 
detained by airport customs officers. At first, he gave customs officers a convoluted story about 
why he had gone to Brazil. But then, he broke down and decided to tell a very detailed account 
RIKRZKHEHFDPHDµFRXULHU¶he was approached by a man with whom he played football, who 
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offered him £5000 to go on a holiday and bring back a package. We are told that he owed 
money and was caring for his mother, who suffered from multiple sclerosis. The CA agreed 
ZLWKWKH$EDGD¶VFRXQVHOVXEPLVVLRQWKDWLWZDVD³UDUHFDVH´308 meriting a degree of mercy 
because: 
Unlike many of those convicted of this kind of crime, his immediate focus is not himself. 
+HZULWHVµI have let down my parents and feel ashamed as they have brought me up to 
be a law-abiding citizen. I worry that I have caused them many sleepless nights and that 
the unnecessary stress may cause my mother's condition (multiple sclerosis) to 
deteriorate further¶309 
Thus the sentencing judge took all his personal circumstances310  into account: caring for his 
ill and divorced mother, a cousin suffering mental illness, and two siblings. We are reminded 
by the appellate narrative that he had tried to find work but it conflicted with the need to stay 
at home and take care of his family. Additionally, the narrative states that the sentencing judge 
took into account the candid and detailed explanation when the defendant confessed his guilt. 
In fact, LJ remarked how the sentencing judge had been impressed by his being straightforward 
about his crime, albeit a reflection of his naiveté.311 The narrative of the appeal also notes that 
Abada never felt threatened. In fact, when he felt he could not follow through, he negotiated 
ZLWKKLVFRQWDFWLQ6DR3DXORWRSRVWSRQHWKHIOLJKW:KLOHWKH&$DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWWKHUH³LV
WUXHPLWLJDWLRQ´312 based on his personal circumstances, the sentencer had made a mistake in 
the range and given and unduly lenient sentence; it was increased from three to five years. 
 6XPPLQJXSWKHGHFLVLRQWKH&$UHPDUNHGKRZ³WKHSUREOHPZLWKWKLVW\SHRIFDVHLV
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simply addUHVVHG 6R YHU\ RIWHQ WKH FRXULHUV KDYH D WUDJLF VWRU\ WR WHOO´313 LJ added that 
personal tragedy does not supersede the protection of the community. Giving the example of a 
JUDQGPRWKHUZKRLPSRUWVGUXJV³LQRUGHUWRSD\DQRSHUDWLRQIRUDVHYHUHO\GLVDEOHG FKLOG´
he argues that such a defendant could not be easily granted mitigation because of the potential 
³GLVDVWHU´FDXVHGE\GUXJV314  Read otherwise, the law must protect the vulnerable from the 
YXOQHUDEOH$OWKRXJKZHPD\DVNKRZWKHFDWHJRU\RIµSHUVRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶LQFULPLQDO
courts exerts a questionable division between the private and public sphere, often criticised in 
feminist legal scholarship. At the same time, we might wonder if the sentencing judge appraisal 
for Abada has to do with gendered frames of truth-telling and valour. In contrast to the 
DSSDUHQWO\ GXSOLFLWRXV IHPDOH GUXJ PXOH DGMHFWLYHV OLNH ³GLUHFW´ DQG ³VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG´315 
sprinkle the narrative of male offenders. Consider the contrast between the characterisation of  
$EDGD¶VVHOIOHVVFRQIHVVLRQZLWK+DOO¶VµPDWWHU-of-IDFW¶VWRU\-telling to the probation officer 
VHFWLRQDERYHZKLFKZDVUHDGDVEHLQJDVDµGHWDFKHG¶ZRPDQ    
 Another example, although also presenting a peculiar aspect of reading the narratives 
through gender, is the case of John Frederick Noble.316 The appeal cites a passage recounting 
WKHPRPHQWKHZDVGHWDLQHGDIWHUUHWXUQLQJIURPDWULSWR-DPDLFD1REOHVDLG³KDQGRQKHDUW
,ZLOOWHOO\RXZKDWKDSSHQHG´DQGWKHQDVWKHOHJDOQDUUDWRUUHFDOOVSURFHHGHGWREH³Serfectly 
IUDQN´WRWKHDXWKRULWLHV317 The judge recounts how he had fallen in love with Sylvia Blench, 
D SURVWLWXWH ZKR EHFDPH LQYROYHG LQ GUXJ WUDIILFNLQJ ³ZKHQ VKH ZDV LQ D YXOQHUDEOH
VLWXDWLRQ´318 The vulnerable situation, which we are told includes her work as a prostitute and 
GHEWVLQFXUUHGZLWKRWKHUVDOORZHGKHUWREH³H[SORLWHG´319 John and Sylvia lived together and 
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when she went to Jamaica with the purpose of doing a drug run, he went after her. In the words 
RIWKHMXGJHKHGLGKLV³EHVWWREULQJKHUKRPH´DQGIRUWKDWUHDVRQKLVPRWLYDWLRQZDVQRW
ILQDQFLDOJDLQEXW³WKHDIIHFWLRQIRU0V%OHQFK´320 Thus, the court decided Noble had had a 
subsidiary role in the offence and his sentence was reduced from 4 and a half years in prison 
to 3 and a half. Could we read here a form of identification of the law with the male-protector 
who protect vulnerable women?   




case draws a difference between the tragic-but-XVXDOWKURXJKDUHIHUHQFHWRWKHµXQLTXHQHVV¶RI
his situation. The drive to differentiate the usual from the unique is not fortuitous. It arguably 
derives from Fuluade.322 I suggested in chapter II that Faluade was a response to the guidance 
in Aramah323 ZKHUHYXOQHUDELOLW\ LVGHVFULEHGZLWK UHIHUHQFH WRD µJRRGFKDUDFWHU¶ and b) 
people with physical disabilities and weak will. This guidance sought to close the door for 
mules to use personal characteristics/circumstances as mitigation arguments since Lord Lane 
suggested that those features were the reason why they were recruited in the first place. This 
reasoning was supported by the logic of deterrence but in Faluade, the CA granted there will 
EHFDVHVZKHUHLWFRXOG³DFWZLWKPHUF\´324        
 The story of Olyinka Madupeula Faluade, as told in her appeal, states the following 
facts. We are told she is a Nigerian citizen, who was sentenced to four and a half years in 
custody after she was found with 95 packages containing 210 gr. of heroin concealed in her 
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body. We are also reminded that she had given contradictory information throughout her 
interviews with the authorities. Finally, Faluade accepted her guilt but in her defence, she said 
she did not know the type of drug she was carrying. The narrative states that she accepted 
£2000 which the court speculated was intended to hHOS KHU FKLOGUHQ¶V FORWKHV EXVLQHVV
Pondering if the sentence had been excessive, the court examined her personal 
circumstances.325 Yet, it decided that although her health condition was serious it was treatable 
in prison. Moreover, the court could not heed the pleading letters sent to the court by relatives 
and members of her community:  
She is, it is said, badly needed at home. Her family is without her. We have seen various 
letters from a Minister or Ministers of religion from the church or churches which she 
attends in Nigeria. They are quite touching. But they cannot serve to affect the 
judgement of this Court, which must be utterly dispassionate in such matters as this.326 
-XVWDV LQ+DOO¶VFDVH WKHFRXUWUH-affirms its role as a dispassionate arbiter and the need to 
focus on the offence and potential harm of drugs. However, Faluade also opened the door to 
claim sentence reductions based on pleas for mercy. Although the CA did not formally consider 
the precedent of Faluade on Attuh-%HQVRQ¶VFDVHLWGLGLQYRNHWKHGRFWULQHRQPHUF\Recall 
that Attuh-%HQVRQZDVQRWUHFRJQL]HGDVDYXOQHUDEOHRIIHQGHUEHFDXVH³VKHZDVDQHGXFDWHG
ZRPDQHPSOR\HGDQGOLYLQJLQDµVWDEOHIDPLOy unit¶´327 Her counsel had suggested in the 
DSSHDOWKDWDGUXJPXOHZRXOG³RIWHQEHDQXQHGXFDWHGDQGYXOQHUDEOHSHUVRQVXVFHSWLEOHWR
pressure and ill-informed about the approach adopted by the British courts to cases of drugs 
importation´328 'UXJPXOHVZHUH³H[SHQGDEOH´DQGXVXDOO\WROG³ZKDW WRFDUU\DQGKRZWR
behave´329          
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 Whilst stressing the personal characteristics of mules-FRXULHUV$WWXK%HQVRQ¶VFRXQVHO
also argued that high sentences for drug importation were not only disproportionate to the role 
of couriers-mules but also had severe impact on the families of offenders and their 
communities. Indeed, the vulnerability of her family, who lived in Ghana, was central in her 
appeal. After she had been detained and convicted, one of her children fell ill, and her husband 
lost his job as the caring responsibilities fell on him. Additionally, he had received death threats 
by the people behind the drugs-run. We are told in the narrative that her counsellor submitted 
copious reports about how orphaned children in Africa are at a higher risk of contracting AIDS 
and of human trafficking; and also how the absence of welfare and social security, represented 
a risk to children without parents. Urging the CA to reconsider sentencing policy, Attuh-
%HQVRQ¶VFRXQVHODUJXHGWKDWWKHVHPDWWHUVZHUHQRWHQYLVDJHGLQAramah¶VJXLGHOLQHVRQWKH
YXOQHUDELOLW\ RI GUXJ PXOHV 0RUHRYHU VHQWHQFLQJ SROLF\ ³ZDV LQHIIHFWLYH´ EHFDXVH LW
³SHQDOLVHV WKHYXOQHUDEOHDQGSXWVXQQHFHVVDU\SUHVVXUHRQ WKHDOUHDG\RYHUFrowded prison 
system in the United Kingdom´330         
 The argument on behalf of $WWXK %HQVRQ¶V children is supported through the 
international framework protecting the rights of the child, stressing the vulnerability of 
orphaned children in Ghana. Of course, they were not orphaned, but could have been had 
something happened to their father as the narrative notes how he had also been subject to 
threats. Although the appeal was about Attuh-Benson as an individual, her subjectivity could 
not be disassociated from her children, and the judgement affirmed that. We could read also a 
form of relational expression of vulnerability; yet the vulnerability of her children took centre 
stage since the claim of vulnerability-as-financial-desperation and caring responsibilities prior 
to the offence failed,331 Still, her sentence was reduced from ten to eight years because the court 
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granted her mercy. :KLOHDGPLWWLQJWKHµXQLTXHQHVV¶RIWKHIDPLO\¶VFDVHWKHFRXUWODLGRXWWKH
general position towards drug offenders: 
When a parent, be it mother or father, commits an offence as serious as this, there is, 
quite simply, no alternative. Drug addiction is a blight on society and causes untold 
misery throughout the world. The courts of this country and elsewhere have no choice, 
in our judgment, but to impose substantial sentences upon those who willingly involve 
themselves in what has rightly been referred to as an evil trade.332 
Instead, Hallett LJ took into account Attuh-%HQVRQ¶V µSDUWLFXODU GLIILFXOWLHV¶, mainly her 
medically recognised depression which the CA concluded resulted from the separation from 
her children and concern for their well-being.  The judge commends how the appellant is 
described as a model prisoner because she goes out of her way to help others despite her own 
problems.333 Through mercy, she was pulled out of the margins of the selfish female criminal 
into the bounds of the norm of the selfless caring mother and friend. Thus, the court was 
³VDWLVILHGWKDWDVDQDFWRIPHUF\VRPHPRGHVWUHGXFWLRQLQWKHVHQWHQFHSassed upon her is 
SRVVLEOH«7RWKDWH[WHQWDQGWKDWH[WHQWDORQHWKLVDSSHDOVXFFHHGV´334 In contrast, the ruling 
in Attuh-Benson was not applied to Quarcoo. Angela Quarcoo was also a Ghanain woman, 
who brought 9 kg of cocaine into the UK. A mother of two young children and carer of her 
elderly mother, she was denied the mercy granted to Attuh-Benson, because the court did not 
consider her personal circumstances as serious. While taking into account the vulnerability of 
the children, Aikens LJ VWDWHG WKHFRXUWFRQVLGHUHG WKDW WKHSHUVRQDO³FLUFXPVWDQFHVRI WKLV
appellant's are commonplace´335         
 Drawing on these cases, P\ILUVWVXJJHVWLRQLVWKDWWKHµPHUF\¶UHDVRQLQJXQGHUSLQVWKH
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eventual distinction between mule and couriers based not oQO\ RQ µH[FHSWLRQDO¶ HFRQRPLF
vulnerability as implied in Abada, but also the suffering body of the post-colonial female 
subject, in Attuh-Benson. The suffering female body of Attuh-Benson is cited through what the 
court interpreted as melancholia for the ORVVRIKHUFKLOGUHQZKLFKVKHµKDGWROLYHZLWK¶DVD
consequence of her actions.336 This construction failed however, in Quarcoo, pushing the legal 
recognition of vulnerability further into the margins. Secondly, the legal recourse to mercy, 
allows the law WRµJLYHLQ¶WRWKHFRPSDVVLRQZKLFKLWFDQQRWµIHHO¶DVLWPXVWµKDUGHQLWVKHDUW¶
against the vulnerability of the offender in order to maintain objectivity. The next section 
elaborates how the drug mule is iterated with reference to the suffering female body and the 
relational feminine subjectivity.  
v. The vulnerable female drug mule: Embodiment, relationships and suffering  
 
The last section looked at how women drug mules are emphasised in the narratives as relational 
subjects with caring responsibilities. This section explores how references to mules in the cases 
also builds on their romantic relationships337 and also how frail embodiment figures in the 
narratives. The question, as in the section above, is whether and how gender frames notions of 
embodiment and subjectivity of female offenders. Two clarifications are needed. Although the 
cases discussed above also show cases where men are considered as mules driven by financial-
caring responsibilities, references to parenthood were less common for men than women. In 
fact, caring responsibilities were seldom mentioned in cases of men. Another gap in the 
research is that data on relationship status (single mother, in partnership, extended family) and 
caring responsibilities could not be collected consistently. The availability of this information 
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depended on whether the appellate court referred to it through the PSR, the arguments for the 
appellant, or by reference to the trial or sentencing remarks.     
 That being said, frail embodiment and caring responsibilities were often paired together 
in the reconstruction of the subjectivity of the appellants prior to and after the 2012 DG. In 
Basoah,338 the appeal stresses how Rose, a Belgian resident of Ghanaian origin, was the sole 
carer of six children working as a seamstress after becoming a widow. She had been sentenced 
to 12 years after a trial by jury for importing 1.43 kg of cocaine.  Citing the summary of the 
WULDO-XVWLFH(OLDVVDLG³REYLRXVO\´WKHMXU\KDGQRWEHOLHYHGKHUVWRU\DERXWEHLQJDVNHGE\D
friend to deliver a hold-all to a friend in London. Instead, she had misrepresented herself as a 
genuine business woman, as her story had been she traded goods of African origin.339 After 
rehearsing the submissions on behalf of Rose, mainly her maternal responsibilities and good 
FKDUDFWHU(OLDV-UHFRJQL]HGKHUVLWXDWLRQDVµGLVWUHVVLQJ¶EXWZDVERXQGE\Aramah, which 
MXVWLILHGWKHFRXUW¶V³YLHZWKDWKDUVKGHWHUUHQWVHQWHQFHVPXVWEHYLVLWHGRQWKRVHZKRKHOSWR
promote this evil trade´340 Thus, her appeal was rejectHG 'DQLHOOH 0LOOLJHQW 3XUSHUKDUW¶V
personal circumstances were dismissed for similar reasons.341 The 25-year old Dutch woman 
was convicted for carrying less than a kilo of heroin strapped under her armpits.  Her counsel 
laid bare the complexity of her life: she had been raised by her grandparents in Surinam, though 
her grandmother had lost her sight after a stroke, which required the grand-daughter to take 
more caring responsibilities at the age of 11, including helping her mother with the care of her 
younger siblings from an early age; she was the daughter of an abusive father, who had actually 
used her as a child drug courier.  Further on, the Recorder of Middlesbrough explains that she 
had had two significant relationships, one with a man involved in dealing drugs and the other, 
ZLWKDJRRGDQGLQWHOOLJHQWPDQZKROHIWKHUDVDGDQGµDLPOHVV¶\RXQJZRPDQ 
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Then her life was aimless and symptoms arose affecting her eyes.  She had got a job at 
a postal sorting office, but lost it due to her inability to read addresses.  In short it 
transpired she has severe defects in both of her eyes and was informed that if she did 
not undertake an expensive regime of treatment her eyesight would deteriorate and like 
her grandmother go blind herself.342 
The reason for the drug run was to finance eye surgery, an intervention which her counsel 
suggested would allow her to go to college. The CA concluded that even if the circumstances 
of the appellant had been considered by the sentencing judge, the sentence was right343. Even 
though her counsel tried to argue that in view of the substantial quantity of hard drugs imported, 
³EHKLQG WKLV ZRPDQ WKHUH PXVW EH WKRVH RI HYLO GHWHUPLQDWLRQ´344 her culpability was 
incontestable. A similar reading can be seen in Graham,345 where her counsel emphasised 
*UDKDP¶VVLWXDWLRQDVD IRUHLJQZRPDQZLWKDQDOFRKRODGGLFWLRQVWUXJJOLQJZLWK ILQDQFLDO
GLIILFXOWLHVDIWHUDGLYRUFHIURPDQDEXVLYHPDQ7KHDSSHDOZDVGLVPLVVHGEHFDXVHVKH³KDG
gone into the arrangement with her eyes wide open...educated and LQWHOOLJHQW ZRPDQ«QR
UHPRUVH ZKDWVRHYHU´346 Here, her fragility is intensified with reference to her addiction to 
alcohol but also her relationship to an abusive man.      
 ,QFRQWUDVWWKHQDUUDWLYHRI3DXOLQH.D\RGH¶VFDVHLVIUDPHGLQWKHDSSHDOWKURXJKher 
romantic relationships and poor health. She is shown as a dependent woman, who had been 
with abusive partners, had learning disabilities, and a history of suicide attempts and self-harm. 
The CA granted the appeal on the basis of mercy and reduced the sentence from 11 to 9 years.347 
We can see a slightly different in the narrative of Ahmed Amal Mohammed and Selina Marsha 
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-DPHV¶DSSHDO,348 where the PSR described Ahmed as a naïve and vulnerable woman in her 
twenties. Her probation officer also expressed concern about her ability to cope with prison 
and the CA took note of a letter vouching for her academic achievements. James, also in her 
twenties, was described as a naïve woman and a mother of two children who was unaware of 
the seriousness of the offence. Yet, both had pleaded guilty to importing almost 500 gr of a 
Class A drug concealed in their vaginas. We are told through the PSR that James had been 
motivated to do the offence in return for the money but also that she had been anxious about 
her unplanned pregnancy and mourning the death of her mother. The appeal was also based on 
WKHGLIIHUHQWUROHVHDFKRQHKDG$KPHG¶VFRXQVHOORUVDUJXed she had been recruited by James, 
ZKLOHWKHODWWHU¶VFRXQVHODUJXHGVKHKDGEHHQDFWLQJRQWKHLQVWUXFWLRQVRIWZRPHQ7KHDSSHDO
succeeded to a degree on account of the lack of clarity in the reasons for the 7-year sentence 
given by the sentencing judge.        
 References to vulnerability, naiveté and bodily vulnerability were not always accepted 
as mitigation. For example, in the request for leave to appeal of Karoline Egwenu349 WKHFRXUW¶V
reading of the PSR was contrasted with her criminal record. She was recognised as a vulnerable 
FRXULHUGXHWRKHU³OLPLWHGLQWHOOHFWXDOFDSDFLW\´ZKLFKPDGHKHU³YXOQHUDEOHWREHLQJWDNHQ
DGYDQWDJHRI´350 <HW-XGJH5LFKDUG%URZQUHMHFWHGKHUDSSHDOEHFDXVH³YXOQHUDELOLW\FDUULHV
little weight in the absence of a guilt\SOHD´DQGZKLOHKHU³GLVDELOLW\DQGLQILUPLW\UHQGHUHG
KHUDVXLWDEOHFDUULHU¶LWGLGµQRWFRXQWIRUPXFKLQDFDVHRILPSRUWDWLRQ´351   
 The role of medical testimonies cannot be underestimated in the citational practices 
constructing the feminized vulnerability of the appellant. For example, Attuh-%HQVRQ¶V
µFOLQLFDOGHSUHVVLRQ¶YRXFKHGIRUKHUVXIIHULQJ LQSULVRQ ,QAnderson,352 WKHSV\FKRORJLVW¶V
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report also carried significant weight in the recognition of vulnerability as a personal 
characteristic. This UHSRUWGHVFULEHG$QGHUVRQDVDZRPDQRI³ORZLQWHOOLJHQFHGHSHQGHQWRQ
others, highly vulnerable and open to manipulation and suggestion´353Yet, this case shows a 
SHFXOLDUIHDWXUHRIKRZWKHFRXUWVKDYHDSSOLHGWKHUXOLQJLQ$WWXK%HQVRQ¶VMXGJHPHQW:KLOst 
UHFRJQLVLQJKHUSV\FKRORJLFDOLVVXHVWKH&$VWDWHGWKHDSSHOODQW³GLGQRWKDYHWKHPLWLJDWLRQ
available for the particular category of courier to which Attuh-Benson applied, namely women 
from oversees with young children having to serve a long sentence DZD\IURPKRPH´354 The 
appeal was allowed, partly because the CA considered that, in cases like hers, deterrent 
VHQWHQFHVZRXOGKDYHQRHIIHFWEHFDXVHVKH³ZDVRIVXFKORZLQWHOOLJHQFHDQGZDVVRHDVLO\
led´355       
vi. Reducing coercion to naiveté  
 
In chapter II, I explained how coercion figured as an explanation for the involvement of women 
and men in the drug trade. The purpose of coercion references in the sentencing appeals prior 
to the DG of 2012356 ZDV WR SURYLGH ³H[WUDQHRXV PLWLJDWLRQ SXUSRUWLQJ WR H[SOain the 
background of the offence´357 The DG has included it as one of the characteristics indicative 
of a lesser role. Whilst vulnerability and debt-acquisition were sometimes cited as reasons for 
the threats against drug mules, this section elaborates upon how coercion is framed through a 
feminized iteration of naiveté. For example Selina Martin,358 a 22 year-old French citizen, told 
officers her son had been kidnapped and threatened with violence if she did not smuggle drugs 
from France to the UK. Further, the probation officer also reported that she believed she would 
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be carrying cannabis not cocaine, but realised her mistake once the 3 kg of cocaine was being 
strapped to her body by an unknown man. However, the decision to mitigate the sentence 
leaned on SHOLQD¶VDJHDIDFWRUZKLFKZDVXVHGWRH[SODLQWKHVWRU\RIFRHUFLRQDQGPLVWDNHQ
belief. Judge J paraphrased the remarks by the sentencing judge, who took into account how 
KHUDJHPDGHKHUDQDwYHSHUVRQ³OLNHO\ WR IDOO LQZLWKXQVFUXSXORXVGUXJGHDOHUV´.359. And 
while the sentencing judge could feel some compassion for the young mother, the fact that she 
was a mother should have made her realise the danger of drugs. Moreover, as the quote by the 
sentencing judge, cited by Judge J, the drugs were not only gRLQJ WR KDUP RWKHU SHRSOH¶V
FKLOGUHQ¶VEXWDOVRKHURZQ³<RXDUHSXWWLQJ\RXUFKLOGLQWKHZD\RIDWKUHDWE\KHOSLQJWR
circulate a drug like cocaine to which young people are going become addicted and bring ruin 
on themselves´360 Thus, Judge J H[SODLQHG³despite the compassion he felt, the court had to 
EHVHYHUH´361 In the end, her appeal was allowed but because the CA considered the sentencing 
judge had correctly reflected the effect of the guilty plea under s. 144 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 in the sentence.          
 A rather different rationality frames the decision in Quinn and Others.362 The four 
appellants,363 three women between the age of 19-26 and a 41 year-old man, travelled together 
on a cruise to the West Indies. They were caught in Southampton with an aggregate amount of 
20 kg of cocaine strapped around their bodies. The CA retold the following facts from the trial: 
7KH &URZQ &RXUW KDG DFFHSWHG WKH\ ZHUH YXOQHUDEOH ³FRXULHUV´ EHFDXVH RI WKHLU DJH DQG
circumstances, mainly caring responsibilities who were acting for others. Yet, the CA 
characterised the trip as an elaborate ploy to traffic drugs into England. The basis of the appeal 
was that the sentencing judge did not follow Aranguren¶VJXLGHOLQHFKDSWHU,,RQYXOQHUDEOH
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drug mules. Yet, Justice Holroyde stressed that the court was very aware of the role the 
GHIHQGDQWVKDGDV³FRXULHUV´XQGHUVWRRGDV 
 «SHUVRQVRIJRRGFKDUDFWHUDQGSHUVRQVZKRE\UHDVRQRIDJHILQDQFLDOVLWXDWLRQRU
personal circumstances are vulnerable to a greater or lesser degree. That being the case, 
and for that reason, there is a limit to how much weight a sentencing court can give to 
personal mitigation in a case such as this.364 
Similar to Hall and Martin, the CA took into account their remorse and good character and 
how they accepted that they could have rejected the offer or withdrawn from the operation. 
However, Justice Holroyde said that whilst there wDVV\PSDWK\LQUHODWLRQWRKRZ³each of 
them became apprehensive or fearful of the possible consequences of trying to pull out once 
they had become involved,´365 had they had succeeded, they would have brought large 
TXDQWLWLHVRIGUXJV³FDSDEOHRIUXLQLQJPDQ\OLYHV´366 The appeal was allowed, on the basis 
that the guilty plea had not been fully factored into the starting point as the sentences had been 
KLJKFRQVLGHULQJWKHLUUROHDV³FRXULHUV´        
 There are other cases where coercion has been referenced and constructed around the 
notion of naiveté. The case of B367 presented a more pressing scenario of violence where a drug 
mule was tortured by a man who had offered to repay a debt in return for her carrying out a 
drug run. Although it is not clear how she got involved, the appellant had already contracted a 
debt with man called Vincent Powell, and confessed she had successfully imported 300 gr of 
cocaine in 2002. Upon her return from a family trip to Jamaica in 2003, Powell waited for her 
at her home, where he tortured and threatened to kill her for six hours in front of her daughter. 
After the incident, she went to the police and confessed her previous involvement as a mule, 
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IRU ZKLFK VKH ZDV FRQYLFWHG WR  PRQWKV LQ FXVWRG\ RQ DFFRXQW RI WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V
µFRXUDJHRXV¶ testimony against Powell and the low quantity of the drugs imported. In her 
appeal, her counsel argued that she ought to have a lower sentence, considering she was a naïve 
offender; that her incarceration would have a negative impact on her daughter; and that she 
would not have been convicted if it had not been for her confession.   
 Whilst taking into consideration the mitigating factors, the CA said that the most 
SRZHUIXOPLWLJDWLRQKDGEHHQ³WKHSOHDDQGWKHIDFWWKDWWKHRQO\HYLGHQFHDJDLQVWWKHDSSOLcant 
was her own confession volunteered to the police in the circumstances we have described´368 
The CA noted that the 30-months sentence was already much lower than the normal range 
(between 4 ½ to 7 years). Rejecting the appeal, on account that the sentence was already very 
lenient, the CA stated the sentence was far less than that usually given to drug mules and it 
could not lower it further because she had a previous conviction for an importation offence. 
Further, the sentence had to reaffirm the deterrent principle in Aramah, that is, prevent 
unscrupulous dealers like Powell from recruiting more drug mules.369 What is common in these 
narratives is how coercion claims are side-lined in the judgement.  Rather than considering the 
real effect of subjective or objective perceptions of coercion on the drug mules if they back out 
of the enterprise, the narrative draws more on the personal characteristics of the appellants or 
the right application of the law. We could see these instances also as a dismissal of a different 
kind of vulnerability during the process of travel, as noted in chapter I. 
vii. The exceptional vulnerability of drug mules after 2012 
To conclude this section, I will review the effect of the two leading cases on the interpretation 
of the 2012 DG discussed at the beginning of the case study analysis. My suggestion is that the 
DG also reflects the shifting perception that drug mules are driven by poverty and caring 
responsibilities while the emphasis on the culpability or role is overshadowed by the drive to 
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maintain deterrence as a sentencing policy for drug offences.  The case of Jaramillo and 
Others370 LQYROYHGWKUHH6SDQLVKZRPHQDQGRQHPDQ7KHLUFRXQVHODUJXHGWKH\ZHUH³QDwYH
DQGH[SORLWHG´GXHWRWKHLU³GLUHILQDQFLDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV´371    
 Reviewing the personal circumstances, Felix Abello is described as man who had been 
working since he was 14 but made redundant from his permanent job two years previously. His 
unemployment benefits ceased but he had no means to support himself and his widowed 
mothHU7KHSV\FKRORJLFDOUHSRUWDOVRQRWHGWKDWKHKDG³ERUGHUOLQH´LQWHOOHFWXDOIXQFWLRQLQJ
DQGZDVDYHU\³SDVVLYHDQGQDwYHHDJHUWRSOHDVHDQGDYRLGRIFRQIURQWDWLRQ´372  In addition, 
he had an expensive cocaine habit. Secondly, Ana Isabel Palacios Exposito, 27, was a single 
mother of a seven-year boy and responsible for the care of her partially blind mother. She had 
also worked since she was a teenager and was unemployed since the economic crisis in Spain. 
The CA judge explains that the defendant had managed to make a living through sex work but 
left it because she had been exposed to violent customers and because this line of work caused 
her to feel fear and shame.373 Her circumstances drew her to accept the drug run and the 
promised payment of 7000 euros. Johana Solis Jaramillo, 19, was also a single mother who had 
left school at 15, and also described as being in a difficult financial situation. Finally, we are 
told a few facts about Estefania Pardo-Puertolas, 18, who had no fixed home because her family 
travelled from place to place. There was little information about her life situation. The CA was 
ready to accept all the defendants had performed a lesser role but the quantity of drugs imported 
was above category 1, requiring sentences of 20 years and above. Citing the precedent from A-
G (No.15-17 of 2012),374 Pitchford LJ UHFDOOVWKDWDSSHOODQWVLPSRUWHGµPDVVLYH¶TXDQWLWLHVRI
Class A drugs.  Each of them had imported about 16 to 25 kilos of Class A drugs in their 
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suitcase, undoubtedly for commercial purposes.375 Thus, while recognising their roles as 
³FRXULHUV´WKH&$ 
«GLd not intend to diminish in any way the force of the sentencing judge's observations 
that the court's primary function is to mark the pernicious nature of this trade in Class 
A drugs, even among those who carry the drugs for those much further up the chain of 
command.376 
The appeals against the high starting point were allowed but reading the distinction between 
courier and mule in Boakye & Others3LWFKIRUG/-VWDWHGWKDW³WKH\GRQRWIDOOSDUWLFXODUO\
easily within the group to which Hughes LJ was there desFULELQJ´377 DV ³PXOHV´ ,QVWHDG
3LWFKIRUG /- VDLG WKDW WKH GHIHQGDQWV ³YROXQWDULO\ MRXUQH\HG WR WKH 'RPLQLFDQ 5HSXEOLF
NQRZLQJ WKH\ ZRXOG EHFRPH &ODVV $ GUXJ FRXULHUV IRU VXEVWDQWLDO VXPV RI PRQH\´ DQG
accepted the risk of being intimidated.378 To the court, they were willing offenders who had 
assumed the risks379  UDWKHUWKDQRIIHQGHUV³H[SORLWHGRURSSUHVVHGE\RWKHUV.´380 While their 
counsel submitted they had no second thoughts about deciding to commit the offence, once in 
WKHMRXUQH\WKH\KDGEHHQ³XQGHUWKHcontrol of the organisers, men with guns.´381 Although 
QRWUHFRJQL]HGDV³PXOHV´WKHDSSHDOZDVDOORZHGDQGWKHLUVWDUWLQJSRLQWVZHUHFRQVLGHUHGWR
be too high. The CA gave credit to the guilty plea and all mitigating factors. Yet, the sentencing 
range departed from category 1 because it was a massive importation.   
 A similar rationale was applied to the case of Henry382 although the iteration of 
IHPLQLVHGIUDJLOLW\LVDFFHQWXDWHGWKURXJKWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VIDLOHGUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKPHQIDLOHG
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motherhood and mental health problems. When detained, she told officers that she had gone to 
Trinidad for a funeral but eventually pleaded guilty and confessed she had been approached by 
a man in a bar in London who offered her £5000 and a µKoliday¶ Henry was a beautician who 
wanted to set up her own business. After reviewing the pre-sentencing report, which detailed 
her history of depression, bipolarity and obsessive compulsive disorder, domestic abuse since 
the age of 14, and caring responsibilities for her six children (all minors), the sentencing judge 
decided she had played a significant role. She was sentenced to three years and four months 
for importing almost two kg of cocaine hidden in her brassiere. In the absence of duress, the 
court concluGHGVKH³had engaged in the conduct voluntariO\6KHZDVLQLWIRUWKHPRQH\´ and 
WKH ³MXGJH GLG QRW DFFHSW WKDW KHU QDLYHW\ DQG H[SORLWDWLRQ PDGH LW D OHVVHU UROH´383 
 +RZHYHU+HQU\¶VFRXQVHOPDGHDQLPSRUWDQWSRLQWWKDWLVDWWKHFUX[RIWKHGLVWLQFWLRQ
EHWZHHQPXOHVDQGFRXULHUVVWDWLQJ ,I³HYHU\FRXULHU LV OLNHO\ WREHPRWLYDWHGE\ ILQDQFLDO
DGYDQWDJH´WKHQLWLVOLNHO\WKH\ZRXOG³IXOILOWKDWSDUWLFXODULQGLFDWRUXQGHUWKHJXLGHOLQHRID
µVLJQLILFDQW¶ UROH %XW QRW HYHU\ FRXULHU SOD\V D µVLJQLILFDQW¶ role´384  This argument was 
dismissed because the sentencing judge was fully entitled to conclude the defendant had a 
significant role from her own submission, mainly that she suspected she would be carrying 
GUXJV+HQU\¶VVXVSLFLRQVVKRZHGWRWKHMXGJHWKDWVKHZHQWDKHDGZLWKWKHRIIHQFH³KHHGOHVV
RIKHUFKLOGUHQ´385 whilst fooling her mother into taking care of them. The court concluded this 
ZDV³QRWDFDVHRIDJXOOLEOHGHIHQGDQWZKRZDVDOUHDG\DEURDGEHLQJDVNHGWRFDUU\DSDFNDJH
DWVKRUWQRWLFHDVDµGUXJVPXOH¶DQGGRLQJVRRQLPSXOVH´386 Instead, she was motivated by 
ILQDQFLDO JDLQ DQG³GHVSLWHKHUPHQWDO KHDOWKGLIILFXOWLHV KDVRQO\KHUVHOI WREODPH IRU WKH
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damage that this greed has caused and will cause to herself and her children. It was her 
choice´387 +HQU\¶VDSSHDODJDLQVWVHQWHQFHGLVSXWHGRQWKHEDVLVRIKHUUROHZDVUHMHFWHG 
7. Conclusion: Merciful exclusions of vulnerability 
To conclude, the analysis presented shows how vulnerability has been pushed to the margins 
of the law because the CA characterized as an exceptional circumstance for few offenders could 
qualify. The effect of limiting the drug mule category to exceptionally vulnerable offenders 
who deserve the mercy of the law has been implicit since the 1980s but has evolved through 
case law and the DG. Starting from Aramah in the 1980s (discussed in chapter II), punctuated 
by Attuh-Benson,388 AG-Ref. (No 21 of 2006),389 Boakye & Others390 and AG-Ref. (No.15-17 
of 2012),391 WKHFDWHJRU\RIPXOHKDVEHHQIXUWKHUQDUURZHGDVD µYHU\VSHFLDOFDWHJRU\¶RI
offender. Although the inclusion of the non-exhaustive list of roles and mitigating factors 
would suggest otherwise, the narrative in post-2012 cases show a reluctance to recognise 
offenders as mules. This does not mean that a sentencing reduction is denied by the court. That 
is not the case always, as shown in Jaramillo and Others.392 In the end, even though the CA 
did not recognise them as drug mules, their appeal succeeded. In other words, aim of the appeal 
(the reduction of the sentence) can be achieved without a formal recognition that someone is 
vulnerable, a recognition implicit in the term mule. Still, what the analysis does suggest is that 
the term mule appears through the convergence of two schema of vulnerability: economic 
precariousness and gender norms.  The citational practices rehearsed normative models for 
women¶V subjectivity, stressing their caring responsibilities, sexual partnerships, and 
medicalization of their lives. Embodiment lurks throughout these references but usually 
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through the voice of the vulnerable body, the one that is not rational, bounded, intentional, and 
able to move through the world undisturbed. The pressure thus is to interpret vulnerability as a 
personal characteristic or circumstance, isolated from the social and political context of the 
appellant. $OWKRXJKWKHFRXUW¶VPHUF\KDVEHHQVRXJKWWRUHOLHYHWKHKDUVKHIIHFWVRIDGUXJ
sentencing policy which has placed greater stress on harm and deterrence over proportionality, 
the CA seems to push back and limit the availability of vulnerability. The effect is that 
YXOQHUDELOLW\LVUHFRJQLVHGDVDQµH[FHSWLRQ¶UDWKHUWKDQFRQVWLWXWLYHRIVXEMHFWLYLW\5HFDOOKRZ
Attuh-Benson was not recognised as DYXOQHUDEOHRUµLQDGHTXDWH¶RIIHQGHUDQG\HWEHFDPHWKH
PRGHOIRUWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµPXOHV¶DVVXIIHULQJSRVWFRORQLDOPRWKHUVZKLFKQuarcoo393 
did not satisfy.           
 The analysis of the cases here explored if and how stories representing aspects of 
vulnerability (relationality, dependence, embodiment, gender, precarity) were marginalized or 
accepted within different norms, but particularly gender and legal norms. By legal norm I do 
not suggest only sentencing law, but there were a number of norms implicit in the cases shown. 
For example, the rational legal person and how the law defines individual responsibility as the 
person who calculates risks or the one who should have known the immorality of her/his acts, 
mainly bringing drugs that would harm the community. Perhaps almost imperceptible in Attuh-
%HQVRQ¶VFDVHZHVHHWKHFKDOOHQJHWRWKHFRQIOLFWVXQGHUSLQQLQJGUXJSROLF\KRZLWDIIHFWHG
couriers-mules and their families. However, the legal frame translated those conflicts in the 
way that it can at the sentencing stage: that is, personalising the tensions through personal 
circumstances, such as Attuh-%HQVRQ¶VGHSUHVVLRQ7KHTXHVWLRQRIWKHSRVVLEOHLQMXVWLFHRI
high sentences for drug offences was postponed, as the CA noted it did not have the authority 
to change sentencing guidelines. The new DG were thought to shift away the disproportionality 
of sentencing dragged along since Aramah¶V JXLGHOLQHV +RZHYHU WKH &$ GLVSHOOHG WKRVH
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µP\WKV¶ in AG-Ref (No 15-17 of 2012).394 In doing so, the CA also reaffirmed its attachment to 
deterrence, particularly in cases of massive quantities.    
 <HW,KDYHVXJJHVWHGWKHµH[FHSWLRQDOLW\¶RIWKHPXOHFDWHJRU\ZDVDOUHDG\EXLOGLQJXS
since Faluade,395 Attuh-Benson396 and AG-Ref. (No 21 of 2006).397 In my view, iterations of 
WKHµYXOQHUDEOHRIIHQGHU¶DVDUHODWLRQDOVXEMHFWWKUHDWHQWKHQRUPRIWKHVHOI-bounded rational 
person of criminal law. Thus, it only prevails as a narrowed-down version, in the shape of 
vulnerability-as-exception. The dispossession of the appellants in Jaramillo & Others, to the 
economic crisis in Spain, the lack of welfare protection, etc., was closed off, because the CA 
focused on the financial reward as a definitive characteristic of the drug courier in contrast to 
the drug mule. Prior to the DG, the offenders did not appear in the text as duplicitous couriers-
or-mules. However, there were other forms of duplicity emerging in the judgement, where the 
ambiguity of the role was eliminated through a gendered re-recitation of the facts and a 
gendering of the appellants actions, motivations and character. Like now, the task of the court 
is to take away the cover of the masquerading (ambiguous) victimized offender.   
 1RZLQFRQWUDVWWR<RXQJ¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHZRPDQYLFWLPLVEURXJKWEDFNIURP
the margins to the centre, I will suggest that the doctrine of legal mercy, granted only to the 
authentic vulnerable drug mule is actually a way to abject vulnerability in order to reify the 
rule of the invulnerable legal subject.  Recall the discussion of sovereign governmentality and 
the law in Chapter V. My suggestion is that there is an analogous performance where the law 
H[HUFLVHVLWVDXWKRULW\WKURXJKH[FHSWLRQDOµDFWVRIPHUF\¶ There are various examples of legal 
DFWVRIPHUF\VXFKDVµLOOHJDO¶LPPLJrants being granted residence; or the commutation of death 
sentences; or permitting abortions in exceptional cases where prohibition is the norm 
(Deutscher 2008b). Penelope Deutscher suggests that across time and jurisdictions, the law has 
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created exceptions to the general prohibition of abortion. These exceptions function as a form 
RIELRSROLWLFDOUHJXODWLRQRYHUZRPHQ¶VERGLHVWKDWLVZKHUHWKHSHUPLVVLRQWRDERUWEHFRPHV
WKHUXOHLQWKHUHJXODWLRQRIZRPHQ¶VUHSURGXFWLYHSRWHQWLDOV(Deutscher 2008b). The regulation 
is directly linked to the intensification of feminine bodies as frail and vulnerable. Without, that 
intensificationWKHERG\LVVLPSO\DµQRUPDO¶ERG\ 
«VWDWHVRIH[FHSWLRQ LQVWLWXWH WKHIUDJLOLW\DQGFHQWUDOLW\RIERGLHV²reproductive no 
less than incarcerated. Whether the exception seems to protect while concurrently 
VWUHVVLQJWKHYXOQHUDELOLW\RIZRPHQ¶VUHSURGXFWLYe autonomy, or whether it seems to 
defend a state while weakening civil liberties, bodies are being intensified, weakened, 
and invested with their possible exposure to violence (ibid., 62). 
The exposure of the frail and vulnerable body of the pregnant woman works to suspend the 
criminalization of abortion or restrictions to abortion laws, through the sovereign mercy.398 
However, the effect of the exception is to re-confirm the rule: the illegality of the act of 
abortion. Unlike other formulations of biopolitical exceptions (Agamben 1998) where the 
sovereign suspends the death sentence, legally sanctioned abortions suspend the law to allow 
the death of the foetus, for example, where an illness threatens the life of the mother. To decide 
LVWRSHUIRUPDZDJHUEHWZHHQWKHIRHWXV¶ULJKWWROLIHDQGWKHPRWKHU¶VULJKWWROLIH+RZHYHU
Deutscher suggests that the norm is to regard the mother as a potential threat to the life of the 
foetus; hence the prohibition of abortion. In contrast, the foetus is as a norm, the one is who is 
XWWHUO\YXOQHUDEOHWRWKHPRWKHU7KHVWDWH¶VH[HUWLRQRIFRQWURORYHUWKHPRWKHU¶VUHSURGXFWLYH
SRWHQWLDOLVDOVRWKHQRUPDOVWDWHRIDIIDLUVZKLFKLVWKZDUWHGE\ZRPHQ¶VµVHOI-LQWHUHVW¶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The woman legally forbidden to have an abortion is sometimes figured as a potentially 
murderous competing sovereign whose self-interest would thwart the intervening 
motivations of the state concerned with the threshold life in question (Deutscher 2008b, 
66). 
Hence, under this structure of vulnerability-invulnerability, the roles between mother-foetus 
need to be reversed in order to be granted mercy. The effect is not entirely benign, since the 
suspension of the norm is confirmed by the exception. Deutscher concludes that the law 
SDUDGR[LFDOO\JUDQWVDGLVSHQVDWLRQIURP³LWVRZQKDUVKHVWYHUVLRQVXFKWKDWWKHH[HPSWLRQ
ERWK VXVSHQGV DQG UHFRQILUPV WKH KDUVKHVW UXOH´ (ibid., 65). Again I should reiterate that 
questions of life and death are not limited e literally to abortion or death sentences. Rather, as 
noted at the end of chapter V, invocations of life and death also refer to how subjectivity 
appears in the legal and political sphere, whether a person is symbolically and practically 
UHOHJDWHGRXWVLGHRIWKHUHODWLRQDOVSKHUHRIµEHLQJ-in-FRPPRQ¶EHFDXVHWKH\GRQRWFRPSO\
with the ideation of the legal subject under the social contract.      
 Of course, offenders whose sentences are reduced through legal mercy are biologically 
alive, but their persistence continues outside of the schemas of intelligibility that make it 
impossible to recognize vulnerability or the precariousness of every life (Schippers 2014, 40) 
by the law. Instead, the dynamic of mercy and exceptionality, as illustrated by Deutscher, limits 
the appearance of woPHQ¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\WRWKHDEVROXWHYLFWLP2QO\WKHQVKHZLOOQRWWKUHDWHQ
WKHQRUPRIWKHVRYHUHLJQSDWULDUFK,QFRQWUDVWWR<RXQJ¶VDQDO\VLVWKHYXOQHUDEOHIHPDOHLV
not simply accepted back into the community as the absolute victim, while the ambivalent 
female is excluded. The relationship is more complex. Both the ambivalent offender and the 
absolute victim are excluded in order to sustain the boundaries of the rational legal subject of 
FULPH &RQVLGHU KRZ LQ 'HXWVFKHU¶V UHDGLQJ WKH OHJDO UHFRJQLWion of fragility and the 
vulnerable body is only given as an exception to the norm. Thus, the victim is both inside and 
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outside. We could read her occasional acceptance, as the victim, only in utilitarian terms for 
the law, in other words, to maintain its authority to define the boundaries of legal personhood 
as well as gender norms.         
 In conclusion, the analysis of the cases shows a reluctance to recognize the ambiguity 
of vulnerability and the precarity RI WKH RIIHQGHUV¶ VLWXDWLRQV SULRU WR DQG GXUing the 
commission of the offence, as well as their vulnerability in relation to the law. As Janet 
Loveless notes,  ³ZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRIGUXJPXOHVWKHUHZDVQRH[SOLFLWUHFRJQLWLRQE\WKH6&
in any of its reports of the severe impact imprisonment has upon drug offending women more 
JHQHUDOO\RUWKHLUIDPLOLHVDVDW\SHRISXQLVKPHQW´(Loveless 2012, 8). This point is crucial 
because it leaves drug laws and sentencing practices politically unaccountable.  Recall how 
Attuh-%HQVRQ¶VFRXQVHOPDGHDYHU\FOHDUFKDOOHQJHWRVHQWHQFLQJSROLF\IRUGUXJRIIHQGHUV
That tension was resolved through the exceptional mercy granted on account of her vulnerable-
frail personal circumstances. Drug policies and laws arguably affect more people than solely 
mules but it is also undeniable that they are also blamed and affected by drug laws in a 
particularly punitive way. Significantly, the analysis shows how the legal schema of 
intelligibility reduces vulnerability into a very narrow idea: the identity of the post-colonial 
mother who is poor, uneducated, passive, and exploited and naïve.    
 Although the sentencing stage is not bound by the rigid conventions of legal guilt, 
sentencing judges still have to determine the culpability of the convicted drug offender through 
attention to the role and harm. Sentencing decisions are, after all, the culmination of the process 
DQG ZKHUH WKH FRXUWV H[SUHVV WKH FRPPXQLW\¶V FRQGHPQDWLRQ RI WKH FULPH 5HFDOOLQJ WKH
discussion on punishment and the future of a community at the end of chapter III, this stage 
has been the one that ensures the memorialization of the wrong and the future of the 
community, through the assurances of the disembodied person of liberal subject of law 
(Valverde 2005; Butler 2014a).  Explained otherwise, my suggestion is that the sentencing 
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decisions evince an effort to maintain the borders of that model of legal personhood. Instead 
of dealing with the conflicts and contradictions in how the law addresses legal subjects, the 
rational legal subject is safeguarded from the conflicts underpinning drug offences.  
 The case of drug mules unveil the failure of that project, throwing the law into doubt 
about the legitimacy of its principles. The cases presented in the chapter show how the 
ambiguous vulnerability of men and women cannot be accommodated into the parameters of 
the legal subject, re-drafted through the simplistic representation of victim/offender along 
gender lines. If ambiguous vulnerability- understood as the relational sphere RI µEHLQJ-in-
FRPPRQ¶- FDQQRWEHDFFRPPRGDWHGLQWRWKHVFKHPHVRILQWHOOLJLELOLW\RIWKHODZWKHµHLWKHU-
RU¶IUDPHZRUNVLWGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWLWGLVDSSHDUV,QVWHDGYXOQHUDELOLW\LVGLVSODFHGRXWVLGH
or incorporated. Vulnerability is moved outside legal normativity (a departure from the 
guidelines at the discretion of the judge) through legal mercy or effaced by confirming the 
norm of the wilful offender motivated by greed (the legal subject of criminal law). At the same 
time, while I have stressed that vulnerability reminds us of the social ontology of subjectivity, 
the repeated iteration of women relationality selectively limits and distributes vulnerability 











1. The promise of vulnerability 
 
This project has examined what is at stake in the articulation of drug mules-couriers as 
vulnerable offenders and its effects on sentencing law in England and Wales through a 
philosophical inquiry. Since 1983, sentencing law has recognised that some drug importation 
RIIHQGHUV FRXOG EH FKDUDFWHULVHG DV µYXOQHUDEOH¶ EDVHG RQ WKHLU GLVDGYDQWDJHG HFRQRPLF
VLWXDWLRQ DQG VXJJHVWLELOLW\ ZLWK UHJDUG WR µPDNLQJ D TXLFN SURILW¶ HLWKHU EHFDXVH RI WKHLU
circumstances or personal characteristics vis-à-vis the standard of the rational calculating 
subject of criminal law. This reference to vulnerability fleshes out a contradiction in criminal 
law where people are judged as disembodied legal persons yet they are relational embodied 
subjects acting in a particular context. At the same time, this contradiction is also interpreted 
as an ambivalence because mules-couriers are recognised through the legal frames either as 
victims or offenders. I have endeavoured to show how these terms are underpinned by a 
discursive apparatus which is shaped by gender norms. The gender-blindness in the Aramah 
guidelines has arguably been countered through an intensification and expansion of 
YXOQHUDELOLW\ GLVFRXUVHV EH\RQG WKH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI DJH DQG µVXJJHVWLELOLW\¶ IRU D µTXLFN
SURILW¶9XOQHUDELlity iterations, inside and outside the courts, point to caring responsibilities, 
JHQHUDOKDUGVKLSDQGFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKDWIDUIURPEHLQJµSHUVRQDO¶H[SRVLQJWKHJHQGHUHGDQG
unequal distributions of vulnerability and political dispossession. As the universality of the 
disembodied legal person subjectivity is constantly challenged through vulnerability 
discourses, the latter also produces conflicting results that reposition and impose a gendered 
discourse on drug mules through the invocation of accepted parameters of femininity and 
masculinity. As the case study shows, legal discourse participates in the organisation and 
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distribution of vulnerability, by guarding the boundaries of the disembodied rational legal 
person.           
 Beyond just stating that the law draws the boundaries of the legal subject and excludes 
embodied subjectivity, the contribution of this thesis is that is asks why and how vulnerability 
has become gendered in scholarly, legal and political discourses, and the effects of gendering 
vulnerability in these fields. Rather than adopting vulnerability as a characteristic of identity, 
which would have restricted the parameters of the inquiry, I deploy vulnerability as a critical 
concept that fleshes out embodied and gendered subjectivity in order to question legal 
personhood, criminal responsibility theories, punishment theories, and the sexual politics of 
injury. Ambiguity and ambivalence are two concepts closely interrelated to vulnerability 
approaches in feminist and queer theory, and as I have suggested, these concepts open up the 
possibility of articulating a critical ontology of vulnerability. Through this perspective, the 
thesis scrutinises the limits of criminal law through critical encounters with vulnerability in 




of ambiguity in order to expose the practices of domination and control deployed through 
criminal law and drug control.        
 To be sure, the ambivalence is an effect of the discourses on the feminized vulnerable 
subject and hyper-masculine acquisitive drug offender implicit the mule-courier categories 
incorporated by the Definitive Guidelines for Drug Offences (2012). Chapter II articulated this 
idea through an analysis of international and domestic drug policy, while introducing 
sentencing law governing importation offences. Excavating the assumptions and frameworks 
behind the legal procedure of the drug trafficking offender, the chapter suggests that drug 
293 
 
policy rhetoric is shaped by two distinct but interrelated rationalities. First, there is the 
neoliberal rationality which frames drug offenders as profit-oriented actors who bypass 
legitimate sites of profit-making such as labour markets. The second is the securitisation model 
LWHUDWHGWKURXJKWKHH[LVWHQWLDOWKUHDWVRIGUXJVDVDQµHYLO¶WRKXPDQNLQG,VXJJHVWWKDWERWK
rationalities operate implicitly in domestic drug laws in England and Wales. The securitization 
model underpins sentencing laws for drug trafficking while the neoliberal logic underpins the 
institutional organization of border management practices. While drug trafficking discourses 
DUH UHLWHUDWHG WKURXJK DQ DUWLFXODWLRQ RI VXLWDEOH µHQHPLHV¶ WKLV SURFHVV DOVR DUWLFXODWHV
µVXLWDEOH¶YLFWLms. Both victims and offenders orient the normative responses to international 
drug trafficking. The victim implicit in securitization discourses is both the community at risk 
of consuming drugs and the nation-state. There are competing vulnerabilities impinging upon 
drug control, drawn along lines of identity (global, national, racial, gender), and the 
securitisation practices and techniques used to exclude or colonise victimisation. Discourses 
on vulnerability in the CA appear only through a gendered version of victimhood, constructed 
via the references to the exploitable, third-world mother and those with caring responsibilities. 
Yet, postcolonial and feminist criminology shows how victimhood tropes animate practices of 
racial profiling  and legitimate prRWHFWLYHLQWHUYHQWLRQVWKDWFRORQL]HWKH³ILHOGVRIYLFWLPL]DWLRQ
DQGUHSUHVHQWWKHPDVSDUWRIWKHWHUULWRU\RISHQDOW\´(Biko Agozino 2008, xi).  
  Without being ready to jettison what vulnerability-as-victimhood signifies, 
namely the bodies upon which discourse inscribes, chapter III asks how those self-same bodies 
appear or disappear in criminal legal theory and practice. This entails an inquiry into the limits 
and contradictions of the rational legal person, individual responsibility, judgement and 
punishment.  Confronting failure in criminal legal practices and the penal equation, the chapter 
SRLQWVWRWKHFKDOOHQJHVDQGSURPLVHVRIµUHODWLRQDOLW\¶KLJKOLJKWLQJLQWKHSURFHVVWKHXQHTXDO
distribution of attributions of relationality along lines of heterosexual gender difference. This 
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induces me to pause, and, before embracing relationalLW\ WR LQTXLUH WKURXJK %HDXYRLU¶V
interventions on ambiguity, into why relationality  has been disavowed and what gender has to 
do with the abjection of interdependence at the epistemological, political, legal, and ethical 
levels. In this context I suggest that criminal law and punishment are geared towards 
eliminating ambiguity in social life through the calculable legal person. Although not directly 
addressing law per se, philosophers of ambiguity and ambivalence like Beauvoir and Butler 
invite us to think about the possibility of a non-violent criminal law; one which does not in 
IOHHLQJ IURP WKH DPELJXLW\ RI OLYLQJ ZLWK RWKHU µLQFDOFXODEOH¶ EHLQJV WKURXJK WKH ³WHUULEOH
VDWLVIDFWLRQV´of violence (Butler 2014b). Whilst ambiguity and ambivalence are a provocation 
to for ethical life, they do not prescribe norms for it (Murphy 2012a; 2012b). In short, they call 
for non-violence in criminal law but cannot list or define the norms for achieving ethical life. 
At the same time, Deutscher and Murphy heed the limits of the ethics of ambiguity, because it 
marks simultaneously promises and failures.      
 Building on the logic of abjection to embodiment and interdependence in social life, 
chapter IV examines the connection between bodies and vulnerability. It begins by linking 
these two concepts through the etymology of vulnerability: injury which is defined as 
VRPHWKLQJµDJDLQVW¶RUQRUµULJKW¶LQODZ+RZHYHUKHUH,HQFRXQWHUDQRWKHUSX]]OHWhy has 
criminal law often failed to recognise injuries to and harms suffered by women? Historically, 
the legal recognition of rape as well as injuries to other persons or groups not identical to the 
white male, have been inhibited or distorted by the dominant influence of patriarchal social 
attitudes. Considering how often feminist scholarship has highlighted the identification of 
masculinity  with able bodies and transcendental reason (Beauvoir 1986; Grosz 1994; Naffine 
1997; Du Toit 2009), I extended the analysis of the body in pain to encompass a gender 
perspective. I explore how the desire to flee from ambiguity as carnal beings has been organised 
along gender lines, where masculinity abjects its own embodiment (Schott 2010b). Extending 
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further the politics of separate spheres, this chapter seeks to unsettle the onto-epistemologies 
of duality through the phenomenology of pain and its relation to speech and language. It 
suggests that the aPELYDOHQFH RI µPDNLQJ¶ DQG µXQPDNLQJ¶ PDUNV WKH OLPLWV RI SROLWLFDO
domination. Overall, this chapter shows how the onto-epistemology of the Cartesian subject 
alienated from embodiment has been replicated in closed off notions of vulnerability which 
preclude recognition of ambiguity and ambivalence.  The notion of vulnerability deployed in 
some of the discourses explored in this thesis (namely criminal law and drug control) 
reinscribes the problematic language/materiality distinction while discourses of ambiguity and 
ambivalence present a conceptual opportunity to trouble this distinction.  
 Building on the idea of how sex and gender help to demarcate legal enclosures of 
injurability, chapter V analyses how feminist and queer scholarship articulate a critical attitude 
to political appropriations and disavowals of pain and injury whilst simultaneously troubling 
µZRXQGHGDWWDFKPHQWV¶(Brown 1995) WKDWUHDIILUPGLVHPSRZHULQJµSURWHFWLYH¶LQWHUYHQWLRQV
This chapter explores the sexual politics of vulnerability suggesting that if vulnerability is to 
be reclaimed for feminist legal theory and causes, such as the impact of criminal law and drug 
policy on drug mules, the context where vulnerability claims are uttered must be examined. 
This is because certain aspects of the philosophical imaginary animating the concept of 
vulnerability may resonate with securitization rationalities in criminal law and drug trafficking 
discourse, which aim to prevent injuries and risks through the managerial control of future 
insecurity (chapter III). However, I do not belief we should renounce to the promises of 
vulnerability. Instead, naming and renaming vulnerability vitalizes the debate on how some 
lives are made invisible by the allegedly universal subject of law.  The purpose of this 
critique was not to delegitimise vulnerability but identify its limits through a gender analysis. 
This chapter unpacks the references and histories associated with vulnerability, including the 
imaginary of violence, with a view to revising the work that metaphors of experience do and 
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their effects.399 Through this lens, I analyse how vulnerability carries over and mobilises the 
imaginary of risk into the sciences, legal theory, political theory, and human rights discourse. 
Following the trace of gender in bodies, chapter V unpacks the gendered ideation and gendering 
effects of vulnerability associated with risk and injurability which call forth the conceit of 
mastery and control over uncertainty.         
 Rather than jettison vulnerability altogether, feminist and queer scholars have present 
D³critLFDORQWRORJ\RIYXOQHUDELOLW\´(Murphy 2012, 63) that is attentive to the ambiguity and 
ambivalence of embodied vulnerability. By re-appropriating the ambiguity and ambivalence of 
critique that marks the limits of possessive practices to dispossession, these approaches to 
vulnerability UHSUHVHQWDµSURYRFDWLRQ¶WRZDUGVUHVSRQVLELOLW\LELGZKHUHWKHGLVWLQFWLRQVRI
ethics and politics are sustained but their relation is not dissolved (Bergoffen 2001; Loizidou 
2007). At its core, vulnerability marks the dispossession of care and violence (Murphy, 2012) 
grounded on the social ontology of subjectivity (Butler 2006; 2009a; 2012a). Showing how the 
PDWHUQDOERG\LVDUHPLQGHURI³the self as unstable, insecure or unstabOHYXOQHUDEOH´EHFDXVH
RIWKH³potential (of) dependency and lRVVRIPRUSKRORJLFDOERXQGDULHV´ (Schott 2010b, 46) 
serves as a reminder of our mutual interdependence which the phallic power disavows. 
Contrary to the norm of self-bounded and able-bodies, the maternal body exposes the 
impossibility of individualism conceived as a coherent and independent self (ibid.). At the same 
time, my project leaves unresolved the idea of the feminine and the maternal. For example, 
Kelly Oliver argues these two have been conflated in Western culture. The problem with lack 
RIGLVWLQFWLRQLVWKDWµIHPLQLQLW\¶DQGµZRPDQ¶DUHRQO\UHFRJQLVHGWKURXJKWKHreproductive 
SRZHUVRIPDWHUQLW\'UDZLQJRQ.ULVWHYD¶VZRUN2OLYHUH[SODLQVKRZDEMHFWLRQLVUHSURGXFHG
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 The critique matters not only to deconstruct the metaphor impinged in the concept of vulnerability. 
,QRWKHUZRUGV0XUSK\¶VSURMHFWDGGUHVVHVDUDQJHRIGLVFRXUVHVZKHUHYLROHQFHDQLPDWHVWKHRU\VXFK
as post-structuralism, phenomenology, post-colonialism, feminism and queer theories.  
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LQ WKH FXOWXUDO VSKHUH 7KH IHPLQLQH ZRPDQ DQG WKH PDWHUQDO ³KDYH EHHQ UHGXFHG WR
UHSURGXFWLRQRQO\´DQGWKXV³WKH\KDYHDOOEHHQH[FOXGHGIURPFXOWXUe as that abject which 
FKDOOHQJHVWKHERUGHUEHWZHHQFXOWXUHDQGQDWXUH´(Oliver 1995, 135).    
 Whether it is possible to ascertain a feminine subjectivity distinct from the maternal, or 
to re-configure the relationship with the maternal, has been beyond the scope of this thesis. My 
FRQFHUQKDVEHHQWRIROORZWKURXJKWKHµSRZHUVRIDEMHFWLRQ¶DQGFRQIURQWWKHVHLPSXOVHVRI
DEMHFWLRQDQGGHVLUHVWRµIOHHIURPDPELJXLW\¶LQRUGHUWRGLVFRYHUDOWHUQDWLYHQDUUDWLYHVRISDLQ
and vulnerability, even when it appears futile. In that sense, chapter IV my analysis on the 
sexual politics of vulnerability was meant to unsettle the power of sovereign governmentality. 
The aim was WRDUJXHWKURXJK/RL]LGRX¶VDQDO\VLVWKDWFULPLQDOODZLVQRWFRQGHPQHGWREHLQJ
an instrument of political power but also has a role to play in society as a translator of  
competing notions of legal personhood. But that requires a reconfiguration of the identity of 
criminal law itself, what it is and how it can function. As Loizidou and Norrie argue, the law 
is not an institution isolated either from political power or ethical aspirations of socio-political 
community. Criminal law is then relational and ambivalent. In that sense, vulnerability 
discourses provoke the criminal law to respond and translate competing claims about what is 
an offence. These claims are not uniform because there is a plurality of views on how to deal, 
for example, with drug trafficking. However, criminal law has failed to translate and respond 
to the precarity of people to the war and how it affects people differently. Instead, my analysis 
shows that the logic embedded in criminal law is more likely to respond with violence, and 
increase the precarity of drug mules and, for that matter their families too.  That being said, I 
have only sketched the contours of a non-violent criminal law. Many would argue that criminal 
justice cannot not respond to injuries and harms tKURXJKVRPHIRUPRIµSXQLVKPHQWDQGWKXV
escape the spectre of pain. However, if its work is meant to translate competing claims of 
vulnerability in society, criminal law cannot elude the ambiguity of its authority. As William 
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Connolly argues, modern authority has to deal with the prospect of the absence of 
WUDQVFHQGHQWDO UXOHV DQG QRUPV WKDW ZRXOG MXVWLI\ LWV UROH +H DOVR DGYRFDWHV  DQ ³HWKLF RI
DPELJXLW\´ZLWKRXWZKLFK³DQ\DWWHPSWWRUHVWRUHWUDGLWLRQDODXWKRULW\DQGYLUWXH«HYHQWXDOO\
degenerates into an authoritarian effort to impose a unified image of the good on those who 
UHVLVWLW´(Connolly 1987, 135).       
 This crucial task, of holding a space for ambiguity, has been complicated by the 
proximity of criminal law to political power and a lack of reflexivity about the temporality of 
experiences, values and norms. I showed how drug control framework shows its deep and 
intricate relationship to sovereign governmentality. The ambiguity of vulnerable bodies and 
the ambivalence in which competing vulnerability claims are received in politics involves a 
public debate and struggle to re-define the injurability or harm of drugs, which is arguably long 
overdue. This is not a point I discuss directly, that is, whether drug trafficking should or not be 
criminalised.  The main point to which I seek to draw attention is how the goal of order and 
crime control is sustained at the cost of masking and distributing vulnerability unequally, 
understood also as the isolation and dispossession of others who fail to respond to claims for 
better life conditions. Thus, Martha Fineman and Butler remind us that the state has been 
unresponsive to these claims.        
 Finally, chapter VI sets out to examine sentencing cases involving drug mules through 
the theoretical approach developed above, adapted to deliver a close analysis of sentencing 
appeals decisions. The chapter asks why sentencing appeal narratives perform an ambivalence 
articulated through victim-offender references. The ambivalence presents an aporia within the 
criminal law, an impasse that is carried over from the adjudication process. Recall how 
importation offences cast a wide net, both through the mens rea and actus reus, to adjudicate 
the actions of everyone who participates in the trafficking chain. Also, remember that actors 
are judged through the lens of the rational calculating person of criminal law. Hence, personal 
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circumstances and characteristics do not matter in law until the sentencing decision. Finally, 
recall also how the majority of offences are not even decided through trial by juries but by 
guilty pleas. Guilty pleas effectively silence the lives of couriers-mules in the adjudication of 
crime; thus, it is unsurprising that personal characteristics and circumstances take a centre stage 
in the sentencing appeals.        
 Building on the critique in chapter III, I suggest that the aporia or uncertainty signified 
by the ambivalent victim-offender narratives in sentencing appeals reflects several unresolved 
conflicts. It reflects: the isolation of individual responsibility through the quasi-disembodied 
legal person in criminal law (chapter II and III); the dispossession of subjectivity and abjection 
of embodiment and re-assignment as a characteristic of non-male subjects (chapter IV and V); 
the tensions in drug control (laws, policies and implementation) which grounds its authority on 
the vulnerable (children) in order to punish other vulnerable (marginalised) individuals and 
groups (chapter II). This technique has long authorised deterrence policies justified through the 
LQWHQVLILFDWLRQRIWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\DJDLQVWWKHµH[LVWHQWLDOWKUHDW¶RIGUXJV(Barrett 
2010; Lines, Barrett, and Gallahue 2010; Crick 2012). Yet, recall that deterrence is underpinned 
also by a vengeful and anxious stance of securitisation in relation to the vulnerability of the 
sovereign.          
 Instead of solving the contradictions and unjust practices of criminal law and drug 
control, I suggest that the puzzlement of amELYDOHQFHRUFRQWUDGLFWLRQDSSHDUVWREHµVROYHG¶
through a  disambiguation technique drawing on gender norms simultaneously translated 
through legal norms. The analysis highlights a number of key themes which emerge from 
judicial efforts to expose (or interrogate) the vulnerability of drug mules: financial distress, 
appeals to relational feminine subjectivity or exploited feminine naiveté, and attaching 
significance non-able bodies (marked by physical illness or cognitive disabilities). On the first 
theme, the case study shows how both men and women have been exposed as vulnerable 
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subjects through financial and caring responsibilities for other vulnerable ones (ill mothers, 
wives, children, siblings and parents). Economic narratives frame good masculinity through 
WKHWURSHRIWKHµKDUGZRUNHU¶FRQWUDVWHGZLWKWKHGUXJWUDIILFNHUVZKRPDNHµHDV\PRQH\¶E\
WUDGLQJLQµPLVHU\¶        
 Ambivalent gender performances are disambiguated through the imaginaries of 
DXWKHQWLFIHPLQLQLW\DJDLQVWµIDNHIHPLQLQLW\¶Rr woman acting in a masculine way (Young 
1997). Good femininity is iterated through the image of the economically precarious third 
world mother oUWKHQDwYHH[SORLWDEOH\RXQJZRPDQ$UWLFXODWLRQVRIµDXWKHQWLF¶YXOQHUDELOLW\
DUHJHQHUDOO\FRQWUDVWHGZLWKFRQVWUXFWVVXFKDVWKHVHOILVKDQGGHWDFKHGZRPDQ WKHµIDNH¶
business woman, women who feign economic desperation; or the careless mother who 
performs as the vulnerable mother by involving her children in the trafficking of drugs. Yet, 
judgement narratives show how the concept of responsibility ingrained in the bounded legal 
person is kept intact while vulnerability can only be recognised as somethLQJµH[FHSWLRQDO¶
7KH FRQFOXVLRQ WKXV VXJJHVWV WKDW YXOQHUDELOLW\ LV D µPHUFLIXO H[FHSWLRQ¶ ZLWK WKRVH PRVW
meriting exceptional mercy including the postcolonial suffering mother. This discourse of 
exceptionality limits the appearance of vulnerable lives and only recognises the vulnerable as 
absolute victims.         
 )LQDOO\DGDSWLQJ<RXQJ¶VLGHDRIWKHH[FOXVLRQRIXQUXO\IHPLQLQLW\,FRQFOXGHWKDW
WKHODZ¶VPHUF\WRZDUGVWKHYLFWLPL]HGGUXJPXOHVWLOOPDUJLQDOL]HVKHUEXWDOVRUHFRQVWLWXWHV
the norm of the legal person through her. Heeding the positions of the marginal and the 
DSSURSULDWLRQRIYLFWLPV¶ERGLHVWKURXJKRXWWKHWKHVLVVKRZVWKDWWKHPHUFLIXOH[FHSWLRQLVQRW
the norm. Hence, the inside/outside status of the victimised drug mule confirms the norm of 
WKHFRXULHUDV WKHµILQDQFLDOO\¶PRWLYDWHGRIIHQGHUZKRSURILWV IURPWKHYXOQHUDELOLW\RI WKH
community through the distribution of drugs. The narrowing down of vulnerability as an 
µH[FHSWLRQDO¶FDWHJRU\ thus exemplifies how law translates vulnerability into its own schemas 
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of intelligibility. Although there are several overlapping frames (drug control, legal doctrine, 
sentencing law and gender norms), my reading of the cases broadly shows the abjection of 
vulnerability narratives. Judges repeatedly affirmed that they could not be affected by the 
typicality of mules-couriers stories. Instead, the textual appearance of such stories in the 
judgment demonstrates how the boundaries of the rational legal person are held and illustrates 
the jurisprudential interpretation techniques that clarify and disambiguate ambivalent subjects 
and their responsibilities into clear judgements that sustain and shape categories of typical 
offenders versus atypical victims. While vulnerability narratives contextualize male and female 
drug mules-couriers pathways to crime, they also unveil the failure of the criminal law to act 
as a translator between ethical concerns and political power. Rather, they exposed how, in the 
case of drug offences, the law performs the two overlapping modalities of power ± understood 
as the neoliberal rationality of control-managerialism overlapping with securitisation against 
vulnerability - discussed throughout the thesis. In other words, my analysis shows that the 
criminal courts operate through a logic of sovereign governmentality which, focused on its own 
vulnerability (and sustaining the appearance of the self-bounded rational law), is concerned 
with the penal governance of risky subjects.    
    
2. The limits of vulnerable resistance: Why this analysis matters 
 
By pointing out the different iterations of vulnerability, the overall aim has been to map the 
onto-HSLVWHPRORJ\RIYXOQHUDELOLW\XQGHUVWRRGDV WKH³LQWHUWZLQHGVWXG\RI WKHSUDFWLFHVRI
NQRZLQJDQGEHLQJ´ZKLFKDUHWKRURXJKO\PDWHULDOSUDFWLFHV(Barad 2007, 379). Contrary to 
the assumptions embedded in the dichotomous Cartesian subject which posit discourse, 
language, and knowledge as immaterial, as simply abstractions without a relation to the 
material, I suggest throughout this thesis the interdependence of knowledge, practices, and 
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embodiment through a revision of historical practices of punishment, the phenomenology of 
pain and performative practices of political power.       
 At another level, I suggest that vulnerability is an affective intensity, moving and being 
moved by our corporeal embodiment. While I focus on the affective intensity of pain, 
vulnerability is not marked only by pain, though this remains an important aspect. I note the 
propensity of vulnerability to depart from the image of injurability and the effects of deploying 
the imaginary of violence. Through that perspective, I have sought to unhinge the affect from 
the effects of pain and injury. This effort is instantiated by my concern to reproduce and 
reiterate vulnerability in the modality of victimhood as absolute GLVSRVVHVVLRQ WR SDLQ¶V
destructive powers over speech that totalise subjectivity without room for speaking back, 
individually or collectively to this performance of power. By approaching pain or violence 
through different methodologies and examples, I point out how Scarry, Du Toit, Butler and 
Loizidou, show how totalizing forms of power over discourse are contestable and fragile. They 
DOOHPSKDVLVHWKHµVSHFWDFOH¶ZKLFKVXSSRUWVWRUWXUH,QGHHGWKHUHFXUUHQFHRIYLROHQFHVKRZV
the tenuous reality of political patriarchal powers. Butler articulates a sophisticated account of 
the relationship between invulnerability and vulnerability (chapter V). Whilst sovereign 
masculinities abject vulnerability through a violence that perpetuates the fantasy of 
invulnerability, the fact that violence is used evinces instead how fragile such sovereignty is. 
However, this fantasy materializes in the violence that reproduces itself, through the temporal 
extension of pain and deterrence/ retribution as noted in chapter III.    
 By marking the potentials and limits of the vulnerability, my claim is that advancing 
vulnerability claims in criminal justice institutions alone cannot offer justice for drug mules 
because there are also deeper contradictions in criminal law that have not been dealt with. In 
other words, my aim is to stress the limits of criminal law in receiving vulnerability claims. 
Still, I suggest vulnerability pushes the limits of modern criminal, evincing its failures. Once 
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we take note of those failures, the challenge is to relationize criminal law by locating it in its 
socio-political context. This involves inevitably an inquiry on the validity, authority, and 
interaction with drug control policies and the general doctrine of criminal law- including the 
limited version of universality and equality in legal theory and practice.     
 I suggest that a way forward is to confront and encounter the ambiguity of vulnerability 
through a revision of the power of abjection (Kristeva 1982) implicit in the relationship with 
corporeality, in particular the body in pain.  Recall that chapter IV explained how Arendt 
characterizes pain as the most intimate experience which cannot transcend into the political 
sphere because it destroys speech and action. Without those two activities, pain is condemned 
to the private sphere of the individual. Thus, body is completely apolitical for Arendt because 
when one is consumed in covering these necessities, one cannot participate in political life. 
And in that sense, the law would appear unable to respond to the stories of precarity appearing 
before the CA. Of course, such a conclusion seems to foreclose the possibility related political 
or ethically with vulnerability. Yet, I signpost how the phenomenology of pain does not 
necessarily lead to the alienation of the self. Alienation is an orientation inscribed already in a 
context that favours certain interpretations of the body in pain. Culturally and socially, Western 
societies have geared towards containing pain, and interpreted the relationship with the body 
in pain or illness as a problem to be solved with knowledge and technological artefacts (Leder 
1990; Vetlesen 2009; rua Wall 2008). My contribution to feminist and critical legal studies is 
to show how pain and injurability, are not condemned to the isolation of the private sphere 
(represented by the bounded body) because there are others who participate by responding, 
denying, minimizing, healing, and caring for that pulsating pain that threatens to engulf every 
corner of our being in the world. A more just criminal law would not further these mechanisms 
of abjection, and for that matter violence, through fraught theories of criminal responsibility 
and punishment which extend the debt of drug mules towards society indefinitely. In that way, 
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this thesis provides, through a feminist and critical legal theory perspective, a critique on the 
symbiotic operation between legal doctrine and drug trafficking laws. Contrary to other 
approaches which focus on drug laws and policy, I show the complicity of criminal law in 
perpetuating the precarity of drug mules. Through feminist and queer theory, this project 
explains how attending to the body is a crucial political and ethical gesture, which the criminal 
law has long repressed. At the same time, challenge for feminist approaches to relating with 
the life of women who act as drug mules is not fix these lives into the identity of the victimized 
woman, because it another way of masking and limiting the potential of vulnerability as 
concept that contests the conditions and relations that shape subjectivity.   
 In that sense, Butler shows a way forward, showing how vulnerability (and pain) is not 
condemned to the privacy of the body as Arendt proposed. While she has been significantly 
influenced by Arendt (Loizidou 2007; Butler 2011; Butler 2012a), Butler reworks the place of 
the body in politics in  a way that ultimately keeps the political space open to vulnerability by 
re-interpreting the relationship of the body with the private/public spheres. When embodied 
subjects appear in the public scene, exposing the vulnerability and violence of the existing 
HFRQRPLF SUDFWLFHV WKH\ DUH ³ZLWK $UHQGW DQG DJDLQVW $UHQGW´ (Butler 2012c, 113). The 
µDJDLQVW¶UHYROYHVDURXQG$UHQGW¶VVHSDUDWLRQRIWKHERG\IURPWKHSROLWLFDODQGµIRU¶ because 
Arendt reconfigures the idea of the space of political representation that is not simply in a 
parliament or other formal political venue (ibid). Instead, Butler suggests that the political 
space is created through plural action and encounters with vulnerable bodies.  For this reason, 
I think that exposing vulnerability in the courts is a political gesture, one that shows the 
disavowal and abandonment facilitated by drug control policies but also economic policies 
(Corva 2009). In other words, the struggle of vulnerable bodies in politics is to expose the 
disavowals of the elemental needs of the body: the lack of care evidenced by receding health 
SURWHFWLRQ WKHGHQLDORISHRSOH¶V VRFLR-economic rights; the neglect of the elderly who are 
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abandoned by the state because of fraught pension systems and welfare cuts; the absence of 
caring for people who lose their jobs and struggle with other circumstances in their lives. Some 
of these stories were partially presented in the cases drawn in chapter VI. But they are 
incomplete because  they do not show the failure of other areas of the law (human rights, public 
law, labour law) that converge into the criminal cases (Young 1997).    
 If the space of the court is ambivalent, negotiating the ethical and the political, we might 
have to think more about the material configuration of politics and the distribution of 
vulnerability. I argue there are also limits in naming vulnerability, in other words, it is also an 
ambivalent gesture, because it can also mask the practices of dispossession and possession even 
further. Yet, performativity also allows for holding a view on how addressees do often resist 
the names they are given, and by doing so, they also resist the authority of the addressor 
(Loizidou 2007). The re-appearance of vulnerable bodies and their persistence in the streets, 
protesting, and challenging the legal and political configurations that render them precarious,  
is not as victims but as agents demanding an end to the political conditions which do not 
recognise their vulnerability (Butler 2012c, 113). The re-appearance of vulnerability in the 
criminal courts cannot be read in a similar way though as in a social protest.  This is because 
the dilemma for drug mules in the post-'* ODQGVFDSH LV VLPLODU WR%XWOHU¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW
precarious lives face DSDUDGR[EHFDXVHWKH\QHHGWR³appeal to the very state from which they 
QHHGHGSURWHFWLRQ´ (Butler 2009a, 26). But we cannot remain oblivious to the refusals and acts 
of resistance by drug mules to counter the stories already provided by the law (victim/offender). 
While Loizidou recognises that resistance ³does not dismantle the whole socio-symbolic strata 
or the conditioQV WKDW HQDEOH VXEMHFW IRUPDWLRQ´ LW LV VWLOO D ³gesture towards different 
aspirations of life and the possibilLW\RIWKHLUPDWHULDOLVDWLRQ´(Loizidou 2007, 90).  Resistance 
to injurious forms of address requires a space to be able to reject them. If those spaces are 
foreclosed, the power to injure is maskeGLQRWKHUZD\VDZD\WRNLOO³the subject both literally 
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DQGPHWDSKRULFDOO\´LELG, 41). For example, when a judge defines someone as a drug mule or 
a courier, the name cites a convention in sentencing law, reiterated throughout legal practices, 
such as precedent interpretation. Yet, the label should not be considered as totalizing. If the 
court has failed to act as a translator, or arbiter of competing claims of vulnerability, drug 
offenders themselves re-appropriate victim-offender tropes, such as the prison protests in El 
Inca prison in Peru where the ³collective idHQWLILFDWLRQ ZLWK WKH GUXJ PXOH´ SURYLGHG D 
³collective adoption of an effectual LGHQWLW\QHFHVVDU\IRUSURWHVW´(Fleetwood 2014, 49). Thus 
drug mules show how they are not passive victims or evil offender. They become agentic 
subjects by re-appropriating the label of drug mules or by resisting to be named as an evil drug 
offender. For example, Attuh Benson refused to accept her guilt for trafficking drugs (as 
discussed in chapter VI).400 Of course, Hallett LJ reprimanded her for that refusal. However, if 
she had not refused the label as a criminal; her story of precarity (her situation as a foreign 
offender; the effects of harsh sentencing policies on her family in Uganda) would have been 
silenced by a guilty plea or a jury or judge who sees vulnerability as a masquerade. Similarly, 
there are other cases in which drug mules affirmed duress and refused to accept guilt, which 
arguably exasperated judges.401 Without Attuh-%HQVRQ¶VUHIXVDO to accept her guilt, her story 
would have been further obscured by the legal norms that appraise those who confess, their 
LQWHQWLRQV IRU RIIHQGLQJ DV VHHQ LQ WKH QDUUDWLYHV YDORULVLQJ PDOH RIIHQGHUV¶
straightforwardness.           
 In that sense, I do not think articulations of vulnerability-as-victimhood should be 
rejected altogether because vulnerability carries a relevant signifier of precarious life 
conditions in which states are often implicated. IIWKHµYLFWLP¶WURSHLVWKHRQO\H[SUHVVLRQRI
vulnerability which is intelligible in criminal law, its potential should not be wholly disavowed. 
                                                          
400
  R v Attuh-Benson (Irene Cynthia) [2004] EWCA Crim 3032, para 22. 
401
 R v White (Patrick Emanuel) [2003] EWCA Crim 344 
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Yet, I have also argued for the need to pay critical attention to discourses of vulnerability as 
victimhood in order to identify when victimhood has become appropriated or transmogrified 
into a µZRXQGHGDWWDFKPHQW¶WKDWUHLILHV the conditions of victimhood (as for example, when 
the mule trope becomes a drug enforcement profile). The struggle for academics, legal actors, 
civil society, and those all invested in speaking for drug mules is against the reification of 
meaning and for the pluralisation of narratives contesWLQJPRQROLWKLFVWHUHRW\SHVRIµmothers 
with suffering children¶IURPWKHµWKLUGZRUOG¶%\SOXUDOLVLQJWKHQDrratives of vulnerability 
and exposing the local and global conditions of precariousness, we might one day recognise 
WKH DUWLILFLDOLW\ RI WKH FDWHJRULHV LQ VHQWHQFLQJ ODZ VXFK DV µSHUVRQDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶ RU
µLQGLYLGXDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶  If vulnerability is relational, the personal is also political and what 















Definitive Guidelines for Drug Offences 2012 
Sentencing guidelines for the offence of fraudulent evasion of a prohibition by bringing into or 
taking out of the UK a controlled  
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (section 3) and Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (section 
170(2)) 
Table 1. 
Step 1 Determining the offence category 
 
Step 2 Starting point and category range 
 
Step 3 Consider any factors which indicate a reduction, such as assistance 
to the prosecution 
 
Step 4 Reduction for guilty pleas 
 
Step 5 Totality principle 
 
Step 6  Confiscation and ancillary orders 
 
Step 7 Reasons for sentence 
 


















Table 2.  
Step 1. Determining category of the offence 
Culpability of the offender (role) Category of harm 
Leading role: 
 









 KHURLQFRFDLQH± 5kg;  
HFVWDV\± 10,000 tablets;  
/6'± 250,000 squares;  
DPSKHWDPLQH± 20kg;  
FDQQDELV± NJNHWDPLQH± 5kg. 




LQYROYHVRWKHUVLQWKHRSHration whether by 
pressure, influence, intimidation or reward; 
PRWLYDWHGE\ILQDQFLDORURWKHUDGYDQWDJH
whether or not operating alone; 
VRPHDZDUHQHVVDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIVFDOHRI
operation. 
Category 2  
 
KHURLQFRFDLQH± 1kg;  
HFVWDV\± 2,000 tablets;  
/6'± 25,000 squares;  
DPSKHWDPLQH± 4kg;  
FDQQDELV± 40kg;  
NHWDPLQH± 1kg. 







of the scale of operation; 
LIRZQRSHUDWLRQVROHO\IRURZQXVH




 KHUoin, cocaine ± 150g;  
HFVWDV\± 300 tablets;  
/6'± 2,500 squares;  
DPSKHWDPLQH± 750g;  
FDQQDELV± 6kg;  
NHWDPLQH± 150g. 
Category 4  
 
KHURLQFRFDLQH± 5g;  
HFVWDV\± 20 tablets; 
 /6'± 170 squares;  
DPSKHWDPLQH± 20g;  












Step 2. Starting point and category range 
Table 3.  
After deciding the category, the court finds corresponding starting point within category ranges 
set out below. Starting points are the same, regardless of the plea or previous convictions. 
Afterwards, there is a further adjustment considering mitigating and aggravating factors.402 
CLASS A Leading role Significant  role Lesser role 





Starting point  
\HDUV¶FXVWRG\ 
Category range 
12 ± \HDUV¶FXVWRG\ 
Category range 
9 ± \HDUV¶FXVWRG\ 
Category range 
6 ± \HDUV¶FXVWRG\ 
Category 2 Starting point 
11 custody  
Category range 
9 ± \HDUV¶FXVWRG\ 















Starting point  
6 years 
Category range 




3 years and 6 months 
5 years in custody 
 
CLASS B Leading role Significant  role Lesser role 
Category 1 Starting point 
8 years custody  
Starting point 
5 years and 6 months 
custody  
 
Starting point  
4 years custody 
Category range 




2 years 6 months- 
\HDUV¶FXVWRG\\HDUV
custody 
Category 2 Starting point 




Starting point  
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 &DWHJRU\IRUDOOFODVVHV³:KHUHWKHTXDQWLW\IDOOVEHORZWKHLQGLFDWLYHDPRXQWVHWRXWIRUFDWHgory 4 on 
the previous page, first identify the role for the importation offence, then refer to the starting point and ranges for 
possession or supply offences, depending on intent. Where the quantity is significantly larger than the indicative 




CLASS C Leading role Significant  role Lesser role 










2 ± \HDUV¶FXVWRG\ 
Category range 
1 ± \HDUV¶FXVWRG\ 
Category 2 Starting point 
3 years 6 months in 
custody 
Category range 
2- 5 years in custody 
Starting point  
18 months in custody  
Category range 
1- 3 years in custody 
Starting point 
26 weeks in custody 
Category range- 
12 weeks-18 months 
in custody 
Category 3 Starting point 
18 months in custody 
Category range 
1-3 years in custody 
Starting point  
26  weeks in custody 
Category range 
12 weeks-18 months 
in custody 
Starting point 




level order- 12 weeks 
in custody. 
 
Table 4.  
Non-exhaustive list of additional facts providing the context of the offence and factors relating to the 
offender. Combination of these factors should result in upward or downward adjustment of the starting 
SRLQWUHOHYDQW7KH6HQWHQFLQJ&RXQFLOQRWHVKRZ³LQVRPHFDVHVKDYLQJFRQVLGHUHGWKHVHIDFWRUVLW
may be appropriate to move outside the identified catHJRU\UDQJH´'HILQLWLYH*XLGHOLQHV 
Factors increasing seriousness  Factors reducing seriousness or reflecting 
personal mitigation 
Statutory aggravating factors: 
3UHYLRXVFRQYLFWLRQVKDYLQJUHJDUGWRD
nature of the offence to which conviction relates 
and relevance to current offence; and b) time 
elapsed since conviction (a third drug 
trafficking conviction sets off different 
sentence) 
2IIHQGHUXVHGRUSHUPLWWHGDSHUVRQXQGHU
to deliver a controlled drug to a third person 
2IIHQFHcommitted on bail 
0LVWDNHQEHOLHIRIWKHRIIHQGHUUHJDUGLQJWKH
type of drug, taking into account the 










having been taken to address addiction or 
offending behaviour 
6HULRXVPHGLFDOFRQGLWLRQVUHTXLULQJXUJHQW
intensive or long-term treatment 
$JHDQGRUODFNRIPDWXULW\ZKHUHLWDIIHFWVWKH
responsibility of the offender  
0HQWDOGLVRUGHURUOHDUQLQJGLVDELOLW\ 
6ROHRUSULPDU\FDUHUIRUGHSHQGHQWUHODWLYHV 
Other aggravating factors: 
6RSKLVWLFDWHGQDWXUHRIFRQFHDOPHQWand/or 
attempts to avoid detection 
$WWHPSWVWRFRQFHDORUGLVSRVHRIHYLGHQFH
where not charged separately 
([SRVXUHRIRWKHUVWRPRUHWKDQXVXDOGDQJHU











Criteria for selection of cases included in the analysis 
The case law collected in the case study section was collected from two different databases: 
Westlaw and Casetrack. Case track is a specialist database containing over 80 000 full 
judgment transcripts from the Court of Appeal and the High Court collected from 1996 until 
date. Case transcripts and judgements are provided by Smith Bernal reporting, the office source 
of the Court of Appeal and Administrative Court transcripts. Westlaw is comparably a richer 
database because it includes cases reported in the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting Law 
reports and the Criminal Appeal Reports, as well as access to unreported cases from 1865 
onwards.  The ICLR is the authorised publisher for the Law Reports for the Superior and 
Appellate Courts of England and Wales and the Criminal Appeal Reports series, which is the 
specialized series published by Sweet and Maxwell.  Of the thousands of cases heard every 
year, not all are reported and published in law reports. In 2001, the UK courts introduced a 
neutral citation system for all judgements decided in the Supreme Court, High Court and both 
the criminal and civil division of the Court of Appeal.      
 The majority of the cases selected were reported through their neutral citation (EWCA 
Crim) or the Criminal Appeal Reports series (Cr. App. R.).  A small number were transcripts 
of unreported cases collected in Casetrack. The analysis took into account cases which have a 
binding effect on future decisions, but also explored how they were applied to the cases that 
conformed to WKH VHDUFK FULWHULD 7KH RYHUDUFKLQJ VHDUFK FULWHULD ZHUH UHIHUHQFHV WR µGUXJ
FRXULHU¶DQGµGUXJPXOH¶LQFDVHVSUHVHQWHGWR&RXUWRI$SSHDO&ULPLQDO'LYLVLRQIURP-
2014. Further filters were introduced to the search to narrow down the analysis according to 
the theoretical framework explored in this thesis.      
 The first search included an open search in Casetrack for cases that included the word 
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µGUXJ FRXULHU¶ DQG DQRWKHU RQH ZLWK WKH NH\ ZRUG µGUXJ PXOH¶  )URP WKH WRWDO QXPEHU RI
entries, I then selected only those involving an appeal against sentence or leave to appeal. Some 
cases overlapped with those found in the search in Westlaw but others. The limitations 
searching in this database were significant, particularly because it did not allow including 
search terms within the initial search term and it did not have the option to include only cases 
from the Criminal Division. The first criteria to select a case were the type of offence; second, 
the grounds for appeal. Thus, from the 17 cases appearing in the search on drug mules and  58 
cases, I discarded cases which did not have the following characteristics: 1) were not appeals 
against sentence or applications to leave to appeal; 2) were not offences under s.170 (2) of the 
CEMA; 3) cases involving conspiracies which did not have a relevant discussion on 
vulnerability,QWKHHQGFDVHVZHUHVHOHFWHGIURPWKHµGUXJPXOH¶VHDUFKDQGFDVHVIURP
WKHµGUXJFRXULHU¶VHDUFK6HHWDEOH7KXVWKHWRWDOFDVHVFROOHFWHGIURPWKLVGDWDEDVHZHUH
29 cases including men and women.        
 A second search was done in Westlaw with the same criteria. In this search, I applied 
WKHVDPHILOWHUXVLQJWKHWHUPµGUXJFRXULHU¶ZKLFKJDYHFULPHFDVHV,WKHQDSSOLHGDQRWKHU
filter to find out those who were convicted for fraudulent evasion of a prohibition (drug courier 
+ fraudulent evasion of a prohibition). This filter indicated 141 cases. Subsequently, I applied 
RWKHU YDULDEOHV FULWHULD ORRNLQJ IRU VSHFLILF UHIHUHQFHV WR WKH IROORZLQJ NH\ZRUGV µPXOH¶
µYXOQHUDEOH¶ µH[SORLWDWLRQ¶ µPHUF\¶ DQG IDPLO\ VWDWXV RI WKH DSSHOODQWV LQFOXGHG LQ WKH
QDUUDWLYH PDLQO\ µPRWKHU¶ DQG µIDWKHU¶ $OO FDVHV LQFOXGLQJ WKRVH UHIHUHQFHV ZHUH UHDG
FDUHIXOO\VRDVWRVHOHFWWKHFDVHVLQFOXGHGLQWKHDQDO\VLV5HIHUHQFHVWRµPRWKHU¶µIDWKHU¶
DQG µFKLOGUHQ¶ LQ WKH QDUUDWLYH ZHUH RIWHQ LUUHOHYDQW EHFDXVH LW GLG QRW SRLQW WR FDULQJ
responsibilities or dependants. Instead, they were references to the narration of events. There 
might be a gap for cases where the offenders did not have dependents but were actually 
dependent on others. Some cases showed how offenders with disabilities, mental illnesses or 
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young offenders did not have caring responsibilities but instead, depended on others for their 
wellbeing or were financially dependent on others. There are gaps as well in the data collected 
where such details were not included in the transcript of the appeal.   
 Another gap was that there were different results according not only to the keyword, 
but also when the key word was in plural RUVLQJXODUIRUH[DPSOHµFRXULHUV¶RUµPXOHV¶7KH
limitation from applying filters in Westlaw is that it is obviously sensitive to specific key terms. 
In total, I selected 54 cases from the results in this database. An additional open search for the 
teUP µGUXJ PXOH¶ LQ :HVWODZ VKRZHG FDVHV WKDW GLG QRW DSSHDU E\ VHDUFKLQJ µGUXJ FRXULHU
IUDXGXOHQWHYDVLRQRIDSURKLELWLRQPXOH¶EXWLWDOVRUHVXOWHGLQDJUHDWHUQXPEHURIFDVHV
54 results. The problem of including the type of offence in the key word search was that 
important authoritative cases did not appear anymore in the search result (especially Boake & 
Ors (2012) but it also increased the number of cases that were not under s.170 (2). Moreover, 
few cases that appeared in Casetrack matched to the RQHVLQ:HVWODZXQGHUWKHWHUPRIµGUXJ
PXOH¶           
 Despite applying different search criteria, some cases overlapped and thus, appeared 
more than twice. The results of total cases (after merging the results of the two database search) 
are shown in the tables annexed here. To get a good sense of the case as a whole, I collected 
legal data and facts about the case:1) type of offence, 2) grounds for appeal or leave for appeal; 
3) if the appellant pleaded guilty or if convicted after a trial; 4) defences; 5) sentence; 6) 
quantity and type of drug imported and 7) method of importation (whether in a suitcase, 
swallowed, strapped around body, clothes or other garments, vehicle). I then included also, 
where available, information on the appellant: 1) sex; 2) age; 3) dependents; 4) health 
conditions (illness, disability, mental health condition); 5) unemployment or precarious work.  
This list is non-conclusive but rather depended in the narrative of the appeal. The source for 
these narratives varied but in appeals to sentences, the CA often referred back to the pre-
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sentence reports (where available) produced to determine the sentence in the first instance 
court.  The meaning of pre-sentence report is outlined in section 158 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003: 
(1) In this Part "pre-sentence report" means a report which: 
(a) with a view to assisting the court in determining the most suitable method of dealing 
with an offender, is made or submitted by an appropriate officer, and 
(b) contains information as to such matters, presented in such manner, as may be 
prescribed by rules made by the Secretary of State. 
These reports are produced by probation officers and it is meant to give an assessment on the 
nature and seriousness of the offence (CPS, 2014). The PSR is shared with the prosecutor and 
the legal representative of the offender. Probation officers work for the National Probation 
Service, which is a statutory criminal justice service entitled to supervise high-risk offenders 
released into the community.  In other cases, the narratives about the facts related by the 
prosecution, defence, and the judge.  The appellants are quoted directly in just a few cases.
 The gaps in the search and the information provided in the sentencing appeal do not 
allow me to establish firm quantitative conclusions at this point. Furthermore, that was not the 
intention of the case study. My aim has been to find out how specific key concepts in the 
theoretical framework appeared and were deployed in the appeals.  Bearing in mind the legal 
rules, e.g. the binding effect of authoritative cases, the analysis explored how appellants were 
UHFRJQL]HG DV D µGUXJ PXOH¶ RU DV µGUXJ FRXULHU¶ WKURXJK UHIHUHQFH RI JHQGHU HFRQRPLF
circumstances, exploitation, vulnerability, and caring responsibilities.   
 To be clear, the majority of the cases selected did not discuss whether the appellant 
could be said to have a leading role. Thus, the analysis of the cases chosen show a struggle to 
determine whether the appellant would be afforded a lesser or significant role. Finally, I do not 
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wish say that personal stories or circumstances are absent in defences, trials, or else. However, 
the life-story of defendants seem to be shaped and translated into the objectives of the relevant 
proceeding. What I mean by this is that, as I was selecting the cases, it became evident how 
appeals to points of law, evidence, or confiscation orders often focused on the interpretation 
DQGDSSOLFDWLRQRID OHJDOUXOHZKHUHWKHDSSHOODQW¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGVWRU\ZDVPDUJLQDO
Thus, I focused on appeals to sentencing rather than appeals on points of law or confiscation 
orders. After applying all the filters in the case selection, I ended up with a total of 59 cases. 
When looking at the numbers below, it is important to remember that some cases included 
more than one appellant. 
Table I. 
Guilty pleas 45 
Contested trial 18 
Unknown or unclear from appeal (not 
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